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Abstract 
 
The present research concerns the global ‘value chain’ of the açaí berry, a Non-
Timber Forest Product (NTFP) derived mainly from the Tocantins Estuary region in 
the State of Pará, Brazil, and which sustains its mostly riverine population. Through 
the adoption of methodologies employed in studies of Global Production Networks 
(GPNs), the study aims to identify how contextual factors have, over time, influenced 
the formation of the chain by actors across geographical scales, how they sustain 
the chain in its current configuration, how they enable or preclude the capture of 
value regionally, and influence development outcomes. Existing research and 
interventions continue to be predicated on locally-based approaches that aim to cut 
out middlemen or otherwise reshape local extraction and processing arrangements, 
without taking into full consideration the ways in which the chain is embedded into 
different social, economic, and cultural contexts across geographic scale, 
conditioning chain formation, value distribution and actor behavior. 
 
The empirical work was carried out in the form of semi-structured interviews, 
supported by secondary data and field observations. Field research sites included 
several locations in the interior of State of Pará, its capital Belem, the States of São 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Southeast Brazil, as well as coastal towns in California, 
USA. From these findings, key policy recommendations are made, which are 
applicable to this specific NTFP chain, but which can be extrapolated to other NTFP 
chains. The research also employs knowledge about consumer cultures, and the 
subjectivities concerning value determination, to investigate the role of consumer 
myths about a product in contributing to its value chain. The conclusion indicates 
that a whole-chain approach, which appreciates in a reflexive fashion the ways in 
which actors negotiate territorial specificities to configure chains, is instrumental in 
the development of efficient, strategic policy programs that aim to improve the 
income of forest communities that exploit NTFPs.  In order to understand, and build 
trade-based development interventions, researchers and practitioners must engage 
with the structures, material and cultural, that encase chain relations across 
geographical scales.  
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Chapter 1. THE AÇAÍ BERRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
OF NTFP GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The present research focuses on the production, processing and marketing of açaí 
berries. These small fruits are borne by the species of palm tree Euterpe oleracea, 
native to the Amazon Basin, and sustain several thousand families in the State of 
Pará, Brazil. A traditional ‘famine food’ of Western Amazonia, the açaí berry has in 
the last few years become fashionable in global markets as a ‘superfood’ – a 
foodstuff with alleged extraordinary benefits to human health. The boom in 
consumption has made this crop the key source of income for most riverine 
populations in the State of Pará. It is estimated that local families can receive 
anything from US$ 1117/year to US$ 3513/year from açaí exploitation (IBGE, 2015). 
The region in one of the poorest in Brazil, though it holds immense potential wealth 
in its forests. Harvesting of the açaí berry has helped realize part of that potential, 
and has reshaped the region’s economics, generating R$ 422 million (Brazilian Real) 
in 2014 (IBGE, 2015). Though this is a small proportion of Brazil's R$ 125 billion 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the açaí berry trade seems to generate wealth at 
the base of the social pyramid, through its inclusion of the Ribeirinho smallholder 
while much of the State’s activity centres on mining and large-scale ranching, which 
concentrate wealth (Brondízio, 2008). 
 
The international açaí market has emerged spontaneously, with minimum 
intervention from governments and development organizations. Overcoming 
logistical and institutional barriers, strong demand for açaí berries and supply- and 
product-development systems made them a global commodity. Understanding how 
and why this has happened could provide important clues for development 
professionals seeking to replicate that success for other produce and/or NTFPs, and 
other commodities. The establishment of the açaí berry’s ‘value chain’ – the various 
activities that are used in a specific industry to deliver a product or service to 
the market whereby additional value or revenue is amassed through the chain 
(Porter, 1985) – has resulted in a substantial, and recognized, improvement in local 
livelihoods, while encouraging forest conservation. It is a rare win-win situation, in a 
region with historically high poverty and deforestation rates. It is also an incredibly 
intricate chain, spanning the tortuous canals of the Tocantins River, to processing 
plants in urban centres, travelling by ship to America, Asia, and Europe, and by truck 
to the South of Brazil. It is then processed into a wide range of products, including 
foodstuffs like sorbets, and even shampoo. 
 
The insertion of such an ‘exotic’ ingredient into global markets is no negligible feat. 
Markets are faddish and difficult to reach, and the global adoption of a novel 
 
 
Page 7 of 249 
 
foodstuff/herbal product ingredient is far from a common occurrence. Development 
organizations have been attempting to market similar products for some time 
(sustainably harvested forest products), with, at best, mixed results (Belcher 2007). 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) such as açaí have long-fascinated 
researchers and economic commodity practitioners alike, because of their potential 
for social and conservation win-wins. They allow local communities to have an 
income while causing minimal deforestation. Yet creating sustainable trade pathways 
that generate sufficient income for communities is a challenge. Many development 
projects and trade partnerships have thus taken shape, in a programmatic context 
that Hall dubs ‘productive conservation’ (Hall, 1997). Such projects aim to find ways 
of harnessing the trade potential created by globalization, by organizing local 
communities, improving harvesting conditions and changing the structure of existing 
value chains, or creating new chains, to allow communities to capture more of the 
revenue that is generated through trade. However, success has been limited. 
Producers continue to strive, but struggle, to get these products to market in an 
equitably beneficial way. In Brazil, NTFPs represent a mere 1% of the total income 
generated by silviculture. Wood extraction still represents the overwhelming majority 
of economic activity in its tropical forests (IBGE, 2015). 
 
Initially NTFP research was very locally centred, and community oriented, but 
recently researchers have been calling for a more-holistic, chain-based approach to 
both investigation and project implementation (Ruiz Pérez 2004, Shackleton 2011, te 
Velde 2006, Marshall 2006, Pokorny 2012). This new perspective follows a trend in 
overall development research and practice. As economies globalize, and production 
webs internationalize and interconnect, it has become essential to understand how 
these products fare beyond the local sphere. It is now widely recognized that 
consequent factors can have a direct impact on local circumstances. Yet very little 
research has been carried out that is multi-sited, and adopts a whole-chain, holistic 
approach. 
 
As countries and regions integrate into globalized economic flows, drivers outside 
nation states condition outcomes for development as much as local contextual 
issues. Scholars speak of an ‘axis’, between a vertical pull of global flows, 
particularly of trade flows, and a horizontal axis, where issues of local governance, 
human capital, logistics, finance and other conditioning factors combine to produce 
determinate development outcomes (Coe and Yeung, 2015). Within this context, the 
study of value chains has proven a valuable tool to reflect the analytical challenges 
posed by globalization, and increasingly so, its discursive biases. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the research 
 
- To investigate how the açaí berry value chain took shape over time, and how 
society determines notions of ‘value’ and creates trade links, 
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- To determine what factors (contextual and intra-chain dynamics) shape the açaí 
berry value chain, and its present configuration across geographic scales, 
 
- To evaluate how value is shaped and distributed in the chain, and with what 
development outcomes, at each scale and at the local community scale.  
 
- To determine what kind of policies could enhance these benefits within the açaí 
berry supply chain, and can be applied to other, similar, chains to increase their 
chances of success (i.e. their ability to remain economically viable in the long term, 
while providing satisfactory development and conservation outcomes).  
 
At present, there are no peer-reviewed examples of such research being carried out, 
spanning the entirety of an international NTFP value chain, from origin to consumer. 
Although some value-chain research has been published, it remains mostly 
local/regional in focus. This study therefore aims to carry out international, multi-sited 
research, to attempt to create a whole-chain view of the açaí business, and 
investigate relations between geographical scales. 
 
The specific case of the açaí berry can provide unique insight into what makes an 
NTFP chain successful for several reasons. It is a newly developed market, and 
therefore it is relatively easy to trace its inception and the factors that helped create 
the current trade scenario. It is also a sufficiently widespread market relying on both 
small- and large-scale activities to provide a representative account of global flows. It 
is essentially still grown as an NTFP, though monoculture efforts are intensifying. In 
essence, the chain is relatively young, and a thorough investigation could provide 
vital information about what can make NTFP interventions successful. 
 
Investigating and identifying the key elements of success of the product is thus a 
potentially beneficial endeavor for those wishing to expand, and replicate it in related 
endeavors. The research tracks the entire chain, from harvesting through processing 
to the market in the Southeast of Brazil, and to the market in the US, most 
specifically, California.  
 
Qualitative interviews were used to identify actors and their roles, and to ascertain 
how these actors have worked to set up the value chain, and in what context. 
Questioning lines included how processing facilities in consuming countries handled 
the commodity, on what terms new products were developed, and what the market 
requirements that direct the consolidation of trade relations are. For example, what 
factors, local or not, enabled actors to negotiate the extremely difficult logistics of 
riverine transport to establish pulp freezing facilities and begin exporting? How have 
the regulatory and social hurdles been overcome and new structures been put in 
place to accommodate trade? How do actors manage to form and sustain global 
trade links? These questions remain unanswered for the açaí berry trade, and are 
mostly neglected in NTFP scholarship in general. 
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There are several analytical and methodological pathways available for conducting 
value-chain research across multiple sites. The most widely employed of these 
methodologies, until recently, was the value-chain paradigm postulated by Gereffi 
(Gereffi 2011), based on the work of Coase (Coase 1937), which uses input-output 
calculations to determine intra-chain governance and explain outcomes, and point to 
possible pro-development alternatives and ‘upgrading’ strategies (ways individual 
actors can reposition in the chain to capture more value). This body of research has 
nonetheless been criticized for its inability to factor in context, thus providing a poor 
account of how the chain is woven into the territorial and social fabric that condition 
its existence (Bair 2008). 
 
To redress these shortcomings to a certain extent, a new concept has emerged, 
entitled ‘Global Production Networks’ (GPNs), which seeks to explore how a value 
chain forms, and functions within its context – its ‘embeddedness’. This approach 
allows for qualitative methods to be used, and for a more nuanced, textured, 
rendition of the chain’s workings to be produced (Coe 2008). Considering that the 
açaí chain spans such a notable diversity of settings across geographical scales, 
GPN thinking was selected as being the most suitable to the current research. The 
notion of ‘embeddedness’, which can be subdivided into societal embeddedness, 
territorial embeddedness and network embeddedness, further allowed an integration 
of the current, highly qualitative, existing literature on developing NTFPs to be 
integrated into the project’s literature review, providing a solid foundation for this 
investigation. The concept of embeddedness and its relation to NTFP chains is 
reviewed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Value-chain scholarship is not without its blind spots. It is marred by a ‘productionist 
view’ of economic activity. Economists are accustomed to examining the economic 
process from resource extraction to consumption, in sequence, and focus on how 
raw materials are transformed into finished goods through labor input. This is how 
value is added, and how the economic cycle functions. In this context, consumption 
is simply the completion of the cycle, and the consumer is passive. The power to 
shape economic relations lies in those who control the capital and exploit the labor, 
constricted as they may be by structural/material factors such as logistics, or policy 
environments (Yeung 2014, Levy 2008). 
 
Yet, increasingly, we move towards a fully-fledged consumer society, where the 
value of goods is often divorced from their use-value, or the sum of the cost of 
inputs. We buy goods based on subjective meanings, and not their intended use. We 
buy brands to express our identity, for example, wearing clothes not just for practical 
reasons but to identify our preferences and status. This viewpoint, starting from 
consumption and looking backwards, remains underexplored in the traditional value-
chain literature (Yeung 2014, Prahalad 2004). 
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In the value chain literature, marketing is considered a key activity, as is design, 
while consumption represented as a passive act. The formation and shaping of 
demand and value in consumer markets thus remains somewhat nebulous. The fact 
that consumers are seldom studied as actors in value-chain models leaves us 
without a key realm of power, and without a meaningful understanding of the 
mechanics of exchange value formation, as has been recognized by the value-chain 
literature itself (Gradin 2016). Criticism has been aimed at the Global Value Chain 
(GVC) and Global Policy Network (GPN) literature for its exclusion of consumer 
perspectives, and lack of reflexivity, as is shown in the following chapter. 
Researchers have begun to embrace these aspects in the value-chain literature, 
bringing in new developments from cultural economy and post-structural thinking 
(Yeung 2004, Levy 2008, Gibbon 2008, Barnes 2001, Bartlet 2003, Booggs 2003, 
Dicken 2002). 
 
In the case of the açaí berry trade, the role of ‘consumer myth’ formation is central. 
The açaí berry is not at all a fungible commodity, such as iron ore, or timber. It is a 
commodity whose worth is controlled by cultural values. It is as a health ‘superfood’, 
with health benefits asserted as a result of its high antioxidant content, that açaí has 
found a place in international markets, particularly in the USA. It has found success 
because of its identity in contemporary health trends. It became a successful 
commodity in the South of Brazil following the rise of jiu- jitsu (a martial arts) 
movement in the late 20th century, and later, where it became part of the local 
surfing culture that then gave it exposure in California in the early 2000s. It has 
become a staple ingredient in juices, smoothies, cereal bars and even cosmetics, for 
example. Although it is estimated that the ‘fashionable’ phase of the product has 
waned, with consumers moving on to other, new, superfood trends, such as 
kombucha, or maca, the market has endured. Pioneer companies, such as 
Sambazon, founded in 2000 in California, have had remarkable sales in the last ten 
years, and continue to grow. The açaí berry has also reached European markets and 
Asian markets, cementing its status as a global superfood. It is crucial to 
understanding of açaí’s success to unravel its appeal, to understand how it was 
developed and how it drives demand, and, in consequence, to understand the value-
chain configuration. 
 
It is important to note that these factors are not unique to the açaí chain. NTFPs are, 
by the nature of their extraction process, niche products. They cannot be easily 
mass-produced within forest scenarios. Understanding how these niches form is thus 
relevant to the broader NTFP literature, in addition to representing an evolution 
within the wider value chain body of literature. Adding this dimension to the analytical 
framework also allows for discussions about conservation, tropical forest community 
identities and products (such as the ‘commodity fetishism’ literature, see below) to be 
incorporated into the literature review, providing another linkage to the existing NTFP 
and development literature from which extrapolations can be made. 
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Though under-theorized in development and value-chain scholarship, consumption 
and the formation of value in our current cultural context is the object of a vast body 
of literature, from commodity fetishism to cultural studies as well as the practical 
knowledge concerning product branding. Researchers have employed many 
methodologies and analytical lenses to understand the rise of globalized consumer 
society, and how this new economic paradigm has reshaped social relations, 
economics, and power structures. It is through this lens that we can begin to grasp 
how, why, and with what outcomes, demand has been generated for the açaí berry, 
and to trace this ‘pull’ back up the chain and examine its impact. There further exists 
a great deal of literature on of alternative consumption, Fairtrade and eco-
consumerism from which to draw on and further strengthen analysis. 
 
To investigate, as far as possible, the ways in which the açaí chain has taken shape, 
two analytical ‘lenses’ are proposed, at opposing ends of the chain. One in accord 
with the traditional productionist paradigm, examining the production of açaí, from 
extraction to consumption, using value-chain methodology. The other is placed at the 
consumerist viewpoint, looking back towards the chain, to investigate the formation 
of ‘value’ and chain configuration in consumer markets. This approach ensures that 
both a ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ analysis can be combined to form a three-
dimensional picture: these two foci together provide a richer, more-contextualized, 
three-dimensional account of the formation of this chain than either of them could do 
individually. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
To explore the formation and configuration of the açaí value chain, the thesis is 
structured as follows: 
 
- Chapters Two and Three present literature reviews, which correlate the literature 
on value chains and NTFPs (Chapter Two), and consumer cultures and value 
formation for NTFPs (Chapter Three); 
 
- Methodology is developed in Chapter 4, to elucidate the how's and whys of 
research design, its advantages and shortcomings; 
 
- Chapter Five focuses on the interior of Pará, Brazil, centering on Ribeirinho 
producers and their way of life, as well as their connection to the chain; 
 
- Chapter Six takes us to Belém do Pará, and investigates the middlemen and 
processors that take the fresh berries, transport them and make them into either 
fresh or frozen pulp; 
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- The açaí industry and consumers in the Southeast of Brazil, where most of the 
production occurs, and where the contemporary ways of consuming açaí originated 
are the topic of Chapter Seven; 
 
- The final fieldwork chapter (Eight) is based on Californian industry and 
consumption, where açaí has made its most relevant international foray, and where 
a vastly different business environment and consumer landscape creates very 
different chain configurations; 
 
- The final chapter provides a summary discussion of the açaí chain, its formation 
and configuration and offers policy recommendations, as well as a discussion of the 
theoretical advances made possible by this work.  
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Chapter 2: ON NTFP VALUE CHAINS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The present chapter aims to relate the existing body of knowledge on value chains to 
the discussions about the trade of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). Although 
the need to rethink the ‘toolkit’ concerning NTFP trade-based development 
interventions has often been recognized in the literature (see below), few advances 
have been made that can elucidate how chains take shape, how value is distributed, 
and what kind of interventions can maximize gains to communities. Juxtaposing 
existing research on NTFPs with the value-chain literature helps to draw out 
preliminary insights that can be further developed in investigative empirical research.  
 
In general, the focus of NTFP research has been at the local level, or regional, at 
best, with few investigations embracing the whole range of activities from local to 
international, which would facilitate inter-scalar analysis. Many of these forest 
products are traded globally, involving different business environments, from raw 
NTFPs to packaged consumer goods. Yet little is recorded about the breadth of 
market and the detailed operations and processes involved, the material 
transformations that reconfigure the products, or the subjective transformations that 
transpose the products for new audiences, beyond the community level. Gaining a 
holistic understanding of the business of NTFPs from a value-chain perspective can 
thus prove quite challenging. There is a general tendency to focus on ‘community-
based’ interventions that do little to elucidate the webs of relations, and institutions 
that bind trade networks and condition value-chain formation. Despite the recent 
adoption of holistic chain terminology, the type of work that is being done remains 
predominantly unchanged (te Velde 2006, Marshall 2006, Pokorny 2012). Although 
te Velde's research adopts fully the Gereffi value chain approach, discussing 
governance and upgrading, for example, his research never moves beyond the local 
scale. There is virtually no data regarding any of the NTFP chain’s functioning, 
contextual or otherwise, past the local level’. In the first section of this chapter, the 
history of NTFP interventions is explained, and how those interventions came to be 
implemented, from this local perspective. 
 
In the following sections, the range of new analytical tools are examined, particularly 
Global Production Network (GPN) theory to show how they can provide new insight 
into research, analyse outcomes and in formulating policy recommendations for 
NTFPs. The factors that condition formation and maintenance of chains across 
scales are identified, and how they can be made to secure long-term income 
improvements to forest peoples are considered. This can be used to establish to 
what extent chain configurations and ‘value capture’ are conditioned by intra-chain 
dynamics or the contextual issues that surround the chain (‘embeddedness’). A 
further discussion is provided about how the productionist bias in value-chain 
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research can be overcome to incorporate the important lessons of cultural economy, 
to examine more critically certain pillars of value chain research, including the 
formation of value. 
 
2.2 NTFP development interventions in context 
 
For decades, forest development and forest conservation remained separate 
activities, and were often analysed in conflicting discourses, dominated by Western 
actors (Bakker, 2010). However, with the easing of the ‘Cold War’ (a period where 
there was hostility between the Soviet bloc countries and the Western powers 
between the Second World War and 1990) and the unfettered rise of neoliberal 
ideologies, as well as the rise of social movements throughout the developing world, 
a new discourse on conservation emerged. Local activists such as Chico Mendes 
(1944–1988), a Brazilian rubber tapper, whose livelihood was endangered by 
mainstream development, joined up with conservation groups to fight deforestation, 
gaining substantial media attentions (Hall, 2007). The World became more aware of 
the existence of subsistence forest peoples, after ignoring local resistance from local 
populations to the restrictive, punitive ‘fines and fences’ paradigms of conservation 
for decades (Brown and Rosendo, 2000). Conservation had very much been an 
exercise in policing, keeping people out of conserved areas, and imposing fines for 
trespassing - very much in line with colonial and post-colonial governance mind-sets. 
In this new configuration, conservation groups assumed the position of benevolent 
protectors of forest people, seeking to empower them, while gaining even greater 
perceived legitimacy for their agenda. These people were amongst the World’s 
poorest, and the imagery portraying their pure, holistic and ancestral ways of life 
were a powerful marketing draw. 
  
The need to simultaneously conserve forests and protect indigenous ways of life was 
a cornerstone of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in 
Stockholm in 19721. The poverty-deforestation link was further explored in the World 
Conservation Strategy of the IUCN2, a softening of the ‘fines and fences’ approach. 
There was growing consensus on the need to ensure that benefits from conservation 
would accrue to local communities, as set out in the Bali Action Plan, an outcome of 
the 3rd World Parks Congress in 19823. The publication in 1989, by the COICA, a 
group of indigenous organizations from the Amazon, of Two Agendas on Amazon 
Development4, was a breakthrough in exposing the incongruences between the 
development and conservation agenda for the region (Arts and Buizer, 2009). The 
Integrated Conservation and Development project (ICDP) sought to replace the 
‘fines and fences’ approach (Belcher, 2005; Barretto Filho, 2009, de Jong 2012). 
 
																																																						
1https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milestones/humanenvironment		
2	https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/WCS-004.pdf	
3	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02240060	
4	https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/two-agendas-amazon-development	
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Hutton et al. (2005) identified four main reasons for the rapid adoption of this new 
discourse. First, it built a link to the concept of ‘sustainable development’ as set out 
in the highly influential Brundtland Report5. Second, it embodied the rediscovery of 
community- and grassroots-action as a counterpoint to state-led initiatives. Third, the 
discourses spilling over from the development arena of decentralization were easily 
packaged into this new breed of conservation project. Finally, the ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ of the Washington Consensus, with its market-based, neoliberal aesthetic, 
was perfectly suited to this non-state based approach (Hutton et al., 2005; Arts and 
Buizer, 2009). This policy thinking was in direct opposition to that previously 
promoted, in that it emphasized market-driven solutions as opposed to central 
planning and state-led initiatives. It also encouraged the dismantling and 
streamlining of State bureaucracy, and thus led to the devolution of several activities 
to local governments. New ways of managing sustainable forestry, which were 
decentralized and marked-based rather than centrally planned and state-led, were 
needed (Arce, 2003; Asher and Ojeda, 2009). Hall dubbed this new mode of 
conservation as ‘productive conservation’ (Hall, 1997, 2006). Communities gained 
some social benefits, and mostly acquiesced, to access much-needed funds (Hajjar 
et al., 2011; Le Tourneau and Kohler, 2011). 
 
This new policy package often included creating cooperatives and associations to 
market products in ways that diminished transaction costs and enabled scaling of 
production, while propagating, in local communities, a conservation discourse that 
matched that of donors. ‘Value’ is created at community level by taking it from self-
interested middlemen and the rebuilding of trade links directly with ‘fairer’ markets. 
New rules were put in place to enable participatory decision-making and conflict 
resolution, such as community-based resource management. Much effort was put 
into training and building infrastructure to enable participation in markets. 
Communities were encouraged to participate in the demarcation and sustainable 
exploitation of their natural resources, in the hopes that their increased involvement 
would stimulate them to protect their forests, as well as provide additional income 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Belcher, 2005). 
 
Within this context, the commercialization of NTFPs became a top priority. It was a 
natural ‘win-win’ situation, allowing forests to remain standing while providing income 
for local communities (Arnold and Pérez, 2001; Belcher 2005; Belcher et al., 2005; 
Charnley and Poe, 2007; de Jong, 2012). It was the ‘Rainforest Crunch’ paradigm6, 
which sought to harness the benefits of global capitalism, decentralization and 
neoliberalism in favour of conservation and development. New product lines were 
developed for Western markets using NTFPs gathered by forest communities in the 
developing world. Forest people and conservation were a key draw for their 
																																																						
5		World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development,	1987,	"Report	of	the	World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development:	Our	
Common	Future"	
6	Named	after	the	Ben	and	Jerry's	ice	cream	flavour,	aimed	at	building	incomes	and	raising	awareness	of	forest	livelihoods,	using	Brazil	
nuts	that	were	ethically	sourced,	and	launched	(and	pulled	from	shelves)	in	1988	
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marketing, and new trade relations were set up with communities to ensure supply. 
Marketing was often based on documentary-style images of poverty, primitivism, and 
wilderness, and the innocence and purity of forest peoples (Anthias and Radcliffe, 
2013). How this type of image formation and marketing strategy served to value or 
devalue products, and the validity of uprooting local trade relations, were glossed 
over (as further discussed in Chapter 3). The general discourse was that of cutting 
out the middleman and building direct links with ‘the market’, in an amorphous way 
that transcended the local scale (Asher and Ojeda, 2009). 
 
The overwhelming majority of projects aimed at improving the commercialization of 
NTFPs thus acts by substituting the existing web of traders that linked producers and 
consumers by a new, improved and ‘fairer’ extraction and trading system which 
would balance power and improve the terms of trade of communities. The discourse 
is that of a new trade paradigm for specific commodities in contract to mainstream 
trade relations. The assumption here is that development is the product of improved 
conditions at the base level, and that poverty is entirely the result of local 
disorganization and exploitation. Value formation is portrayed as a local zero-sum 
game, with local traders depriving revenue or other benefits to local communities 
(Neumann 2000). There is no discussion of how the community scale interacts with 
other, broader, scales, of how value is formed and distributed between them beyond 
the community level. There is seldom any discussion of demand formation.  
 
Very few of these earlier initiatives have survived. Once donor support was 
withdrawn, these interventions tended to fail in their objectives (Herrero-Jáuregui et 
al., 2011; Belcher, 2012). Researchers have published a series of reviews and 
critical pieces, calling for a ‘reality check’, and a re-examination of the factors that 
can lead to success (Marshall et. al., 2006; Belcher, 2007). In fact, the relationship 
between communities and markets is more complex than these discourses, or this 
new development agenda, allow (Peluso and Alexiades, 2005; Charnley and Poe, 
2007, Vaccaro et al., 2009). While the majority of case studies usually focuses on 
‘exotic’ isolated communities, the reality is that forest peoples are increasingly 
becoming integrated into mainstream cultural and social lifestyles and ideologies 
(Peluso and Alexiades, 2005; Hall 2007; Barretto Filho, 2009; Cocks et al., 2011). 
The tinkering with local trade dynamics, cutting out pre-existing trade ties, and 
changing the organization of local livelihoods, is not necessarily beneficial to 
communities. Despite best efforts to include communities in this new ‘participatory 
paradigm’, somehow the fundamentally ‘othering’ epistemic violence that initially 
shaped development and conservation discourses remain in place, producing 
myopic, biased analysis and interventions (Cooke 2001, Anthias 2013, Arce 2003, 
Arts 2009, Bakker 2010, Burke 2012, Fitter 2009, Le Tourneau 2010, Schakelton 
2011). 
 
These discourses, reproduced in the reports, policy frameworks and marketing 
strategies of these NTFP initiatives and development projects have direct impact on 
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the livelihoods of forest communities. In the case of AmazonCoop and the Body 
Shop, for example, Burke (2010) concludes that their discourse on the failure by the 
Brazilian government to protect the poor and victimized indigenous communities is 
the cornerstone of their branding strategy. This leads to interventions at the local 
level that are mistrustful of governments, and which establish program priorities that 
often have little to do with local realities (such as, in this case, the setting up of 
cooperatives, but also of a local green pharmacy based on indigenous knowledge), 
and that are more relatable to consumers than useful to producers. The interventions 
do little to improve local livelihoods, and are often short-lived. Burke does not find the 
outcome of these projects particularly productive for local communities in the long 
term (Burke, 2010, 2012). What much of the ‘Rainforest Crunch’ type of interventions 
thus end up promoting are local-only interventions that force outside ideas into the 
community life, rather than embracing activities that effectively make sense to local 
people and their context. Little is done to investigate that context, or the role played 
by intermediaries, local institutions and actors across scales in shaping value and 
sustaining trade. The most-effective changes are those initiated locally which offer 
maximum ‘bottom up’ benefits for communities. The top-down creation of new trade 
pathways that are not culturally significant to local actors, and do not effectively 
contemplate the vicissitudes of trade, has in general produced unstable interventions 
with questionable benefits to communities in the long term (Neumann 2000, te Velde 
2006, Belcher 2005). 
 
More recently, the general upswing in interest in value chains in overall development 
has reached NTFPs, and produced new studies and interventions (Jensen 2009; te 
Velde 2006). NTFP value chains have also been discussed in the academic 
literature, and in reviews and papers on commercialization, though not necessarily 
employing value-chain terminology. The adoption of value-chain jargon does not 
often, however, question underlying assumptions about trade and development. The 
type of intervention undertaken by agencies has also remained mostly identical. The 
focus is still local, and the discursive biases and the accompanying tools remain 
mostly unchanged. Despite the presence of a large number of international value 
chains under analysis in the literature, there is seldom any inclusion of non-local 
actors in the studies. In analysing value chains, the localizing ‘myopia’ is highly 
problematic. Often, the national business environment itself is not contemplated. 
Therefore, it is hard to truly trust the totality of findings of much of the literature that 
claims to conduct value-chain analysis, as a large segment of the chain is typically 
ignored, and with it considerations of the origin of a large amount of the value 
(Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007). This significantly limits the scope of such 
analysis.  
 
The newer literature on NTFP commercialization, however, can provide a wealth of 
information on local links in value chains, offering insights into out some key issues 
in the field. The mere existence of these studies represents a paradigm shift, 
whereby intermediaries are no longer viewed as mere exploiters of local 
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communities, but are now construed as valuable links, providing important services 
such as access to market, quality control, credit, amongst others. Most notably, the 
work conducted in Mexico and Bolivia by a group of researchers, who traced 16 
value chains, analysed factors that influenced success (Marshall et al., 2006), 
providing a uniquely solid and comprehensive overview of how these chains operate, 
and what roles each actor plays. In addition to a core paper, describing each chain, 
te Velde et al. specifically apply the Gereffi methodology regarding governance and 
upgrading (te Velde et al., 2006).  
 
Often, the tools of value-chain analysis can be used to draw out important findings 
from the wider NTFP literature as well, pertaining to the key issues investigated here: 
value formation and distribution, development outcomes and policy 
recommendations. However, these studies often describe extant chains, and do little 
to investigate how they were formed, how demand sustains them, and what 
development outcomes they can achieve beyond the community level. The interplay 
between agent within the chain and the wider geopolitical context, or business 
environments that surround trade, are undertheorized. The cultural story around 
value creation is not represented, although is a shortcoming of value-chain studies in 
general.  
 
 
2.3 Value-chain thinking applied to NTFPs: how chains form and how 
value is distributed  
 
 
World Systems Theory 
 
Structural inequalities in trade are at the heart of the writing of World System 
theorists Hopkins and Wallerstein, who coined the concept of ‘commodity chain’ in 
1977 to shed light on how economic processes have drawn wealth from the 
periphery of the World economy to its core of privileged nations throughout history. 
This marked a departure from previous analytical models, which took the nation state 
and its expansion towards global foreign trade as their locus of investigation 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977; Bair, 2005). The purpose of these studies was to 
illustrate how a ‘network of labour and production processes whose result is a 
finished commodity’ reproduces patterns of historical, structural inequality in the 
world economy, particularly from the 16th century (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977). 
 
World Systems Theorists (World System Theory, WST), tracing the transformation 
and circulation of goods across scales, provide a picture of how the social 
reproduction of labour in a capitalist system embodies an unequal distribution of 
power and engenders structural poverty in the developing world, the ‘core-periphery 
drag’ (Wallerstein 1974). The analytical lens here focuses on the entire, macro, 
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‘World System’, rather than the development of a particular nation or group (Bair, 
2005). Power relations are perceived to be set structurally, in a similar way to 
Dependency Theory (Ferraro 2008). The means of production is set out by the still 
hegemonic post-colonial west, and force wealth to be dragged from the resource-
intense Global South to their core. This overarching view about the structural 
inequality of the global economic system is often reflected in the development 
literature, particularly in the critical analysis of scholars such as Escobar (2011), and 
throughout this research there are certainly encounter echoes of this ‘modernized 
colonial system of production’ in place, and shaping chain outcomes. We see value 
formation here as rigid, a result of historical colonial relations, with a strong 
predominance of structure over agency. In existing NTFP value chains, value is 
mostly captured very far away from communities at the base of the chain, essentially 
in the end markets of the developed World. This is precisely the type of structural 
inequality that many NTFP chain interventions have sought to address by forming 
new market links.  
 
The Gereffi approach -  Value Chain Analysis 
 
Meanwhile, Gereffi in the 1990s, adapted this approach, narrowing the focus of his 
analytical lens to a ‘meso-level’, by separating the two notions: the transformation 
and circulation of goods and the underlying structures – effectively separating 
agency from structure. This new approach first appeared in 1994, in a chapter of 
Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, which set out the bases of a new 
framework entitled ‘Global Commodity Chains’ (Gereffi, 1994). In his methodology, 
Gereffi no longer sought to shed light on the structural inequalities which reproduce 
hegemonic power structures in global capitalism, but to analyse specific ‘value 
chains’ to see how producers at the bottom can capture more value by reshaping 
their terms of inclusion through ‘upgrading’. Instead of looking at the whole, ‘macro’ 
picture, a ‘meso’ analysis is undertaken: a specific strand of trade within a 
particularly industry, from extraction to final transformation. The underlying 
assumption here is not only that integration into a globalized, capitalist mode of 
production is a good thing, but that benefits can be maximized by a strategic, ‘whole 
chain’ approach that seeks to attach producers at the bottom of the chain to the most 
auspicious ‘lead firms’ in a determinate industry. It is not only a shift in the scale of 
analysis, but in perspective. Value chains can be reworked to harness development 
benefits if policies are put in place to retain value at specific production sites/regions. 
In a way, it is a meso-level representation of the traditional, one-way forward, 
modernizing vision of development. 
  
Preoccupations with structural inequalities in the world economy are thus somewhat 
put aside in Gereffi’s approach. The step-by-step labour division and material 
transformation of commodities is dissociated from their social and historical context. 
The object of study for Gereffi is defined as a single global industry and how it is 
organized: how value is created and distributed amongst the actors that make up the 
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chain, and what that reveals about its internal power dynamics. The formation and 
distribution of value along the chain is taken as a given, objectively, based on 
transaction-cost economics and the rationality of market behaviour. This line of 
research is influenced by the business literature and firmly based on the transaction 
cost economic theories of Robert Coase (1937). According to Coase, firms organize 
themselves into hierarchical patterns when the transaction costs of switching trading 
partners exceed the opportunity to garner the lower price or best conditions available 
in free market forms. This is heavily liberal in its ideological foundations, seeing 
rational, rent-seeking economic behaviour as the fundamental raison d’être of 
existing trade configurations between firms (Coase, 1937). 
 
It is also important to stress that Gereffi views inclusion in global commodity chains 
as an unequivocal driver of development, therefore placing himself both in the free 
trade, and in the development bandwagon. These underlying ideological biases are 
not without consequences. Gereffi believes that regions can change their prospects, 
and improve their standing in the global economy if they correctly analyse the trade 
scenario, and seek the competitive advantages that will allow them to trade with the 
most-rewarding partners. There is no space for conflict, or for contestation of the 
existing system. Inclusion into global trade pathways is viewed as inherently a good 
thing, and it is to be obtained by conforming to the right criteria to make the best of 
an inexorable globalized economic thrust. 
  
For Gereffi (1994), the ability for a certain firm to ‘upgrade’, that is, to move up the 
value-added ladder and capture more value, is directly related to the governance 
pattern within the chain (Hess, 2008). While WST provides a static portrayal of trade, 
Global Value Chains (GVC) provide some leeway for movement of actors. However, 
to do so, all information on context is sacrificed, in favour of intra-chain dynamics, 
described within the governance frameworks. For GVC researchers, upgrading is the 
‘holy grail’ of globalization. By increasing or changing their share of the production 
process, firms can increase their share of overall value added, and thus generate 
local development. Different input-output structures, governance and institutional 
structures will influence the ways in which firms can upgrade to capture more 
benefits from trade. 
 
There are few studies that effectively apply Gereffi's framework to NTFP trading, yet 
some analysis can be undertake of that literature based on the criteria set out by the 
former. Regarding governance, many of the existing value-chain studies on NTFPs, 
researchers tend to find that short chains, with localized markets, tend to be supply 
driven, while more complex, and spatially stretched chains, tend to be demand-
driven. This confirms the findings of Gereffi, regarding factors that influence the 
governance of value chains across scales. The communities’ inability to switch 
trading partners or access markets directly restricts their ability to make decisions. te 
Velde’s study, which is specifically focused on Gereffi's methodology, further 
cements this understanding (te Velde et al., 2006). Squeezing communities in this 
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way ends up putting them in poor negotiating positions, and unable to capture value, 
which ends up being concentrated, at the local level, in the hands of middlemen. 
 
Traditionally, particularly in the Amazon Basin, the relationship between extracting 
communities and middlemen has been described as a patron-client relationship, but 
where buyers (middlemen) exert great control over extractivists and keep them from 
receiving the fair value for their goods (Hall 1997). The distance from markets, and 
the reliance of communities on these traders for accessing essential goods and 
credit (‘aviamento’) makes for exceedingly unequal relations. Many studies that 
examine NTFP trade have observed this dominance of traders over communities, 
detailing how they collude to exploit extractors and take the lion’s share of profit. 
Often, extractivists are kept in perpetual debt, and never gather enough capital to, for 
example, buy a boat and escape the dominance of traders (Padoch, 1992; Sizer, 
1993; Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). From these accounts, we learn that governance 
patterns of longer value chains as captive, where extractivist communities are tied 
into existing trade networks. They have little opportunity to switch trading partners, 
due to their physical distance to market, lack of financial resources and market 
information. This situation can make upgrading very difficult, and many reports claim 
this powerlessness perpetuates the poverty cycles that have often been observed in 
NTFP trade  (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000; te Velde et al., 2006). 
 
However, te Velde et al. (2006) find that, often, in captive chains, strong lead local 
entrepreneurs have the power to organize the chain and stabilize supply, finding new 
trading connections that benefit communities. Without any space within Gerefffi's 
(1994) framework for exploring other contextual factors, such as distance from 
markets, the notion of captivity of relations between actors does not provide a 
convincing account of how actors form or maintain these chains. It has nothing to 
adhere to, in a sense. In this way, governance of the value chain is not in itself a 
determinant of development outcomes. te Velde et al. conclude that by recognizing 
that the vision of two-way power proposed by Gereffi in his governance framework is 
insufficient to analyse power relations and their relation to chain formation. The 
ability of local actors to organize trade relations in challenging environment is central 
to the formation of new trade links and to maintaining them over time with sufficient 
efficiency to meet market needs. Although classifying governance types and 
upgrading strategies is possible, it cannot reconcile these into a convincing matrix to 
determine development outcomes. The governance framework only analyses 
relations between two points, both necessarily within the chain, whereas chains are 
polymorphous entities, spread across scales. Local actors who may dominate the 
chain are themselves constricted by their own conditions, material and discursive, 
and subject to power structures that they must also submit to with other chain and 
non-chain actors. 
 
As Hospes and Clancy (2011) point out in a chapter of the book entitled Unpacking 
the Discourse on Social Inclusion in Value Chains, the Gereffi framework 
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undervalues existing entrenched power relations and their potential to impact 
inclusion and distort the distribution of benefits. To redress this imbalance, they 
advocate a deeper investigation of the relationship of chain actors with non-chain 
actors who, despite not directly handling the product, have a profound impact on how 
value is distributed. In addition, at any specific point in the value chain, it is important 
to question why certain actors are included, and how, and why others are not. The 
choice for inclusion can be no choice at all, since political and social coercion can 
take many forms. The outcomes of inclusion must also be understood in the context 
of wider livelihoods strategies, monetary and otherwise, that make up the life of 
actors (Hospes and Clancy, 2011). For example, in NTFP chains, the relation of 
‘captivity’ with a middleman can represent a way to free one's self from crushing 
relations of patronage with local land barons – as is the case of the açaí chain, as 
described below. 
 
Additionally, the governance approach allows only for a discussion of power relation 
between two points, whereas chains are made up of a multitude of actors, at 
different scales, forming a ‘rhizome’ of forces (Hess, 2004). The study conducted by 
Landstrasse and Lindner (2009) details and compares three international NTFP 
chains/pathways for the same product, shea, and highlights the power of industrial 
buyers and processors in consumer markets, who ultimately dictate the terms that 
national actors implement locally. That is, the constraints that are felt by collectors 
mirror the market constraints faced by national traders, who do not necessarily set 
the terms, but mostly translate and adapt them to meet their clients’ needs 
(Landstrasse and Lindner, 2009). A recent study in the bay leaf value chain in Nepal 
also locates the key power player outside national borders, with power to influence 
terms of trade higher up the chain as well as with communities of the producers 
(Choudhary et al., 2014). 
 
The transaction-cost, rationalistic approach also overlooks much of the subjective 
behaviour that underlies commercial ties, and the choices of individual actors over 
inclusion. For Gereffi and the wider GVC research community, people/firms choose 
trade configurations objectively, based on cost and financial advantage alone. This 
does very little to explain how certain relations are analysed by others, and how they 
remain throughout time. For example, in perfect free-market conditions, one could 
easily switch supplier constantly, based on price alone. This is seldom the case: 
relationships endure, and determine economic outcomes. The relationships that 
Ribeirinhos form with middlemen are particularly telling in this respect. 
 
In NTFPS, ‘captivity’ of the value chain, does not, on its own, explain the weight of 
middlemen in networks, as has been observed in the case study involving Natura 
and Brazil nut extracting communities (Le Tourneau 2010). Despite the negotiation 
of a contract paying higher prices for the oil that a new production facility, 
communities slowly abandoned the arrangement and went back to trading with their 
traditional intermediaries. Not only do middlemen provide essential services such as 
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credit and quality control, they ensure that relations run smoothly, both with 
communities and with urban buyers as brokers. They also organize the logistics and 
transport, develop marketing channels, and take significant risks. For example, if 
there is a loss, for example if a boat capsizes on the way to the market, the cost is 
borne solely by the intermediary. They also absorb price fluctuations, and can often 
trade at a loss when markets are fickle (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). They negotiate 
the chain environment to make trade possible, in ways that narrowly focussed 
analyses have often failed to capture. 
 
The focus on transaction costs and micro-relations within the GVC literature leaves 
many questions unanswered. Perhaps the most important, yet overlooked, factor is 
the underlying structural patterns that enable these key activities to remain in the 
hands of the very few, with the conclusion that power lies with the same set of actors 
time after time, but the underlying causes – the structures – remain outside the area 
of analysis, outside the ‘picture’. As we see so clearly in the NTFP literature, despite 
best efforts at reconfiguring the chain, poverty and exclusion persists. Ultimately, 
what remains unclear when we move from the structural, fixed approach of World 
System Theories into GVCs is how much space there actually exists for actors to 
reconfigure structure, under what conditions, and with what development outcomes 
(Bair 2005; Bolwig et al., 2010). What is needed is a way to include context that 
contemplates fixed structures, while allowing space for individual agents to 
renegotiate their environment, and even affect structural relations. 
 
Bolwig et al. (2008, 2010) seek to refocus the analysis in GVC studies, to include a 
more lateral dimension, that pays more attention to gender, poverty and 
environmental considerations about the chain, especially at the bottom (primary 
supply) end, where poverty is most often to be found (Bolwig et al., 2008; Riisgaard 
et al., 2010). Helmsing and Vellema (2011) investigated the relationship between 
value chains, social inclusion and economic development. The book reviews the 
concept of inclusion, often taken as a good thing per se, and discusses in more 
depth the terms of inclusion of specific groups into value chains. This approach 
seeks to build a more nuanced view, with various possible permutations for the way 
in which people participate in value chains (Helmsing and Vellema, 2011). 
 
 
The concept of embeddedness – bringing context into value chain research 
 
The concept of ‘embeddedness’ returns context to the forefront of value-chain 
scholarship, allowing researchers to better discuss the ways inclusion into value 
chains, and combines with place-centric institutional contextual issues. It was 
developed by Granovetter (1973)7, in counterpoint to this transaction-cost, 
																																																						
7	When	economists	broke	the	traditional	barrier	between	the	disciplines,	set	out	by	the	Parsons	Agreement,	sociologists	began	themselves	
to	venture	into	fields	traditionally	unexplored	by	sociologists,	providing	new,	empirically	rich	studies	in	fields	traditionally	relegated	to	
pure	economic	analysis	(Velthuis	1999).	
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rationalistic economic-behaviour models; in provoked a rebirth of economic 
sociology, into what is now termed ‘the new economic sociology’  (Smelser and 
Swedberg, 2005). Granovetter’s work on embeddedness has heavily influenced 
more recent work on value chains, such as the work of Hospes and Clancy (2011), 
Hess (2004), Coe (2012), and many others who seek a more-integrated, horizontal 
representation of value chains. His work came as a direct counterargument to 
Coase’s (1937) transaction-cost based analysis of organizational patterns. 
Granovetter criticized the ‘under-socialized’ conception of human action promoted by 
neoliberal economics (Hess, 2004). He developed the ideas put forward by Polanyi, 
who first made use of the term ‘embeddedness’ in an article in 1944, in which he 
postulated that “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social 
relations are embedded in the economic system”. Though this dichotomy – between 
embedded non-market societies and dis-embedded market societies – is somewhat 
crude, the introduction of the concept of ‘embeddedness’ has been deeply influential. 
In latter texts, he acknowledges that market societies are embedded in social 
relations, to varying degrees, and that the economic and social realm mutually 
construct each other. He proposes a vision of the market as socially constructed, 
rather than natural and subject to universal laws like the physical world (Polanyi, 
1944).  
 
Granovetter takes the concept of embeddedness forward in his work, particularly in 
his 1985 article Economic Action and Economic Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. For the author, the extent to which opportunism drives economic 
behaviour is variable and determined, at least in part, by the extent to which 
economic relations become ‘overlaid with social content that carries strong 
expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism’ (Granovetter, 1985, p. 490). 
He does not altogether discard a rational, rent-seeking, opportunistic aspect of 
human behaviour, but contends that social content also shapes and constrains 
behaviour. 
 
The ‘social content’ here is made up of a network of personal relationships, rather 
than the rigid social structure depicted by World System Theorists, for example. 
Based on any ‘cognitive marker around which actors may construct trust relations at 
higher intensity than with those outside the category’  (Granovetter, 1985; Bair, 
2008), actors tend to build lasting trading relationships with those with whom some 
sort of perceived kinship permits the formation of trust. Actors thus articulate links of 
existing social capital to build relations based on trust, and knowledge sharing, to 
form economic relationships. This implies a notion of power relations that is more 
diffuse and collaborative than the ‘control’ paradigm of GVC or the structural 
determinism of World Systems Theory. These findings have led to the development 
of a great deal of research, which seeks to trace economic activity in relation to 
networks of social ties. In his research in the New York garment trade, for example, 
Uzzi (1997) describes how bonds of trust substitute official monitoring protocols and 
contractual ties to produce a governance structure that is relational and heuristic. In 
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an ethnographic analysis of 23 firms, Uzzi found that existing social ties condition 
economic outcomes to a great extent. The build-up of trust between trading partners 
was fundamental to the functioning of the trade network, in the absence of 
monitoring mechanisms (Uzzi, 1997). 
 
The work of Burt on social capital also builds on that of Granovetter (1973), and has 
also had great influence on value chain scholarship (Burt, 2001). He defines social 
capital as ‘the contextual complement to human capital. The social capital metaphor 
is that the people who do better are somehow better connected’ (Burt, 2001, p.201). 
He then extrapolates from this core concept a networked theory of social capital, to 
understand how certain individual actors can navigate the social structures in which 
they are embedded to seek advantages, based on brokerage opportunities (Harriss 
and De Renzio, 1997; Lin, 1999; Borgatti and Li, 2009; Burt, 2009). 
 
To develop his theory, Burt expands on the on the work of Granovetter (1973) and 
Freeman (2000) on the strength of weak ties, and Cook and Emerson (1978) on the 
benefits of having exchange partners. He also relies on, and critiques, the work of 
Coleman (1988) on closed networks as indicative of social capital. He distinguishes 
between weak and strong ties, and plots them in diagrams to evaluate their ability to 
seek advantages in markets. Close ties are characterised by strong bonds of trust, 
and high levels of information exchange. Cohesive contacts  (those with close ties) in 
closed networks are thus likely to share the same information, which stabilizes 
relations through bonds of trust and shared meanings  (and friends and 
acquaintances). This underlying, shared social fabric serves as a monitoring 
mechanism that builds trust, as their wider social group is constantly watchful of their 
interactions. This is exemplified quite well by the work of Uzzi (1997). However, the 
closeness of the social group’s ties also makes them redundant as sources of new 
knowledge. They all share the same world, and information travels quickly within the 
network itself, leading to homogeneity amongst actors. This is very much the case 
within forest communities, for example, which live in relative isolation, but who share 
close bonds, and often blood lines, and where these bonds condition behaviour 
within the community. These relations underpin very specific chain configurations, 
and their disruption can often have unexpected effects on the chain, and the 
underlying social fibre upon which they rest.  
  
On the other hand, actors who can broker between closed networks, across 
‘structural holes’ have near monopoly on access to relevant information, and 
therefore gain significant advantages in trade. When actors can operate across 
unconnected networks, they gain unique opportunity to innovate, to build new trade 
links, and thus increase their social standing (Borgatti and Li, 2009). This type of 
advantage can be empirically observed many times in the advantages gained by 
middlemen in trade relations. In a study in the Ethiopian grain market conducted by 
the International Food and Policy Research Institute (http://www.ifpri.org/), for 
example, brokers were observed to have similar endowments of ‘in-born’ social 
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capital  (family and friends in the trade, the nepotistic ‘closed network’), they had 
considerably more ‘acquired’ social capital, that is, they had five times as many long-
distance trading partners (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). Here, the type of bond that best 
describes middlemen is well-displayed, where several communities and their local 
middlemen are bonded, while also being able to bridge across to urban centres and 
build lasting business relationships with buyers. The ‘embeddedness’ concept, as 
proposed by Granovetter (1973) and adopted by scholars such as Burt (2001), is 
nonetheless highly skewed towards individual actors, and ignores the ties between 
firms, for example. The ways in which scales intersect can be under-contextualised. 
 
The new economic sociology approach has thus come under criticism for its overly 
localized and ‘micro’ understanding of trade, to the detriment of wider, international 
processes. Although, a priori, there is no specific scale at which these process can 
be observed, the focus on individual agency and social structure has led to what 
Hess has conceptualized as an ‘overterrritorialised’ conception of embeddedness 
(Hess, 2004). This view also provides an overly smooth and cosy description of 
relations between actors, and of the market itself, devoid of any political contestation. 
While the social relations that underpin the market are examined, the market and its 
construction itself are mostly ignored. The narrow, ‘micro’, focus on the behaviour of 
individual agency disregards much of the discussion of the underlying structural 
issues as manifest in discursive constructs that condition specific social relations. 
  
The concept of embeddedness has nonetheless had a tangible influence on new 
thinking on value chains. It enables us to see how existing structures constrict 
agency (for example social bonds or territorial issues such as the business 
environment), but also how actors can work to navigate, and often reconfigure 
certain, if not all structures. This concept has thus gained popularity with scholars 
who use the business-systems approach, and economic geography (Hess, 2004). 
Each genre of literature has sought to articulate how different typologies of actors 
(firms, individuals, networks, or ‘the economy’) interact with different contexts (social 
and cultural structures, networks of social relations, time, space, etc.). In an attempt 
to collate these valuable contributions, GPN scholars have adopted and developed 
the concept of embeddedness to help analyse the ways in which actors interact with 
and reconstruct social structures over time, adding a layer of social content to input-
output representations of value chains. They seek to reinsert not only social 
relations, but also place-centric contextual factors into the analysis of value chains, 
to better explore development outcomes. They re-plot a horizontal axis that is deeply 
tied to local circumstances, against which the vertical ‘pull’ of value chains is 
analysed. In seeking to recapture clarity in the conceptualization of embeddedness, 
and to instrumentalise its application to empirical research, Hess (2004) has 
redefined the concept, particularly as regards its uses for economic geography, in his 
formulation of the bases of the Global production network school of thought  (Coe et 
al., 2004; Coe, 2012). 
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The relational turn – networks 
 
This notion is central to what has been dubbed the relational turn. In Hess’ words: 
(2004, p.176) 
 
‘Globalization, then, is obviously not a process of disembedding based on mere 
market transactions and impersonal trust, but rather a process of transnational (and 
thereby translocal) network building or embedding, creating and maintaining 
personal relationships of trust at various, interrelated geographical scales.’   
 
Rather than surrender to strict structuralist depictions of economic behaviour such as 
WST, or the highly actor-centred conception of the new economic sociology, 
relational-turn scholars seek to unravel the ways in which individual agency is 
constrained or enabled by local structures, and, most importantly, the way in which 
reiterated agency in chain relations reshapes those structures (Bathelt and Glückler, 
2003). In this way, institutions mediate between the micro level of individual agency 
and the macro, structural, level. Notions of power based on control and opportunity 
costs have been challenged in favour of networked representations. This 
conceptualization as ‘network’ rather than chain provides a key ontological re-
examination of the relation between agency and structure in trade relations (Dicken 
et al., 2001, 2002; Boggs and Rantisi, 2003). This new approach references 
structure against agency debates, which predominate in the work of Giddens (1984), 
with structuration theory, and John Law, amongst others, with his actor-network 
proposition (Law 2008). The challenge, as with much of that literature, is to find a 
balance point, where the existence of social structures (‘rules or resources’) is 
recognized, if not entirely defined, while also recognizing a role for its reconfiguration 
by agents. It rests on a notion of dynamic interplay between these poles – the 
diachronic relationship, as Giddens postulates (Bailey, 1994). 
 
The GPN line of research thus reimagines chain relations no longer as stiff, and 
control-based, but rather as flexible and networked. Production networks are no 
longer portrayed as hierarchical strands of trade, but rather ‘economic processes 
conceptualized in terms of a complex circuitry with a multiplicity of linkages and 
feedback loops’ (Giddens, 1984; Hudson, 2004; Coe et al., 2008; Latour, 2005). 
Researchers do not seek to see how one actor controls another (binary – such as 
the governance theory of Gereffi, 1994), but how power is spread and articulated 
throughout the networks, in a more-diffuse and complex fashion. This includes non-
chain actors, such as governments, local institutions and even underlying social ties. 
The term ‘network’, which is relational, substitutes ‘chains’, deemed overly linear, 
while ‘production’ substitutes ‘commodities’, to include a sense of the social 
processes involved in economic activity (Bair, 2005, 2009; Levy, 2008). From this 
perspective, GPNs are no longer simply arenas for market competition, but complex 
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political economic systems, which shape, and are shaped by, an institutional context 
(Helmsing et. al., 2011). This has important ramifications for how power in the chain, 
and its relation to the distribution of value, is understood. By moving away from a 
realist, ‘control-based’ notion of power, it becomes possible to envisage economic 
outcomes that or not based on ‘zero-sum’ assumptions, but rather allow win-win 
situations and unexpected reconfigurations of trade links and resource use. This 
enables researchers to see how individual actors and specific networks reconfigure 
and navigate existing power structures, through the shaping/reshaping of trade 
relations and reorganizing local institutions in ways that may or may not capture 
value and engender positive development outcomes  (Coe and Yeung, 2015; 
Dicken, 2015).  
 
The GPN framework focuses on three forms of embeddedness: network, social and 
territorial. The concept of network embeddedness investigates the way in which the 
structure of relationships between agents along a network of trade shape production 
networks. The GPN approach includes, in this perspective, relations with non-firm 
actors, such as governments and NGOs, who can have a profound impact on the 
structure of a trade network. As stated by Hess: “network embeddedness is more 
aptly conceptualized as an outcome driven by the ability of individuals and firms to 
achieve the relational proximity necessary to facilitate interactions that can lead to 
thicker flows of knowledge and industrial upgrading”. It is thus focused on the ways 
in which individual agency build the trust that enables different trade configurations 
across scales (Hess, 2004). 
 
It is the capacity of certain intermediaries, at several levels in the chain, to build links 
across scales, often with international buyers, which makes trade possible in chains 
that extend beyond the local. Not only is network embeddedness key to local trade 
arrangements, since value chains stretch across wider geographical scales, the 
bonds that traders form become increasingly important to sustain trade. They require 
different scale-crossing specificities, depending on their position. A local trader must 
be able to hold close social ties with communities, and navigate their cultural 
universe, to ensure supply. He must also be able to forge bonds with city traders, 
and their already vastly different social realities, to market their product (te Velde et 
al., 2006). 
 
It is their unique ability to build bonds of trust across scales, and to ensure the flow of 
information and product that keeps the value chain rolling (Marshall et al., 2006). The 
community may prefer the lower prices paid by the traditional network, rather than 
the hassle of dealing with a new trade arrangement. Clearly, price alone is not a 
good indicator of chain behaviour. Certainly, there are often abuses, but what 
previous attempts to eliminate them indicate is that these actors are often essential 
(Le Tourneau and Greissing, 2010; Le Tourneau and Kohler, 2011). It has been 
observed that relations along NTFPs chains are increasingly dynamic and 
polymorphous – much as the GPN theories used to characterise them. The 
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improvement of communications, both by water, but also telecommunications (the 
arrival of the mobile phone), and the increasingly monetised forms of trade have 
reshaped these power dynamics (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). These relations have 
been re-embedded in a new context, and are being continually reshaped. The 
overlapping modes of trade and social relations that often characterize NTFP trade 
also paint a more nuanced picture of power dynamics along the chain, with 
communities having increasing freedom to trade along different pathways and 
capture value. 
 
In this way, the role of network embeddedness shifts as value chains stretch. While 
at the local, community, level, and carrying on to the urban centres, it is the tight 
bonds between actors that are crucial to producing durable networks, the ability to 
bridge structural holes gains importance upstream. The agency of ‘scale-crossing 
brokers’ becomes increasingly important. In more spatially stretched value chains, 
scale-crossing brokers are fundamental  (Bass and Mayers, 2012). In the NTFP 
literature, we see that it is the bonds forged, for example, by the Matsutaki 
mushroom entrepreneurs that connect them to Japanese distributors, which enable 
them to find markets and sustain working relations (te Velde et al., 2006). It is their 
individual ability to negotiate varying cultural universes that make trade possible. 
They are able to negotiate the local vicissitudes of NTFP trade, but also to engage 
with Western buyers in international markets in accordance with their specific needs. 
In this way, we see elements of the network ties that bridge ‘structural holes’ that 
Burt (2009) alludes to in the work in the te Velde et al. analysis, where he highlights 
the role of ‘entrepreneurs’  (te Velde et al., 2006). 
 
Though often traders can reach near-monopolistic control over other actors in the 
chain, this governance pattern does not indicate abuse of power and unfair value 
capture  (te Velde et al., 2006). If we extend the analysis horizontally, and look at the 
wider context under which each actor ‘pulls’ the chain, what emerges is a much 
more-complex picture than the traditional ‘oppressed community’ compared to 
‘exploiting middleman’ portrayal. It is perhaps the need to find a local culprit for 
poverty, rather than investigate the full dynamics of the chain, and the inability by 
Western actors to see in the often-uneducated middleman the qualities that are 
described here, which often portray middlemen as villains to be vanquished in 
development interventions. Here, the discursive biases exposed by the cultural turn 
in value-chain studies become particularly evident. These local network ties that 
superimpose traditional social bonds are reminiscent of the bonds described by Uzzi 
(1997) in his work on the garment trade. It is the shared ties that build trust, enabling 
trade to flow and production to organize itself. 
 
The notion of societal embeddedness is perhaps that which most closely resembles 
that proposed initially by Granovetter (1973), as discussed above. In Hess' paper,  
these networks are analysed within the context of cultural formations and social 
norms, which condition behaviour of actors. It is concerned with how an actor’s 
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background (political, cultural) influences and shapes his or her actions, the ‘cultural 
imprint’  (Hess, 2004). NTFP trade does not occur in a social vacuum. On the 
contrary, it is heavily embedded in long-standing social relations, and a cultural 
environment. The plight of forest communities, the fight against deforestation, and 
the involvement of NGOs and development organizations indicate these underlying 
social dynamics. Forest communities are often locally marginalized, and subject to a 
host of social prejudices that hinders their advancement. They have little access to 
basic public services such as healthcare, education and sanitation. They are 
perceived as ignorant and backward, and their labour is often undervalued. Their 
way of life is often perceived as antagonistic to development of regional economies, 
which often value industrial development, large-scale timber production, farming or 
mining rather than small-scale sustainable forestry. Forest community activity is 
typically perceived as marginal, and unimportant in their societies at large. 
 
Locally, government corruption, or political co-optation by traditional elites of 
government institutions, hinders the advance of programmes that seek to redistribute 
wealth and assets. NTFP traders are often politically weak and marginalized, having 
little power to demand from their government the tutelage needed to develop their 
activities (Belcher et al., 2005; Hall, 2006; Hajjar et al., 2011). The solutions 
implemented by many development projects so far have consisted of ‘building 
capacity’ or developing ‘social capital’, by encouraging communities to organize 
politically, through associations, or economically, through cooperatives. Although this 
can be a useful strategy, and empowering communities is in itself a worthy goal, 
underestimating the weight of communities’ predicament, the overall 
political/economical game in which they are steeped, can be often naïve. Power is 
not easily wrested from traditional elites, and traditional cultural patterns and 
institutional arrangements can be hard to overcome. It is important, when analysing 
or designing interventions, to take into consideration the particular history of NTFP 
trading communities, and the wider culture in which they are embedded. While many 
communities have organized themselves in cooperative ways in the NTFP trade for 
centuries, and are highly cohesive, many have a very different vision of their relation 
to the forest, and trade. In Bolivia (Anthias 2013), for example, communities strongly 
identify with collaborative modes of production, which they have employed for 
centuries and have a holistic vision of nature and their place in it. Meanwhile the 
Ribeirinhos, who arrived in the Amazon in the early twentieth century to tap rubber, 
are most often highly individualistic, and see the forest as a source of resources for 
exploitation (Hall, 2007). 
 
The relationship with traders, as we have detailed above, is also highly contingent on 
cultural norms. Where often outsiders see mere exploitation, these relations are 
often charged with social meaning, and reflect an organization of society that is 
meaningful and useful to all actors involved. This societal berth is key to providing 
cohesion to trade links, forming the type of bond characteristic of network 
embeddedness. Though these bonds are often patronising, they are often easier to 
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negotiate for local communities than new arrangements that are artificially 
implemented (Le Tourneau and Kohler, 2011). They are often much preferred to 
foreign, and difficult to comprehend, relations imposed by third-parties. 
 
In proposing the notion of territorial embeddedness, the GPN literature also aims to 
reterritorialize studies of global trade, and reconnect it with the literature on regional 
development (Hess, 2004). The existing territorial constraints and opportunities, such 
as the business environment (pre-existence of clusters, for example), condition a 
region’s ability to capture value in its engagement with a trade network and 
contribute to shape outcomes along the chain. In addition, to enable a truly 
‘development-oriented’ approach to GPN, it is important to consider local livelihoods, 
and the strategies of individuals and households. As Coe and Hess (2013, p.7) point 
out in a special issue of Geoforum: 
 
“The ways in which communities become enmeshed in GPNs and how territories 
strategically couple with global buyers and lead firms is a crucial determinant for the 
development paths and prospects in these places. Engaging in systems of global 
production is by no means a development panacea, whichever definition of 
development is used. As the literature on GPNs has shown, there is a ‘dark side’ to 
strategic coupling potentially leading to disarticulation, ruptures and frictions within 
and between regions and GPNs (Coe and Hess, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012). Regions 
are not homogenous entities but consist of multiple actors with divergent interests.”  
 
The work of Saxenian (1996) remains amongst the most-referenced foundation for 
this line of scholarship. In her comparative study of the technological centres Silicon 
Valley (California, USA) and Route 128 (Boston, Massachusetts, USA) in the 1980s, 
she was able to evaluate many variables, such as political events, business-cycle 
position, production period and nation-state. This allowed her to focus on the cultural 
practices that determined the success of Silicon Valley in fostering innovation over 
Boston. Individuals and firms in Silicon Valley make part of a community of practice 
that is more prone to taking on risks, and collaborate across firms, leading to a level 
of dynamism that the more conservative environment of Boston could not achieve 
(Saxenian, 1996). Other studies have eschewed the ‘place-specificity’ of this type of 
analysis, which is open to the critique of ‘over-territorialized embeddedness’ that Coe 
and Hess make, above. Grabher (2002), in particular, worked to elucidate the ways 
in which organizational cultures across scales in the advertising industry enable the 
flow of creativity and knowledge across scales, in a form of network that he 
describes as ‘heterarchy’. This wider definition of territorial embeddedness facilitates 
the discussion of inclusion, and the terms of inclusion, as called for by development 
scholars who have engaged with value-chain research (Helmsing et. al, 2011). 
 
It is with the lens of territorial embeddedness that we can group together the most 
commonly occurring ‘contextual’ issues highlighted in the NTFP trade literature. 
Belcher (2004, p.7) posits that: 
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“The most important ‘context variables’ concerned the nature of property rights, the 
size and accessibility of markets for the product, and the opportunity costs of labour 
and land. With sufficient control over the resource and a strong market, people are 
able to specialize in the production and marketing of forest products, provided of 
course that this is the most rewarding use of their time”.  
 
Geographical constraints, but also local cultures, productive arrangements, 
regulatory and business environments play a key role in shaping trade relations, and 
are deeply embedded in specific territories (Roth and Dressler, 2012). Some key 
issues seem to permeate almost all NTFP value chains, and are often replicated in 
the literature. Perhaps the most obviously territorial of these factors is the fact that 
NTFP value chains necessarily originate in a forest. The products are native to a 
certain territory, and can seldom be found elsewhere. Regardless of price 
fluctuations or market power, there is only one, or at best a few, possible territories 
for the chain to begin. This often creates a substantial advantage for communities, 
who, despite all their vulnerabilities, are secure in knowing that, as long as there is 
demand, they will be in a privileged position to guarantee supply, unless this security 
is taken away through a switch to monoculture production  (such as has occurred 
with guaraná) or the development of synthetic alternatives  (such as has occurred 
with rubber), which can entirely replace the chain and exclude communities 
(Homma, 2002). 
 
Additionally, a marking aspect of territorial embeddedness of NTFP trade is the 
physical distance from trading centres and lack of transport infrastructure. Production 
occurs in small batches, and is often dispersed, hiking up transaction costs. In every 
review, this factor plays a deciding role in the formation of trade links for NTFPs. 
Many NTFPs are perishable, and require quick transport to the next rung on the 
chain to remain viable/usable. Many others, though not perishable, become 
prohibitively expensive to explore when transport costs are too high. Physical 
proximity to market, and transport infrastructure, are thus key factors in determining 
the viability of NTFP trade (Shanley et al., 2002; Belcher et al., 2005). 
 
Rising urbanisation is a key trend that has reshaped many NTFP trading networks, 
which can be characterised as a shift in territorial embeddedness. As many forest 
people leave for urban centres and start earning higher incomes, they take with them 
their appetite for NTFPs, creating new local markets for products that were once 
mostly extracted and consumed directly by communities near source. The urban 
consumption of NTFPs also opens space for cross-cultural exchanges, bringing new 
potential consumers into contact with them for the first time, people would never 
have accessed these products before, thereby bringing these unfamiliar products 
along with them in their travels. The migration patterns characteristic of globalization 
can have a significant impact in building new demand and thus new trade pathways 
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for NTFPs  (Shackleton et al., 2011). The meaning attached to products change 
significantly across scales, as discussed below. The exodus to cities also  
depletes the labour pool for which agriculture or mining often competes in rural 
scenarios, while urban demand rises (Goodman, 2002). This new configuration 
points towards a higher specialization in NTFP production, with more high-value 
products concentrated in fewer, larger and more-efficient production facilities  
(Scherr et al., 2004). 
 
Poverty, lack of health care, education, banking services and government services 
also make for a challenging business environment. These are pervasive issues in 
tropical forest settings, which seriously constrict the ability of communities, as well as 
many traders, to upgrade. The physical isolation of these communities is often a key 
contributing factor to their poverty (Belcher, 2005; Belcher et al., 2005,) More 
recently, many communities that previously remained relatively isolated from their 
local economies now have access to mobile phones, and use cash instead of a 
system of bartering. This new context has changed the governance of many value 
chains, as communities no longer rely on barter with intermediaries and are also able 
to check prices for their products independently through their mobile phones  
(Shackleton et al., 2011). This new reality erodes or reshapes traditional trade 
relations, and has a direct impact on patterns of societal embeddedness. 
 
Bringing these themes together 
 
The research will seek to build a new layer of knowledge on the issues that condition 
the formation of chains and their development potential, by investigating in a more 
structured manner, using the three notions of embedded are described above, the 
ways in which the chain is connected with its context, and with what specific 
outcomes, across each geographical scale where it is located. In the NTFP literature, 
, the narrow focus on communities, to the detriment of other, broader, scales, makes 
it very hard to access information on existing trade pathways and the distribution of 
value they engender, particularly beyond the local level. Some empirical evidence is 
presented for example by te Velde, when he highlights the role of intermediaries in 
articulating production, but very little is heard about how, for example, the existence 
of infrastructure for international trade, such as shipping, or the existence of easily 
accessible international banking services, facilitates the expansion of NTFP trade (te 
Velde et al. 2006). There is also little information about how the presence of a local 
industrial park, or ancillary industries affect the chain. Belcher and Schreckenberg 
provide some important evidence on the role of the ‘business environment’ in 
developing NTFP trade when describing the often-difficult marriage of NTFP 
extraction and product-development cycles (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007). Yet 
it is not known how or why this happens or where it happens. In this way, we are 
unable to establish how value is distributed beyond the local scale, and how that 
distribution is tied to aspects of chain configuration.  
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How does the business environment in a juice factory in Germany, for example, 
allow it to cope with new NTFPs? How do industrial groups across the World 
articulate network embeddedness to find distributors for their goods once they are 
processed? The Body Shop may source ingredients for products in the Amazon, but 
it later distributes its wares across the World. The literature therefore provides a 
somewhat warped vision of value distribution in chains, very much restricted to local 
realities, when we know that international parts of the chain often capture most of the 
revenue, rather than the original source providers. We can infer from the literature 
that the low educational levels and poor business environments of community 
settings hamper their ability to capture value by engaging in more-sophisticated 
activities, but we seldom confront what this actually means for communities and 
regional development, or the cultural biases that underlie this view  (as World 
Systems Theory so clearly exposes). This research will thus clearly seek to extract, 
across each research site, key insight from local actors on how the chain enables or 
hampers value capture, and what were the fundamental contextual factors that have 
enabled it to take shape in its current configuration. 
 
2.4 Upgrading – strategies for capturing value and fostering local 
development 
 
The goal of most value-chain research is to enable firms and policy makers to 
analyse the existing scenarios and then seek to obtain the right mix of resources and 
skills to upgrade into more profitable positions in commodity chains (Kaplinsky, 2004, 
Altenburg, 2007, Humphrey and Navas-Alemán, 2010). This has generated a range 
of programmes aiming to harness this knowledge to improve the development 
prospects of specific regions or populations, as a report highlighting the many uses 
of the approach across seven UN platforms shows (Stamm and von Drachenfels, 
2011, Taglioni and Winkler, 2014) 
 
The idea of upgrading, that is, climbing up the chain to capture a greater amount of 
value, as defined by Gereffi (1994), is also often considered in the GPN literature. 
The terms of that upgrading, and its societal impacts are nonetheless much more 
detailed. While previous value-chain analysis (VCA) work tends to portray inclusion 
in itself as a bounty, a deeper horizontal perspective at the local level allows for 
better understanding of the impact of that inclusion on communities, particularly its 
interaction with local class and gender dynamics. A more-holistic approach enables 
the incorporation of the lessons learned about local livelihoods and local 
development to be incorporated into the analysis. Ultimately, more-careful 
examination of the embeddedness of trade in the local context can facilitate better 
understanding of successful practices that benefit people at a community scale.  
 
In Coe and Yeung’s (2015) thinking on Global Production Networks, in what the 
authors term ‘GPN 2.0’, they eschew the notion of upgrading in favour of a more-
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nuanced and complex analysis of the strategies that can result in the type of value 
capture that generates positive development outcomes – their ‘value capture 
trajectories’. They recognize that upgrading is not necessarily a desirable solution, 
and that it does not necessarily generate positive development outcomes for a 
specific region. Rather, when contemplating these value capture trajectories, they 
seek to examine how actors and groups of actors are able to harness the potential 
benefits of inclusion into GPNs production networks over time to retain and capture 
value within the region. This does not necessarily have to be done through 
upgrading. This new approach looks more closely at that intersection, between local 
contextual issues inherent in embeddedness analysis and chain conditions, to create 
an economic climate where individual firms can best harness and retain value over 
time. 
 
Overall, the NTFP literature highlights a set of repeated strategies for upgrading: 
improving quality, moving up the chain by cutting out middlemen, increasing the 
amount of processing undertaken by communities locally or moving into new value 
chains (Macqueen, 2008). Although much of the literature does not directly employ 
‘upgrading’ or specific value-chain jargon, it is still possible to classify existing 
analyses of interventions according to these categories. The only information 
available on NTFP value-chain upgrading relates to communities, and what the 
impacts of the activities of NGOs and development agencies have on them. There is 
no obvious data available on what strategies private traders follow outside of 
communities, and what impacts this could have along the chain. 
 
Certification of the product is constantly touted as the key form of upgrading for 
NTFP extracting communities. It should allow producers to charge higher prices, and 
ensure more-equal power relations in the chain. Because it entails a change to the 
actual product’s perceived quality, it can be classified as product upgrading. 
Certifications include such accolades as ‘organic’, ‘rainforest alliance’, ‘GMO-free’ 
and ‘Fairtrade’ for example. Because the primary material is seldom transformed 
locally into secondary/manufactured products, certification is perceived to be the key 
form of product upgrading available to producers. Through these certifications, it is 
hoped that higher prices can be achieved, and that more-stable relations will be 
established with buyers, guaranteeing a regular source of income, less subject to 
market fluctuations. Often, when the literature discusses marketing, or branding, the 
solution is cited automatically as certification. 
 
Yet certified producers at the very base of the chain seldom effectively benefit 
substantially from this strategy. The demand for certified products is small, and has 
failed to grow beyond a niche. In addition, the price premiums, even in Fairtrade 
chains, sometimes fail to materialize, and other actors still capture the greatest 
proportion of the value. This phenomenon has been recognized in many chains, 
particularly coffee and cocoa. Often, certification itself can also be an exclusionary 
practice, with many producers unable to afford the bureaucratic process to become 
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certified, unless technical and financial assistance is available (Belcher and 
Schreckenberg, 2007; Pierce et al., 2008; Marston, 2013). Unfortunately, we have 
little information on how power relations amongst local actors interrelate with this 
upgrading strategy. 
 
Another form of upgrading that is often proposed for NTFP extracting communities is 
the reconfiguration of the chain (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000; Choudhary et al., 
2014). The aim is often to ‘cut out the middleman’. The creation of cooperatives to 
increase bargaining power is perhaps the most valued type of intervention in 
community forestry, and perhaps the most ideologically charged. As this strategy is 
imagined to move communities up the chain, it can be described as a form of 
functional upgrading. To increase their bargaining power and maximise the utilization 
of collective assets, NGOs have been encouraging the creation of cooperatives for 
decades. Often this is also a requirement for certification. The ideology behind these 
initiatives is that of collectivist, totally inclusive development, although this model has 
eluded most of the developed world. Interventions are often viewed as a form of 
rebalancing power relations locally, probably breaking communities out of a captive 
governance model (which, in itself, is not a problem). A fraction of current productive 
forces worldwide is organized in cooperatives, yet this has become the standard for 
community forestry. Primitive forest peoples represent an antithesis to capitalist 
greed in Western eyes. 
 
Unsurprisingly, these forms of cooperative have seldom been successful once 
external support is withdrawn. These new, externally imposed forms of organising 
seldom take into consideration local social relations. Participating requires a shift in 
existing social norms, in addition to an investment in time (to participate in meetings 
and engage in management) that people do not necessarily want to comply with 
(Herrero-Jáuregui et al., 2011). It is also common for existing power relations within 
the community to simply adapt to the cooperative format, with the elite taking over 
the management of the cooperative and using its instruments to reinforce existing 
power relations. 
 
Communities also often resent being bundled together, with more entrepreneurial 
individuals feeling disadvantaged by being viewed as level with others that they 
perceive to be less engaged in their work, for example. Though resource use can, 
although not necessarily, be collective, the exploitation thereof is often considered 
highly individual, according to local social norms. Initiatives that attempt to remove 
these existing divisions are often very poorly received. Commonly, trading with 
middlemen in a captive chain is still a way to escape other, more-oppressive, local 
bonds of patronage, within and outside the local community. Where cooperative 
ways of producing are traditional  (Brazil nut collection in Bolivia for example), 
supporting cooperatives can be a successful intervention. Artificial implementation 
seldom is. ‘Cutting out the middleman’ can also have several, unwanted 
consequences. As we have seen, the middleman often plays a multitude of important 
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roles in the chain. Communities can simply lack the contacts, or market information, 
or managerial capacity, to take over the job of intermediaries (Brown and Rosendo, 
2000; Burke, 2010; Hajjar et al., 2011; Herrero-Jáuregui et al., 2011; Pokorny et al., 
2012). These strategies are unlikely to succeed when they fail to consider the webs 
of social relations and multitude of exchanges that configure relations with 
middlemen in many of these settings. 
 
Many interventions also work to install processing equipment at the community level, 
to allow communities to climb the value chain, also cutting out the local middleman 
and, often, a local processing facility. Although some success has been verified, 
such as the OELA musical instrument factory (Oficina Escola de Lutheria da 
Amazônia8), operating at the heart of the Amazon, these initiatives tend to falter once 
external funding is withdrawn. Communities often lack the capacity to manage these 
processing facilities, and have a hard time marketing goods without external 
assistance. Also, the additional costs incurred in functional upgrading often make the 
endeavour financially unattractive, and levels of productivity continue to be 
sufficiently lower than larger-scale commercial endeavours (Pokorny et al., 2012) 
Without an understanding of the local capacities and vocations, defining an 
intervention such as this can be more problematic than helpful. 
 
A common strategy at community level involves the move to cultivation, or crop 
management, and the improvement of quality control. NTFPs are harvested in small 
quantities, from large geographical areas. Achieving quality control and regular 
quantities to supply markets is a constant challenge  (Cunningham, 2011). Ruis 
Perez has found that the transition towards domestication of species is perhaps the 
surest way to ensure regular, high-quality supply to build reliable streams of product 
in stable, to supply developed markets with good infrastructure links  (Belcher, 
2005). Because it entails a change in the mode of production to increase efficiency, it 
can be categorised as a form of process upgrading. NTFPs can either be wild- 
harvested, with little transformation of the natural environment. They can be 
managed, through weeding or crown opening, to encourage NTFP species to thrive. 
They can also be deliberately cultivated, becoming regular crops, rather than pure 
NTFPs, but there is little information in the research on how governance can affect, 
or be affected by, this strategy. 
  
Moving along this gradient improves yields and incomes for communities  (Ruiz-
Pérez et al., 2004; Belcher et al., 2005). However, cultivation becomes a strategy 
only when there is sufficient infrastructure to reach markets, and when these are 
sufficiently stable. It can also become an exclusionary strategy, as capital, technical 
knowledge, and tenure security are often required to manage or cultivate NTFPs  
(i.e. territorial embeddedness), which the poorest and most vulnerable members of 
communities often lack (Belcher et al., 2005). The implementation by outside 
																																																						
8	http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/08/brazil-producing-guitars-and-luthiers-in-the-rainforest/	
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organizations of overly complex management techniques, which do not take into 
consideration customary local knowledge can also often lead to discouraging results  
(Herrero-Jáuregui et al., 2011). 
 
Many researchers have been wary of the move towards cultivation or management, 
because of its potential impact to the local environment (Homma, 2002). Although 
there can be significant changes in the natural make-up of forests, these strategies 
are often much less detrimental than the monocultures that often threaten natural 
forests. Additionally, wild harvesting can bring desirable NTFPs to the brink of 
extinction, something that can be prevented through management and cultivation  
(Arnold and Pérez, 2001; Ruiz-Pérez et al. 2004; Sills et al., 2011). Studies also 
record that forests have been managed and manipulated by local populations for 
centuries, which brings into question the existence of ‘wild, undisturbed forests’ that 
fear ‘de- characterisation’ of the ‘natural’ environment. More importantly, this is a 
strategy that does not require community actors to change roles, or build entirely 
new capacities, and is therefore more-easily assimilated. 
 
The management of NTFP resources, with intensified production, is therefore often a 
desirable upgrading strategy, although care must be taken to avoid substantial 
biodiversity loss, as well as exclusion of more vulnerable members of communities 
as resources are ‘privatized’. The move towards a monoculture system, which takes 
away production from its original location in favour of large, privately held, capital-
intensive modes can also pose a threat to communities and the regions in which they 
live, which are typically excluded from this new chain configuration in the name of 
market efficiency  (Kusters et al., 2006; Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007). 
 
Because the livelihood strategies of forest communities are themselves diversified, 
the development of several concomitant value chains, for different local products, 
can be an important means of improving incomes, and securing stability across 
different harvest seasons. This type of diversification strategy is preferred by NTFP 
communities, allowing them to widen incomes sources, balance labour requirements 
and manage labour needs across the seasons  (Coomes et al., 2004; Belcher et al., 
2005; Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007; Shackleton et al., 2008, 2011; Stoian, 
2012). This type of strategy represents product upgrading, as it entails moving into 
different product chains. NTFP-extracting communities often subsist on a collection 
of activities, including fish farming, crop farming and timber extraction. Most of these 
activities are seasonal, resulting in large fluctuations of income throughout the year, 
bringing a heightened sense of insecurity. Without stable income, it is difficult to plan, 
save and organize activities (Ros-Tonen and Wiersum, 2003, Scherr et al., 2004). 
Yet the vast majority of projects tend to look specifically at one product, rather than 
attempt to integrate the range of products that constitute the livelihoods of forest 
communities (Neumann, 2000; Pokorny, 2012; Le Tourneau and Kohler 2011). 
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From a territorial embeddedness perspective (for example, proximity to markets and 
business environment), to the ability to articulate the right types of brokerage, the 
success of value chains is contingent on the ability of actors to articulate their 
surroundings to produce certain outcomes. Cooperative marketing structures, for 
example, must be socially embedded, that is, hold cultural meaning for local actors. 
This cannot be achieved forcefully. Furthermore, the disruption of existing network 
embeddedness is not a desirable strategy to ‘cut out the middleman’ on its own. 
Those pre-existing bonds with middlemen are usually tried and tested, and allow 
actors to negotiate a series of important contextual issues, of a territorial nature, 
such as physical isolation and lack of government services, but other societal, such 
as the preservation of a meaningful local social order. Furthermore, the territorial 
constraints, the poor business environment and lack of local managerial capacity are 
not easily overcome. Despite what it might seem from a purely intra-chain 
perspective, these interventions are often doomed to fail. Meanwhile, diversification 
of income is a strategy that is particularly meaningful to forest-dwelling communities. 
It recognizes the nature of local productive arrangements (‘territorial 
embeddedness’), and the social organization of communities’ livelihoods. 
 
Upgrading is indeed an often difficult, if not impossible task for producers (Coe 
2015). In fact, lead firms in the developed world fiercely guard the intangible aspects 
of production (marketing, brand development, packaging) where most value is added 
(much as World Systems Theorists defend). The globalization project as proposed 
by the Washington Consensus9 pulverizes production to maximize the potential 
‘efficiency gains’ that can be wielded from exploiting the low-paid labour force in the 
developing world, but the immaterial activities that add the bulk of value remain firmly 
in the hands of developed-world workers (Gibbon, 2000, 2001, Fernandez-Stark et 
al., 2012). Fundamentally, although insertion of a product into global value chains 
generates income, and facilitates the development of production capacity, innovation 
remains firmly in the developed world, and with it, most of the value created 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, Schmitz, 2004, Coe and Yeung, 2015). This is the 
type of structural obstacle that is so clear within World Systems Theory, which is lost 
when we chose to remove context in favour of intra-chain dynamics only. 
 
Scholars have recognized that acting strategically across a sector can be more 
beneficial than small, highly localized, interventions at community level. Scholars 
have thus increasingly called attention to the need to truly engage in a holistic 
analysis of value chains, from start to finish, to truly understand their functioning and 
																																																						
9	According	to	Gore:	"	this	approach	recommends	that	governments	should	reform	their	policies	and,	in	particular:	(a)	pursue	
macroeconomic	stability	by	controlling	inflation	and	reducing	fiscal	defcits;	(b)	open	their	economies	to	the	rest	of	the	world	through	trade	
and	capital	account	liberalization;	and	(c)	liberalize	domestic	product	and	factor	markets	through	privatization	and	deregulation".	It	was	
propagated	by	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	in	the	late	80s	and	90s	as	a	pathway	for	development.	(Gore	2000,	p.789)	
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decide how to improve them (a circumstance labelled as ‘leverage’). As a review by 
Belcher and Schrekenberg (2007, p.369) state: 
 
“Whether the market is newly established, like that for Namibian exports of marula oil 
to the Body Shop  (Schreckenberg, 2003), or hundreds of years old, as with the 
birds’ nest trade or gaharu trade from Indonesia, efforts to support the trade need to 
understand the structure and function of the entire production-to-consumption 
system  (Belcher, 1998). The most effective interventions are those that have a 
simultaneous impact on many similar firms, what Haggblade and Gamser  (1991) 
term ‘leverage’. Thus, policy-level interventions that encourage investment in 
processing and trade may be the most effective way to support raw material 
producers, as seen very clearly in the case of the China bamboo sector (Ruiz-Pérez 
et al., 2004b). In other cases, the most helpful intervention may be improvements to 
transport infrastructure.” (Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007) 
 
An adequate regulatory framework, which benefits small-scale enterprises and 
provides land tenure security to communities, has been recognized as playing a key 
role in facilitating the development of NTFP value chains (Hajjar et al., 2011). 
Political will is key to promote the exploitation of NTFPs and sustainable forestry 
initiatives as a development priority. Insecure land tenure represents a major hurdle 
to NTFP development (Belcher et al., 2005). Communities require integrated 
programmes, which provide technical assistance for extraction and handling of 
products, as well as tailored financial services  (Stoian et al., 2012). When the 
regulatory and political environment is geared towards large-scale exploitation and 
deforestation, it is very difficult for these initiatives to thrive. For example, sanitary 
legislation and agricultural policy is often ill equipped to manage the specificities of 
NTFP extraction and trade (Bass and Mayers, 2012). 
 
The trade in NTFPs, beyond local scales, also requires an enabling business 
environment outside the community itself. This can include anything from facilities for 
communities to process the product, storage along trade routes, financial 
instruments to foster increases in local processing capacity, amongst other vital 
conditions for trade development  (Scherr et al., 2002). There must also be capacity 
upstream to absorb market information and adapt production patterns, and ability to 
trade and reach markets, manage client demand, and so on. In this way, the 
articulation of forces beyond the local scale can have meaningful impact on 
communities. We cannot, in the existing NTFP literature, proceed to any analysis of 
these factors, since the vast majority of the literature is community-centric. The 
empirical research proposed in this thesis therefore provides important clues as to 
how these forces operate and impact NTFP trade at the community level. 
 
2.5 Unravelling discourses about value creation and distribution in 
value chains, and in NTFP chains in particular 
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Value chains are the object of several lines of inquiry, including World Systems 
Theory (WST), the Global Value Chains (GVC) literature of Gereffi (e.g. 1994) and 
peers, as well as the Global Production Networks (GPNs) of Coe (2012). Each of 
these strands of literature has its own perspective of analysis and ‘toolkit’, which 
provide valuable insight into how chains are sustained and value is distributed. 
However, in many cases, subjective discourses about the merits or ‘development’ of 
particular livelihood models are used to explain differences in value formation and 
distribution using purportedly objective language to disguise cultural prejudices and 
justify structural inequalities inherited from colonial trading economic patterns. This is 
particularly true in NTFP research, where a marked bias towards certain types of 
research and development interventions can be detected.  
 
Value-chain scholars have begun to incorporate notions of cultural studies, as part of 
a wider trend in economic geography towards cultural political economy and cultural 
economic geography: the hotly debated, yet somewhat established, cultural turn 
which has taken hold in the study of economics in general. The cultural perspective 
aims to break with the opacity of depoliticized, universal metanarratives, to allow for 
plural, even if contradictory accounts of economic relations – and frictional, 
conflicting relations resulting from globalized economic processes (Tsing, 2005). 
This new point of view is spurred by a general mistrust of ‘one way forward’ 
development narratives, in a world of constant instabilities and rising inequality. It 
also aims to recognize the variety of organizational forms that make up economic 
relations, the richness of interdisciplinary work that currently intersects with 
economics, and the narrowness of the latter’s investigative and explanatory toolkit  
(Amin and Thrift, 2008). 
 
Though GPN provides an elegant description of trade and its wider context, existing 
studies commonly resemble GVC studies in their overemphasis on coordination 
between market actors, upgrading and development, over political contestation and 
subjective meanings. As Hess and Yeung (2006, p.7) point out: 
 
“The ontological challenge that GPN research is facing lies in integrating both the 
material and the socio-cultural dimensions of GPN development. In other words, how 
do we conceptualize a relational network that is neither under- socializing nor over-
socializing in its explanatory capacity?”   
 
In Political Contestation in Global Production Networks, David Levy (2008) provides 
a basis for reflecting on how the dispersion of trade across scales produces and 
challenges established gender, class and ethnic inequalities. The author reflects on 
the underlying dynamics that make up the ‘transnational space’ constituted by 
international elites, their institutions  (such as the World Trade Organisation, WTO), 
and their ideologies  (free-trade neoliberalism). A great amount of cultural production 
goes into reinforcing this space, through business publications, international summits 
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and business schools that propose legitimizing ideological discourses packaged as 
‘objective business knowledge’. In contesting the objectivity of this knowledge, it is 
possible to find a new dimension to the way in which trade relations manifest 
discursively underlying power relations  (Levy, 2008). 
 
This perception is taken forward in Global Value Chains: From Governance to 
Governmentality? by Peter Gibbon and Stefano Ponte (2008), in which they 
juxtapose the GVC notion of governance with the literature on governmentality. They 
describe the ways in which the ‘supply management institutional context’ is formed 
around certain norms that are enforced and performed by actors in firms, to create 
certain outcomes. These ‘performances of power’ are engendered by trade 
certifications that guarantees a level of homogeneity in business practice, further 
reinforced by the discourse set out by business schools and the consulting industry. 
These institutions propose a set of tools for practitioners to adopt, from evaluation of 
suppliers to metrics for cost calculation, as well as series of tactics to enable the 
building of supply relationships (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). 
 
Thus, many NGOs and academics contest these discourses and the related trade 
configurations they sustain. Organizations such as Christian Romero and Human 
Rights Watch adopt an opposing discourse of oppression and submission of 
powerless actors in the developing world, while others such as Solidaridad, The 
Nature Conservancy work to promote alternative modes of trade in niche markets. 
This has been the case in particular for NTFP interventions, which aim to reform 
local relationships and production patterns at the base of the chain, without making 
any real challenges to the overarching, globally entrenched inequalities in which 
trade relations occur. These attempts have been problematic in their own light, as 
will be widely debated in the following chapters. For example, the relationship 
between communities and markets is more complex than dominant discourses, or 
the new development agenda, allow  (Peluso and Alexiades, 2005; Charnley and 
Poe, 2007; Vaccaro et al., 2009). While the majority of case studies usually focusses 
on ‘exotic’ isolated communities, the reality is that forest peoples are increasingly 
integrated into mainstream cultural and social lifestyles and ideologies  (Peluso and 
Alexiades, 2005; Hall, 2007; Barretto Filho, 2009; Cocks et al., 2011). The tinkering 
with local trade dynamics, cutting out traditional trade ties, and changing the 
organization of local livelihoods, is not necessarily beneficial to communities. 
 
This type of distorted intervention model is the outcome of discourses and policy 
paradigms that have been sedimented through many decades of unreflexive praxis 
in both development and conservation, within a context of hegemonic domination by 
Western actors  (Asher and Ojeda, 2009).It is thus not surprising that the track 
record of these NTFP projects is very poor: few have survived; fewer still have 
provenly improved livelihoods in the long term  (Herrero-Jáuregui et al., 2011; 
Belcher, 2012). A host of studies have emerged to analyse successes and failures, 
and to propose solutions to reshape them. Yet because of existing biases in 
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development and forestry  (development is something that happens elsewhere), they 
do not look at consumer markets for answers, or consider overall embeddedness of 
these trade relations in a wider societal context. 
 
In many ways, value formation and capture is indeed a great means of unpacking 
the tensions between the material and discursive, as it provides a clear and 
quantifiable locus to measure these dimensions. If chain scholars use value as a 
means to investigate power relations, and if value is set subjectively, then it is 
imperative to understand the subjective dimensions of value to ever truly understand 
power. To expose the underlying power dynamics, it is fundamental to rethink the 
notion of ‘value-added’, which has remained uncontested in GPN studies. 
Furthermore, value capture is the key connector between value chains and 
development outcomes. 
 
Many commodity studies have similar findings: value capture happens predominantly 
at the end of the chain, where products are packaged and sold to the ultimate 
consumer. The creation of exchange value greatly supersedes the use value that 
dominates the chain until it leaves the local scale. In the case of timber, retail has 
also proven to be the most value-producing step, and the greatest influencing power 
source for the whole chain (Jensen, 2009). This unequal distribution of value is often 
noted and decried; yet seldom explored in detail, as international dimensions of trade 
are not contemplated in the NTFP literature. Instead, there is a repetition of similar 
strategies, narrowly geared towards communities, without much depth of exploration 
of their context, or their position in relation to other scales. In this way, how value 
forms and is shared is seldom questioned, rather, efforts are made to pull them 
towards communities almost by force, without consideration of the structures and 
webs of relations and that support the chain. 
 
According to Levy (2008), it is important to break down the economist’s notion of 
value, which have remained central to both the GVC and GPN approach, which 
focus on the ability of multinational corporations to distribute production in ways that 
promote efficiency and value creation, to better examine underlying social dynamics 
of power and equity. Levy posits that the strategic advantages, described from a 
transaction-cost focus by these scholars who describe the distribution of value along 
scales “are not static endowments, but rather dynamic capacities that accumulate at 
the firm and regional cluster level” (Levy, 2008). We must then seek to examine why 
certain forms of labour are more valued than others. In this instance, why must 
extractors become traders or processors to be entitled to more value? 
 
Along the chain, researchers seek to question the notion of ‘price’ as an objective 
representation of labour plus resource costs, somehow measurable in input-output 
terms. Hudson explores this theme further in Cultural Political Economy meets 
Global Production Networks (Hudson, 2008). While he recognizes the material limits 
of resource use and transformation of goods, he discusses the ways in which value 
 
 
Page 44 of 249 
 
is subjectively formed in contemporary society. For the goods that are produced in 
GPNs to fulfil their life- cycle, they must be sold to consumers, and as such must be 
seen as useful to them. They must thus have meaning in their ‘life-world’. 
 
Increasingly, particularly at the consumer level, these meanings are more affective 
and culturally coded, rather than merely utilitarian. One does not estimate the value 
of a consumer good as its ‘use value’ any longer. This subjective value formation at 
the consumer level can have meaningful impact across the chain, all the way back to 
its base in local communities. Yet consumers, the final arbiters of value, and thus 
consumer power, are conspicuously absent from all value-chain literature. Most 
studies stop arbitrarily at the last corporate link the value-chain. The final transaction, 
whereby the commodity reaches its ‘realization’ through consumption, is somehow 
omitted. Coe and Hess (2013) acknowledged this shortcoming. Studies that seem to 
redress this omission unfortunately focus mostly on the material process of 
consumption and its impact on waste, rather than positioning consumers as actors in 
production networks, and rethinking the concept of value (Coe and Hess, 2013).  
 
Within NTFP scholarship itself, researchers have also concluded that ‘markets drive 
the specialization of NTFPs’ (Ruiz-Pérez et al., 2004), and many articles indeed 
mention the importance of markets – and consumers – in determining the success of 
NTFP commercialization (Scherr et al., 2002, 2004; Marshall et al., 2006; Belcher 
and Schreckenberg, 2007; Roth and Dressler, 2012). Yet issues that concern value 
formation beyond extraction and primary processing, and how these relate to 
extraction patterns, are seldom addressed in detail. This bias is common in the 
overall value-chain literature, particularly in NTFP research. One can only speculate 
that the specific ‘community-based’ trend in development and conservation praxis 
and research creates such a case of analytical tunnel vision that precludes cross-
scalar research. This is the type of positional bias that the cultural turn seeks to 
expose, and which must be considered in order to bring new insight into the study of 
NTFP commercialization. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
The adoption of value-chain lens provides important initial insights into the existing 
corpus of NTFP literature. It builds on the original efforts made by te Velde and 
others (e.g. te Velde et al., 2006), which applied GVC tools to NTFP cases, to move 
into a more complex representation of chains, through the introduction of the GPN 
literature, and particularly the concept of embeddedness. To form and sustain 
chains, a minimally functioning business environment is necessary, and the 
brokerage of local actors with particular kinds of social capital can greatly offset the 
difficult logistics and lack of infrastructure that hamper the formation of trade links 
(‘network thickness’). In this way, although much of the literature can be critical of the 
‘captive’ governance that characterizes many value chains at the local level, these 
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tight bonds can in fact be crucial to making trade possible in a minimally efficient 
manner. This has been the finding of in depth study of te Velde et al. (2006), 
amongst others.  
 
Regarding the possibilities for improving value capture at the base of chains, the 
success of these strategies is dependent on the peculiarities of local communities, 
but also on the inter-scalar arrangements that sustain trade. There is no universal 
‘one-size fits all’ solution. Nonetheless, we can generalize that while acquiring 
recognised certification can often be a prerequisite for entering markets, it seldom 
brings tangible benefits to NTFP communities. Projects that aim to ‘cut the 
middleman’ also have met with various levels of success, for failing to take into 
consideration the importance of local social capital to regulate trading relationships, 
and the ability of local brokers to bridge different cultural realities, and provide a 
variety of key services  (sales, credit, insurance, logistics). 
 
Meanwhile, strategies that aim to strengthen existing activities in the community, 
such as intensification, are often more easy to adopt, although their impact on local 
ecosystems can be damaging. The diversification into other locally familiar activities 
can also be a welcome strategy, as it not only enables for the increase of income, 
but plays an important role in the reduction of risks for producers. However, the 
formation of new market links to market these new products is often beyond the 
reach of local producers, which rely on a web of actors and capacities to form and 
sustain new demand in markets.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no relevant information regarding the formation and shape of 
trades beyond the local community level in the existing NTFP literature. The 
positional biases that have engendered this strand of research and the 
accompanying development interventions are indubitably at work here, narrowing the 
focus on community-level interventions and building an image of forest communities 
that is very tied to the positionality of the research and development fiefs that 
engender them. What the research does make clear is that there is a need to better 
connect existing knowledge to an understanding of how markets work, and the 
nodes that form these connections along the chain. In particular, we have little 
understanding of how new chains form and how value is created in consumer 
markets, and what this means for communities. 
 
As an initial attempt to deconstruct the notion of ‘value’, the next chapter  
attempts to open a new connection within value-chain scholarship, by weaving in 
existing knowledge on marketing, ‘commodity fetishism’, ethical consumption and 
alternative foods. It looks at the same phenomena, trade and value formation, but 
from a different viewpoint – starting from consumption. This is an attempt to address 
the positional limitations of value- chain studies presented here, in its productionist, 
materialist bias, as critiqued by cultural geographers. Value chains flow, and value-
chain analyses look at trade, in one direction, from extraction to consumption. They 
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are unable to contemplate the formation of value and demand that is key to the 
formation of chains, and occur in consumer markets, a locus of value, and power, 
not contemplated by extant literature. This is not to exclude the subjectivities about 
the value of labour throughout the chain, which will also be considered whenever 
sufficient material for discussion is available. 
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Chapter 3.  THE CONTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL STUDIES TO 
VALUE CHAIN RESEARCH 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The present chapter aims to explore existing knowledge about how concepts of 
value and demand are formed, to shed light on how the açaí chain took shape and 
has assumed its current configuration. The case of NTFPs more widely is used to 
illustrate how ‘consumer myths’ are formed (see Section 3.3), and how this 
knowledge relates to the value-chain literature (Goodman, 2002, Mceachern and 
Schroeder, 2004). Existing analytical models for commodity-chain analysis tend to 
focus on objective ‘use value’, and input-output calculations, taking ‘value’ as an 
objective formulation, placing all control over outcomes in production, and leaving 
consumers as passive. Goodman and Dupuis (2002, p. 10) state: 
 
 “Consumption has been neglected, under-theorized, treated as an exogenous 
structural category, and granted ‘agency’ or transformative power only in the 
economistic, abstract terms of demand.”   
 
To address our research questions, particularly around how chains are formed and 
value is created and distributed, we draw upon existing knowledge on commodity 
fetishes and circuits, cultural studies and branding to unpack and analyze messages 
in a fashion coherent with the findings of the previous chapter. The literature on 
commodity fetishism and cultural geography seeks to resituate the social meaning of 
products, revealing the means by which use-value is obscured in favor of symbolic 
value in trade relations. The literature produced in cultural studies provides further 
insight into how brands have emerged as a cultural phenomenon, what they reveal 
about underlying social relations and power dynamics contemporary society, and 
how this process has reshaped economic models. The approach is mainly semiotic, 
and scholars seek to interpret the meaning of advertising and cultural products by 
unpacking their symbolic meaning. Through Consumer Culture Theory and notions 
of ‘cultural branding’, it is possible to envisage how specific actors negotiate their 
cultural surroundings to form ‘value’, how successful brands can captivate 
consumers and become loci of value across scales in the global marketplace. These 
strands of research have, to varying degrees, helped to reshape our view of 
economic activity as productionist, extraction-to-consumption conduits, towards a 
more-complex vision of a cultural economy, highly aestheticized, where consumers 
are heterogeneous, culturally situated and active players, constructing meaning and 
value and driving chain behavior. This knowledge is particularly relevant for the açaí 
berry, a specialty product whose spread across the globe is intimately tied with the 
encoding and recoding of highly subjective meanings constructed through chance, 
but also targeted niche marketing, at each geographical scale. 
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Knowledge about NTFP branding strategies, how they are formulated, by whom and 
on what grounds, is sparse in the existing literature. In the absence of actual data on 
the marketing and valuation strategies of NTFPs specifically, the general strategies 
that are often associated or mentioned in the literature for forest products and, more 
widely, the products that are the object of development and conservation 
interventions will be used to form the basis for analysis of this chapter. The symbolic 
dimensions of natural resource branding also lack thorough evaluation (Scherr et al., 
2004; Cunningham, 2011; Bryant, 2013; Marshall et al., 2006). In addition to the 
scalar biases and ideological barriers that impede this type of reflection within the 
NTFP literature, one can also add the traditional ‘productionist’ bias of value-chain 
literature, which has a propensity to stops at the last corporate level, ignoring the 
power of consumers. Yet exchange value is constructed within the complexities of 
the cultural backdrop, with the participation of consumers, cultural brokers and 
companies, shaping value collectively. Understanding this process is key to 
understanding how products find demand, and how the shape of that demand 
trickles all the way back up the chain.  
 
The marketer's intention is to create a sense of ‘belonging’, and encouraging the 
consumer to compare themselves to others – and ‘outdo’ them – to appeal to their 
lifestyle aspirations. The product itself can even be absent from the campaign so 
long as the brand is reinforced. What is being advertised is an attitude, a lifestyle 
(Klein, 2000). The product will be designed, packaged and marketed in a way to tie it 
to a certain cultural identity, its actual material function as a garment is entirely 
secondary. The value comes essentially from its cultural significance to a certain 
group of consumers, who themselves hold tremendous power to ‘make or break’ 
companies. Companies select images for promotional purposes that reinforce their 
brand, to market a concept with which the consumers engage from their own cultural 
situation (Moor, 2007). 
 
Branding often constitutes the most stable, if intangible, asset of a company, 
surviving changes in commercial strategy, and spreading globally. It has become the 
core of advertising practice, and a key component of management activity. Forbes 
estimates that up to 70% of top companies’ market capitalization is related to the 
brand identity, the most valuable, yet intangible, asset a company can possess 
(Clifton, 2009). Brands are the epitome of the process of simulacrum described by 
Baudrillard (Baudrillard, 1970), when the marketing signals lose all reference to 
material reality and become valued merely as symbols (Klein, 2000). 
 
These cultural processes can today be construed as an iterative construction, a 
relationship continually embellished and reinforced between companies and their 
consumers, in which the latter are presently hold a tremendous, however diffuse, 
amount of power (Wright, 2005). The ways in which consumer society creates values 
for products percolates all the way across value chains. The cultural discourses that 
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surround brands reveal underlying discourses about the actors involved and the 
value of their labor, their identity, and the power relations amongst them. In the açaí 
chain, cultural discourses around healthy lifestyles and beach culture were a key 
driver of the formation of the chain and its internationalization. Yet the associations 
with the product's origins and its ties to the forest have had varying degrees of 
relevance to different consumer audiences in each geographical scale investigated 
in the research. This has direct implications for the ways in which it is extracted, 
transformed and traded, and how value can be created and distributed, as we will 
discover in the empirical chapters. 
 
 
3.2 The commodity fetish and the obscuring of the value chain actors 
 
The commodity fetishism literature has been an important avenue for investigating 
the subjective meanings that are embodied in commodities, and their impact on 
trade relations. Research in commodity fetishism burgeoned throughout the 1980s, 
in an attempt to investigate relationships between production and consumption in an 
increasingly branded, and global, marketplace. Marx originally coined the term 
‘commodity fetishism’ to mockingly point out how, as if by some sortilege, people 
attribute value to objects, as if it were somehow inherent to them, rather than to the 
labor that went into crafting them (Appadurai, 1994). The ways in which current 
marketing strategies further obscure geographic inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth (perpetuated by patterns of attribution of value has been widely criticized by 
Marxist thinkers in the commodity fetishism literature. 
 
‘Commodity fetishism’ became a popular term, and field of research, with 
Appadurai’s publication of The Social Life of Things (1988), where he investigated, 
from an anthropological perspective, the ways in which different societies invigorate 
objects by the attribution of subjective meanings. For Appadurai, this process of 
attribution of subjective meanings is observed in many societies, from the most 
‘primitive’ to the westernized consumer society (Appadurai, 1988). Specifically, as 
regards globally stretched chains, Appadurai observes that there is a strong 
tendency to create ‘culturally forced mythologies’ about their production process. 
 
He distinguishes three kinds of trade-related mythology:  (1) mythologies constructed 
by traders, who are not preoccupied with the ‘meaning’ of the product, and only 
worry about its price fluctuation and logistic flow,  (2) mythologies produced by 
consumers, who are divorced from the origin of their product and create narratives 
around them; and (3) mythologies created by workers along the production chain, 
who have no contact with consumers and the reality the product they work on is 
meant to inhabit. In each case, Appadurai (1988) postulates, the creation of 
mythologies is the outcome of a disconnection in the flow of information between 
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actors. He describes the way in which this knowledge is not only fragmented by 
scalar obstacles, but also increasingly commodified itself.  
 
In the case of the açaí berry, this disconnection becomes very evident throughout 
the fieldwork. Actors across the chain have little knowledge of each other. 
Interviewees often had a lot of questions to ask about the other actors and their 
connection to the chain, their values and perceptions. The Ribeirinho, the primary 
extractor, and the primary cultural locus of meaning of the product are entirely 
obscured by the chain. This "asymmetry of information" is crucial to the formation of 
myths around the product for different audiences. While the beach identity can 
prevail in some parts, in other the Amazon myth is prevalent, and its associations 
with mysterious natural benefits. These myths are carefully packaged and encoded 
into the product by companies to build value within each consumer market.  
 
In fact, Appadurai pays particular attention to the manipulation of this knowledge 
fragmented by the advertising industry. Based on the notions of aesthetisation first 
proposed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1979), he highlights the way in which advertising 
creates a certain aura of achievable exclusivity (‘desirable yet reachable’) for mass-
produced goods. He regards this as the epitome of the commodification of the 
consumer himself, as lifestyles become increasingly symbolic. It is the potential 
attributes of his existence (from sex appeal, to sophistication, or health) that are 
appropriated into signs, then ‘branded’ (Appadurai, 1988). 
 
While Appadurai focused on observing the process of fetishisation, many 
researchers have aimed to challenge it. In No Logo (2009) Naomi Klein describes, 
with abundant empirical detail, the way in which capitalism has co-opted the public 
sphere to engender consumer behaviors by taking advantage of the breaks in 
communication generated by globalized production modes. The sportswear 
company Nike multiplied its advertising spending more than tenfold in the 1990s 
(Klein, 2009), to create an image of an attitude, a way of life, for its brand. Not only 
does the company advertise, it promotes events, sponsors cultural manifestations, 
and produces web content. In this sense Nike, does not simply sell sportswear –it 
sells ‘values’. The product itself becomes a conduit for the expression of brand 
identity, over and above its direct use. Klein (2009) quotes its CEO Phil Knight: 
 
 “Nike is a marketing-oriented company, and the product is our most important 
marketing tool.”  
 
Klein goes on to describe how different big brands, from Absolut tequila, Starbucks, 
to fashion houses like Louis Vuitton or Versace, have overtaken the cultural 
landscape, promoting capitalist ideas, spreading out production to poor countries, 
eroding labor rights, and enforcing a mode of living that conflates identity and 
consumption (Klein, 2009). 
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For many of the academics and writers that have embraced the concept of 
commodity fetishism, this is not an innocuous process. They view it as necessarily 
nefarious, serving to obscure gross inequalities inherent in existing trade patterns 
(Miller, 1995; Jackson, 1999; Castree, 2001). They engage in commodity-chain 
analysis to expose inequality. For the consumer, Nike offers a way to overcome 
obstacles and fulfill aspirations. In reality, the company is harsher at source, with 
children working in sweatshops under slave-like conditions (Lasn, 1999). These 
authors argues that there is a disconnection that enables corporations to divert 
attention from the immoral material reality of global trade patterns (Hudson and 
Hudson, 2003). The current branding and marketing impetus is thus viewed as mere 
extension of the capitalist project, a new form of economic colonialism, meant to 
extract further value from the impoverished periphery, hidden behind a veil of cultural 
(mis)communication. Undoubtedly, the complete absence of the Ribeirinho and the 
means of production of the açaí berry from the minds of the actors across the chain 
create a real impediment to the rebalancing of value distribution in their favor. 
 
The growth of branding as an expansion of capitalism was spurned by the neoliberal 
policies of the late 20th century. The mass privatizations, and international mergers 
and business acquisition frenzy of the 1990s resulted in considerable consolidation 
of power for global conglomerates. Local companies, and national brands, were 
bought off by foreign businesses, either to be adapted to their core strategy, or, in 
many instances, to be replaced by a foreign brand. Many national brands and 
companies were simply pushed out of the market (Moor, 2007). The underlying 
causes for the difficulties in ‘upgrading’ so important to the value-chain literature can 
be viewed in this light. There is a fundamental division of labor between the 
developed and developing world. The process of keeping ‘value’ –through the 
semiotic process of exchange value formation – remains in the West. The chain 
activities that GVC/GPN scholars describe as branding, design activities, product 
development, packaging, are in fact fundamentally immaterial. The economies of the 
core of rich countries have become increasingly ‘service economies’, with no real 
material dimension; they are factories of the immaterial, packagers of discourses, 
storytellers of the global capitalist hoax. Meanwhile for the productor economies of 
the Global South, who sell natural resources, or assemble goods that are designed 
and branded elsewhere, value is often represented as ‘use value’ based on ‘labor 
costs’ and resource-extraction costs, and studied through the input-output lens. 
There is no semiotic dimension to the value of their labor. In this way, the immaterial 
society reproduces the colonial trading patterns much as described by World 
Systems Theorists.  In the case of the açaí, for example, we see clearly that no 
Brazilian brand has managed to tap into the markets of the Developed countries 
where açaí is nonetheless abundant. They have been unable to set up because of 
lack of capital and logistics, but also because of their inability, or unwillingness, to 
take up a place in that collective imaginary. With much of the cultural discourse of 
globalization being fabricated and disseminated from core to periphery, there would 
be little space for new messages travelling in the other direction. What travels out of 
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Brazil is a non-descript commodity, which is transformed into a valuable product in 
developed consumer markets. 
 
The vision of a one-way, overbearing mass media, shaping the collective imaginary 
and obscuring reality, was first proposed by the Frankfurt school, including Adorno 
(1997), Marcus (1995), Benjamin (2008), who after the second world war sought 
refuge in the USA. They built on the theory of Gramsci (1971) of hegemony, to 
highlight the ways in which cultural industries legitimized notions of commodification 
and massification for the benefit of capitalism and the solidification of consumer 
society, much in the same way of thinking as developed in the commodity fetishism 
literature. These researchers theorized marketing and advertising as malicious 
instruments of segmentation of markets, creating false differentiations amongst 
consumers, while enabling the marketing of almost identical, mass-produced goods. 
This strategy obliterates real cultural specificity, creating a massified, conformist and 
risk-averse cultural and marketing landscape (Adorno, 1997; Holt, 2006; Durham 
and Kellner, 2009). Habermas (1970), a late scholar of the Frankfurt School, 
described how the concentration of ‘firing power’ in mass media resulting from 
collusion of corporate entities has consolidated the rule of capitalism, and the power 
of big corporations. 
 
Social Domination operates through distorted communication, that is, between the 
marketer having much greater power than the consumer to dictate the codes of 
communication (Habermas, 1970; Adorno, 1997; Holt 2006; Durham and Kellner, 
2009). In such a Marxist-inspired tradition, power is perceived to lie in production 
Their approach is strongly based on the political economy that has spawned the 
World Systems Theory discussed above, and the unveiling of the corporate 
structures that dictate the production of certain messages, much as the commodity 
fetishism literature would do. The consumer is considered a dupe, powerless and 
oppressed by overwhelmingly repetitive mass media messages churned out by 
highly through Hollywood films, glossy magazines, and conservative newspapers. 
The predominance of Fordist capitalist models, and the explosion of mass-produced 
goods reinforced this vision propagated by the cultural theorists of the time, who 
feared for the total annihilation of individuality in favor of consuming, apolitical 
automatons. This is the vision presented by commodity fetishism scholars, for the 
most part. It is also the dominant paradigm in value-chain research, as described in 
the previous chapter. Consumption is a passive act, mandated by corporate 
conglomerates through massified messages (Adorno, 1997; Holt 2002, 2006; 
Durham and Kellner, 2009). 
 
Against this obscuring of material disparity through commodification, David Harvey 
has strongly positioned himself, calling to ‘lift the veil on this geographical and social 
ignorance’ (Harvey, 1990). From the Marxist commodity fetishism perspective, all 
power lies in production, and the market, where consumers interact, is an apolitical 
sphere. Consumers are entirely passive, unable to see beyond this veil (Goodman, 
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2002; Goodman and DuPuis, 2002). Many authors propose that we aim our 
analytical guns at defetishising commodities, and exposing the unspoken inequalities 
in the global production system. Through providing sufficient information about 
production, we would empower consumers to take political action and redress 
inequalities (Lasn, 1999; Hudson and Hudson, 2003). 
 
These works have prompted a gamut of ethical consumption practices, which aim to 
bring information about production practices to consumers, and imbue consumption 
with an ethical, reflexive and political dimension. A plethora of new modes of 
consumption has emerged, be it Fairtrade, local, recyclable, organic, reflecting a 
host of political and ethical preoccupations, mostly from an environmental or 
development/global equity perspective. The rise of the consumer activist has been 
amply documented (Castree, 2001; Bryant and Goodman, 2004). These new forms 
of consumption have direct impact on value chains, as they seek to redress 
inequalities through targeted interventions. For example, Fairtrade products pay 
particular attention to labor standards, and aim to redistribute more value at the base 
of the chain through premiums offered to certified producers. For açaí in particular, 
organic certification is an important strategy for adding value in consumer markets. 
 
 
3.3 The semiotics of ecobranding and their impact on value formation 
and distribution of NTFPS 
 
For NTFPs in general, ‘eco’ and ‘ethical’ are often crucial consumer myths. 
Considering the dominant discourses regarding tropical forests and their inhabitants, 
it is the ‘natural/eco’ and ‘Fairtrade’ consumer myths that are most often conferred 
upon NTFPs by development interventions, and are discussed in the literature.  
(Jensen, 2009; Achabou and Dekhili, 2013; Sénéchal et al., 2013). The semiotic 
implications of this type of branding strategy has direct impact on how these 
products are value. In a detailed semiotic analysis of some of these products, Bryant 
and Goodman (2004) examine some of the underlying discursive assumptions that 
shape the consumption of these products. Eco branding is predicated on the 
‘endemic myth’ of a pristine nature, constructed in conjunction with years of 
conservation discourse. Buying an ‘eco’ or ‘rainforest friendly’ product allows people 
to reconnect with nature and ‘save the planet’. It also leads the consumer to 
associations about exoticism and adventure that have been engendered through 
exposure to wildlife documentaries and colorful images of tribes, and 
development/conservation praxis (Cook et al., 2004). 
 
The work of Barthes (1972) allows us to further unpack these discourses through the 
analysis of images used in visual communication. Barthes created a technique of 
interpretation of cultural products to explore their structures, significance and effects. 
He describes how current cultural paradigms obliterate historicity and materiality, 
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and how objects are substituted for signs, that are represented in ways that recreate 
meanings abstractly. In Rhetoric of the Image, for example, he applies his semiotic 
technique to analyze an advertisement for Panzani pasta. He shows how the advert, 
made by a Canadian company for a French audience, successfully uses red, white 
and green coloring, and images of peppers and tomatoes to denote ‘Italianicity’ 
(Barthes 1972). The actual identity of the product is of little importance in relation to 
its semiotic portrayal. Cook and Crang's (1996) discussion of geographical 
knowledge, for example, is very much reminiscent to Barthes’ pioneering work. 
 
For Barthes, signs are combined to form mythologies that express wider cultural 
ideas. These mythologies serve to obliterate history and dissent, and naturalize the 
status quo, the existing social order. This creates a scenario where people do not 
question ‘the rules of the game’ – motivations are interpreted as ‘reasons’. These 
mythologies maintain bourgeois ideology and capitalism. By making acts and images 
appear natural and quotidian, they are depoliticized, naturalized, and remain in place 
undisputed, following closely the viewpoint of the Frankfurt School (see above). In 
this way, semiotics can allow us to observe how ideologies are enforced, and social 
order reproduced. This method of semiotic analysis, and the investigation of 
symbols, though much improved upon, has become a key feature Cultural Studies 
and brand analysis (Barthes, 1972). It provides us with a step-by-step account of 
how fetishes are fabricated. 
 
Many products with ‘ethnic’ appeal tap into these exotic/’othering’ myths of 
developing world communities. It is perhaps important to note that the word ‘ethnic’ 
has a very specific connotation today, to use Barthes’ terminology. 
 
According to the Oxford English dictionary: 
 
 
‘Ethnic: 1. Of or relating to a population subgroup (within a larger or dominant 
national or cultural group) with a common national or cultural tradition… 
 
             .3 Characteristic of or belonging to a non-Western cultural tradition’ 10 
 
 
The term ‘ethnic’, when relating to products, is thus shorthand for ‘Other’, or ‘non-
Western’. It falls prey to the usual prejudices to which the ‘Other’ is subject. The 
world’s cultural diversity is reduced to a ‘cultural mosaic’ created for Western 
entertainment  (Cook and Crang, 1996). Although the latter type of product has 
found some niche markets, they seldom succeed in becoming desirable objects in 
consumer societies. They are considered to be naive, or representing a lack of 
culture, wild and unsophisticated like those who produce them, and their design and 
																																																						
10		http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/ethnic	
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branding cannot compete with the more sophisticated alternatives available. The 
overall visual identity is very different from the more sophisticated exotic products 
marketed by Western luxury brands. There are clear differentiations between these 
two nature myths in the branding of these products. 
 
‘Ethnic’ products are usually sold in specialty shops, and at a much lower price 
points when compared to Western goods. The packaging is usually colorful, if not 
garish, in line with modern notions of ‘ethnic’ in the mainstream media, with imagery 
displaying colorful ‘typical’ clothing and decorations. As Bourdieu points out, this 
‘maximalist’ imagery is in stark opposition to the refined restraint preferred by 
bourgeois audiences (Bourdieu 1979). The cultural attributes that are valued are 
precisely their lack of a specific culture, their primitivism and guilelessness. The 
resulting imagery is that of racial difference and rainbow colors, a pastiche of 
Otherness, with little aspirational value for the sophisticated western consumer 
(Arnold, 2000; Bryant and Goodman, 2004). 
 
Carol Hendrickson’s (2002) analysis of the portrayal of Guatemalan handicrafts in 
over 350 mail-order catalogues in the USA provides a rich depiction of the process of 
representation of ‘the primitive’. She unpacks the cultural assumptions that lie 
beneath the written text and images portrayed in these catalogues, such as the 
classic L.L. Bean, to Oxfam, to Robert Redford’s Sundance catalogue. She 
describes how the catalogues choose exotic words such as ‘jungle’, or ‘highlands’, to 
denote mystical settings, and describe the goods as ‘hand-woven’ to denote a lack of 
technological sophistication. The use of ‘realist’ imagery, in stark contrast to that 
used by fashion magazines, falls in line with the documentary style that has become 
such an essential element of the primitive trope (Hendrickson, 2002). 
 
Herein lies indeed the trap of Fairtrade, ‘ethnic’ or alternative/ethical trade branding 
strategies for NTFPs. There has been a significant, and often successful, effort to 
find markets for goods, and many consumers are more than willing to choose them. 
These markets can, in some cases, provide potential benefits to communities. Yet 
there is no real defetishisation at work, rather a substitution of one fetish for another: 
the charity/development, ‘Other’, ‘primitive’ signification, with little cultural distinction. 
The premium that can be added to a product that makes it ‘charitable’, or ‘Fairtrade’, 
or the type of ‘eco’ reserved for the primitive, appears much smaller than that can be 
added to make it aspirational (the type of ‘eco’ reserved for the Danish restaurant 
Noma, for example11 ). By creating an image of the ‘primitive’ that is caricatural, a 
‘glass ceiling’ may be created for the exchange value of the goods they trade. 
Research has shown that consumers buy things they deem useful/desirable, and 
high quality, and place a high value on brands, eco or fair attributes are usually 
secondary (Young et al., 2010). 
 
																																																						
11	http://noma.dk/	
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‘Fairtrade’ or ‘eco’ is a charitable attractant, rather than an aspirational purchase, 
with advertisements typically portraying abundant wildlife, or a poor, unglamorous 
and culturally uninspiring subsistence peasant, smiling gratefully – the primitive 
trope. There is no brand, no aspiration, and thus little added value. In breaking the 
fetish, it is probable we are also limiting the formation of exchange value (Achabou 
and Dekhili, 2013) Yet for NTFPs in particular, production is a specialized, labor-
intensive activity, which would require high price premiums to generate development.  
Perhaps this type of imaging positions its products in an unfavorable niche.  
 
French anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1966) unwittingly provided an interesting 
account of how ‘Fairtrade’ or ‘Ecotrade’, can come to devalue producers in the 
Global South in The Gift, The Form and Reason for Exchange In Archaic Societies 
(Mauss, 1966). His writings are a popular theoretical basis for discussions on 
Fairtrade and eco consumption, by providing evidence in other societies of the 
importance of gift giving as a form of extra-economic exchange (Fisher, 2007). 
Mauss details the way in which the act of gift giving creates a social bond between 
giver and recipient in Polynesia, Melanesia, and northwest America. He sees this 
exchange as an important counterpoint to the representation of ‘Homo economicus’ 
of utilitarian economists. He proposes that we look at these pre-capitalist societies as 
examples of how we can reclaim a social dimension in trade relations, and sees in 
this behavior the core of social solidarity that becomes the welfare state, for 
example. 
 
Yet one aspect of the gift exchange that is often underplayed in the literature is the 
position of the recipient. The act of giving presupposes an obligation to reciprocate 
on behalf of the receiver. In Mauss' own writing, when the receiver fails to 
reciprocate, they lose honor and status. What is being exchanged here is not just a 
particular good, but prestige. The recipient of an unreciprocated gift (i.e. charity) is 
undermined by the act, losing face and becoming inferior to the giver. It is easy to 
follow Mauss’ (1966) example of the ‘social security net’ in contemporary Britain, to 
see how recipients of benefits are demonized and devalued into ‘benefit scroungers’ 
and ‘wasters’ by the popular media. 
 
In an era of commodity fetishism, where the symbolic underpinnings of trade are of 
core significance, this dimension of gift giving is particularly revealing. If we contend 
that buying a Fairtrade product, and often an ‘eco’ product, is both a purchase and a 
gift, the transaction is perceived as a charitable action, in which the receiver loses 
face, while the buyer gains honor and social standing. The merely optimistic, 
unreflexive notion of ‘gift giving’ fails to expose the power dynamics at play (Fisher, 
2007). Added to the existing inequality in the relation between western consumer 
and primitive trope, we compile an added layer of submission through the ‘charitable 
purchase’. It might well be that the portrayal of the ‘primitive’ in Fairtrade and eco 
trade endeavors contributes to their devaluation, rather than create an aspirational 
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image that could justify, in the contemporary world of simulacrum and branding, the 
addition of value to their products (Norris, 2013). 
 
This could explain why Fairtrade marketing is moving away from a ‘break the fetish’ 
strategy towards one that centres on the superior quality of its products. In The 
Mirror of Consumption: Celebritisation, Developmental Consumption and the Shifting 
Cultural Politics of Fair Trade, Goodman (2010) criticizes the move towards more 
‘mainstream marketing techniques’, such as endorsements by celebrities, and 
‘quality’ over ‘morals’, which he posits creates barriers to entry and puts the product 
in an ‘iron cage’. In an attempt to move to a more aspirational line, idyllic sceneries 
have substituted the images of the farmers in promotional campaigns. Celebrities 
now appear more often endorsing the brands than the actual producers and their 
communities. This seems to indicate that Fairtrade marketers have caught on to the 
‘Maussian paradox’. Yet he admonishes the loss of a ‘political soul’ in the movement, 
a ‘Faustian bargain’, however successful it seems to be (Goodman, 2010). 
 
The article (Goodman, 2010) does not consider whether traders and producers in the 
developing world are more interested in successfully marketing their products, rather 
than critiquing capitalism. In general, the literature does not commonly ponder how 
the producers prefer to be represented. For Goodman, it is a loss that Fairtrade is 
being co-opted (arguably very marginally if we analyze the current imagery 
associated with it) into mainstream marketing, and losing its political edge. He does 
not address whether the producer was ever interested in being a political pawn in the 
first place. Yet the producer, when heard, as Sarah Lyon points out in her study, is 
most interested in getting more money for the product, and often has very little 
interest in the wider political or ecological battle (Lyon, 2006). As Spivak points out, 
here, the subordinate does not speak. The plight is instrumentalized into a political 
agenda that the producer may or may not be comfortable with (Spivak, 1988). 
 
By expressing their revolt with globalized capitalism in the branding of products, the 
NGO community, social enterprises, and those involved in a variety of endeavors 
that seek to redress injustices in trade relations may end up betraying the best 
interest of communities by using trade as a site for their own politics. They 
appropriate these images and their meanings to raise critiques to Western capitalism 
that often escape the grasp, or are in stark contrast to the worldview of the people 
being portrayed (Sadath et al., 2013). People in the developing world are commonly 
in favor of globalization and trade (Morgan, 2010). The critique being 
instrumentalized by the appropriation of these people’s identities is not necessarily 
one that they would support. Does this type of product attribution best serve the 
economic objective of maximizing value capture? The literature on certification’s 
impact seems to suggest otherwise, and discussions on the actual value of ‘primitive’ 
branding have yet to engage more deeply with this question. Instead, what we see is 
the reproduction of hegemonic discourses, that reinforce structural inequalities in 
World Trade relations, in a very Gramscian fashion (Gramsci, 1971). These products 
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are unwittingly marketed in a way that does not disrupt existing cultural norms, and, 
consequently, values. 
 
The primitive so attached to NTFPs has become another ‘fetish’ of post-modern 
society, a trope in our pantheon of symbols. A person lives in the ‘jungle’ irrespective 
of whether that be somewhere in South East Asia or the North of Brazil. The people 
are depicted wearing ‘traditional clothes’, colorful, and often revealing, seemingly 
defenseless, and innocent, wild and unsophisticated - something that must be 
protected, almost as if an endangered species. Through documentaries, and 
magazines, such as National Geographic and the Discovery Channel, we learn that 
these are exotic beings, like the jaguar or the orangutan, and that the people of the 
‘developing world’ are mostly different from us, rather than inherently like us. Here 
lies the fundamental hegemonic discursive relation that Said (1979) describes as an 
unequal, inferior, although picturesque ‘Other’, and as such our dominance over 
indigenous forest dwellers is somehow justified. And therefore they are nothing like 
the sophisticated forager of European gastronomical circles (Said, 1979).  
 
Expanding from Said, the work of anthropologist Marianna Torgovnick (1991) brings 
insight into the representation of what we call ‘indigenous people’ or ‘the primitive’ 
(Torgovnick, 1991). This bears particular importance for the notion of exoticism that 
these ‘wild’ associations have on the valuation of NTFPs. Amazonian communities 
remain a nebulous construct in the Western collective imaginary (Schmink, 2003).  
Starting from the inception of ethnographic investigation, she unpacks the ways in 
which representations of the ‘primitive’ are riddled with hidden prejudices and 
misappropriations that produce a patronizing, and infantilizing portrait of other ways 
of living. She shows how ethnography has contributed to the creation of tropes that 
represent these people as ‘libidinous, irrational, violent, dangerous’, while we in the 
West occupy the high ground of ‘proper’ civilization. 
 
As such, the primitive exists to tell us something about ourselves in the West, as in 
the idealized pre-capitalist fantasies of Left-wing philosophers, or in the new 
‘guardians of the forest’ trope, adopted in sustainable development discourses, a 
counterpoint to the greedy consumerist Westerner (Torgovnick, 1991). From the 
beginning, the adoption of ‘indigenist’ discourses in the West has been tainted with 
such preconceptions, shaping the development of NTFP interventions and 
commercialization. The actual impact of these new consumer practices and 
labels/brands on labor standards or environmental wellbeing is highly questionable 
(Bernstein and Campling, 2006; Morgan, 2010; Marston, 2013; Guthman, 2003; 
Bacon, 2005). Hudson and Hudson point out that only 50% of Fairtrade branded 
coffee is sold as such, because producers fail to find buyers willing to pay the 
premium associated with the certification (Hudson and Hudson, 2003). Meanwhile, 
brands that peddle the classic fetish of ‘aspiration’, such as Starbucks or Nespresso, 
continue to flourish. 
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Meanwhile an entirely different, luxurious and culturally rich myth can apply to 
NTFPs, with truffles, for example, reverencing the highbrow forager in an authentic 
and valued terroir. For example, the restaurant Noma in Copenhagen, currently 
ranked as the number 1 restaurant in the World, specializes in serving NTFPs. Yet 
the language they use, and the way in which extractivists are valued, is entirely 
different from the developing world NTFP collector. Noma’s motto, as stated in their 
website, reads: 
 
‘In an effort to shape our way of cooking, we look to our landscape and delve into our 
ingredients and culture, hoping to rediscover our history and shape our future.’12  
 
The nature described here is one that is culturally rich, of the highest sophistication, 
much like the organic movement described by Guthman (2003) in California. There 
is no mention of extractivism, or poverty-reduction and forest conservation. Rather, 
the language adopted is that of ‘foraging’. The restaurant’s book dedicates its first 
section to the life stories of each of the company’s supplying ‘foragers’, highlighting 
the cultural richness of their traditional activities (Redzepi, 2010). Foraging has 
become a gastronomical trend in Western restaurants, an activity of the highest 
sophistication, that takes place in a nature that is cultivated, and steeped in tradition. 
This is an aspirational, luxurious ‘nature’, i.e. one that is rich with exchange value.  
 
Yet NTFP research and development praxis remains trapped in an ideological 
contradiction, seeking to harness the benefits of globalization, and yet fundamentally 
mistrustful of it, unwilling to exploit its workings. In this vein, trade is good, but is also 
bad, in that it needs to be fairer. Consumer society can be viewed as the source of 
our woes, but also a possible solution. Indigenous communities are pure, innocent 
forest guardians that need to be ‘empowered’. ‘Alternative’ pockets of trade are 
created, where actors can do things differently, patronizing both consumers and 
communities, and creating a distorted lens through which they communicate with 
each other, heavily framed by specific ideologies, though openly declaring itself 
capable of ‘breaking the fetish’. Other forms of value addition and harnessing 
demand are deemed exploitative and unworthy. The impact on value formation of the 
representation of these communities embedded in the identity of their products is 
typically ignored. The way in which meanings and relations affect overall chain 
formation, and condition development outcomes remains underexploited. An 
approach that contemplates these discursive constructions and their underlying 
meaning, while not losing sight of material constraints, could unlock the discussion 
and provide valuable new insight. Fundamentally, we must examine what myths are 
created for NTFPs, and for what purpose. Are they instrumentalized to critique to 
capitalist project, or to maximize value for forest peoples? What would they prefer? 
 
																																																						
12	http://noma.dk/	
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Regarding the impact of these myths on NTFP value chains, the literature about 
green or ecosocial production, outlined above, indicates that dominant upgrading 
strategies are highly contingent on the marketing myths employed in western 
markets tied to Fairtrade or organic certification. Some studies juxtapose the 
semiotic value of certification versus community impact (Lyon, 2006). Most often, 
companies with strong brands in consumer markets capture the overwhelming 
majority of these price fluctuations (Fitter, 2009; Johannessen and Wilhite, 2010). 
However, the type of messaging involved can have consequences for the stability of 
demand, the shaping of the chain, and the type of intervention operating at the 
community level.  
 
For the açaí berry, one might argue that the absence of an appealing myth of the 
Ribeirinho, or of the Amazon, creates in fact a barrier for the successful marketing of 
its products, particularly its NTFPS. We will see in the empirical chapter that one of 
the best options for increasing incomes at the base of the chain would be to diversify 
into other products. However, there is no cultural backdrop against which to market 
them in a significant way, based on their existing cultural relevance. Yet a myth of 
forest primitivism has not proven appealing to açaí's consumers, and as we see here 
is not likely to add significant value.  Either these other products' myths are 
reinvented like the açaí, or a meaningful identity for the people of Pará must be 
carved out in the collective imaginary. These arguments are revisited when we trace 
the chain and formation of meaning of the açaí berry throughout the field work. 
 
At present, the identity of the açaí berry has few ties to its Amazonian roots, or 
ecological implications of production. It is the beachy identity of the product, far 
removed from its original identity, which has enabled it to find a place in premium 
markets worldwide. Again, here, although many might argue that in order to value 
producers we must break this fetish, perhaps in this case embracing the fetish and 
allowing for new meanings to be associated to the product were the key to the 
formation of the chain and creation of exchange value, by connecting culturally with 
consumers in a way that would be meaningful to them. Still, organic certification is an 
important marketing tool for opening up international market, although it is of little 
relevance for producers.  
 
3.4 Reconfiguring meanings – postmodernism, consumer agency and 
the iterative construction of the açaí myth 
 
The process of reconfiguring meanings and attributing value can indeed be seen as 
a  more free flowing, iterative process than the top-down representation of scholars 
such as Klein, as has shown to be the case for the açaí berry (the "new" myth 
occurred naturally, on the beaches of Rio in the early 1990s). Despite the cultural 
barriers that condition exchange value formation and distribution, contemporary 
consumer culture is gaining strength and independence, particularly with the onset of 
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the internet.  Consumers are increasingly understood to reconfigure, and co-create 
myths, in ways that can hold potential for meaningful and positive development 
outcomes for forest products. Many scholars have seen space for dissent, and 
reconfiguration of meaning – and value – at the consumer level. The ways in which 
the açaí myth has been reconfigured, unwillingly, by consumer behavior, irrespective 
of targeted marketing, as it has travelled across scales is telling of this phenomenon, 
and the importance it can have for building markets for NTFPs in general. The 
formation of its dominating myth, of beach/health, was not the object of a planned 
corporate plan to obscure its origins, but an iterative construction that happened 
spontaneously, through an amalgamation of lifestyle trends.  
 
In a much less negative vein than his colleagues in the Frankfurt School, Walter 
Benjamin (2008) highlights that even in the 1930s the ways in which consumer 
society liberated individuals to express themselves creatively, in a polymorphous and 
ambivalent ‘carnival of realities’, without the restrictions of traditional artistic codes 
existed. People have choices, and can construct their individuality in much freer 
ways than previous mores allowed. Artistic forms were democratized through 
technology, ushering a new era of self-expression. For Benjamin, there is meaningful 
enjoyment and self-expression in the spectacle (Benjamin, 2008). This less austere 
point of view allows some space for individual expression in consumer society, and 
the recognition of consumption as a meaningful, political situation. As consumer 
society, has continued to evolve, people have become accustomed to the constant 
bombardment of mass media, the appropriation of cultural spaces by corporations, 
and other marketing ‘trickeries’. Despite pervasive hegemonic messaging, individual, 
counterhegemonic spaces and behaviors continue to flourish. Countercultural 
movements continue to emerge, producing a constant flow of discourses and 
spaces. The polymorphous configurations of subcultures (youth, Latino, LGBT) 
continue to proliferate, resisting the massifying pull of corporate culture forms (Holt, 
2002). Globalization did not obliterate cultural differences, and massified shared 
meanings coexist with local, situated cultural forms. Postmodern reality would be, 
above all, hybrid, although unequally and often problematically so (Featherstone, 
2007). Acts of resistance are diffuse, rather than revolutionary, forming a complex 
relationship between individuals and consumers, constantly coevolving. Consumer 
culture theory shows us how marketers quickly caught on, coaxing with irony, humor 
and artistry, relying on taste rather than forceful repetition. Rather than reinforcement 
through repetition, marketers began to weave their brands into existing cultural 
trends in favor of their brands, thus commodifying all cultural expression (Holt, 2002). 
It was the birth of ‘cool’, as brands used often ironic messaging to present 
themselves as bearers of authentic cultural context (for example, sponsoring rock 
tours), distancing themselves from mere commercial trading. 
 
The recognition of individual agency as formative of counterhegemonic spaces 
would find its most accomplished theoretical expression in the model proposed by 
the Birmingham School of Stuart Hall (1973). In the 1970s, Stuart Hall and the 
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Birmingham School highlighted the ways in which people would reconfigure and 
‘hybridize’ signs. They would reimagine the ‘semiotic process’ from a new viewpoint, 
postulating that the masses were not entirely passive receivers, but active producers 
of meaning. In Encoding and Decoding Hall (1973) postulates that for the discursive 
cycle to come to fruition, it must be translated into social practices: ‘If no ‘meaning’ is 
taken, there can be no ‘consumption’’ (Hall, 1973; see also Durham and Kellner, 
2009). 
 
Hall, in exploring the ways in which television audiences decode messages, 
proposes three different strategies: the dominant-hegemonic position, the negotiated 
position and the oppositional position. In the first case, such is the force of elites in 
enforcing a point of view, and so ‘natural/technical’ is the form of the message that it 
is received and decoded exactly as expected: reproducing the expected hegemonic 
signification, and enforcing the dominant ideological apparatus. In the second case, 
that of the negotiated code, audiences can identify the dominant, expected 
discourse, while still leaving space for additional, more-situated interpretation by the 
receiver – there is some wiggle room (Hall, 1973). 
 
In the opposing position, the receiver decodes the message and reinterprets it 
according to another framework, ascribing another, non-intended meaning to the 
message. In this way, although the Birmingham School recognizes the unequal 
power between marketers and consumers in their communication and the power of 
images as symbolic vessels of ideology, it opens space for a more-nuanced view, 
where reconfiguration and dissent on the part of the receiving public is possible. 
From this perspective, the work of semiotic interpretation is not uniform, but manifold 
and positional. Messages can have several meanings according to who decodes 
them. The interpretation of the semiotic academic is only one, and empirical 
research must be employed to hear consumers and investigate different processes 
of decoding. 
 
This paradigm, labelled ‘reception theory’ (Hall, 1973), opened space for the analysis 
of how people receive and reconfigure the signs they receive. Marketing is no longer 
just solely about cultural engineering, but rather an iterative, if asymmetric, process 
between corporations and individuals, with ample space for resistance. Marketing 
embeds itself into a wider societal dialogue in the public sphere, with significant 
levels of dissent and hybridization. 
 
The prerogative of the semiologist savant, and their unique ability to decode 
ideologies in symbols, is ultimately challenged, though semiotics itself remains a 
valuable tool. There is no single ‘right’ interpretation for a message, no unique code. 
The advertiser no longer controls the outcome and forces the formation of value. The 
process of creating, encoding, decoding, and interpreting, symbols is tentative, and 
plural, as is value formation. Rather than a programmatic, predictable activity, 
branding and advertising are better interpreted as a dynamic dialect relationship 
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between marketers and consumers (Holt, 2002). While companies increasingly 
develop new techniques to add value to brands, consumers increase their reflexive 
ability and resist the homogenizing messages created by advertisers, in an ongoing 
‘tug of war’. To interpret their symbols, and identify discourses, one must identify 
positionality, listen to consumers, and embrace the multiplicity of forms of decoding 
that are possible in postmodern society. 
 
In particular, concerning consumers’ relation to commodities, the work of Bourdieu 
(1979) also opposes Baudrillard’s notion of total political erosion (Baudrillard, 1970), 
by observing the ways in which varying levels of cultural capital enable individuals to 
judge commodities according to codes of good taste, reproducing social difference. 
Although mass media may be attempting to annihilate all real meaning, individuals 
still reconfigure goods in their own lives to represent their social position. People are 
endowed with ‘symbolic capital’ which betrays their class positioning and personal 
trajectory in life, and are naturalized to appear instinctive, in a blend of fashion 
choices and general demeanor. Direct class conflicts are effaced in favor of taste, 
the ultimate arbiter of social relations. Although marketing messages, and fashion, 
no longer follow a homogenous pattern, people somehow still manage to express 
differentiation and class through their own interpretation of these signs. 
Consumption is thus a political practice (Bourdieu 1979). Cultural expression and the 
symbolic meanings of commodities become forever entwined, and mutually reinforce 
each other, forming a cornerstone of the post-modern era. People no longer 
subscribe to a fixed identity, but rather to fluid, overlapping, ‘fragmented identities’, 
for example stating that they are health conscious, because they buy low fat yoghurt, 
or a gourmet, because they bought imported French yoghurt. The constant 
appropriation and remixing of signifiers by the advertising industry, and the dizzying 
pastiches that result as individuals receive, interpret and reconfigure meanings are 
what differentiate post-modernity, where power lies in diffuse practices, shared 
between spaces of production and consumption. Identity is not dissolved by passive 
consumption, rather it is performed through active, meaningful consumption 
(Simmons, 2008). 
 
Academic researchers have increasingly employed ethnographic methods to 
investigate consumers as the locus of creation of value, rather than mere arbiters. 
Within cultural studies, the research conducted by Katz and Liebes in 1986 in the 
reception of the soap opera ‘Dallas’ by four different ethnic groups in Israel and the 
USA is a commonly cited illustration of these notions of hybrid reception. For 
example, while Russians distance themselves from the plot by discussing the 
storyline based on assumptions such as ‘capitalists behave like this’, the Americans 
are prone to identify personally with the storyline, and compare characters to people 
in their direct social circle. Different cultural contexts enable different modes of 
interpretation, and homogenous cultural messages are thus reimagined through 
hybrid interpretation practices (Katz and Liebes, 1984). 
 
 
 
Page 64 of 249 
 
As regards commodities, Miller’s study of Coca-Cola in Trinidad provides a 
perspective on how brand meanings are reconfigured in different contexts (Miller, 
1998). Yet this study makes clear that local decoding should not be interpreted as an 
equaling of power between corporations and consumers, because their messages 
remain overarching, global and pervasive, despite the existence of some variation 
between groups, based on place, gender, or class. There is, nonetheless, an 
apparent constant tug of war, as cultural values and commodities morph, through the 
dialectic relationship between companies and consumers, where aesthetics and 
taste becomes increasingly prevalent forms of hybrid value creation, and consumers 
increasingly navigate multiple diffuse identity projects.  
 
In recent times, through marketing praxis, the recognition of the consumer as a locus 
of value co-creation has led to the now dominant paradigm of ‘emotional branding’. 
Fournier’s (1998) notion of ‘brand relations’ has pushed marketers to evolve brand 
management into emotional territory, seeking to build affective relationships between 
brands and consumers, and generating brand communities. Emotional Branding: 
The new Paradigm for Connecting Brands to People (Gobe, 2001), brought the 
advances in academic research to marketing praxis, and created a new way of 
branding (Gobe, 2001; Merz et al., 2009). Marketers now sought to create ‘brand 
stories’ that succeeded in becoming part of consumers’ life stories to link to their 
social networks, this phenomenon has been observed by ethnographic research in 
brand communities (Muniz and O’guinn, 2001; Thompson et al., 
2006). Value is created through this iterative relationship. This tug-of-war between 
the homogenizing forces of mediated advertising messages with globalized 
commodity production, as well as local reinterpretation and social difference, is 
explored in the evolving literature on cultural studies, anthropology and geography 
(Ozanne and Murray, 1995; Murray 2002). While many scholars see this process as 
a manifestation of the further erosion of place and identity in the global landscape 
like Baudrillard (1998), others see brands as complex, and subject to 
heterogeneous, meaningful reinterpretation (Luna and Gupta, 2001; Pike 2009). 
 
This viewpoint would very much inform the empirical work of Commodity Circuits 
literature such as that of Cook and Crang (1996), and the discussion of creolization 
present in the work of Hudson (Hudson, 2004). Cook and Crang urge us to ‘embrace 
the fetish’: they observe the inexorability of this process in contemporary society, and 
encourage an analysis of the process to work towards better social ends, rather than 
seek to dismantle it altogether (Cook and Crang, 1996; Jackson et al., 2006). In this 
perspective, the process of fetishization is seen as inevitability. It is assumed that 
attempts to dismantle these fetishes through the formulation of new knowledge about 
the origins of commodities only create new fetishes (Crang et al., 2003). The authors 
highlight the ways in which different modes of knowledge created by producers and 
used by consumers in the circulation of commodities shape material outcomes, and 
vice-versa (Cook and Crang, 1996). 
 
 
 
Page 65 of 249 
 
Knowledge about food, in particular, is not merely imposed by marketers upon 
passive consumers, but reconstructed collectively within cultures. Consumers 
interpret the information passed along by marketers within their own cultural 
universe, made up of their personal cultural heritage, their social relations, and the 
wider cultural symbols amongst which they exist. Cook and Crang (1996) describe 
the ways in which geographical knowledge is used to ‘re-enchant’ mass-produced 
goods, and add exchange value. These meanings are produced, interpreted and 
reconfigured through the circulation in flows of knowledge that are heterogeneous, 
complex, and in a constant state of flux (Cook and Crang, 1996). 
 
Other similar studies in commodity circuits and consumers (Morris and Kirwan, 2010) 
build on this knowledge to further develop notions of commodity fetishism as an 
inevitable cultural co-construction. There is an intertwining of material and symbolic 
dimensions, where the consumer has epistemic power in the construction of signs. 
Goodman and Dupuis (2002) point out that this approach marks a shift from a ‘single 
locus of power’, modernist representation, to something more reflexive and post-
modern. This means that where material and cultural dimensions co-produce social 
realities it is possible to shift our understanding from Marx’s consumer fetishism, of 
power in the hands of producers used to obscure social relations, to the totem, 
representing social relations resulting in a more-diffuse distribution of power than 
classic Marxist thought would allow (Goodman and DuPuis. 2002). 
 
What we see then is that the extent to which eco/Fairtrade modes of 
production/consumption effectively dismantle the fetish is highly contested. For many 
researchers, it would seem that a new fetish substitutes the last, as these goods gain 
their own commodified symbolic dimension, and are appropriated into lifestyle 
identities of consumers such as health conscious, or gourmet, or environmentalist, 
amongst others (Crang et al., 2003, Guthman, 2003; Goodman, 2004; Lyon, 2006; 
Morris and Kirwan, 2010; Marston, 
2013). 
 
Much as Bourdieu (1979) describes, the consumption of ‘organic’ foods in Western 
circles responds to a need by consumers to differentiate themselves from the 
mainstream. It is a reconfiguration, whereby consumers recreate traditional 
associations to create differentiated identities. The organic movement shares close 
historical ties, for example, with the formation of the Californian gastronomic scene, 
as preoccupations with origin, or terroir, have always led to the high value placed on 
certain ingredients (the truffle, an NTFP from Europe, amongst the most valuable of 
them all in terms of price per unit weight). This trend towards ‘green consumption’ 
has been critiqued by authors for being a type of ‘new age’ status seeking, while 
companies are often accused of ‘green-washing’. This type of consumption has also 
come under attack for depoliticizing the environmental discussion, as individuals opt 
out of political contestation and ‘placate their guilt’ through ecological consumption 
choices instead (Guthman, 2003; Bryant and Goodman, 2004; Spaargaren and Mol, 
 
 
Page 66 of 249 
 
2008). Nonetheless, it is a clear sign of the ways in which myths can be reshaped by 
consumers, rather than forced top-down by the marketing machine on the public. 
 
For the açaí berry, this process of creolization was central to the formation of the 
chain beyond the State of Pará, as becomes clear throughout the fieldwork. The açaí 
berry did not find favor because of the building of a primitive Fairtrade eco-myth, or 
because of top-down marketing trickery. It became popular almost by accident, as 
athletes, surfers and the beach population of Rio began to consume it in the form of 
frozen bowls throughout the 1990s, after being introduced to it by the Gracie family 
(as described in detail in Chapter 7. It was reinvented as a new product, one that 
resonated with local culture, and in this way, became popular. Once again the 
product identity changes in California, for example, in order to find a place (Chapter 
8). Without this process of creolization, it likely would remain in Pará, only, and fail to 
sustain the thousands of families it currently sustains. It becomes clear that 
attachment to a "real" meaning for products is not necessarily conducive to building 
positive trading outcomes, and that adaption to local trends is crucial to creating new 
markets.  
  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The investigation of exchange value formation in consumer markets is crucial to 
understanding how, and on what terms the açaí chain has formed and globalized. 
The creation of a new myth on the beaches of Rio de Janeiro was crucial to the 
formation of the chain. In this way, understanding how these myths are formed and 
how they can impact producers becomes a crucial axis of this research.  There are 
several dimensions to the formation of the concept of ‘exchange value’ in the 
literature. First, marketing messages can be construed as effective means of 
obscuring the inequalities of global trade (the fetish), blocking consumers from 
influencing value chains that could lead to fairer outcomes. Effectively, there is 
practically no knowledge of açaí's Ribeirinhos in the chain's markets, and this could 
certainly limit the ways in which they are valued, and consequently, their revenue. 
 
In reaction to this smoke screen effect, a multitude of certifications and labels have 
arisen to promote fairer and more-sustainable trade practices, and to seek to lift the 
veil from chain relationships. However, these certifications have little impact on value 
formation, and do not warrant significant price premiums in the way that aspirational 
brands do. For açaí, certification plays an important role for consumers in the US, 
but has little meaning for producers.  
 
Furthermore, the representations of people in the developing world, and particularly 
forest peoples, as lowly victims may serve the value of political contestation within 
Western systems, but does little to improve their terms of trade. Yet we see these 
strategies percolate through forest communities in the form of well- intentioned 
development interventions, despite holding little local meaning or truly improving 
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incomes. In the açaí chain, attempts at creating these "documentary-style" 
associations with producers have found little success, and companies have found 
them to be of little use in building relationships with consumers. 
 
In the meantime, without much top-down intentionality, the açaí berry has found in 
the iterative construction of meaning, or creolization, the key to its expansion as a 
global commodity. It has transformed from a forest berry to a beach food, and has 
become associated with health trends, sports and beach culture. This has happened 
initially almost spontaneously (although marketers quickly caught on to reinforce 
those messages). We see that although the fetishisation does obscure the chain, its 
impact to development might bring significant benefits, by ways of enabling the 
reinvention of products in markets, a  re-situation of meaning, that can build such 
consumer demand (and at significant exchange value premiums) that it can pull the 
formation of entire value chains.  
 
Furthermore, as consumer culture has evolved, and the internet has democratized 
access to information and the building of ‘global tribes’ connected by shared 
identities, the space for new representations of forest peoples grows. Already, myths 
of sophistication of Western nature have become notably aspirational and ecoluxury 
markets thrive. However, we see that, in a sort of scalar differentiation pattern, the 
nature of the wealthy is chic, while the nature of the poor is primitive. Yet the space 
remains for new formations of consumer myths, which resonate with increasingly 
astute audiences, and revalue the fruits of forest peoples’ labor.   
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Chapter 4. METHODOLOGY FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This research rests on three theoretical bases: value chains, consumer studies, and 
development. This chapter now identifies the methodological path used for the 
present study. This path includes the selection of methodological tools, how these 
were applied to the açaí case study; and a discussion of their constraints.  
 
As the preceding chapters have shown, much criticism has been directed towards 
Global Production Networks (GPN) and Value-Chain Analysis (VCA) research, 
especially concerning its alleged lack of theoretical robustness. Despite these 
criticisms, various scholars in these fields have claimed that these approaches have 
achieved methodological advances. (Yeung and Coe, 2014). Indeed, VCA scholars 
have argued that there is a need to choose methodological guiding principles to take 
into account the maze of actors, relations and scales, follow a certain commodity, 
throughout its travels from extracted raw material to final consumer good, and 
investigate its path, like an Ariadne thread, through these global webs (Dicken et al., 
2001). 
 
In the present study, I am trying to understand how a chain is formed, the value 
conditions for each section of the chain, and, more importantly, how can we 
maximize development potential at the point of origin. How did certain actors 
manage to erect this chain from nothing, under what constraints? What is the impact 
of consumer myths in forming the chain in its present configuration? To answer 
these questions, the research is based on semi-structured interviews, and backed up 
by secondary information. To bring out as much context as possible, actors along the 
chain should be interviewed in some depth. By splitting the fieldwork into four 
regions, the research aims to look beyond "one" local, which has been the norm in 
most studies, to tie together several "locals" (or geographical scales) and understand 
how internationally stretched chains can influence development outcomes. With 
qualitative methods being employed in different contexts, this chapter also discusses 
the researcher's own positionality within the research process. 
 
The style of analysis adopted In this study might also be called a ‘multi-sited’ 
ethnography is adopted, because it seeks to explain the significance and experience 
of broader changes occurring in several locations. Yet, inevitably, it is not possible 
engaging with diverse locations without losing the same depth of analysis achievable 
if the research were conducted in only one location (Marcus, 1995). Such analysis 
cannot portray either the summation of local realities, or the entirety of the world 
system it concerns, but it does provide insightful narratives through the collection of 
a well-chosen selection of data and other information. In order to strengthen the 
representativeness of this information, different modes of triangulation were used  in 
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order to provide insights of the same aspects of the value chain from the 
perspectives of different informants. Triangulation also enabled the analysis of 
institutional context, sociocultural issues, territoriality and development (livelihood 
patterns) that GPN requires (Crang and Cook, 2007). The present research thus 
follows and develops the steps proposed by Yeung (2003), which, while providing 
the depth required of an investigation into the ‘whys and hows’, still provides 
sufficient triangulation to ensure a reasonable level of solidity to the resulting data 
set (Yeung, 2003). These practices refer especially to mapping, interviewing and 
collection of secondary data, as well as information from consumer focus groups and 
personal observation of research sites. 
 
 
 4.2 Positionality and research ethics 
 
The positionality of the researcher conditions the design of the research, and the 
knowledge created throughout. Certainly, my own background informed the core of 
the research design, having grown up travelling as the child of a diplomat and then 
further through my career in development. I have also lived in the countries where 
the research was carried out, and am part of the surprisingly global and connected 
yoga/healthy lifestyle 'tribe'.  I have grown up constantly in an "inside" and "outside" 
position, even in my country. It was from my own position as a "product of 
globalization" that I approached this chain and its people, seeking cultural stories to 
weave together, and differences to highlight. Following a thing such as the açaí berry 
around the world was a way to materialize the fragmentation of globalization, while 
building strings of cultural connection. Still, as an active development worker, it was 
important to find structural constructs that would create sufficient replicability and 
applicability to the research for others to employ in practical development work.  
Perhaps being myself Brazilian, and having felt the Othering eye of the West on 
"peripheral" cultures, and the constant ideological appropriation and essentialization 
of our identities in development praxis, it was important to try to articulate a voice for 
forest communities that effectively did not "put words in their mouth" about their 
viewpoints on capitalism or trade (Belsky 1999, Sultana 2007). I was very careful not 
to overly interpret what I heard from my interviewees. It was important to ask what 
they wanted, rather than to imply to them what they should want, which has become 
so second-nature for the development industry.  
 
The positionality of the researcher constantly comes into play, in different ways, 
across research sites (Rose, 1997). As a white, Brazilian woman, I was met at each 
research site in very different ways; finding ways to recognize social and cultural 
difference, while also building rapport is crucial for a productive dialectic process of 
building qualitative insights. Luckily, being Brazilian, but also a near native English 
Speaker, did not create a language barrier at each site, enabling conversations to 
flow in a more unstructured fashion.  
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It was through my background as a development professional that I gained access to 
key players in Belém, and that I was able to tap into the existing network of the açaí 
business in Belém. Certainly, my position as an educated outsider, and particularly 
my business background, were key in building rapport with factory owners and 
corporate actors, who were often gatekeepers to middlemen and communities. 
Interviews were very long, often stretching over more than two hours. Friendships 
were built, and trust was created. For a period of two and a half years, I spent 
several months at a time in Belém, waiting for people to return calls, trying to gain 
access.  Over time, some interviewees had several conversations, and invited me to 
their homes as well. It was through this mutual trust that it was possible to gain 
access to one factory's supply chain, and to find my way to communities. As a 
woman wandering into jungle settings alone, it was important to be accompanied by 
a trusted presence. This was the case for the communities in the Abaetetuba region, 
which were reached through a middleman from the city. This was a crucial means 
already of observing the importance of his social brokerage role, as he had tight links 
with the factory owner, and had family bonds and long friendships with the 
communities from whence he sourced açaí. In Marajó, it was through a local NGO 
that a web of social entities and communities were accessed. It was possible in this 
way to see not only the workings of the chain, but to speak to social workers and 
other members of the local community about living conditions and social inclusion.  
 
At community level, conversations about trade and income were had mostly with 
men. Being a white outsider with a clipboard granted me some level of respect from 
these men, but cultural difference often made conversations sparse. The cultural gap 
between us was notable. In contrast, it was always easier to approach the women, 
often caring for kids, or taking care of kitchen duties. Perhaps the most valuable, and 
light-hearted conversations about Ribeirinho livelihoods, local dynamics, and trade 
relations, were had around a kitchen table. It was often after getting the women to 
warm up that the men came into the kitchen and joined the discussion. Even as an 
outsider, I could find common ground as a woman in the kitchen and build more 
familiarity when brewing coffee and helping to make lunch.  
 
Being from the city, in contrast, helped create rapport with the teenagers, who were 
happy to unload local gossip, discuss music and pop culture, and talk about their 
aspirations.  This was crucial to help me relate culturally, and begin to see the 
vibrant cultural life that exists in what would seem to me, an urban outsider, very 
sparse settings.  
 
Having time to chat, turning off the recorder, and spending entire days with families 
was key to creating a sense of ease. As much as possible, conversations were 
unstructured, and my questions about livelihoods and the açaí trade were woven into 
the overall conversation. Talking in groups also helped interviewees in communities 
supplement each other's knowledge. Often, despite their experience with the trade, 
the questions I asked felt unfamiliar, and demanded that we reconstitute their 
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knowledge in a different way. For example, discussions of relationships with 
middlemen, the impact of their surroundings on their livelihood options, or their 
aspirations for "upgrading".  This exercise always worked better in groups. 
 
At other rungs of the chain, as it became more corporate and less informal, my 
façade as a corporate insider was crucial to building rapport.  These were business-
like chats, with plenty of business jargon on logistics and marketing strategies.  
Access here was a lot more hard-earned, having to come through a business 
contact, a common acquaintance and so forth. It took three weeks of waiting to get 
an interview with the founder of Sambazon, which only came through an old 
personal contact (a yoga teacher, most telling of the company's cultural positioning).  
Having lived in the US and being a yoga practitioner made it easier for me to 
approach that subculture, to put together participants for a focus group (by attending 
and befriending a "yoga mommy" class in the park in Long Beach) that was attuned 
to the consumer culture broadly associated with açaí consumption.  Similarly, in São 
Paulo, contacts were made through personal connections, and once trust was built, 
more doors were open. Still, a lot of patience was required to access each 
interviewee, and getting them to reveal sensitive information was near-impossible. 
Again, the focus group was built based on my own personal contacts amongst the 
“yoga mommies" of São Paulo.   
 
Regarding research ethics and fulfilment of duty of care, the guidelines of the 
London School of Economics were followed carefully, ensuring active consent from 
all interviewees. These guidelines in turn also reflect the advice 13of scholarly 
networks and funders such as the Economic and Social Research Council or the 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth.14The 
research does not, according to those guidelines, require any outside revision or 
certification, the self-certification having been adequately submitted to the Head of 
the Department. In the context of this current research project, the main 
requirements referred to consent; storage and reporting of sensitive personal 
information; and personal safety and ethics in the field.  
 
Concerning consent, care was taken to discuss the objectives, and public interest of 
the research, particularly for Ribeirinho interviews, who might have more difficulty 
understanding the terms of their cooperation. Before interviews, meetings were held 
with communities to discuss the terms and objectives of the research and ensure 
participants that they could choose to participate and withdraw at any time. During 
interviews, all speakers were asked if they were willing to provide information, and 
informed of their right to terminate the interview, or request their exclusion from the 
study and deletion of their information at any time, by contacting the LSE directly, or 
the researcher. Whenever possible, consent was written and provided by a signature 
																																																						
13	https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics/	
14	https://www.theasa.org/ethics/guidelines.shtml	
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that also explained (in Portuguese in Brazil, in English in California) the purposes of 
the survey and the spearker's right.  When appropriate, consent was also given 
orally in interview recordings (such as for participatns who apparently did not read or 
write).  
 
Concerning the storage and reporting of information, all informants were anonymized 
in resulting reports and analysis. Furthermore, any particular information that could 
allow tracing to a specific village or household were also removed where 
appropriate. It should be noted, however, that the research did not (in the main) 
touch upon clearly controversial or illegal activities. The interviews were recorded 
using two different audio devices, which were, whenever possible in the same day, 
stored in the Apple Cloud in encrypted format, using the FileVault sytem. The data 
was not shared with any outside party, and only the researcher accessed and 
transcribed these files. 
 
Concerning personal safety, the main requirements were to seek advice about travel, 
and the potential risks to a woman working alone in rural locations. For this theme, I 
was able to draw upon my own knowledge and experience of visiting remote zones 
in Brazil, as well as asking advice from local NGO workers, village heads, and 
prominent women householders. Added to this, the discussions with village heads 
also clarified the nature of the work in order to remove the possible fear that my 
arrival in these zones might be to assess other, possibly, illegal activities. These 
informants could also communicate any special requests concerning my own 
activities. To be clear, however, the research process did not detect illegal activities, 
and I experienced no obvious threats to my personal safety. 
  
 
 
 
4.3 Choosing a methodological toolkit 
 
 
Value-chain research involves the tracing of a product across a value chain 
(mapping), the identification and interviewing of actors across scales, the gathering 
of secondary data and the investigation of the links between scales and actors. What 
varies is how widely the net is cast horizontally, at each stage and the type of data 
collected. VCA is primarily centered on intra-chain dynamics and measures power 
relations, value distribution and upgrading prospects through input-output data. It is 
heavily reliant on quantitative data, and does little exploring outside the actors 
directly involved in the contemplated chain (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2013). Meanwhile, 
the more lateral, holistic approach preferred by GPN scholars, particularly those that 
embrace more wholly the cultural aspects, is concerned with context (institutional, 
social and cultural ‘embeddedness’) in which trade relations take shape, and is more 
qualitatively oriented (Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002). In this research, 
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we are concerned with how the chain took shape, which makes mapping essential 
(to establish the actual shape of the chain), and why, and how it connects to 
contextual issues at each geographical scale. In this way, the choice for qualitative 
methods imposes itself, to build a narrative that explains, rather than merely relays 
the chain configuration. This means that qualitative, in-depth interviews are the 
preferred method for this part of the study. Furthermore, input-output data is of little 
use if we cannot clearly assess the costs and revenues of each company, which 
actors in the chain were very unwilling to reveal. 
 
As regards the production of NTFP-specific research, the manual produced by 
Marshall et al. (2006a) is a particularly valuable study undertaken in a large, well-
funded project, with the participation of many researchers. A great deal of data was 
collected, from input-output data, to livelihood studies of each community, policy 
analyses and market studies, through the application of questionnaires, and the 
writing-up of community and market studies. The strong focus on community-level 
participatory research, conducted primarily through ethnographic methods, anchors 
the exercise as a development project, aimed precisely at improving the livelihoods 
of those communities, providing a ‘horizontal’ counterpoint to the VCA analysis 
(quantitative and input-output based, Marshall et al., 2006). 
 
Marshall et al. (2006) chose tools such as community mapping, focus groups, and 
participant observation to provide in-depth of knowledge at the community level. 
Ethnographic methods such as these are a staple of development research and 
particularly of NTFP literature. Unraveling forest peoples’ livelihoods is a complex 
task, as these people often lead secluded lives, with little access to communication 
technology and live mostly outside the cash economy. Income can be a poor 
measure of poverty or inclusion, and the application of standardized questionnaires 
is difficult in challenging settings such as these (Nolan, 1996). 
 
The need to delve as deeply as possible into the livelihoods of producing 
communities, and the ways in which the articulation of trade patterns affects them, 
was a key preoccupation in the design of the current study.  Since a large amount of 
research exists which chooses to only investigate deeply local community dynamics, 
a choice was made to attempt a whole-chain analysis. However, the need to take 
time and observe local specificities, particularly at community level - the ‘horizontal’ 
aspects of the value chain – was a key concern within the research process and was 
carefully considered in its design. 
 
Rather than complete a quantitative VCA and a deep community-level analysis, the 
research was instead conducted through in-depth qualitative interviews throughout 
the chain, and involved field visits, to provide the richness of observation that is 
crucial to building a convincing narrative into the operations of a particular chain. 
Although a comprehensive, input-output analysis of the açaí value chain would be a 
desirable outcome, the research questions pointed to other priorities that would more 
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readily bring out the contextual issues that are pertinent to unraveling chain 
formation and configuration.  
 
To date, few studies have followed such a methodology that might be used as a 
basis for a more-qualitative investigation. In this situation, the objective is to unveil 
what factors enabled the formation of the chain in its current configuration and how it 
is sustained, with what development outcomes, rather than merely with a specific 
intra-value chain governance pattern upon which VCA scholars such as Gereffi 
(1994) are fixated. 
 
As Yeung (2003, p.455) clarifies: 
 
‘Since quantitative data are not sensitive to variations in experiences at the individual 
social actor level, they are not necessarily a valid measurement of the rationale and 
behavior of these social actors. If we take the economic action of these actors as 
socially embedded and highly contextualized, the validity of quantitative data is even 
more questionable, since indicators of economic action may not be compatible with 
the goal of measuring social and cultural behavior.’ 
 
In this way, the qualitative sensibility is at the core of the present research design. It 
is also the method of choice of cultural economy, commodity fetishism, much of the 
consumer research and literature about development, precisely for the rich 
qualitative data it elicits. The predilection of these research methods makes possible 
the formulation of a coherent research design, despite the disparity of conceptual 
fields addressed in the literature review of the present study. The ethnographic 
sensibility is thus at the core of the methodological design of this study.  
 
‘Ethnography’ is defined here as a particular approach, rather than a fixed set of 
methods. To acquire some of the textured data on how people live and why they act 
the way they do, much detail can be lost by moving across sites rather quickly, 
instead of focusing on a single site. In trying to elucidate how and why a value chain 
came about, this sensibility is thus crucial. Although economic concepts such as 
value addition and business environments are the focus of the present study, this 
data is captured through the perception of interviewees, and later corroborated with 
secondary data. 
 
 
4.4 Mapping the value chain -  Determining its configurations and actors 
 
The process of mapping the value chain (see Figure 4.1), although it produces a 
schematic and seemingly linear flow, is in fact iterative and tentative. The researcher 
maps and remaps what is learnt about the chain throughout the research, constantly 
plotting actors and contextual factors, trying to map relations, and seeking to 
investigate the nature of each link. While VCA scholarship is concerned with 
 
 
Page 75 of 249 
 
mapping intra-chain actors that are directly tied through trade links, GPN scholars 
see chains as networks, embedded in wider webs of overlapping scales and 
contexts. Mapping is thus a much more comprehensive, and complex exercise 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2013). This entails mapping out, at each link, the business 
environment, that is, ancillary firms and institutions that provide support, such as 
design, packaging, but also credit, or legal support. It also seeks evaluate 
institutional contexts, such as the role of governments, NGOs, labor organizations, in 
shaping trade relations, as well as the socio-cultural conditions that enable or restrict 
value formation and upgrading potential. There is thus a great deal to map in each 
chain, and this process itself generates directly a great deal of data for analysis 
(Henderson et al., 2002). 
 
The mapping process also serves to identify suitable interview subjects. In the 
present study, interviews were open-ended, sometimes protracted, and shaped to 
extract from actors their motivations and subjective viewpoints vis a vis the specific 
context in which they are embedded. A key consideration here concerns how the 
chain emerged, and what factors have led to its internationalization and current 
configuration. Through receiving information from key players, and allowing them to 
share their experience in dealing with the product requires long, open-ended 
interviews, to generate the genuine recollection that can provide not only a valid 
reconstruction of the history of the chain, but a deeper understanding of the 
motivations and incentives that have shaped each actor’s participation. They are 
meant to construct ‘thick descriptions’, that betray informants’ points of view (‘etic’) 
(McCracken, 1988; Spiggle, 1994). Together with the mapping exercise and 
collection of secondary data, interviews provide a solid basis for triangulation, while 
still allowing the necessary level of qualitative fluidity to enrich the research findings. 
 
To create a first value-chain map and select research localities, secondary research 
was conducted initially. This enabled key themes to be identified, and informed the 
formulation of interview outlines. Data about input-output volumes and value 
distribution was collected whenever possible through the literature available. This 
helps build the shape of the chain, and grasp value distribution across scales. Within 
the existing literature on the açaí berry; some studies that have mapped out the 
chain, though mostly partial, and attempted input-output calculations, which can 
provide useful, complementary information for discussion. They were useful in 
guiding the present, more qualitative, textured, investigation. 
 
The choice of localities was based on what was known from the historical expansion 
of the commodity’s reach, and considered to provide sufficient cultural variety to 
provide valuable data for analysis. Of course, only strands of this chain were 
mapped. Understanding for example how European countries have or not adopted 
açaí products and why, would be very valuable. Well exploited discrepancies 
between developed and developing business environments and their chain impacts 
are invoked. Understanding how different developed environments and consumer 
 
 
Page 76 of 249 
 
landscapes compare to each other could point to important policy recommendations 
for the market development of value chains.  
 
The açaí chain stretches from the entire basin of the Tocantins River towards 
markets as far as Korea and Japan, passing through processing facilities in Belém, 
factories in the Southeast region of Brazil, Europe and the USA. Intervening 
institutions are often local, but the central government in Brasilia, thousands of miles 
away, also has direct impacts on chain configuration. Once a general map of the 
entire chain was sketched, a specific segment of the chain can be selected, and 
analyzed with greater detail. The choices made here were to prioritize the most 
important segments of the chain, which enabled the tracing of its formation (it was 
through Belém, the Southeast of Brazil, and then California that it eventually reached 
across the rest of the Globe). Familiarity with the language and personal contacts 
were also important in finding research sites. 
 
4.5 Conducting interviews to understand chain embeddedness and 
upgrading trajectories 
 
The mapping exercise spawned the interview process, which in turn constantly 
retraced the mapping of the chain and the key underlying issues that shape it (Figure 
4.1). Throughout the study, a total of 90 people were interviewed, from a wide 
geographical area. Interviews were long and some key questions were always 
asked, using the guiding principles of the impact of embeddedness on chain 
creation, its current configuration, and its development outcomes. Questions were 
nonetheless open-ended, and interviews often lasted over three hours. These were 
almost all audio-recorded, and reviewed many times over to identify key themes, and 
uncover motivations, positions, and relations between actors and their context that 
could reveal how this remarkable chain took shape. The number of interviews for 
each topic or place was selected based on their relevance, rather than repeated 
exhaustively to provide some form of quantitative solidity. 
 
As Crang and Cook (2007, p.12) make clear of the ethnographic approach: 
 
 
‘It is not the sheer number, 'typicality' or 'representativeness' of people approached 
which matters, but the quality and positionality of the information that they can offer.’ 
 
Interviewees were selected during the course of the research, through the contacts 
of those previously approached and contacted in the research process. As other 
studies have also found, the tracing of the network of interviewees itself provides a 
rich account of the underlying social relations that tie trade together. Sometimes, 
such as with factory owners, more than ten interviewees were involved, and other 
times, such as local actors in Abaetetuba, once the initial interviews were completed, 
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it was clear the topic had been exhausted. The richness and uniqueness, and the 
quality of the information received directed the research. Overall, the interviews 
concerned how actors behaved in certain ways and why, and sought to elicit specific 
points about configuration, embeddedness and value capture. There was opportunity 
to explore the effective quantitative information that makes up value-chain research. 
This type of information would have proven valuable to better substantiate findings 
on value capture. 
 
Several months were spent in 2012 and 2013, initially, in Belém, getting to know the 
region and reaching out to local NGOs and government officials to find relevant 
actors within the chain to interview, such as factories, traders, NGOs and 
government representatives. At this stage, contacts were acquired in Marajó and 
Abaetetuba that could facilitate the community-based stage of the research. Then 
several months were spent between field sites in the region of Abaetetuba and 
Marajó, interviewing communities and conducting participant observation to 
understand the extractivist context of the açaí production system. Two different sites 
were selected, the first, Abaetetuba, with good logistic links to the city and the 
second, Marajó, in relative isolation, to contrast and compare how different territorial 
embeddedness conditions the terms of inclusion into the chain. Interviews were 
conducted with community members but also with key informants from NGOs, 
governments, and community leaders. 
 
Access was a key driver to identify communities. In the Marajó region, it was granted 
through a local NGO, Instituto Peabirú, which has worked with the remote 
community of Curralinho, in the Marajó region, for several years.  The community is 
very isolated, hard to locate physically. Each household is spread out and a 
reasonable amount of time is required to conduct each interview, at least a half day 
per household. Several days were spent commuting to and from Breves by boat to 
conduct interviews. Being accompanied by a local leader and community activist was 
crucial to quickly gain some level of trust and engage in conversation. The research 
required asking about earnings, trading relationships within and outside of the 
community, which can be sensitive issues to broach with a stranger. Sticking around 
and chatting with the whole family was key to getting these issues out.  
 
Meanwhile, in the Abaetetuba region, access was granted by one of the smaller 
factories, through one of their middlemen, or "atravessador". He sources his açaí 
mainly from the Limoeiro region, from whence his family originates. In this way, I was 
able to meet many community members and his extended family. Being Brazilian, 
again, helped build common ground, through general chit chat and a little humor.  
 
In addition to the qualitative interviews and open questions, the research also 
gathers data from the field through direct observation, to build a scenario from which 
to infer how and why actors behave within and outside the chain in certain ways. 
Many of the interviews reported here were spontaneous, in the form of informal 
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conversations in the field, involving group interviews and the recording of meetings 
and events in the daily life of participants. For example, the recording of a 
conversation amongst a group of women of Limoeiro (Pernambuco, Brazil), of how 
closely they observe other households, how they monitor local actors and prevent 
theft and punish inappropriate behavior was crucial in understanding how social 
mechanisms regulate actors’ behavior locally in the absence of State presence. 
 
In contrast, gaining access to the middlemen who trade between communities and 
larger middlemen, and spend most of their lives on boats, was quite difficult. In 
Marajó, it took accosting a boat that was travelling along the river, and where the 
men were quite heavily armed. Safety is a real issue for these men, as robberies are 
common. They operate in complete informality and are very weary of outside 
contact. Interviews were quick, almost furtive. The most important middlemen in the 
cities could most easily be reached through their factory contacts. It was important to 
be at the factory on the day their shipments arrived, as it was practically impossible 
to set up conversations, or explain the purpose of the research, on the phone.  
 
After some interruption, for financial and logistical structuring reasons, the research 
then moved on to Los Angeles, California, in 2015, where the pioneer trade link, 
responsible for bringing açaí to the US market is located – the Sambazon group. 
Other products containing açaí in the US market were also identified, and factories 
and traders interviewed whenever possible. This part of the research also included 
focus groups with local consumers, to gauge attitudes to the product and its 
marketing strategies. Several visits were also conducted to retail outlets, from juice 
shacks to supermarkets, to observe consumption and understand the local context. 
Institutional actors were also interviewed, to provide a picture of the food industry in 
the region. 
 
Subsequently, six months were spent in 2017 in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 
investigating trade links, and the ways in which the açaí berry became part of the 
local diet. Interviews were conducted with factories, retail outlets, traders and the 
Gracie family, who initially brought the product to the South of Brazil. At this point, 
the research also included focus groups with consumers. Finally, telephone 
interviews were conducted with federal government agencies, such as the 
Environment Ministry and APEX15, the export trade agency, to discuss the policy 
scenario and discuss existing programs aimed at the açaí chain. 
 
Overall, Ribeirinhos from communities are perhaps the most pervasive voice. 
Several research sites were chosen throughout the Tocantins estuary (four in total), 
and several community members were interviewed at each site, individually and 
collectively. Although much effort was made to include as many middlemen as 
possible, these were quite elusive characters and only seven agreed to be 
																																																						
15	http://www.mma.gov.br/	http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/	
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interviewed. This was enough, however, to gain a general understanding of how they 
organize the trade, and what roles they play. 
 
The chain narrows upwards, since there are fewer actors involved at each stage in 
the natural hierarchy, and, necessarily, the number of potential interviewees 
diminished. In Belém, where there are many factories, it was possible to interview 
and visit five processing plants. In São Paulo, the fieldwork included visits to four 
processing plants. In California, however, where the açaí trade is dominated by a 
lead firm – Sambazon – gaining access to sources of information directly was the 
most problematic. It was still possible to interview other minor processors. 
Nonetheless, as the market spreads out across many brands that have açaí as a 
minor ingredient, it was more important to speak to industry actors that could explain 
the workings of the industry than a particular actor, and to the traders who distribute 
the raw materials. Since the study was aimed at understanding how scalar 
configurations fit together, and how they were negotiated by actors, it was best to 
gain a detailed view of context and gain in-depth insight from key actors. With limited 
resources, a long investigation, for example, into the peculiarities of co-packing (the 
manufacture and packaging of a product under contract to a client) in California was 
impossible. 
 
Overall, the input of supporting institutions, such as trade associations and 
governments, as well as the abundant secondary literature, were also crucial to 
determining embeddedness of the chain in particular scalar contexts. In this way, the 
sampling methodology, although iterative, was to interview as many of the key actors 
that created and maintained the chain, while also seeking to understand the 
viewpoints of the smaller actors involved, whenever possible. For example, in Brazil 
representatives from small factories and local shops were interviewed along with the 
leading firms, to gather a diversity of perspectives. 
 
Gaining access to new web of actors in different locations was a challenge. 
Corporate actors in particular were difficult to pin down, and without an introduction 
from a common acquaintance, it was impossible to get them to participate. With 
more solid institutional backing at each scale, it might have been easier to schedule 
interviews. Less time could have been spent trying to gain access, and more 
interviews could have been conducted. This was always going to be a challenge 
when spreading the research across so many sites, and conducting it in the format of 
a single PhD endeavor. 
 
4.6 Focus groups -  understanding consumer myths and relating them to 
chain configuration 
 
To harmonize data collection, researching the consumer perspective and analyzing 
the chain aims to investigate how subjective meanings of products in consumer 
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markets affect chain configuration, adhering to an ethnographic approach. This type 
of methodology – the focus group in particular – has been widely adopted within the 
consumer studies, providing a strong basis for the setting up of the research 
approach within technically firm parameters. Focus groups are widely used within 
marketing research as an exploratory technique, and are a good basis for 
understanding consumer attitudes and behaviors. As consumer behavior is often 
based on social norms, the sense of belonging, status, and shared meanings, the 
collective construction of ideas that is typical of focus groups is particularly suited to 
marketing research. 
 
Focus groups can be a relatively inexpensive and quick way of acquiring a 
substantial amount of data from the consumer perspective, particular when 
conducted with homogenous groups. Focus groups can also allow open discussion, 
without too much leading from the researcher, thereby providing data that is 
experiential, spontaneous. As the subjects of a group interact, and discuss a certain 
topic, different layers of meaning are revealed in a free-flowing fashion, as 
participants associate ideas and share experiences. 
 
The focus group method is, nonetheless, not without its shortcomings. Participants 
are also often prone to forgo their own views in favor of the dominating views of the 
group, and can be led astray by probing that is too suggestive. It is thus important to 
triangulate the data with information from other sources (Threlfall, 1999; Breen, 
2006). Marketing professionals are very keen on combining focus groups with 
surveys, which provide the type of quantitative reliability that is so crucial to securing 
the immense budgets for advertising and marketing that are crucial to the 
perpetuation of the profession (see Chapter 2, herein; Calder, 1977; Threlfall, 1999). 
 
However, in academia there is freedom to investigate phenomena inductively, with 
greater richness, a task for which standalone qualitative methods are favored 
(Deshpande, 1983), since focus groups are often considered part of the 
ethnographic toolkit, providing a good fit with the overall research design. The 
adoption of this method to investigate consumer preferences in several locations 
provides the necessary variety in place-specific perspectives. The phenomenological 
approach to focus groups, which finds much grounding in marketing research, and is 
also considered a part of the ethnographic toolkit, was thus selected as the method 
through which consumer subjectivities would be examined and integrated into the 
overall GPN evaluation. 
 
Despite many calls in the value chain literature for such an approach to be applied, 
which brings together insights from GPN and consumer studies, there has been little 
work that brings together these bodies of knowledge. Thus the methodological 
experiment proposed in this thesis, of positioning one analytical scale at the 
production end of the chain, and another at the consumption side, is novel. The 
application and bringing together of consumer-based methodology and production-
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based methodology is thus a key challenge, nonetheless made easier by the overall 
qualitative/cultural approach adopted throughout. 
 
The focus groups were held at key consumer sites, in São Paulo and in Long Beach, 
California. Very similar types of interviewees were selected, a group of "yoga moms", 
who are in their late 30s, early 40s, and make purchasing decisions for their family. 
This is the key demographic for food purchases16.  Furthermore, this was a group 
that was easy to access, and to relate to. It is my own demographic, and I am a long-
standing practitioner of yoga. Finding a group in California was the easiest way to 
put together a focus group, as well as in São Paulo. Yoga practitioners are quite a 
global cultural tribe as well, and comparing between two of these groups in different 
regions was an effective way of building a solid basis for comparison in attitudes 
between sites.  
 
Undoubtedly, conducting a single focus group in each consumption site does not 
provide high levels of generalizability that more in- depth quantitative methods, such 
as the combination of exploratory focus groups and surveys, could provide. 
However, the fact that few were conducted at each site does allow for the 
extrapolation of valuable constructs regarding the territoriality of consumer behavior, 
and their impact on chain configuration across scales. 
 
In each location, a group of approximately six participants was selected. In both 
cases, a group of ‘yoga mommies’ was chosen. This more ‘open-minded’ and health-
conscious tranche of the population is a keen açaí consumer, and is receptive to 
issues about sustainable consumption. Mothers are also the key decision makers in 
the household for these types of consumer decisions. The use of a consistent set of 
questions and a similar group of participants allowed a level of standardization 
across focus groups, while highlighting the territorial specificities of each endeavor to 
become all the more evident. Territoriality was, in fact, the key factor in determining 
sampling. 
 
Although it is customary to conduct a series of focus groups until ‘saturation’ is 
reached, the geographical extension of the research design curtailed any such 
ambitions. There was one focus group in each location, which was identified as the 
best available within the time and financial constraints of the study. It is not possible 
to claim that effective saturation was reached. 
 
The exercise was exploratory, and points towards a wider research agenda, which 
was far from exhausted in the present study. Much better clarity could have been 
achieved through the repetition of focus groups of each research site, with different 
profile combinations. The follow-up of the exercises with questionnaires would also 
																																																						
16http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Gender%20Equality/
Women%20in%20the%20food%20industry/Women-in-the-food-industry-web-final-old.ashx	
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have proven valuable to better substantiate the consumer insights in this research. 
Without this further investigation, the research rests often on correlations with the 
literature. Unfortunately, the choice for researching the varying views in the açaí 
trade often made it difficult to build sufficient solidity for analysis. 
 
 
4.7 Analytical process -  connecting field data to research questions 
 
The fieldwork generated a great volume of data. Many hours of interviews, focus 
group sessions, in addition to chain maps, field notes, photos of packaging and other 
branded content, as well as a great deal of secondary data were captured. The data 
was thus first and foremost divided by place, to highlight how different cultural 
localities influence the specificity of the chain (‘territorial embeddedness’). Each 
chapter was analyzed in relation to embeddedness and chain configuration, to 
determine at each rung how the chain took place in its current configuration, how 
that configured value capture, and what policy instruments might improve 
development outcomes.  
 
Scales and territoriality play a key role in the present research, and provide a 
classification that would carry out in the analysis of data and organization of chapters 
(Dicken et al., 2001). The analysis went on to determine chain formation and 
configuration, value capture, development outcomes and policy recommendations, in 
juxtaposition to the different categories’ embeddedness. This formed an analytical 
framework that could tie together different findings at different locations, in a manner 
directly related to the research questions. Consumers and value formation insights 
were then added along the same axis of embeddedness, to allow them to be 
integrated into the analytical process cohesively. These insights were put into tables, 
presented at the end of each chapter, and were used to synthesize key learnings at 
each site, and to form a basis for a final analysis in the conclusion.  
 
The interview recordings and notes of interviews served as important sources of key 
facts. Reviewing this information allowed key themes to surface, which served as an 
open coding mechanism, which left sufficient space for new themes to emerge. Each 
focus group generated its own report, highlighting key collectively constructed 
knowledges for each discussion. The available secondary data also provided 
important clues to contextualize interview data, and facilitate the drawing and 
redrawing of the value chain map as it presently stands (Crang and Cook, 2007). 
 
The communication context was analyzed from a territorial perspective, and possible 
underlying causal threads were identified for the subjective cultural valuation of 
different products containing açaí in each research site. This analysis informed to a 
reasonable extent the focus group exercises, where consumers were asked to give 
their opinion about different marketing strategies, for example. It was also a valuable 
means of analyzing underlying themes emerging from the focus groups, and 
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correlating them with the cultural embeddedness issues identified throughout the 
value-chain analysis. This spatial directive revealed processes of translation, fluidity 
and friction between sites, which formed an important cornerstone of the analytical 
process. 
 
This sorting mechanism allowed key trends to emerge, many of them fitting well 
within the established parameters of GPN analysis, but many of them inconsistent. 
As discussed above, the primary concern here is identifying how different forms of 
embeddedness constricted or enabled chain configurations across scales, and 
determined the distribution/capture of value. The volume of research sources 
allowed for ample triangulation, and the emergence of strong underlying themes 
throughout.  
 
For example, it became evident that the notion of governance, although valuable 
when describing the relationship between two actors, was wholly insufficient to 
explain how multiple chain relationships configured a whole chain. It also became 
clear that coordination across geographical scales was a crucial element of chain 
success, although the captive governance patterns that often mandate it are often 
depicted as conducive to abuse and problematic. Many of the subjectivities involved, 
for example, the under- appreciation of the key role of middlemen as crucial to the 
organization of the chain, which were clear in the fieldwork, required a strengthening 
of the cultural economy focus of the literature and overall analysis. Throughout the 
fieldwork, the tripartite notion of embeddedness served as an organizing matrix, 
eliciting important insights from interviewees, and providing a contextual backbone to 
the mapping exercise. 
 
However, with such a qualitative approach, this study might be interpreted as too 
subjective to directly inform policymaking. Still, it provides a solid narrative, and 
collates much data into a new perspective. While it may lack quantitative data to 
support certain analyses, the sheer volume of opinion reveals a great deal about 
how the chain works, and about what motivates the behavior of actors. With so many 
voices pointing to a need to rethink how NTFP interventions are designed, and the 
wealth of existing secondary data to back it up, policy makers should certainly feel 
compelled to initiate dialogues that include a wider diversity of voices. A new agenda 
for NTFP research and project implementation could benefit from these insights, the 
painstaking work of quantitative data collection and verification, at each scale, would 
be needed to provide the level of certainty that policymakers often demand. This 
would require a team effort, gathering data from a multitude of actors, and, collating 
secondary information too at each scale. 
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Figure 4.1. The açaí production network (prepared by the author)
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Chapter 5. THE RIBEIRINHOS OF PARÁ, BRAZIL, THE 
HARVESTERS OF THE AÇAÍ BERRY AT THE BASE OF THE VALUE 
CHAIN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the fieldwork conducted at the base of the açaí berry value 
chain, which originates among the tangled waterways of the State of Pará. Brazil. 
Here, the local population harvests the berries in small batches from trees along 
flooded riverbanks. The aim of the chapter is to investigate how inclusion into the 
chain has affected local livelihoods, how local conditions affect that inclusion, and 
what strategies have been put in place to improve value capture, and with what 
outcomes. 
 
The Ribeirinhos are one of Brazil’s poorest populations. They live in isolation, with 
very little state support. They rely on subsistence crops and incipient trading. In this 
context, the arrival of the açaí trade has given this population a great bounty, and 
according to local stakeholders played an instrumental role in driving these people 
towards livelihood patterns that are less detrimental to the forests they inhabit. State 
support, in the form of government handout programs such as Bolsa Família, (a 
government welfare programmed – see for example, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/17/brazil-bolsa-familia-
decade-anniversary-poverty-relief) has also relieved poverty. The açaí trade and 
state support are two streams of income that have given the Ribeirinhos a new 
dignity in their situation, local economies have been invigorated, and social 
relationships have begun to change. 
 
Problems, such as lack of organizational support, geographical isolation and 
resulting sociocultural patterns hinder progress for these populations. The 
Ribeirinhos are still reliant on middlemen to trade their goods and are unable to 
increase their income through currently available upgrading strategies. These limiting 
elements, as well as potential opportunities are discussed below in relation to current 
chain embeddedness and potential strategies that could engender better 
development outcomes. 
 
To best capture the different modes of açaí production and their relation to the chain, 
the fieldwork was conducted in several sites. The research began in Breves and 
Curralinho which are two towns in the remote region of Marajó Island, the world’s 
largest fluvial island and a significant producer of açaí. The remoteness of Marajó 
from trade routes provides a valuable counterpoint to the next research site, the 
Abaetetuba region which is Brazil’s biggest trading hub for açaí. This town is it at the 
center of the largest producing region in the Tocantins river estuary; it is well 
connected to the capital by navigable boat waterways and motorway which makes 
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markets easy to access. A community in the small town of Limoeiro was the subject 
of in-depth investigations. Another part of the fieldwork was in the town of Santarém 
that is hundreds of miles away from the Abaetetuba region. The purpose was to 
investigate the new, ‘modernized’ mode of production that could be described as a 
large monoculture experiment.  
 
A visit to a Japanese cooperative in Tomé Açú was arranged. This is a uniquely 
successful mixed agroforestry and industrial model.  
 
In each location, the research explored not only who does what in the chain, and for 
how much, but also how each actor’s surroundings and social relations – their 
embeddedness – shape their behavior, and, in turn, the chain itself. Whenever 
possible, supporting institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
government officials were interviewed to provide context for the intra-chain activities. 
In total, 27 interviews were conducted to inform the present chapter, complemented 
by participant observation at research sites and secondary data. 
 
 
5.2 Local chain formation 
 
Currently, there are approximately 120,000 Ribeirinhos living in the State of Pará. 
The State of Pará, in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon basin, has an area of 
1,247,690 km², roughly five times the area of the United Kingdom. It is covered in 
tropical forest, though about 136,127 km2 have been cleared, mostly for cattle 
ranching.17 This area has been shaped by a history of ‘boom and bust’ cycles of 
extractivism.  
 
The first of these cycles was a tremendous boom and then disastrous bust of the 
natural rubber industry at the beginning of the 20th century.  The first boom 
witnessed a migration mainly from the Northeast of Brazil to the area, to harvest 
rubber in the vast estates of landowners. When the rubber market folded, the 
population, nevertheless, remained in riverbank settlements. They adapted 
technologies and diet from the local indigenous populations to create a model of 
subsistence livelihoods upon which they rely to this day (Brondízio, 2008). This was 
followed by other forms of exploiting other natural resources, mainly through mining 
and extensive low-technology cattle ranching. 
 
Until the late 1980s, the Brazilian government incentivized deforestation and 
encouraged the creation of large landholdings where settlers from the South 
occupied the last, unexplored expanses of the Amazonian rainforest. Meanwhile, the 
elite, who were mainly of white, Portuguese origin, retained the trappings of 
traditional paternalism that was typical of a post-colonial period. Pará is not a State 
																																																						
17	http://desmatamentonaamazonia.andi.org.br/para-entender-melhor/sistema-prodes-fornece-estimativas-anuais	
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that ever developed any specific industries that added value to any particular 
commodity, or specialized in commerce. It has been, and remains, a land of 
extraction of commodities, of fast-gain enterprises that are low-tech and require little 
investment. In this context, the Ribeirinhos have been, and remain, mostly 
overlooked. These people either work as a day laborers in large land-holdings, or 
fend for themselves along the riverbanks. Products are shipped (with no, or minimal, 
processing) to faraway markets, as the economy of the State of Pará remains 
isolated and underdeveloped. This is the historical context in which the açaí chain 
came into existence, and as it currently manifests itself.  
 
Historically, the açaí berry was only eaten by local populations in times of famine, but 
since then it has become a fad in health-conscious markets globally as well as a 
staple food in the diet of the rapidly urbanized local population. The açaí palm is 
native to most of the Amazon basin, but most production occurs in the State of Pará, 
in the Tocantins River estuary and Marajó Island. Traditional riverine populations 
extract the açaí berry manually from the Euterpes eularecia palm. They mash the 
hard fruit into a pulp, and is useful as a foodstuff because it is rich in nutrients and 
healthy fats. The pulp is usually mixed with manioc flour (made from the cassava 
plant) and whatever protein is available. Due to the phenomenal increase in demand 
that has occurred over the last 15 years, the açaí berry has been catapulted to the 
key source of income of the Ribeirinho population, and one of the most successful 
Non-Timber-Forest-Products (NTFPs) in the World. It is estimated to be the main 
source of revenue for 77% of the rural population in the Northeastern region of the 
State of Pará (de Santana et al., 2013). Yearly production is estimated at 107 
thousand tones (IBGE, 2015). 
  
 
5.3 Tracing the chain 
 
In most cases, the açaí berry is extracted from naturally occurring palms by the 
Ribeirinho population, who inhabit the labyrinth of waterways in Pará. Picking açaí 
berries is part of a variety of activities, which for the livelihood of the Ribeirinhos 
usually involves entire family units. To pick açaí, the Ribeirinho climbs the açaí palm, 
with a knife in hand, and cuts down the branches full of ripe fruits (Figure 5.1). The 
next step is called ‘debulha’, and is traditionally done by women. It involves picking 
the berries from the cut branches, and putting them in the straw baskets 
(‘basquetas’, or ‘paneiros’ usually woven from the juriti palm by women in the low 
season) or, in some cases, plastic buckets or boxes. This usually happens at dawn, 
so the product can be quickly passed to the next link in the chain because it is highly 
perishable.  
 
Women play an important role in the trade for the ‘debulha’, though they seldom 
handle any of the money. Many of them also climb trees and pick berries. 
Interestingly, none of the women who were interviewed said they did work – in a 
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machista society such as the Ribeirinho society, not working is a question of honor. 
When encouraged, however, they then relate that they carry out a long list of 
activities, both agricultural and domestic, which sustain the household, such as 
caring for chickens, and tending to the shrimp nets, while also cooking, cleaning, and 
making manioc flour (a very painstaking activity). Were it not for the government’s 
social programs, who aim to deposit money directly in their bank accounts, women 
would be entirely excluded from any of the family’s earnings, and remain entirely 
dependent on men to meet their and their children’s needs. 
 
Figure 5.1 A Ribeirinho picks açaí berries from a palm in Curralinho. (Photo courtesy 
of Rogerio Assis.) 
 
Latest estimates from Conab put the production cost at R$ 1.40 /kg, whereas sale 
prices are currently R$ 2.50/kg. Nearly 70% of costs are related to labor for 
extraction. Another study, by SEBRAE (Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e 
Pequenas Empresas – Brazilian service of assistance to micro and small 
enterprises), in the same Abaetetuba region, has estimated the production cost at 
around R$ 5/lata (a lata is a can of about 14 kg). Average sales values for the year 
were approximately R$ 15,00/lata earning the Ribeirinhos a 300% profit (Interview 
2). Production costs are very low at the base of the chain since the palms are 
naturally occurring and labor is often from smallholders and their families. There are 
no costs involved in acquiring seeds, or any agricultural inputs. Ribeirinhos manage 
their own açaí berry fields. They clear out competing species of plants, prune trees 
and eliminate older specimens because the trunk contains marketable heart of palm. 
Occasionally, they hire in outside labor, depending on the size of the family unit 
(hiring assistance perhaps once every three years). Such hired laborers are called 
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‘peconheiros’, to help them pick the fruit, if they cannot manage on their own. Each 
person can pick an average of 10 latas 140kg) of açaí a day. In many cases the 
exodus of people from the area has shortened labor supply and as a consequence 
this has greatly increased demand for laborers who have had their wages increased. 
Day rates can vary from around R$ 30,00 to R$ 80,00, depending on the region and 
the time of year. Day laborers can also often work as ‘meieiros’  (share-croppers), 
giving the landowner half of their crop, and keeping the other half. Many Ribeirinhos 
will work as day labors in each other’s properties, virtually cancelling out costs and 
keeping them internally within the community. According to Conab (Brazil’s national 
supply company), prices are lower in more remote regions, both in terms of labor 
costs (lower wages) and sales prices (smaller markets). 
 
There are non-monetized costs of dedicating oneself to picking fruit and these can 
have an impact on others. Ribeirinho livelihoods are diverse and vulnerable. If too 
much time is spent on one activity to the detriment of others, for example if too much 
time spent on açaí, instead of on a manioc plantation, there is a significant risk to a 
sustainable lifestyle. It is important to consider that the açaí berry is seasonal and 
available in marketable quantities for at best five months of the year, usually from 
June to November. The rest of the year, Ribeirinhos receive income, mostly from 
government programs, and often rely on their subsistence activities to ensure their 
food supply. This was verified in all research sites by the families who were 
interviewed. There is some money to be made from fishing, and logging. The 
extraction of açaí heart of palm was once an important source of income, but since 
the açaí boom, only older palms are cut for management of fields, because it has 
become less important. Subsistence activities vary across regions, but can include 
manioc crops, fishing, shrimp and chicken farming. 
 
There are many ways that Ribeirinho populations can trade the picked açaí berries. 
If they are relatively close to a market, have a boat, and sufficient açaí to sell, they 
will often choose to go to market themselves. Implicitly there is a choice in their use 
of time, not only in transport, but also in keeping abreast of price fluctuations in 
different markets. Ribeirinhos were interviewed in all locations (even those fairly 
close to markets) and it was found that they will often prefer to relinquish some of 
their earnings to a local middleman, so that they can focus on other activities. They 
may also choose to hire someone to merely transport the product to market or to a 
trader at a cost of approximately R$ 1,50 per lata (i.e. per 14 kg can). They also 
often wait for middlemen to pass by their houses on the riverside and sell their açaí 
directly to them. 
 
Often, communities gather all their harvest in one place, usually the home of a more 
prosperous community member, with a dock where bigger boats can stop, for 
Marreteiros to come by and collect it in larger quantities. This is the most common 
arrangement. Ribeirinhos mostly report that they are unwilling to spend too much of 
their time managing the commercial aspects of the açaí trade, and do not wish to 
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take up the risks involved in it, such as being unable to sell their product and dealing 
with defaulting clients. In addition, the arrival of mobile phones has allowed them to 
become aware of daily price fluctuations, greatly reducing middlemen’s ability to 
exploit them. This is why they often prefer trading with middlemen, rather than going 
to market themselves (Interviews 12, 13, 23, 29, 30, 31). 
 
Pricing for berries that generates income received by Ribeirinhos, at the bottom of 
the chain, can vary a great deal. Proximity to market, and the ability to find new trade 
pathways, greatly influences their ability to negotiate prices with middlemen. In each 
season, there are great fluctuations due to changes in the supply. In Curralinho, 
where they are far removed from markets, and rely solely on the boats that take their 
production to a single factory (Sambazon) they reported selling their crop mainly for 
R$ 5,00/lata, although they can sometimes get between R$ 15,00 to R$ 20,00 when 
the season ebbs. In Limoeiro, in the Abaetetuba region, where there is ample 
competition for their product, prices for Ribeirinhos are much higher, closer to R$ 15 
to R$ 20 on average, and can be much higher when there is little product availability 
(sometimes rising up to R$ 100,00/lata). In a study that is often cited, The Economic 
Institute for Development and Environment of the State of Pará (IDESP) states that 
Ribeirinho earnings average R$ 10/lata. Conab estimates the price at R$ 35,00/lata, 
but this quote relates to the low season, when product is very scarce and prices are 
considerable higher. Overall, considering they usually extract around 20 latas/week, 
average earnings are around R$ 900,00 /month, which is, more or less, the minimum 
wage in Brazil. In the last two years, prices have reportedly skyrocketed, due to a 
poor harvest, but also through pressure by Ribeirinhos, who have refused to pick the 
berries unless better prices are offered. 
 
 
5.4 Embeddedness and Factors That Influence the Açaí Chain 
Configuration  
 
There are several key influencing factors for the chain, these are: the geographic 
dispersion of the production area; the historical isolation of Ribeirinho communities 
and its sociocultural impact; and the absence of State intervention. Social programs 
at the base of the chain, and rising urbanization, have also had a profound impact on 
how the chain works. The factors involved are: supplying additional income and 
providing tenure security to Ribeirinhos; mobile-phone technology becoming a key 
tool in price formation; changing traditionally oppressive social relations, and creating 
big urban markets as people move from the interior to the cities. The concept of 
‘embeddedness’ is thus instrumental to understanding how chain actors behave and 
how different upgrading strategies fare. 
 
Territorial embeddedness is particularly relevant in this scenario. The açaí is a native 
fruit, and its consumption is deeply tied to the local culture of the Ribeirinho 
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population. Its extraction and trade are tied to the region’s topography and climate, 
its waterways and riverbanks. The plant grows on drenched soil along meandering 
river channels and is flooded in water for half the year. The counter clockwise shift in 
patterns of rainfall controls the harvest season and mandates prices. The isolation of 
the State of Pará has formed a very specific socio-cultural context, which binds the 
rationality of the behavior not only of network actors, but also interactions of 
institutions with the chain over a vast area.  
 
The proximity to trade routes and relative proximity to processing plants within large 
urban centres play a key role in determining developmental outcomes of chain 
inclusion. For example, in Marajó, the communities visited around Curralinho and 
Breves are relatively well connected to trading routes and, therefore, have enough 
market access to evade malpractice. However, several interviewees report that in 
more-isolated communities, abuses are still all too common, with many Ribeirinhos 
trading their product in kind (a system of barter) for a kilo of sugar, or a chicken. With 
poor logistics to navigate the tremendously long waterways, many Ribeirinhos have 
a hard time reaping the benefits of chain inclusion, and yet the potential production 
volume cannot satisfy market demand. 
 
The long physical distance by boat, coupled with the perishability of the fruits means 
there are tremendous challenges shared by all those involved. These difficulties 
present themselves in different ways with different outcomes and are the central 
challenges faced by chain actors. Although there are an estimated 15 million people 
living in the Brazilian Amazon basin, many of them Ribeirinhos, they are mostly 
ignored in the collective mind. Stereotypically, we know of colorful indigenous 
populations (colloquially known as ‘Indian tribes’), and what are often thought of as 
exploitative farmers and miners that damage natural ecosystems in the Amazonian 
rainforests, but we have little in-depth knowledge of these people, their culture, or 
way of life. 
 
It is perhaps not until Chico Mendes (1944-1988), an environmentalist who 
prominently defended the rubber tappers brought attention to the fact that the 
Amazon forest was not devoid of a population. The Ribeirinho has, however, 
remained mostly excluded from society, both culturally and economically, living in 
extreme poverty for generations. It is only with the current açaí boom, and the 
creation of social programs aimed at eradicating extreme poverty in Brazil that they 
have seen a change in their living standards. For Ribeirinhos, inclusion into Brazilian 
society, and its cash economy, is relatively recent, coming not only from the açaí 
boom, but also the federal social programs that have been created in the last fifteen 
years. These people arrived here mostly at the turn of the 20th century, to work the 
rubber farms that marked the pinnacle of Pará’s wealth and importance in the World 
(Brondizio, 2008). Once the rubber boom declined, they settled into subsistence 
livelihoods along the waterways, while also working for the local landowners in cattle 
ranches and sawmills. They adopted some subsistence technology from the local 
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indigenous population such as fishing; growing cassava and milling it for manioc 
flour; hunting; selling wood; and picking and pulping açaí berries. 
 
This population had no land titles, practically no social standing and most of them did 
not even have birth certificates. Living in almost complete isolation, and often 
submitted to the will of the landowners, they were the invisible inhabitants of the 
world-famous Amazon forest, the ‘lungs of the world’, or whatever fashionable 
metaphor the Green community would care to promote (Brondizio, 2008). The juice 
of the açaí fruit, mixed with manioc flour, and whatever fish and game they could get, 
and remains, the basis of their diet. Although açaí berry is their main source of 
income, their other activities are key to ensuring secure food supply. The extraction 
of the açaí palm is part of a suite of activities that make up the Ribeirinho’s 
subsistence-based livelihood, which in turn reflects the rich biodiversity around them 
(Brondizio, 2008). 
 
Though there are levels of variation between regions (variables such as proximity to 
markets, and the possibility of growing cassava on dry land), This population earns 
additional income from building and carpentry, or work in neighboring farms. Despite 
this, the government has increasingly cracked down on illegal logging. The process 
of urbanization means a solid demand has been created, and the açaí has, in the 
last ten years or so, become their main source of income, and visibly improved local 
revenues. This can be illustrated by this population now having their own satellite 
television and mobile phones. 
 
The diversity of activities that make up the Ribeirinho livelihood would explain why 
most of the interviewees from this population were reluctant to increase the 
proportion of their time spent on açaí, for example by trying to take their own crops to 
market. Although açaí berry is their main source of income during the harvest 
season, other non-cash activities are just as important. Additionally, because the 
açaí only provides an income for a few months of the year, it could never truly 
become a full-time occupation. All of the Ribeirinho families who were interviewed 
reported surviving on a suite of activities. For example, some rear chickens, others 
spend more time fishing, and the existence of manioc (cassava) plantations is 
dependent on the availability of dry land (interviews 10 to 13, 34 to 46, 47) 
 
The creation of government social programs aimed at low-income families or forest-
dwellers has had a dramatic impact on livelihoods of the Ribeirinho people. Brazil is 
now a country that systematically works to redress inequalities, and has seen 
tremendous reductions in extreme poverty rates. For the first time in history, 
Ribeirinhos, who were amongst the poorest people in Brazil, no longer face extreme 
shortage of food. Due to transfers made directly from the federal government to 
municipal authorities, they have access to basic health services (although these are 
still far from exemplary), and schooling (including boat transfers for pupils) for their 
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children. This is a great paradigm shift for what was once a forgotten and oppressed 
population.  
 
The overwhelming majority of family units now receive somewhere between R$ 
120,00 and R$ 300,00 monthly as a welfare benefit, depending on the number of 
people in each household (typically somewhere around US$ 40,00 a month), as 
reported during interviews (Interviews 10 to 13, 36 to 46). Though this is not much 
money, but it is sufficient to ensure that they no longer go hungry, and can afford to 
buy basic consumer goods. Additionally, they have also, in many cases, received 
stable land-tenure documents from the federal government. These documents make 
them eligible for several other benefit programs, such as those promoted by the 
National Institute for Colonization and Agricultural Reform (INCRA) for fishermen 
colonies, which aim to halt overfishing in the spawning season, and give populations 
a yearly allowance to not fish during that period (interview 47). Tenure security also 
encourages investments, such as crop management and pruning, which greatly 
increases açaí production. These interventions have proven an important part of a 
support process that upgrades and ensures the chain development has positive 
income-generating outcomes at the base. 
 
Another important programmed has been the Bolsa Verde, a government cash 
transfer programmed similar to Bolsa Familia, designed to stimulate conservation 
and diminish poverty for people living in conservation areas. 
Those recruited in fishing colonies also receive the Seguro Defesa for half the year 
to encourage preservation of fish stocks. They are eligible for rural pensions, and 
receive new homes from a federal government programmed. These state programs 
have substantially increased the amount of income available to riverine populations, 
and have had a significant impact on the reduction of rural poverty. All of the 
interviewed Ribeirinhos received at least one of these benefits, with many receiving 
a combination (interviews 10 to 13, 34 to 46, 49).  
 
Cash injections from government programs have caused local economies to flourish 
and urban markets are booming. People who had moved away are returning. Local 
commerce is thriving, with people buying boats, clothes, mobile phones, generators, 
and household appliances. In turn, the local market for the açaí berry has grown, and 
demand for cash to buy consumer goods has driven Ribeirinhos towards cash crops. 
The State of Pará is rapidly becoming urbanized and, as a consequence, there are 
fewer people to pick the berries, and yet more people to consume them in cities. 
Repeatedly, interviewees claimed urbanization was the key factor behind the local 
açaí boom (although the national and international markets, which absorb nearly 
40% of production, certainly have a large role to play). In fact, studies show that as 
small cities boom, ties between rural and urban livelihoods intensify, increasing the 
açaí trade (Padoch et. al., 2008). This finding is in line with much existing literature 
on NTFPs, which show that a thriving local market is a very good stabilizer of Non-
Timber Forest Product (NTFP) trade. 
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However, a practical direct government presence remains sparse. The Ribeirinho 
communities receive little to no technical support to develop income-generating 
activities and this is not conducive to creating the type of independent, economically 
ascendant class that potentially could result from inclusion. According to 
interviewees in Marajó, agricultural technicians, and other state-led support-services 
visit, but this is about once a decade (interviews 29, 30). Despite the availability of 
financing for small-scale farming activities through the National Program for 
Strengthening of Family Farming PRONAF program, the money is spent on day-to-
day activities rather than becoming an investment. The programs that exist do not 
necessarily consider the specificities of their livelihoods, the natural setting or 
specific desires and needs especially in relation to the diversity of their livelihood 
pattern. This lack of technical support leads specialists such as Dr. Cordeiro, at the 
University of Pará, to affirm that with enough technical support, açaí production could 
still grow exponentially (interview 53). 
 
The trade in açaí, coupled with these government programs, has nonetheless 
changed the circumstances of the region, and dramatically improved living 
standards. It is estimated that the average family unit picks around twenty 14 kg 
cans (latas) of açaí berries a week, which they sell for anything between R$ 5 to R$ 
30 each, depending on the season, and their proximity to market (interviews 10 to 
13, 29 to 32). This injection of cash, the combination of açaí income and social 
programs, in regions where livelihoods were subsistence-based has had a visible 
impact. For example, my observations were that homes now have generators, 
televisions, and mobile phones, amongst other ‘modern’ comforts. It is noticeable 
that hunger is a problem consigned to the past. Children now talk about fashion, 
listen to trendy music and people communicate through their mobile phones. Most 
importantly it is noticeable that attitudes have changed with the development of the 
açaí trade. 
 
Changes in the social standing of the Ribeirinho have been important in the 
development of the açaí chain, and this reflects a shift in the societal embeddedness 
of these actors. This population appears to be no longer at risk of going hungry, has 
secure land tenure, no longer needs to work for a landowner, or cut wood illegally to 
make a living. Crackdowns by environmental authorities have also dissuaded many 
from logging, although it is still common. With a safety net in place, and a newfound 
sense of independence and security, Ribeirinhos are more likely to work on their plot 
of land, managing their açaí trees to extract better yields. Land tenure has also 
ensured that they can safely manage their fields, and do not have to worry about 
landowners taking a significant proportion of their earnings as they once did. This 
corroborates the strong bond found in the literature between tenure security and 
successful NTFP enterprises (Neumann 2000). 
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For the Ribeirinhos, who have, in the past, lived an excluded and marginalized 
existence, entering as independent agents into a value chain is already a big step 
towards a productive form of inclusion in society. Most of them, who are barely 
literate, and, in most cases, have had very little access to the outside world and little 
to no work or business experience. They lead very different lives, with very different 
values and parameters than those of consumerist, capitalist Western society. Yet 
they enter into these transactions as independent agents, and have access to the 
cash economy, finally being able to afford televisions and antennas, which bring 
them sense of connection and belonging that they seem to cherish deeply. Things 
are nonetheless changing quickly, and younger generations are increasingly 
educated and aware of the world around them. 
 
A new culture is taking shape, with its specific fashions and music. As Ribeirinhos 
acquire the tools of contemporary society, they are slowly emerging as a culturally 
specific force (as recognized in interviews conducted in Limoeiro and Marajó). A 
group of teenagers interviewed in Limoeiro talked at length about their tastes, their 
designer jeans, their music (a mix of local rhythms and Balearic electronica) and 
their changing social norms. All of them are in school, and have hopes of a better 
future (interviews 10 to 13, 90). We see clearly a contemporary, thriving local culture 
that forms in a unique and rich configuration at the fringes between traditional 
Ribeirinho communities and new urban influences. Children have access to the 
internet, and resignifying global trends in their unique way, much as other children 
across the globe. Unfortunately, none of this vibrancy is acknowledged or celebrated 
as part of the identity of the açaí harvesters’ culture, as discussed below. 
 
Despite this increased proximity between cultural realities, several actors involved in 
the chain, particularly in NGOs and other support institutions such as SEBRAE, 
define ‘cultural differences’ as the key difficulty in ‘professionalizing’ Ribeirinhos, and 
helping them improve production and gains (interviews 2, 5,11, 14, 48). The type of 
cultural difference mentioned by these was easily verifiable during the research. 
Ribeirinhos did not keep records of their transactions, and did not engage in any 
form of financial planning. Their reality and way of engaging with their activities (their 
societal embeddedness) is very different from what Western economic actors 
expect. Out of all the Ribeirinhos interviewed, only one ever kept records of how 
much he had sold and at what prices over that last year. 
 
It is apparent that accounts were not kept to see how much income had been 
derived from this activity over the last year. For people who have grown accustomed 
to living day-by-day, this sort of exercise seems futile. None of the Ribeirinhos 
interviewed had a clear idea of where that money went, or were ever able to manage 
it to save any of it, or plan their expenses (interviews 41 to 46). Their inclusion 
seems to be occurring within their own pace, and according to their own capacity 
and interests. Attempts to steer this process into something that outside forces would 
find ‘professional’ seem to have a hard time taking root. 
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It could be speculated that the geographical isolation, ‘invisibility’, submission to 
patronage relations over decades, and social exclusion may have contributed to 
creating, in the sampled Ribeirinho communities, a highly individualistic disposition. 
Although population growth has seen the size of communities grow substantially it 
can be observed that they still live in extended family units and are at a relative 
distance from other communities. They do not identify as a whole community that 
take decisions together, or pools resources to invest and grow. Everything is done at 
the household level and there is little or no common planning at the community level. 
For example, in one community in Marajó, a senior member of a community had 
taken a training course in the Amazon’s Permaculture Institute, and learned how to 
make chicken feed from açaí seeds and leftover shrimp husks. Everyone in the 
community, or almost everyone, keeps chickens, and spends a great deal of money 
buying corn and other feed. The machine to make the feed costs R$ 7000, which 
would amount to about R$ 70 per capita in a community of 100 individuals. This 
money could be easily gathered collectively from açaí sales, social programs, and 
small government-sponsored agricultural loans, such as PRONAF. 
  
However, this type of cooperative action had never occurred to the community, who 
simply are not in the habit of doing things collectively. Other such examples were 
commonly encountered throughout the fieldwork. During the research, a meeting 
was attended, which brought together leaders from all the Marajó Ribeirinho 
associations, to prepare for a national summit of social movements. It was clear at 
this meeting that these leaders had difficulty articulating complaints, coming together 
to discuss a course of action, or even grasping what the meeting they were attending 
represented. They did not seem able to agree, amongst themselves, what kind of 
demands they would have to make, or what solutions were necessary to improve the 
livelihoods of their communities. Without the coaxing and support of local NGO 
workers, they would not have been able to resolve anything at the meeting. They 
simply do not seem accustomed to working together, or making decisions in this 
way. 
 
This lack of collective action may have been further exacerbated by their recent 
inclusion in the cash economy. For example, in the past people would work in each 
other’s manioc plantations and exchange favors whereas today they pay each other 
for a day’s labor. In this context, the setting up of cooperatives or even of trade 
associations has failed to truly take hold. Ribeirinhos are not inclined to take part, 
and when an organization steps in to form a cooperative or association, it is more 
often not managed by those that are better off, quickly becomes corrupted by the 
richer members of the community, who have the capacity and spare time to invest, a 
common conception, if not always divulged, about all the associations that have 
been set up in the communities visited during fieldwork. In this context, inclusion into 
the more ‘professional’, cash-based value chain that follows on from the community 
level has been conditioned to the existence of middlemen who can deal with these 
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cultural discrepancies. Middlemen in the chain provide are networked, and enable 
the crossover from the local to a capitalist market reality as essential scale-crossing 
brokers. This is explored further in the next chapter. 
  
The relative isolation of Ribeirinho communities and their tendency to live out their 
lives in one place also makes them particularly wary of their reputation. Local gossip 
serves as a powerful regulator of behavior. Local middlemen are wary of 
jeopardizing their reputation and being shunned by their local community. This often 
discourages them from taking too high a profit margin from their neighbors when 
conducting trade. These tight social bonds provide network embeddedness at the 
base of the network.  
 
In Ribeirinho communities, there is little cooperation, but social cohesion is key to 
making sure that thefts are kept low, although it is not entirely uncommon for people 
to arrive and see their trees picked bare by thieves. They also rely on each other for 
labor, when they are managing their fields, and can also often offer an assortment of 
crops to send to a Marreteiro (local middleman) in the boat of a friend or neighbor. 
Although this appears to be a minimal intervention, this support system enables 
them to keep trading. In this way, local relationships serve as the basis for the 
formation of bonds of trust that ensure security in chain transactions. Local people 
are wary of being cheated, as they so often have been, and trading with a neighbor 
is a good way to curtail abuses. People keep track of each other’s activities in the 
secluded waters, and abuses are rather easy to spot. This closeness keeps the 
chain cohesive at this level, in the absence of any official enforcement mechanism. 
 
 
5.5 Capturing value 
 
The explosion in demand for the açaí berry has driven up prices dramatically and 
been the most important mode of increased value capture by Ribeirinho 
communities, and the driver, along with other social programs, of significant regional 
development. Market pull has re-shaped social relations and dramatically improved 
livelihoods. Three different strategies are the most common: first by moving from 
pure extractivism to managed açaí fields through attempting to cut out Marreteiros 
(or other intermediaries), and finally with product certification. The move towards 
management of açaí palms has increased yields tremendously, though there is still 
space for significant improvement. The benefits to Ribeirinhos of certification are 
meagre at best. There have also been smaller attempts to move into new value 
chains, to diversify income sources. 
 
The first strategy relating to marketization relates to increased demand and is due to 
most Ribeirinhos managing their açaí fields. This type of strategy configures process 
upgrading, whereby actors improve on processes that they already perform. For the 
açaí harvesters’ culture, this involves mostly cutting down some competing 
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vegetation, and cutting down older trees, planting new ones, to increase productivity. 
In both Ribeirinhos locations, in Marajó and Abaetetuba, technicians from the State 
Agricultural Authority (EMATER) had once visited the region, and worked with locals, 
incorporating traditional knowledge, to better manage their crops. This information 
was then shared between neighbors and passed along to other communities. It is 
now standard practice for most Ribeirinhos to hire day-laborers every few years to 
manage their fields. They claim this does a good job of increasing production, as has 
been amply verified in existing research (de Azevedo and Ryohei Kato, 2007). 
Interviews corroborate these findings, and crop management thus appears to have 
effectively been a successful strategy, one that has succeeded in improving their 
income through greater yields and longer harvesting periods, and most importantly, 
one that they are able and willing to carry out independently, within the community, 
for many years, without major glitches (interviews 36 to 46). 
 
With regards to moving up the value chain, the ability to cut out middlemen has been 
elusive. This strategy has at some point been brought to Ribeirinhos communities by 
outside actors, mostly NGOs. It would represent a form of functional upgrading, 
where actors move up a link in the chain.  
 
Competition is relatively fierce in extracting communities near to markets, and 
governance patterns are relatively loose as a result, which would make functional 
upgrading easy to achieve. According to a local community leader, the local 
government also made one such attempt in Marajó, but failed dismally. According to 
this interview, local authorities purchased a boat and handed it to local communities, 
in the hope that they would bypass middlemen, trading directly with local buyers and 
increase their share of the profits. Along with the boat, the government arranged for 
a local association to sell their entire crop to a local processing plant. Ribeirinhos 
worked for an entire season, expecting to be paid in bulk at the end which is often 
the norm for factories. When the factory defaulted, the whole enterprise failed. 
Ribeirinhos lost an entire crop’s worth of income, and never touched the boat again. 
The boat now is rusting away on a riverbank and the incident is recalled as a 
traumatic experience by those involved (interview 46). 
 
As many Marreteiros are keen to point out, often factories default on their 
commitments. Marreteiros are experts at managing risks, negotiating favorable 
terms, and making sure they get paid, in cash or assets. Ribeirinhos do not have that 
trading capacity, and could not withstand the impact of the default. The role of 
middlemen more complex than merely transportation with boats and requires a set of 
market skills that isolated Ribeirinhos often lack.  
 
The co-operative in Abaetetuba is also a relatively unsuccessful experiment in 
functional upgrading and has not attracted a significant amount of trade. Those 
interviewed within the co-operative admitted that Ribeirinhos prefer to trade on their 
own with Marreteiros rather than work with the cooperative. The cooperative is 
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unable to secure better prices or to keep up with volatile markets. According to the 
Ribeirinhos and staff interviewed on its premises, they had managed to convey best 
practices to Ribeirinhos, and prevented abusive behavior by local middlemen. It has 
served its purpose as an institutional force, but has not truly represented an 
opportunity for upgrading for local Ribeirinhos. Thus the Abaetetuba co-operative 
remains a marginal enterprise, whose role has become more that of an association, 
with some training and representation capacity. It has received several international 
grants, and significant NGO attention, but has failed to truly gain traction as a trading 
force in the local market. 
 
Within the Abaetetuba region there are two co-operatives that do seem to function, 
and that have received some support from factories such as Bela Iaçá (the biggest 
factory in the State) to buy equipment and other items. This enables factories to cut 
out middlemen who bite into their profit-margins. Yet they only seem to survive in 
semi-urban environments, where actors are already acclimatized to market 
vicissitudes, though their total volume of trade remains marginal. There is also no 
clear evidence that these cooperatives do anything to improve prices for Ribeirinhos, 
since they do not have the bargaining power to set them (interviews 36 to 46). 
 
There are tales of other NGO-led attempts to ‘cut out the middleman’ in the region, 
all of which seem to have failed over time. One of the possible reasons for these 
failures is that NGO cash and management capacity stopped. Marreteiros simply 
seem better equipped to play their role than these artificially formed entities can be. 
Ribeirinhos seldom have the capacity, or will, to manage the vicissitudes of trade on 
their own. Many of them have lived in near-complete isolation all their lives. They are 
often illiterate, and have little to no experience handling commercial relations, doing 
the books, and making managerial decisions. 
 
They are also unlikely to want to pool resources and work together. When outside 
‘help’ comes in, it is usually in the form of NGO workers, with little knowledge of the 
market, or business acumen. They bring enthusiasm, and funding, and as long as 
there is enough of both, the enterprise remains viable. But these eventually dry up, 
leaving in their wake the development fatigue that is so common in these failed 
experiments. 
 
Most importantly, Ribeirinhos are not, according to the interviews, necessarily keen 
to change roles, as they are often most comfortable with living within their traditional 
setting and carrying out the activities to which they have become accustomed. They 
strive towards better conditions for themselves and their families, but cutting out the 
middleman of the açaí trade does not seem to be a strategy they favor. Though the 
formation of associations and the political organization of communities is a worthy 
goal and has potential to increase their visibility and defend their interests, it is 
thought that upgrading by eliminating the middleman does not seem a productive 
strategy to improve their prospects. 
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Cutting out middlemen is not something that they particularly aspire to because it 
would clash with their traditional livelihood balance and disrupt other important 
activities. Taking part in collective activities and NGO-led experiments also takes 
them away from the suite of activities that sustain their livelihoods, and could be 
potentially dangerous. Those who do tend to get involved in these artificially formed 
associations and cooperatives are usually the richest members of the community, 
who can afford to speculate. This study has found that these are the reasons for 
richer community members dominating commercial enterprises and therefore 
defeating the sacrosanct purpose of commonly managed economic activities. This 
was clearly the case in Marajó. 
 
This outside vision that Ribeirinhos need to be capacitated (trained) or they need to 
change their way of living to incorporate other activities to climb their way up the 
chain, has done little good to improve their livelihoods. It does not take into 
consideration the lack of formal education, market savvy and social relations that 
characterize Ribeirinho societies. Nor does it seem to stem from an actual desire on 
the part of these populations, but rather from a projection of these outside forces of 
what these communities should be molded into. Ribeirinho communities are keen on 
inclusion, and an exciting new culture is in formation at the junction between 
traditional livelihoods and the modern behemoth. This is a process that is occurring 
organically, at its own pace, and with its own traits and quirks. These people are for 
the first time in charge of constructing an identity to communicate with the rest of the 
world, and it seems they will do it on their own terms. They are certainly still very 
much in need of assistance, but they do not need to be told who they should be. 
Development projects or State interventions that seek to improve their livelihoods 
must begin by listening to what they express as their needs and desires, and 
empower them to make their own choices. 
 
Another important upgrading strategy is organic certification. This is a form of 
product upgrading, where new technologies or procedures create an improved, and 
more valuable, version of the same produce. Of course, in the case of açaí, this is 
more a bureaucratic procedure than an actual change in agricultural practice or 
produce improvement. Because it is naturally occurring, practically all açaí is grown 
with very little human intervention, and thus by definition it is organic. In practice, a 
specific factory usually obtains certification to tap into export markets. It then goes on 
to certify its suppliers, the Ribeirinhos. They are registered as organic suppliers, and 
receive some security/sanitary equipment (plastic sheets for picking the fruits, so 
they do not drop to the forest floor, and boots). This equipment, according to 
interviewed communities, is seldom used, and there is practically no verification 
protocol (interviews 20 to 24, and 36 to 46). Although factories do receive a bonus 
for selling organic produce, this is not the case for the Ribeirinhos, according to the 
factories themselves (interviews 4, 8, 9). 
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Those who do manage to get certified sell at the same price as everyone else, the 
daily going rate. What could be considered an advantage is that when an organic 
order is available, they have preference over those who are not certified. But there 
are so many different forms for Ribeirinhos in more productive regions to sell their 
crops that it makes very little difference to them. Many actors involved in the chains 
also claimed that processing plants are known to mix up products from all their 
suppliers, and only keep books for eventual audits. Thus, organic certification is a 
more productive upgrading strategy for processing companies than it is for 
Ribeirinhos, although it is viewed by consumer markets as a way of ‘giving back’ to 
those Ribeirinhos communities. They do not gain much from going along, or really 
even understand what organic means in this context (as became clear in the 
interviews). 
 
In interviews, most Ribeirinhos expressed that they were keen to continue to 
increase their yields and to continue to diversify into other activities. Because their 
livelihood patterns are traditionally diverse, and picking açaí does not take up all of 
their time (especially when not in season), it makes sense to try other things. This 
type of strategy is a form of chain upgrading, where actors diversify and move into 
new value chains. For Ribeirinhos, if another activity could provide income during the 
low season, their livelihoods would become much more predictable and secure. 
There is a vast amount of other exotic fruits and oils that could be better exploited 
commercially. Proper management of forests could also enable trading in 
sustainable harvest timber. Ribeirinhos are interested in fish farming and most of 
them already keep small livestock.  
 
Creating alternative sources of income would allow them to buffer against the risks of 
having only one significant income source that only exists during few months of the 
year. Already, where the land is not too soaked, Ribeirinhos have manioc 
plantations. They also fish regularly. Sometimes these activities are for subsistence 
only, but many communities trade fish or shrimp, as well as manioc flour. They are 
also keen to experiment with fish farms, and raise livestock (interviews 10 to 13, 34 
to 46, 48). There is also a wide abundance of exotic, and highly nutritive, fruits, much 
like the açaí, which are not, or barely, exploited commercially. The diversification into 
mixed agroforestry uses would also be a bounty for biodiversity conservation, 
allowing a variety of species to coexist productively in their native milieu. But at 
present only açaí provides significant income. 
 
There have been several experiments with fish farms in Marajó, with some support 
from public authorities. This support is unfortunately so sporadic that many of these 
initiatives have failed. Yet there are reports, where sustained technical assistance 
was given, of considerable success. Near Breves, a local Ribeirinho went on to get a 
degree in agricultural sciences and has been driving a successful fish farm 
experiment in his community, while managing to harness support from EMATER. 
EMATER, the State authority is meant to provide this type of technical assistance, 
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but is extremely overstretched, and is unable to work consistently with communities 
to develop these new and complementary forms of income. 
 
The federal government provides easily accessible credit for small-scale agricultural 
project, but with no assistance on the ground. Ribeirinhos are unable to use the cash 
for much more than to ease their day-to-day cash flow problems. Once more, the 
isolation of communities and their relative abandonment by the authorities of the 
State of Pará restricts these potential complementary activities. Nonetheless, this 
seems to be the preferred route of the Ribeirinhos populations that were interviewed. 
It would help them maintain steady income when the açaí is not in season, and allow 
them to continue to live traditionally (Gámez, 2015). 
 
There is one notable success story of agroforestry diversification in the State of 
Pará. The Japanese cooperative in Tomé Açu, CAMTA18 , a pioneer in the açaí 
trade, has such a business model, and trades frozen pulps of many Amazonian 
fruits, keeping their income diversified and their plants rolling year- round. After 
arriving in the interior of Pará from Japan in the early 20th century, with a few black 
pepper seedlings, they went on to become the biggest producers of black pepper in 
the World. After a plague destroyed their harvest, they later moved on to passion 
fruit. But they began overproducing, and then went bankrupt. It was only then that 
one of the cooperative’s leaders decided to learn from Ribeirinho livelihoods, and 
work on implementing a diverse, mixed agroforestry system, which includes many 
local fruits. 
 
Now they guard against plagues and market fluctuations, while supplying the region 
and foreign markets with a notable variety of native fruit pulps. In fact, when the first 
foreign entrepreneurs arrived to buy açaí pulp for export, it was at CAMTA that they 
found the necessary conditions to begin trading. Currently, they receive technical 
visits from universities, and even the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), to attempt 
to study and reproduce their successful model. Coincidentally, it was this Japanese 
community that brought martial arts to the State of Pará, and thanks to whom the 
Gracie clan gained access to these sports (interview 7), as described in Chapter 7.  
 
The CAMTA cooperative has not only diversified its crops, it has managed to 
become a processing plant as well, and thus has much greater control over the 
production process than Ribeirinhos could have. Additionally, they have a very 
particular cultural history, a specific ‘societal embeddedness’ that makes them very 
different from Ribeirinhos. They arrived in Brazil together as a Japanese community, 
with a strong cultural identity and high levels of literacy, and have stuck together 
since. They have always worked together, and pooled resources and sold their 
production in bulk together. They have sent their children to college to study 
agroforestry, and invested to grow their businesses. It is part of their cultural heritage 
																																																						
18	http://www.camta.com.br/index.php/pt/	
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to work in this way. It is interesting, however, that the key to their success was their 
ability to observe the diversity of Ribeirinho livelihoods. There are many key 
elements of CAMTA’s success absent from the Ribeirinho cultural context and they 
have no history of working together, or forming associations. Many are illiterate, 
accustomed to relations of patronage, and have a hard time negotiating the reality 
outside their riverbanks. Nonetheless, perhaps with adequate technical support, and 
the stimulation of demand, Ribeirinhos could use the existing trade pathways set up 
for açaí to trade other products, even if individually, and diversify their sources of 
income throughout the year. At CAMTA diversified models can, indeed, work. 
 
A widening of the scope of policies aimed at supporting these livelihoods, to create 
demand in consumer markets and engage corporate actors, through participation in 
fairs, marketing activities and ‘place branding’ could help ensure commercial viability.  
If this happened then with market intelligence and brand prominence in place, using 
açaí and its established place in markets as an anchor, can experiments in trading 
and growing other ingredients would begin to grow. Ultimately, it is proposed that 
policy- makers contemplate simultaneous interventions throughout the chain. They 
could do this by scoping and listening to communities about their desired livelihood 
strategies, using market intelligence and commercial networks in order to arrive at 
viable solutions. Investing in actors further down the value chain, to involve 
entrepreneurs that could broker between realities and create space for new products 
could prove as beneficial to communities as local action. As te Velde tells us, not all 
captivity in the value chain creates abuse. Often entrepreneurs take the risks, and 
provide the coordination of the chain that opens and maintains new trading pathways 
(te Velde, 2006). 
 
Another form of upgrading at the base of the chain is the transition to monoculture 
(also a form of process upgrading). This is often the case with successful NTFP 
products (Homma, 2002). Açaí prices have skyrocketed, and continue to rise 
consistently, as demand continues to grow. Though this has represented a 
tremendous bounty for Ribeirinho populations, without a considerable increase in 
production, the chain remains suffocated, in a 
way. Thus, increasing overall yields is a key preoccupation for all those involved. 
Though this would move açaí further towards the agricultural commodity spectrum, 
away from the pure NTFP standard, it would arguably remain a socio-environmental 
win-win product, depending on the production model applied. EMBRAPA, the 
National Agricultural Research Institute, is working towards an entirely different 
production model. 
 
EMBRAPA is working on developing large-scale, monoculture açaí fields, with 
artificial irrigation and fertilizers. This new technique could yield two harvests a year, 
rather than one as a result of irrigation, and allow factories to run all year. It would 
also cut out many of the variables involved with the current model, such as dispersed 
production, uneven quality, and difficult logistics. Mostly, it would definitively cement 
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the end of the extractivist/semi-extractivist mode of production, with Ribeirinhos at 
the center. Instead, production would move to large properties, controlled by large 
land-owners, and rely on hired labor. The Ribeirinho is not seen as an active, 
intelligent ‘forest farmer’, a manager of resources that can be valued and worked 
with. Rather, they are considered a liability, responsible for the ‘inelasticity’ of supply 
that dwarves the chain (interviews 2 and 3). 
 
Currently there is an experiment is in place in Santarém, where an entrepreneurial 
family from the South of Brazil has planted 2000 hectares of irrigated and artificially 
fertilized açaí monoculture. This is a radical illustration of process-upgrade in the 
chain. It could change the face of the market forever. Its owner estimates that they 
have invested some R$ 50 million in the operation. This is a highly professional 
operation, with technicians, monitoring programs, and machinery. Santarém is very 
far removed from the producing regions; it is mostly dry; degraded pasture land from 
old deforestation for cattle ranching. To process their production, the owners are also 
investing in their own processing plant, which will make frozen pulp. This is a 
completely different operational set-up from the forests and riverbanks where 
Ribeirinhos extract the açaí. 
 
What is interesting here is that this monoculture also upgrades the chain in the 
processing of its own fruits, trading pulp directly with clients (process upgrading). 
This is an entirely new production model, where producer and processor are a single 
entity, much different from the dispersed and loosely governed model seen in the 
traditional extraction chain. 
 
The head of the operation, when interviewed, was convinced that this was the only 
way to ensure steady supply to industries, and increase the açaí market (interview 
16). Furthermore, he was convinced that he would get higher yields at low costs with 
this optimized system, which also includes mechanized harvesting. When 
questioned about the exclusion of Ribeirinhos from production, he claimed to be 
creating stable, well-paid jobs at his facility while investing in the social welfare of the 
population by building schools, and guaranteeing healthcare. He was also confident 
of the positive environmental impact of his endeavor since he was respecting the 
20% plantation to 80% forest ratio imposed by federal legislation. He also repeated, 
much as EMBRAPA technicians and government officials had before him, that the 
market should be sufficient enough for both production models. The monocultures 
would supply industrial buyers, while Ribeirinhos would still have local markets, and 
local contracts with municipal authorities to supply schools and hospitals. Eventually, 
if this model were followed, the Homma (2002) prophecy, whereby all NTFPs that 
‘succeed’ end up as monocultures, would be once more fulfilled (interview 3). 
 
Homma, an influential researcher into NTFPs in Brazil, posits that all NTFPs that 
become successful will eventually progress from extractivism into monocultures, to 
sustain increasing demand (Homma, 2002). Undoubtedly, when large volumes of 
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product are required for markets it is possible that monocultures will be able to meet 
demand. Unless a market identity for NTFPs and their gatherers is created ingrained 
into consumer markets, the Homma hypothesis might be an inevitability. NTFP 
gatherers are seen as the foragers of Europe, as keepers of valuable cultural 
traditions, that create a unique subjective value in products. If this is done 
convincingly, there might be a niche for NTFPs as opposed to monoculture 
operations. 
 
Large-scale monoculture initiatives such as this one have many critics, particularly 
from Professor Cordeiro, an academic with the most expertise about açaí value 
chains in Pará, and the author of many of the most complete studies on the topic. He 
explains that better crop management in existing small production units, and 
improved logistics (investments in solar-powered, refrigerated boats) could 
dramatically ease current bottlenecks, while keeping Ribeirinhos in the loop, as key 
actors in the chain, and increasing social returns from the chain (de Santana, 2013). 
 
Working with Ribeirinhos would also sustain the açaí’s role as an eco-social win-win 
situation, keeping riverbanks protected and local populations employed without any 
disruption to their traditional livelihoods. The development and up-scaling of a mixed 
production model, with açaí and other forest commodities, such as that currently 
used by CAMTA, could keep Ribeirinhos in the loop, while greatly increasing yields. 
The improvement of transport infrastructure would also increase the available reach 
of Marreteiros, and allow more distant regions to supply markets (interview 53). 
Thus, for Cordeiro, other avenues are possible to resolve the ‘demand crunch’, 
rather than an inexorable progression towards the monoculture model that Homma 
(2002) claims to be unavoidable. 
 
Ultimately, what is the value chain for? We can see here the regions’ societal 
embeddedness at play, the cultural dimensions of trade that are the object of 
‘cultural turn’ questioning in the GPN literature. Local businessmen, even 
government and research institutes, have little interest in these eco-social benefits, 
and are more interested in increasing profits. They believe the Ribeirinhos can have 
the small local markets, or government contracts to supply schools and hospitals 
(Brondizio, 2004). It is particularly notable to see EMBRAPA, a State-owned 
agricultural research facility, geared towards a monoculture model, without a second 
thought towards the development its potential impact. During the interview with 
EMPRAPA’s key açaí technician, it was clear that although their strains could 
potentially be used in mixed systems and small-scale properties, other facets were 
not contemplated in research design and implementation. EMBRAPA’s history is one 
of supporting Brazilian agriculture into high levels of productivity, and it is staffed with 
engineers and agronomical scientists.  
 
Little thought has been given to how Ribeirinhos could be part of policies to improve 
the chain and reap some benefits from these genetic improvements. One might 
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contend that rural exodus is unavoidable, and that a mechanized production system 
in the country that would stimulate job creation in growing processing plants in the 
city would have a better development potential than the current model. Yet the actors 
interviewed did not express any of these preoccupations or much worry about the 
poverty reduction potential of this strategy over another. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In analyzing interviews with local actors using the concept of ‘embeddedness’ as an 
organizing principle enabled the identification of key factors that have allowed the 
value chain to take shape, and how its development potential could be improved. 
Key findings were grouped by theme, as detailed in Table 5.1 below. 
 
The açaí boom has, indisputably, resulted in a tremendous improvement in the 
standard of living of the Ribeirinhos of the State of Pará. All Ribeirinho interviewees 
agree about that, but the presence of television sets, mobile phones, and most 
importantly healthy children at the visited communities is undeniable proof. For these 
people, trading açaí allows them to stay in their communities to live with dignity 
according to their traditional cultural pattern, while respecting the nature around 
them. At the present time, in its current configuration, the chain works, from a 
developmental and environmental perspective. Despite this, Ribeirinhos still live in 
relative poverty, and much must still be done so they can achieve stable, dignified 
living standards year-round. The chain provides significant income, but Ribeirinhos 
struggle when the berry is not in season. 
 
Regarding contextual factors, the existence of a strong local market for the açaí 
berry has enabled Ribeirinhos to invest in production, providing them with sufficient 
market access and demand stability to invest. They need not rely on a single actor to 
move their product, as this is a local staple; there are often several trading routes 
from which to choose. This is a finding that is often seen in the NTFP literature. A 
strong local market allows the chain to grow organically, without sudden spikes and 
interruptions in demand, without overreliance on one specific trade pathway, and 
without difficult to achieve quality controls. Since açaí is a local staple, communities 
can increase their productive capacity with relative certainty that they will more often 
than not be able to market their product. 
 
Additionally, the existence of some, however insufficient, State support, in the form 
of handout programs that guarantee survival year-round, as well as improved tenure 
rights, has given conditions to local populations to break traditional bonds of 
patronage with local elites, and set out on their own. The relation with marreteiros, in 
comparison, represents freedom. This empowerment of Ribeirinhos has also been a 
key factor in the chain's ability to generate positive development outcomes across 
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communities. The provision of technical assistance, enabling communities to 
manage their plots to maximize productivity has also allowed yields to grow to match 
demand. 
 
As a traditional product, with traditional extraction methods, the açaí berry chain is, 
at its base, profoundly tied to traditional livelihood patterns, and to the geographical 
area where it is grown and traded. The geographical constraints, in particular, are a 
key determinant of the power actors have (chain governance) to shape prices, or 
upgrade. Proximity to market is perhaps the most important variable at this level. It 
determines what prices Ribeirinhos will get for their produce, and conditions the 
social formations and business environment at the base of the chain. Creating better 
logistical links, with incentives for new processing plants across the territory, would 
enable more people to participate in the chain on favorable terms, while increasing 
the overall volume of available açaí for markets. 
 
The seasonality of the açaí must also be considered. The açaí chain only functions 
for around four to five months of the year, leaving Ribeirinhos with a very irregular 
annual income pattern. Thankfully, the government’s social programs guarantee 
basic needs throughout the rest of the year. This irregular pattern explains why 
Ribeirinhos remain attached to traditional and diverse livelihood patterns, in which a 
suite of activities sustains them throughout the year. Still, these other activities do 
not provide sufficient incomes through the year, and, without government programs, 
local livelihoods would remain very insecure. In this way, the existence of these 
programs also helps to ensure chain participation is done on favorable terms. 
 
Understanding embeddedness helps to appreciate why certain upgrading strategies 
work, while others fail. The move to management of palms, something that could be 
done relatively easily, without altering livelihood patterns or altering the governance 
dynamic of the chain, has proven very successful, particularly where the State has 
resolved tenure rights. Whatever outside help they have received from support 
agencies to teach management techniques has had a multiplying effect and 
increased income. 
 
Attempts to ‘cut out the middlemen’ have not worked. In the following chapter, the 
complexity of middlemen’s activities is described, and the multiplicities of roles that 
they must play to ensure trade (‘network embeddedness’), it becomes clear that 
pushing them out artificially to upgrade poorly prepared Ribeirinhos is unlikely to be 
successful strategy. After generations in complete destitution, entirely isolated from 
society, Ribeirinhos have created very insular cultural patterns, which, thanks to the 
açaí chain, but also, to a great extent, to government inclusion policies, are 
beginning to shift. It seems that the existence of a safety net plays an important role 
in supporting communities in entering value chains as independent agents, as they 
have done in Pará. 
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Although communities have recently been the object of targeted interventions to 
relieve their poverty and to give them access to basic social services, cultural 
transformations take time, and evolve unpredictably (Brondizio, 2008. Ribeirinhos do 
not currently feel inclined to organize, to pool resources, to plan or invest, as outside 
development protocols would have them do. They are still relatively unaccustomed 
to dealing with the cash economy, to managing their budgets, or planning ahead. 
They have other priorities and other ways of doing things. This makes extraneous 
upgrading interventions, such as the formation of cooperatives or the purchasing of 
boats to trade directly with industrial buyers difficult to implement. Organic 
certification also has had no impact on local livelihoods or conservation. 
 
Yet, the chain functions, without any significant outside intervention, and actors have 
found by themselves ways of organizing around territorial constraints and upgrading 
that sustain the chain, and improve livelihoods, while remaining true to their cultural 
specificities. Despite their incapacity, or unwillingness, to form co-operatives, or keep 
books, or take over functions offered by middlemen, these communities have shown 
extraordinary resourcefulness with the implementation of small-scale culture of açaí 
berries, and sustaining an ever-increasing market. They have also taken advantage 
of mobile technology to harness as much value as possible and demand, and 
escaped from the traditional roles to become independent agents who will not easily 
be duped by exploitative practices and pricing. The transformations observed during 
research are remarkable. With basic support, such as mobile technology access, a 
bare minimum financial safety net, and minimal technical assistance, communities 
quickly respond to market cues, and can trade on relatively good terms. 
 
Upgrading strategies that fully answers the stated needs of the Ribeirinho population 
would be complimentary with local embeddedness. There is a plethora of exciting 
fruits, fish and plants that are unknown to Western consumers that could be 
exploited to complement Ribeirinho activities and provide additional sources of 
income year-round. A diversification strategy would nonetheless require not only the 
supply of technical assistance at the base, but, most importantly, the formation of 
demand for a new, uniquely Amazonian product such as the açaí. 
 
At present, however, the local ruling elite, including the local State government, and 
EMBRAPA (as well as the local factory syndicate) seem more interested in 
completely excluding traditional populations from the brunt of the trade, leaving them 
with marginal local markets only. They want to follow pure market efficiency and 
predictability which would be incompatible with the diffuse production pattern 
currently in use, to use the neo-liberal jargon (irrespective of the fact that this diffuse 
production pattern has been working for over a decade). If experiments such as the 
large Santarém monoculture succeed, they may in fact completely eliminate the 
traditional production pattern altogether, or drive prices down enough to completely 
wipe out existing livelihood benefits to the Ribeirinho population (Homma, 2002). 
Because the marketing of the açaí berry in consumer markets, as discussed in 
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subsequent chapters, is not tied to its sociocultural specificity, this substitution is 
unlikely to go unnoticed. The cultural relations, between local elites and 
communities, who are seen as ‘backward’ and anti-business, preclude investments 
in the production capacity of communities in the region, which, as many local experts 
confirm, could be entirely economically viable. 
 
In conclusion, using the tools of Global Production Networks (GPNs), particularly the 
notion of ‘embeddedness’ (Table 5.1), helps us elucidate the ‘hows’ of the local 
chain, but also explains the reasons (the ‘whys’), which are often not sufficiently 
clear in the NTFP literature. By asking and listening to community members (over 
twenty interviews in this case) it is possible to review how they see their involvement 
in the chain, what roles they play, and how they articulate their context. It allows us 
to understand why some strategies have worked, and why others have failed. 
 
Most noticeably, the top-down desire to upgrade communities through building 
cooperatives to reduce transaction costs simply does not resonate with local social 
patterns (Table 5.1). State and non-state actors interested in promoting local 
development through value-chain interventions must be willing to listen to community 
needs and provide an enabling environment for these people to determine how they 
wish to navigate their inclusion into value chains, on their own terms. Whenever 
communities have been offered opportunities that make sense to them, however 
flimsy, they have quickly found a way to embrace them. Crop management 
technology has spread from neighbor to neighbor, with negligible State investment. 
 
Meanwhile, the strategy that most interviewees describe as desirable forms the 
cornerstone of the CAMTA's business model. Diversification of income streams is 
perfectly in accord with how Ribeirinhos live, and would allow them to further 
stabilize their income throughout the year, and manage risk, such as crop failure and 
market fluctuation. The leader of the cooperative tells his visitors that this strategy of 
diversification was inspired from Ribeirinho livelihoods. What has allowed them to 
implement is their more favorable financial situation in that they pool resources, and 
show their willingness to trade directly. They have created processing capacity that 
would allow them to store frozen pulps of the variety of the produce that they 
harvest. Ribeirinhos rely on third-parties to take on this role, much as they do at 
present with the açaí. As described in the following chapters, this would require 
demand formation outside the State, by still other actors, also as can be seen in the 
açaí chain. In this way, some of the key drivers of value capture lie far away, in 
consumer markets, and must be better understood for these strategies to take hold. 
 
While many actors argue that açaí costs must reduce to enable the market to grow, 
we must consider this in relation to the subjectivities about the valuation of Ribeirinho 
labor. If markets do not believe that part of the product's worth is derived from that 
labor, which has cultural value, we will continue to view Ribeirinhos as unqualified, 
generic labor, which must somehow be ‘upgraded’ to be worthy of capturing more 
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value. Ultimately, incomes from açaí are a great improvement, but still relatively low. 
As World Systems Theorists would point out, the chain has improved livelihoods, but 
in no way reshaped the systemic biases of distribution of value in global trade. 
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Table 5.1. Analytical matrix – Ribeirinhos  
 
 
 
 Territorial 
embeddedness 
Societal 
embeddedness 
Network 
embeddedness 
Relation to 
chain 
creation 
- Açaí as a local staple 
with a strong local market, 
spurred by urbanization, 
provided stable base for 
chain to grow 
 
- Government programs 
encourage communities to 
set out on their own and 
focus on production 
- The strong local identity 
of açaí has meant that 
those who move to the 
cities take consumption 
habit with them, forming 
the first rungs of the local 
chain 
- Strong local bonds have 
enabled actors to form trade 
relations that are regulated by 
social norms rather than State 
presence 
 
- The difficulty or 
unwillingness in dealing with 
outside realities and 
negotiating logistics, 
commerce, risk, makes 
communities reliant on 
middlemen to intermediate 
market relations 
Relation to 
chain 
configuration 
- Production and trade are 
spread out across vast 
territory, with boats 
navigating from community 
to community to collect 
product 
 
- Most thriving producing 
regions are close to areas 
where processing is 
located 
Communities live in 
extended family groups, 
spread out across the 
territory, with little 
organization across 
groups, requiring 
middlemen to provide 
chain cohesion 
The existence of local 
middlemen with strong 
community ties plays a key 
role in securing chain 
cohesion, and allows for the 
product to be concentrated at 
key collection points in each 
community, diminishing 
transaction costs 
Relation to 
upgrading 
- secure tenure and 
handouts encourage 
producers to manage fields 
to increase yields 
 
- small scale, spread out 
production leads outside 
actors to seek conversion 
to a monoculture model 
 
-traditionally diverse 
livelihoods are well 
matched to diversification 
strategies 
- Local culture and 
lifestyles make 
communities unlikely to 
cooperate and trade as a 
group, or move into more 
managerial roles 
 
- Communities are 
unwilling to eliminate 
middlemen and move to 
trading activities, and 
more likely to seek other 
activities which fit their 
livelihoods 
- Strategies that seek to cut 
out the middleman do not 
consider the many interlocked 
roles that traders play in 
relation to communities (more 
in next chapter) and tend to 
fail. 
 
- The arrival of mobile 
communication has given 
communities better market 
information and improved 
their bargaining power 
Development 
outcomes 
-Tremendous value 
capture by communities, 
with remarkable positive 
development outcomes 
 
- More-isolated 
communities unable to 
- Even with historical 
exclusion and isolation, 
communities have found 
ways to participate in the 
chain on positive terms 
Though middlemen are guilty 
of abuses, particularly in 
isolated communities, they 
have enabled trade to reach 
communities and allowed 
Ribeirinhos to trade with 
relative security, generating a 
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 participate on such good 
terms 
 remarkable diffusion of 
income across the territory 
Policy 
lessons 
- Tenure security and 
social safety nets are 
crucial enabling factors for 
smallholders to enter value 
chains on positive terms 
and to generate scale 
-The existence of strong 
local markets provides a 
solid foundation for chain 
expansion 
 
- Encouraging 
entrepreneurs to set up 
processing facilities across 
a territory can preclude the 
move to monoculture 
cultivation and spread 
benefits to more isolated 
communities 
- Local communities 
require much more-solid 
inclusion policies, 
particularly education and 
political empowerment to 
change positions in the 
chain 
- Strategies that respect 
diversity of livelihood 
patterns should be 
encouraged 
 
- Overall, top to bottom 
policy programs that seek 
to ‘build capacity’ and 
disrupt local communities' 
cultural patterns must at 
least be adapted through 
careful consultation of 
local actors 
- Excluding of local 
middlemen is not necessarily 
a positive strategy since they 
play key roles in the chain 
 
- Balancing bargaining power 
through better market 
information can rebalance 
relations and make trading 
more fair without disrupting 
trade relations 
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Chapter 6. FROM THE FOREST TO THE CITIES – MIDDLEMEN, 
BATEDORES AND FACTORIES IN PARÁ, BRAZIL 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The activities of the intermediary business agents (‘middlemen’), local retail 
businesses and processing plants that make up the chain outside of extractivist 
communities within the State of Pará, Brazil, are discussed in this chapter. To 
establish the modus operandi of the chain, and its embeddedness, 23 individuals 
were interviewed, mostly business agents and representatives from factories, 
associations and government, but also ‘Batedores’ who process and sell the pulped 
berries in local markets. Middlemen play a central role in negotiating the territory to 
provide chain cohesion, and review existing misconceptions about the role of 
factories in the chain. 
 
The brokerage provided by the Marreteiros (street vendors) has been crucial for 
shaping the chain (network embeddedness), as has the setting up of local food 
processing capacity. However, value capture at the base of the chain remains well 
below potential, as actors rely on açaí alone and this is highly seasonal (there are 
typically two major harvesting seasons at the start and end of calendar years, and a 
non-harvest period in the rainy season).  
 
Due to the business environment, and the constraints of local culture, factories also 
find themselves unable to upgrade to more value-added functions (societal 
embeddedness). Actors are unable to join together to develop solutions for the 
problems inherent throughout the entire chain. For example, periods of non-
production resulting from seasonality that needs to be factored into pricing 
strategies, the poor logistics infrastructure, the lack of financing or State support. 
Also there is a need to increase the supply of berries as demand continues to grow, 
generating price instability and hindering investment.  
 
This notwithstanding, the chain resists – against challenging odds, the product 
reaches its destinations, supplies local markets and markets elsewhere. Rapid 
urbanization and economic growth, along with a tremendous growth in demand from 
national and international markets have created a large market for açaí, and new 
product opportunities and markets continue to emerge.  
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6.2 Tracing the chain from the forests to the city 
 
Once Ribeirinhos have picked the açaí berries from the palm trees, and put them 
into baskets, they rely on a web of traders to get them to market. These traders, 
(‘middlemen’), or Marreteiros, as they are called locally, travel from community to 
community on boats, gather the baskets of fruit and take them to market, either 
locally, or farther afield, sometimes hundreds of miles away. They supply either 
batedores (who are the local processors who pulp the açaí for the local market, 
which uses 60% of the produce) or the factories that pulp and freeze the product for 
the national and international market (the remaining 40%). These are crucial nodes 
in the chain, which enable it to project itself to other regions and countries, and they 
have been instrumental to the development and maintenance of the chain. 
 
The Marreteiros maintain the chain in what are often difficult logistical conditions, 
taking the fresh berries to market. Those operating within local community range are 
typically part of the local community, and have managed to buy a boat, or have a 
landing stage that allows boats to dock so they can collect the harvest from the 
gatherers. Either they buy and resell the local production directly to a local market (if 
there is one), or sell to a dealer that handles greater quantities of product. The local 
middlemen may also charge for transport. They often have their own crops to sell as 
well as those of their neighbors. These middlemen also often own small goods 
shops, where they sell back to communities basic necessities such as coffee, or 
sugar. Usually, they make a small profit, usually anything from R$ 1,50 to R$ 2,00 
per 14kg can (‘lata’). Their neighbors closely monitor them and their profits, and any 
observable financial exploitation would make them a pariah in their community 
(interviews 19 to 23, 36 to 46) At a slightly higher level in the supply (and value) 
chain, there is a class of Marreteiros that travels from community to community. 
These crucial actors within the açaí chain in the State of Pará. They have unique 
knowledge of the region’s physical geography, and of the communities that live 
there.  
 
The logistics of managing their work are incredibly complex. There are endless, 
unmapped rivers and treacherous sandbanks through which they must navigate from 
memory (Figure 6.1). They have to carry large amounts of cash to pay the gatherers 
for the product, which makes them easy targets for thieves. The highly perishable 
fruit, packed between layers of ice, must be crammed into small motorboats and 
transported quickly to market across vast expanses of water to destination. Often, 
they sell to traders with larger boats, who source berries from greater spatial areas, 
with whom they exchange merchandise and cash along the river ways, from one 
boat to another, without even docking. 
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Figure 6.1. Marreteiros trade açaí along the river ways, from a community boat to a 
larger vessel. (Photo courtesy Rogerio Assis.) 
 
 
As the seasons rotate, these traders must also change their routes, to source the 
berries, counter-clockwise, from September to January, throughout the entire 
estuary. They own or rent the boats, hire the staff, pay fuel costs, providing a crucial 
management role in supply. Many of these workers operate independently, while 
many others are hired by larger businesses which supply the boat and the capital for 
these enterprises (interviews 11,20, 25). These traders have built stable trade bonds 
with communities and local middlemen, often across that entire territory, based on 
mutual trust, which provides contractual security. There is very little governmental 
regulation in these regions, and the açaí trade at this level is entirely informal and 
unregulated. 
 
Bonds of trust are the only means of assuring any level of contractual security. 
Though these are easily achievable within tight-knit, isolated communities where 
Ribeirinhos live, they stretch out across scales when marreteiros make their rounds, 
encompassing many communities on their routes (interviews 11,15, 20, 25). 
Marreteiros, higher in the supply levels and operating on higher levels of product 
throughput are based in urban centres, often trading thousands of 14 kg latas per 
day in the high season. They negotiate prices with buyers, and regulate the volumes 
of produce reaching markets, to avoid over- or under-supply. In periods of market 
saturation, when there is too much açaí, they have their boats alternate collection 
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dates between communities, to regulate supplies. This allows them to keep prices up 
in the height of the season, when there is greater abundance of product. When the 
supply is not sufficient, they seek it from farther afield, following the harvesting 
season because it moves temporally and geographically, as far as the State of 
Amapá, hundreds of miles away. This ensures pricing stability. Furthermore, they 
have built ties with buyers, either at the open-air fairs that supply local markets or 
directly with industrial units. 
 
The Marreteiros regulate what product goes where, and can act as brokers between 
communities and the urban clients (particularly factories). They build trust at both 
ends by making sure that trade is not interrupted, and are essential for mediating the 
price formation between communities and buyers. In addition they are also 
responsible for ensuring the quality of traded fruits, as they receive them from 
community, and checking for quality before loading the produce onto the boat. They 
select their suppliers based on quality, thus discouraging practices such as adding 
branches or rotten fruit to latas to bulk up volume, which would otherwise 
compromise quality (interviews 19, 20, 22) 
 
Another key function exercised by Marreteiros is ensuring the stability of financial 
flow. Ribeirinhos are mostly paid cash for their product; on the other hand factories 
can often take up to two months to pay, based on a credit system, for the product the 
Marreteiros deliver. Marreteiros that travel inland must self-finance, and travel with 
large amounts of cash to buy the crops from community middlemen. They must hold 
enough cash to buy the product from Ribeirinhos, and recapture their outlay later. 
The local market, where the buyers are individual ‘batedores’ (described below), pay 
cash, but factories seldom do, with a lag between supply and recompense from a 
few days to several weeks. There is no written contract to ensure that they do get 
paid. They rely on their collective bargaining power and their ability to ‘make or 
break’ reputations to enforce these oral contracts. In this way, they are the key credit 
mechanism that finances the açaí trade at this level (interviews 11,15, 20, 22). 
 
All the risk from these practices lies with the Marreteiro. If a boat is damaged, 
crashes, or if the supplier is robbed (quite a common occurrence on these unpoliced 
waters), or if the berries rot during transportation, the Marreteiro has to bear the 
burden of the loss. If anyone defaults on payment, which is often the case for 
industrial buyers who seldom pay by cash then this has to be factored in. The 
Marreteiro is liable to take losses when prices fluctuate, and may be caught having 
paid too much for the açaí to communities. In such an entirely informal business 
setting, no insurance is available. These entrepreneurs calculate their risk, try to stay 
as financially solvent as possible, and absorb these detrimental factors as best they 
can. In this way, they are a buffer that is key to providing stability to the chain 
(interviews 11,15, 20, 22). The profit margin of Marreteiros is perhaps the most 
difficult to estimate. They are the most secretive actors in the chain, and are 
unwilling to reveal exactly how they work. Additionally, there are several classes of 
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Marreteiros, operating in different ways, and with very different profit margins. On 
average, they take between R$ 1,00 to R$ 4,00 per lata in profit, beyond outlay. 
Margins are likely to be lower when the produce originates from regions that are less 
isolated, and where Ribeirinhos can control market prices through their mobile 
phones, and may suggest using other buyers if they do not like the offer. Community 
middlemen also undergo intense control from their neighbors. But in more isolated 
areas, such as the Curralinho and Breves regions visited during fieldwork, 
Ribeirinhos have few options for selecting traders. Most of them report selling their 
crop for as little as R$ 5/lata, up to perhaps R$ 15/lata. Additionally, marreteiros 
often earn a further income, by selling basic necessities such as coffee, sugar and 
dried meat to their suppliers. 
 
 
The chain bifurcates at city centres. Marreteiros sometimes prefer the daily risk and 
fluctuation of the local market, but can find more stable buyers in processing plants. 
Many of the dealers work with both markets. The local market can often reach much 
higher prices than the processing plants. The local market is also a cash market. Yet 
its volatility can also mean that marreteiros may not be able to find buyers, or, if 
supply is too high on a given day, prices will plummet and they will make a loss. 
Factories usually have more predictable buying patterns, and will let their suppliers 
know, for example, when there is a large order to fill. Not all Marreteiros can 
automatically rely on selling produce to supply factories. Businesses are built slowly 
and are exclusively. Securing a factory contract provides substantial security and 
predictability, which allows Marreteiros to increase the volume of their trading, it is 
also a risky endeavor. Factories seldom pay cash, and sometimes do not pay at all. 
 
Losses accrued from factories defaulting on payments can be crippling, and hard, if 
not impossible, to recover from. The local market is more accessible to the 
Marreteiro (there is a daily open market where produce is traded freely, and prices 
are set daily, with no fixed contracts for trade) and volumes are more-or-less 
constant (since the berry is a local staple, consumers buy it every day in the same 
quantities). 
 
At present, it is estimated that approximately 60% of all açaí production is supplied to 
the local markets (Tavares and Homma, 2015). In Belém alone, there are up to 4000 
thousand açaí retailers, or ‘Batedores’, who stock up at the pedra (local açaí trading 
port) at dawn, and then process their berries in their shops in metal grinders to sell 
them to the consumer each day. All other urban centres in the state have a strong 
local market (Figure 6.2). The açaí juice is a staple of the local diet, and 
accompanies almost every meal. It comes in three grades, fino, medio and grosso 
(fine, medium and thick) depending on how concentrated it is. The thicker it is, the 
higher the price. This demand is thus constant, but prices fluctuate significantly 
throughout the year, as supply fluctuates. 
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Batedores pay higher prices than factories, and are more concerned with quality. 
They cater for demanding customers, with whom they interact on a face-to-face daily 
basis, and compete with a host of other local businesses (interviews 2, 26, 27, 51). 
They run small operations ensuring a quality supply is crucial to their profit margins, 
as fresher fruits yield larger volumes of juice. They are unable to store their product 
from one day to the next, as it is highly perishable, and so must buy it every day. 
Although batedores run largely informal businesses, and are able to decide their 
strategy daily, they rely on a faithful clientele and cannot afford to lose custom 
through product unavailability. This keeps the local market vibrant and keen, with 
everyone bidding for the best fruit daily. 
 
Batedores margins vary greatly according to their target market. Many runs very 
small, informal (and often unsanitary) operations with sales of mostly açaí fino (9%) 
aimed at lower-income consumers. Those that are able to establish themselves in 
more prosperous neighborhoods can usually return a better profit margin. They buy 
on average for R$ 13,00 (the Marreteiro taking about a quarter of this in costs). They 
then sell their product to local consumers for an average of R$ 2,06/kg (or R$ 
29/Lata), making more than 100% on each can they purchase. Yet these prices vary 
greatly, and in Belém’s middle class neighborhoods, a kilo will cost more than R$ 
5,00, according to SEBRAE. 
 
SEBRAE’s calculations estimate that on average they make R$ 20,00 profit from 
every R$ 10 spent on raw materials. They often have low costs, including rent, 
operational costs on machines they use to extract the pulp and staff. Batedores also 
expect the price fluctuations to be absorbed by consumers, who know that the 
market varies daily and are used to changing prices. However, when prices in the 
low season skyrocket, they are likely to trade at a loss for several months, to 
maintain their customer base and business (a ‘loss leader’’ situation). Their gains on 
average throughout the year could thus be considerably lower (interviews 2, 26, 51). 
 
The processing plants are in direct competition with the batedores. Spurred on by 
the growing appetite in the Southern states of Brazil for açaí, as well as 
international markets, they now make up approximately 40% of the market for the 
berries. Annually, an estimated 50 thousand tons of frozen açaí pulp leave the State, 
10% to foreign markets, the remaining 70% to the Southeast of the Country (Tavares 
and Homma, 2015). This açaí is processed by factories that buy fresh berries, wash, 
pulp, freeze and sell them. In the last fifteen years, they alone have caused demand 
to nearly double, which explains why prices have risen exponentially and Ribeirinhos 
now make a considerable profit from the berries. These processing plants compete 
with Batedores for fresh açaí, though they buy more often from Marreteiros higher in 
the chain rather than on the pedra directly.  
 
Each processing plant has a fixed number Marreteiros, whom they trust, that 
guarantee their daily supply. Several of these Marreteiros also trade from key ports, 
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or pedras, where most trading takes place. They usually have set suppliers 
themselves, buying from community middlemen, and transferring the supply from 
their small boats to bigger boats in the middle of the river. The harvest arrives mostly 
in the Abaetetuba region, where the biggest port of the producing area is situated, 
and is loaded onto trucks by day laborers. It is two hours to travel from there to the 
Belém factories. Much of the crop is taken by marreteiros in boats directly to 
factories, many of which are riverside to make use of this trading opportunity. Other 
middlemen that do not use the local markets, having established supply (oral) 
contracts with factories, and gathering the fruit from suppliers, operate large boats, 
and deliver the supply directly by boat (many factories have ports). All negotiations 
are conducted on mobile phones on a daily basis (interviews 4, 7 to 9, 2, 50, 51). 
 
Occasionally some factories buy from the pedra, which is necessary when large 
orders come in, or their usual suppliers are unable to deliver. They will often resort to 
this strategy if they run a small operation, without established contacts, but with 
lesser regard for quality. Because their product is frozen, and will often be mixed with 
other ingredients further along the chain, they have less preoccupation with flavor 
and quality than the batedores. This means they commonly wait to buy what is 
leftover at the end of trading, for a lower price. Large factories producing large 
volumes of processed berries in the high season gather and store stock throughout 
the year, to take advantage of lower prices. However, this type of strategy is only 
viable to those who have large freezers, and sufficient rolling capital. Smaller 
operations that do not have that option simply turn off their freezers for part of the 
year and shut down. Producers in interviews estimate that the açaí berries represent 
70% of their income (interviews 5, 7 to 9, 50). 
Factories sell their produce either on the national market, in Southeast Brazil (mainly 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), or export it. The product that is sent to the South is 
received from middlemen, by truck or boat, washed in a cleaning tank, rinsed, pulped 
and turned into a 9% solid extract (the equivalent of what the local consumer calls 
açaí fino – see above).  
 
This product is then packed into plastic bags and frozen. It is a rather rudimentary 
and low-tech process. There are few barriers for entering the market, however, the 
turnover of actors entering or leaving it are relatively high. Often, Batedores freeze 
the juice, and find buyers in the South, operating informally in this market. In fact, 
this is how this part of the market began. The current legal and tax requirements tax 
are considerable, though often flaunted by batedores who spill into the market 
(interviews 4 to 9, 46, 47). The product travels around 3000 km to the South either in 
refrigerated trucks, when sold in large quantities or in small batches by air. Brokering 
transport can be difficult, and some middlemen who have good access to logistics 
often broker sales themselves to distributors in the South. Since the product is rather 
generic, and buyers pay little attention to quality, distributors will very often switch 
suppliers, based on price and availability (interviews 5 to 9, 14, 24). 
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It is estimated that approximately 10% of overall açaí production is exported abroad 
(Tavares and Homma, 2015). This number has grown exponentially in the last fifteen 
years, with studies showing that they went from US$ 104 million in 2002, to US$ 240 
million in 2009 (Nogueira et al., 2013). Due to being no specific, official identifying 
code in Brazil’s agricultural ministry system, it is not possible to have a very precise 
control with how much is shipped abroad (it comes out as ‘others’ in the fruit 
category of the NCM registry, which tracks internationally the flow of commodities). It 
is also difficult to have an actual estimate of the size of the overall sales outside the 
State of Belém itself, because there is tremendous amount of tax evasion between 
companies, who avoid keeping records of their transactions (interview 14). It is 
interesting to note that the first exporters of açaí pulp were also the Japanese 
cooperative of Tomé Açú, which had the diversity of production and processing 
capacity in place to meet the demand of foreign buyers. 
 
There are more bureaucratic hurdles to exporting the açaí pulp, and international 
buyers are choosier than those from the South of the country. International buyers 
require greater phyto-sanitary care, including pasteurization, an additional, and 
expensive, industrial process. The product is more concentrated (12%), the 
equivalent of what is termed ‘médio’ in the local market, and more expensive. Buyers 
often require producers to prove that their pulp contains sufficient levels of 
anthocyanins which is the antioxidant compound for which açaí is known in foreign 
markets. However, foreign buyers often pay in advance, which helps those who are 
able to export to finance their operation. This product is most often exported in 170 
kg plastic containers, in refrigerated cargo containers leaving from the port of Belém. 
Each cargo container holds around 5000 kg, and costs US$ 5000 to ship. Because 
there is no fractioning of this container, new small orders are difficult to fill, making 
the exploration of new markets difficult (interviews 5 to 9, 14, 24, 50). 
 
Factories’ profits have been estimated in a previous IDESP study as relatively high. 
This study estimates that they sell their product for an average of R$ 5.22/kg, or R$ 
73.08/can, which makes their add-on something in the region of 500% (IDESP, 
2010). However, the seasonality of their activity, and the perishability of their 
produce squeeze their margins considerably. Factories interviewed during fieldwork, 
however, provided a very different account of their margins. In addition to dedicating 
70% of their costs to buying the product, they pay very high power bills, to keep their 
final product frozen in chambers. Their inability to secure rolling credit to finance their 
operations and stock up when prices are low increases their vulnerability, and 
hampers their ability to increase production. With fixed costs throughout the year, 
including staff, and mostly empty factories throughout, their profit margins suffer. 
Additionally, because very little value is added to their product, they are unable to 
reach higher margins. According to SEBRAE, smaller factories have margins below 
R$ 3/kg and this barely covers their operational costs (interviews 5 to 9, 14, 24, 50). 
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Overall, concerning price formation, the rise in demand has multiplied prices 
throughout the chain. Before the boom, açaí prices were very low, something around 
R$ 1 for a 14kg lata, for most of the year. In the last ten years, this price has 
considerably increased and can reach something close to R$ 10. This dramatic price 
increase has percolated throughout the chain, and açaí, as we have seen, now 
provides a thriving economy, from the Ribeirinhos to the factory floors. Nearly all of 
the interviewees, from the most isolated Ribeirinho, to the biggest factory owners in 
Belém, will tell you that açaí trading is like a stock exchange. This means that prices 
are formed at the Pedra, mostly in Belém, daily, based on the available supply and 
demand. If too much fruit comes in from the interior then prices fall, and if there is not 
enough to meet demand the price of açaí rises. Additionally, as the season 
progresses, prices fall, and then rise steeply as production dwindles (Nogueira et al., 
2013). 
 
This ‘stock exchange’ image propagates the notion that prices across the whole 
chain are entirely free to form, and there is on-one specifically that has the power to 
drive them up or down. In a classic value-chain analysis one would conclude that, 
price formation being free, power distribution is balanced throughout as well. Yet the 
reality, when one scratches beneath the surface, seems more complex. The prices in 
Belém serve as a base, and regulate the entire market. Because mobile phones are 
now available throughout the region, it is now possible for all actors to control market 
prices daily, and gauge supply. This allows negotiations upstream to be regulated 
daily, and has curtailed much of the abuses perpetrated by middlemen in the past. 
Prices paid by factories do not necessarily match those of the daily rate. Factories 
work to keep prices down, but are often unable to manipulate markets, because 
traders can just divert production to other factories, or to the local market. Yet prices 
can vary a great deal inland, as we saw in the Marajó region, depending on how 
close they are to market routes. Abuses, such as the very low prices often practiced 
in Curralinho, are still very common (Interviews 5, 6, 10, 24, 50). Thus, at this stage 
of the chain, the price is relatively free, and governance is loose, but upstream for 
communities the reality can be quite different. 
 
 
6.3 Embeddedness – extracting context and its relation to chain configuration 
 
Undoubtedly, it is the network of Marreteiros who provide the essential network 
‘thickness’ (network embeddedness) upon which the açaí chain, in Pará, is reliant. 
During the harvesting season, competition can increase, and social bonds are key to 
ensuring supply. They need to know where they can get produce, and have enough 
social clout to outdo their competitors. These bonds are built over time, as trust 
builds up with successful trade partnerships. Further downstream, the larger-scale 
Marreteiros, who supply the processing plants and dominate the local markets, rely 
on an entirely different form of social capital to make their business happen. 
Factories trade exclusively with a set number of marreteiros, with whom they have 
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strong, though informal, bonds. This is a significant cultural jump for them, a 
different, more urban and ‘sophisticated’ environment they must enter into. 
 
Marreteiros are thus surely the key connectors/brokers of the açaí trade in Pará, 
providing the necessary network thickness to keep the produce moving. They gather 
it from producers in its highly disperse natural environment, and then build the bonds 
across cultural universes to urban factory owners to deliver it. It is through them that 
quality control, financial flows, volume distribution and logistics are resolved. 
Still with respect to network embeddedness, factories also spend a great deal of their 
time trying to secure trustworthy suppliers, and cultivate good relations with 
Marreteiros to ensure network flows. Many of them will lend them money for boats, 
or keep ties with their families despite being rather itinerant. To ensure supply, most 
factories work with a set number of Marreteiros they trust, with long associations. 
Some factories have their own, hired ‘Marreteiro’, whom they send out to build 
community bonds, and secure supply.  
 
A good example of the reliance of factories on Marreteiros is that of the now defunct 
Boat House factory in Belém. It tried to bypass Marreteiros and trade directly with 
Ribeirinhos. They set fixed-price contracts and registered all supplying families. In 
the end, the Ribeirinhos would only trade with the factory when local market prices, 
usually driven up by the Batedores, were lower than those set by the factory, which 
drove the factory towards bankruptcy (interviews 6, 50). Although a traditional VCA 
analysis (as conducted by Pagliarussi,2010, for example), would have us believe 
that factory owners dominate the chain locally, and exert pressure downwards, it 
seems their relationship with Marreteiros is altogether more complex. Marreteiros 
often themselves also provide rolling credit to factories, by paying cash to producers 
and receiving their income weeks later. 
 
Meanwhile, the strongly organized network of batedores, who buy more than half of 
the overall production to supply local markets, also pull strongly on the network, 
often competing heavily with factories and other batedores for produce. Many 
Marreteiros prefer to trade on the spot market – the ‘pedra’, where boats dock – with 
batedores, rather than taking their chances with factories, do not pay cash, and have 
been known to default. Batedores are also more demanding of quality, since local 
consumers buy their açaí fresh,eat it pure, and have a palate for subtle flavor 
variations (consumer preferences here play a key role). In this way, the network at 
this point stays tightly in balance, with power stretched out evenly across this web of 
actors, preventing abuses and ensuring network thickness without the need for a 
heavily controlled, top-down captive governance model. 
 
Outside the State, through the sale of frozen pulp, factories are certainly more 
culturally proximate to the entrepreneurs who buy the pulp, more technologically 
literate, and able to function in a corporate environment. Without these abilities, there 
would be no way to export the product, to fill orders, to carry out banking and 
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accounting. They are key to holding the network in place and yet there is also little 
long-term strategizing, or formulation of investment plans. There exist a couple of 
traders in Belém who contact and market international buyers for the pulp, and there 
are several national distributors who market the product in the South of Brazil. 
 
Factories have arisen to meet a demand that was formed elsewhere, and have never 
had to seek out customers actively. This explains why they have remained in a fixed 
positon in the chain, rather than taking an active role in prospecting clients and 
chasing new markets. They do not see themselves as protagonists in the chain. 
Most of them do not regularly attend trade fairs, or have any type of marketing 
strategy. Mostly they do little prospecting. As the owner of Amazonia 100%, an 
international trading business specialized in Amazonian commodities, puts it, ‘the 
factories don’t have sales departments, they just have people taking down orders’ 
(interviews 5 to 9, 49, 52). 
 
This trader declared that the biggest hindrance to açaí’s international growth is that 
local factories do not have English speaking staff, do not answer emails, or work on 
customer relations (interviews 4 to 9, 50). This lack of entrepreneurialism and 
ambition of factory owners (individually and collectively), weakens their bargaining 
position and their overall power in the chain. Here the local societal constraints (the 
societal embeddedness), restricts the chain's ability to reconfigure itself to capture 
value and generate regional development. After all, there have been new products 
developed that could be aimed at final consumers, but they do not know how to 
market them. There are no scale-crossing brokers who can make new connections 
in the chain with other areas. In this way, the chain actors contribute little to network 
integrity of the chain outside the state, and are left in a relatively passive and 
powerless trading position. 
 
Regarding territorial embeddedness, the population growth and urbanization have 
played an important role in allowing the chain to take shape, and this has influenced 
the network of middlemen to meet demand. With people moving to cities, with more 
disposable income, those left in the interior have seen demand rise for açaí (Costa et 
al., 2016). A web of Batedores has arisen in all cities, to ensure supply to local 
markets, who buy the product fresh. The increased demand has inflated prices, 
enabled more Marreteiros to enter the business, and helped batedores become a 
powerful organized professional class. In urban markets, batedores have 
tremendous power. These small businesses are highly organized and are a political 
force to be reckoned with in the City of Belém. To illustrate this, they claim to have 
helped elect a senator, and put constant pressure on government to change rules or 
ease restrictions (interview 6, 26, 27). In this way, Batedores, Marreteiros and 
factories are in a relative balance of power in the region, without any of these actors 
being able to force others into certain behaviors. 
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For Batedores, seasonality is a significant challenge. As their demand remains 
steady (‘inelastic’) throughout the year, they are forced to allow prices to fluctuate 
considerably as supply varies. Those who were interviewed claim they are forced to 
absorb some of this fluctuation themselves when prices rise too high, or they risk 
losing customers to competitors. Açaí is a daily staple and customers are hard 
earned (only in the city of Belém, there are at least 4000 Batedores competing for 
customers). They rely on custom and social bonds, but also on the perceived quality 
of their product, to keep their businesses afloat (interviews 2, 26, 27,51). 
 
In a similar way to the Marreteiros and Ribeirinhos, the seasonality of the chain also 
hits factories hard, perhaps even more so. They are the first ‘official’ link in the chain, 
the first to have bank accounts, to pay taxes, rent, to obey labor laws. They do not 
have the flexibility of previous actors to drop everything half of the year, because 
factories have fixed costs and legal obligations. While larger companies have large 
warehouses with freezers, where they can store and sell the product year-round, 
many simply cannot bear the energy bills, or have the rolling capital to stock up, and 
simply shut down their operation. They still have to pay their fixed costs, and this 
seriously hampers their margins. Most factories have considerable spare capacity, 
which they attribute primarily to seasonality. 
 
Moreover, factories operate within a challenging business environment due to its 
exploratory culture, and relative isolation from the rest of the country. This makes it 
very difficult for them to move up the chain and add more value to their products. 
The State of Pará’s economic focus lies in mineral extraction and cattle ranching 
which are industries that add very little value to their product, and that have 
particularly quick turnover. Very few well-paying jobs are generated, and there are 
no ancillary industries in place to generate added value. Because of this dominant 
economic model, with very little local industry, there are no support industries for 
these factories. It would be advantageous for them to have contacts with others who 
provide packaging, or those that could produce and supply ingredients for more 
sophisticated products, or top level marketing and branding agencies. This makes it 
very difficult for them to upgrade by increasing their product range and making more 
sophisticated products. They do not have access to design and marketing 
intelligence, advanced business schools, qualified labor, ingredient and packaging 
suppliers, and active financing partners. To create a new product, they need to haul 
all their ingredients and packaging from the South of Brazil, and then sell it back, 
which does not make much financial sense. 
 
It is noticeable that there is very little local public support for the chain. There is little 
regard for the slow, step-by-step building of activities such as agriculture, 
agroforestry or food processing, and their potential social benefits. Factories 
complain that they have a hard time accessing funds from public banks, or get 
authorities to structure development plans for the sector. For example, the Belém 
pedra, where açaí arrives, is in desperate need of re-modelling, for bigger boats to 
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be able to dock, and for sanitary standards to improve. There is also a need to 
create labelling and institutional marketing strategies to support the commodity trade. 
Though government officials continue to claim that things will happen, they simply 
never do. Attention (mostly of the State of Pará authorities) is elsewhere (interviews 
5 to 9, 50, 51). 
 
Loans from private banks are prohibitively expensive, and factories must rely on 
sparse government subsidized credit if they are to invest. This leaves factories 
scrambling to finance their rolling activities, with them often juggling their suppliers 
and clients to make ends meet. These issues are a challenge for any actor’s ability 
to obtain credit and invest in anything from technological innovation to increasing 
production. This is particularly harmful for industries, and creates a large productivity 
bottleneck, a fact that has been recognized in the literature published about the açaí 
chain (Pena et al., 2011. It was widely cited by all factories as their key challenge, a 
condition that suffocates businesses, and stifles growth and improvement (interviews 
5 to 9, 48, 50). 
 
From a societal perspective, the somewhat passive attitude of factories is typical of 
the State of Pará, which has spent most of its history in almost complete isolation 
from the rest of the country, and world.  Ben Hur, (the picturesque character 
originally from the State of Santa Catarina who opened the first açaí pulp processing 
plant in Pará, and is considered one of the founders of the business), likes to say, ‘it 
is the fault of the Atlantic winds’. According to him, in colonial times, the wind 
patterns in the Atlantic made it difficult for boats to sail from Pará to the Southern 
regions, creating a pattern of historic isolation from the rest of the country. Boats 
would only ever stop on their way North. This statement may or may not be true but 
it holds up as a valuable metaphor to illustrate how little the businessmen of Pará 
seem intent on pursuing markets, or even understanding their buyers (interview 4). 
 
The ‘quick-buck’ mentality of the local elites who are isolated and where societal 
embeddedness constricts the chain, could be a reason why even the açaí factories 
have gained so little traction (a defining feature of societal embeddedness) in the 
region. All the factory-owners who were interviewed said that they had little faith in 
the chain-associations. They seem unable, or unwilling, to come together to resolve 
issues at the supply side, such as price volatility. They report repeated instances 
where they agreed to set a maximum price for their raw material, but one factory or 
another always sabotages the others and bought off all the available açaí at the 
higher price. They also say they are wary of officially sharing any information, or 
investing together. This makes it very difficult for the factories to successfully lobby 
government together, or to set up joint marketing structures, which might improve 
their chances in the market. The Sindfrutas, the syndicate that rallies together all 
factories, is a hollow institution, without any power, according to all factory 
representatives interviewed, and much to the dismay of its own chief officer. As one 
interviewee describes it, ‘the business environment is like a bucket of crabs, when it 
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looks like one is going to manage to crawl out, all the others pull him back down’  
(interviews 6, 24). 
 
In field observations, one was left with the impression that this lack of social 
cohesion and historic inequality has created a scenario where actors in different 
strata of the chain are unlikely to ever come together to collaborate on solutions 
together. Ribeirinhos, isolated, unschooled, are not regarded as worthy allies by 
factory owners. Marreteiros are perceived as lawless, ‘dodgy’, and not respected. 
They are, very wary of revealing much information about themselves. In this context, 
it is to understand why there is no effective chamber of commerce where all actors 
can come together to debate issues, come up with solutions or pressure the 
government for action. Although the local State agricultural board  (SAGRI) has 
created such a multi-stakeholder platform, once again, it exists largely on paper, and 
is not very productive (interviews 5 to 9, 24, 48, 50). 
 
The social environment also elides current plans to exclude Ribeirinhos from the 
chain altogether. Factories have little contact, or regard for Ribeirinhos, and would 
rather just purchase their fruit from fewer suppliers, with more predictable pricing. 
They do not seem to realize that without Ribeirinhos, should monocultures 
predominate, they too will be out of business. Many of the plans made by those in 
power positions involve creating production pathways that cut the existing chain out 
altogether, in favor of monocultures that are privately owned by members of this 
‘reliable’, ‘professional’ elite. Overall, they seem to want to reserve local public 
procurement contracts for the Ribeirinhos, and explore wider markets through large 
monocultural operations. When, and if, ‘big money’ comes in and a large-scale 
monoculture is implemented, then processing will be done on site in verticalized 
operations. This can be illustrated with other products from frozen peas to 
concentrated orange juice (just as in Santarém, for example, or at CAMTA). Local 
factories do not seem aware of this reality, and have no desire to embrace the 
peculiarities of their trading arrangements. The creation of a dialogue with 
stakeholders on behalf of factories, middlemen and Ribeirinhos to reach an 
understanding of their dependence on each other, and the risk they face from the 
monoculture model, is essential. Although these development processes are labored 
and slow, common solutions and cooperate, could in the medium term change this 
dynamic. 
 
In such a challenging and disparate societal and territorial scenario, the existence of 
the açaí chain is astounding. It exists despite all its challenges, the precarious boats, 
the absence of credit or State presence, the perishability and seasonality of the fruit, 
and yet the chain works. Each actor, the Ribeirinho, the Marreteiro, and the 
processing plants have much to negotiate at each rung of the ladder. They need to 
make significant efforts to sustain the strong social ties that provide the sufficient 
network thickness to sustain trade in such an informal scenario. 
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6.4 Value capture 
 
Bound as they are by the embedded context, the actors within this chapter have 
limited opportunity to improve their ability to upgrade in the chain. In theory, the 
relatively loose power relations would enable a high level of mobility in the chain. 
However, the difficult territory, particularly in urban environments and the weight of 
this particular sociocultural context constricts agency limits the options that might be 
available to capture value and advance local developments. 
 
Due to the seasonality of the açaí, and the lack of demand downstream for other 
forest commodities, the previous chapter illustrated that actors are unable to diversify 
into other activities (chain upgrading), despite the wide array of local products to be 
exploited (Figure 6.3). Marreteiros are also locked out of organic certification or other 
product upgrading possibilities. They can only hope to move up the chain (function 
upgrading), or increase their trading volume and margins (process upgrading) 
through better infrastructure and finance. There are reports of Marreteiros, even 
larger scale ones, who climbed out of Ribeirinho communities into their roles. I 
observed that most Marreteiros have Ribeirinho origins. Despite this there are many 
barriers to entry at this level, because of the  steep competition and little available 
credit. Still, since the pedras are open markets, there is always space for new 
players to enter and sell to batedores and factories alike. 
 
For these marreteiros to move up the chain, they must acquire a bigger boat, and 
sufficient running capital to finance their transactions (to pay for product, but also 
fuel, staff and ice). In this research, smaller-scale Marreteiros who had managed to 
move up the chain received assistance, either by another fellow Marreteiro or family 
member to teach them the system, or through a buyer, who was interested in adding 
a new player to the market to improve their supply. Exclusive contracts for everyone 
concerned from Marreteiro to factories, are hard to come by because they are 
established carefully, throughout time, and require a great deal of mutual trust. New 
players seldom arrive on the scene. The case of the Sambazon factory in Macapá, 
illustrates how a factory can organize the whole supply chain and even decide and 
select the days that an exclusive, supplier can dock at the factory with produce 
(interviews 11,15, 20, 22). 
 
It is possible that larger-scale Marreteiros, who have amassed significant contacts 
and supply levels, as well as capital, can become factories. Such is the case of São 
Pedro, the biggest existing açaí factory in the State of Pará. It was founded by a 
Marreteiro family (dominated by women, which is rare in the trade) that managed to 
close a supply deal directly with a buyer in Rio de Janeiro, who wanted to diversify 
supply. The terms of their agreement are a well-guarded secret, but this bridge into 
the market enabled them to set up shop and become a processing plant. Many 
attribute their continuing and growing success to their knowledge of the Marreteiro 
trade. Yet this seems to be the only such case in the chain. One could speculate that 
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the urban, ‘official’ model of factory work, the fixed costs and bureaucracy does not 
much appeal to Marreteiros. 
 
Upgrading to the position of factory is something that batedores seem more likely to 
do. Basically, the product is identical, but in this case, it is frozen. To start process 
upgrading, all that is needed is a freezer of sufficient capacity. Of course, the level of 
state environmental obligations, and certificates required, are very different. But 
many begin operating informally, and then regularize their operations when their 
business grows (some never do). There are several reports of batedores operating in 
the frozen pulp markets, and these factories started out as batedores. It seems that 
there are several buyers who are willing to accept product without the fiscal and 
environmental health paperwork to obtain a discount, and this opens the market up 
for Batedores. Factories often complain that they are undercut by illegal competition 
with lower costs, with batedores constantly entering their market. 
 
Staying in business as a factory is a difficult job. It seems that factories go in and out 
of business constantly in a business environment that is challenging. A defaulting 
customer can bankrupt an entire business.Brazil’s sluggish legal system makes 
recovery of debt slow and difficult enough to cripple factories before they can get 
paid. There is an almost complete absence of credit, and the seasonality of 
production make factories financially insecure, where defaults can be crippling. They 
have little opportunity to invest in upgrading, considering the difficulty in obtaining 
credit. Only the larger-scale players are ever successful in securing government 
sponsored credit and invest in any upgrading strategy. In a country with one of the 
highest interest rates in the World, where loans must be government-subsidized to 
be viable, investment is thus heavily constricted. The business environment in the 
South is a lot more ‘professionalized’ and cutthroat than that of Pará, and companies 
who do a poor job of customer services, or deliver their product late, or in poor 
condition, are driven out of the market by southern buyers. Therefore, though 
barriers to entry are relatively low, ‘barriers to staying’ are quite high. This cadre, 
along with a short-term mentality and the inability to invest in marketing, seems to 
set factories into a perpetual low-tech operation (interviews 6, 24, 50). 
 
Diversifying into export markets is highly desirable even though this could be a 
strategy that is difficult for factories to achieve. Exporting will often require them to 
obtain organic certification, and have all their paperwork in order (including an export 
license, which can take up to a year to obtain). This will require a host of new 
bureaucratic processes, which are costly and time consuming. Customers are a lot 
more demanding. SEBRAE estimates that the cost of acquiring the appropriate 
machinery to pasteurize the product, can cost anything from R$ 200.000,00 to R$ 
800.000,00 depending on capacity. Additionally, foreign (international) buyers are 
even more demanding with customer service (which is always conducted in English). 
They also require specific levels of anthocyanins in their product, which means that 
factories need to be able to perform continuous and thorough quality control. It is 
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possible that the least professional factories, which flood the national market and 
drive prices down, would be unable to compete here. As a consequence, building up 
capacity to enter export markets (which has the added bonus of paying in advance) 
is a promising alternative for factories that want to add value and escape the 
cutthroat, race to the bottom environment of the national market. Yet only those with 
investment capacity and sufficiently efficient sales department seem to manage to 
access that market (interviews 4 to 9, 24, 50). 
 
At present, many factories are also experimenting with new products. For example 
the açaí mix, (which is basically an ice-cream form of açaí), has been produced and 
consumed in the South of Brazil (frozen pulp is blended with guaraná and sugar 
syrup into a creamy dessert-like concoction). This type of product would allow 
companies to accomplish functional upgrading, moving into the position held by 
factories in the Southeast regions. Some factories have also begun producing 
lyophilized açaí juice, which they claim is pure, non-oily, and can be a great form of 
adding açaí to industrial processes. There is also the açaí powder, which is mainly 
useful for the supplement market abroad. Both these products have the advantage of 
being more highly concentrated, and do not require refrigeration during transport. 
The scientific processes that created these products were developed in public 
universities, and results seem easy to find and reproduce, though factories tinker 
with the product considerably until reaching a marketable solution. 
 
It is hard to ascertain, because they are such new endeavors, how many new market 
opportunities these products can in fact open up for factories. What is notable is that 
the absence of support industries, such as packaging, or even sugar syrup and other 
industrial inputs, makes it costly, and logistically difficult to create integrated 
production clusters that could catapult the local industry into new strata of 
production. Despite the existence of a challenging business environment, and a 
culture that stacks entrepreneurs against innovation, some actors manage to take 
risks (interviews 4, 8). Success has been limited and according to Sindfrutas the 
overwhelming majority of açaí leaves the state in pulp form. 
 
What local factories have not attempted to do is move into the production of finished, 
branded products (even if they are just pulp) and cut out actors in the Southeast 
altogether. This is where most of the value capture occurs, and could unlock regional 
development, spurring the creation of a host of support industries in the region, and 
improving what is undoubtedly an unfavorable business environment. There is a 
dilemma here because the absence of a business environment precludes the type of 
upgrading that could revitalize the local economy. It appears that their distance from 
consumer markets makes them deeply weary of upgrading in this way. They fear 
that their buyers will be put off from entering this type of market, and therefore they 
will lose business. An exception is Bella Iaçá, which is by far the most 
professionalized company in the State and has partnered up with an outside 
company to create a brand. Although it is apparent that they may not feel confident 
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in going out on their own this company are aware that without creating strong 
brands, they have little chance of adding value to their products and growing their 
business. Their outside partner does the marketing while they make the product, 
however even in this example the company feels afraid and incapable of taking the 
risks of going out on their own. As we see later, companies in the Southeast have 
not warmed to this form of vertical integration (interviews 4, 6, 8, 50, 58). 
 
The societal embeddedness of the factory class appears to bind their behavior as 
businessmen, and makes them unlikely to explore new markets or take risks. In an 
extractivist, commodity-based cultural environment, the notion of branding, and 
subjective value adding seems pointless to local businessmen. When strategies 
were discussed in interviews, none of the factories interviewees seemed interested 
in exploiting them. In this way, the gross of their production remains very generic, 
interchangeable, and their businesses are vulnerable. Perhaps the Bella Iaçá 
partnership model is a way for them to start exploring this aspect of the business, 
and will encourage more adventurous behavior in the future (interviews 4 to 9, 24). 
This cultural unwillingness to explore marketing and increase demand helps explain 
why diversifying into new products is also not viewed as an option. With factories 
empty half the year, it is at first surprising that local businessmen do not explore and 
try to sell some of the other, easily available, indigenous fruits, with complementary 
seasonality, to keep their businesses operating yearlong.  
 
This type of diversification would be tremendously positive for the whole chain, since 
everyone from Ribeirinhos to Marreteiros would not have to stop working half the 
year at least. But factories have had no hand in ever marketing or generating 
demand for açaí, and do not appear able or willing to take up this task. Possibly this 
is because it was the demand from foreign (international) players, outside of Pará, 
that created the açaí market and factories merely responded to this demand. The 
local business culture remains reactive. Due to the local business culture of 
accommodation and mutual distrust, it is unlikely that they would, (collectively or 
individually), get behind an initiative to market other fruits. 
 
This inability to create exchange value is baffling in such a culturally context such as 
the city of Belém, where most of the factories are located. It is a city rich in history, 
with a unique cuisine, and an active cultural life. It is a unique modern metropole with 
old colonial quarters, new chefs and traditional markets, and an immense variety of 
fascinating foods and exotic products. Yet, perhaps because the identity of açaí was 
crafted elsewhere, local entrepreneurs are unable to propose products that capture 
that value. At present, the Brazilian export agency APEX is beginning to work 
towards creating a space in global markets for these products, with videos and 
promotional materials that promote the cultural wealth of the region. The local State 
agencies are working to promote the region, through tourism and gastronomical 
initiatives. This work may appear in this region to be too subjective, however it is 
probably the most important intervention to help the region effectively use its unique 
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culture to catapult meaningful regional development. Yet still the investment in this 
type of activity in Brazil is minimal, compared to the hundreds of billions of subsidies 
that are given out to traditional industries such as: oil extraction; commodity 
production; and automobile manufacturing. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The wealth of data gathered in Belém has been systematized according to key 
themes in table 6.1 below. At this research site, we learn the crucial role that 
marreteiros play in building chain cohesion (network embeddedness), and their 
centrality to the formation and maintenance of the chain. We also see that despite 
previous findings, factories are at weak positions, when considering their trading 
relationships beyond this geographical scale. Undoubtedly, the wider investigation 
into "embeddedness" across these scales builds a much more comprehensive 
picture of the chain, which points to a different set of findings, and policy 
recommendations, that more narrow approaches have proposed.  
 
The açaí chain remains in place thanks to steady demand, and the keen 
entrepreneurship of a few individual actors along the chain (the Marreteiros who 
organize product flow, and a couple of key factories who lead the way in supplying 
markets, and developing new products, as well as the vigorously active batedores 
and their association). Despite setbacks, the process – the chain – still works. 
Ribeirinhos manage to make a living by connecting with the market, factories 
process and export. There is much to be celebrated, learned and replicated. The key 
role of marreteiros, the existence of a strong local market, and the powerful pull of 
external buyers all appear to sustain the chain in its current form. 
 
Although the value-chain analysis conducted by IDESP, the Institute for Economic 
Development of Pará, (IDESP, 2010) would single out factories as the key power 
player in the açaí chain within the State of Pará, a closer analysis reveals a far more 
complex reality. We see here the limitations of conducting quantitative analyses to 
determine power relations, without engaging the whole chain and its context. We find 
here that factories seem rather vulnerable, and unable to position themselves as 
drivers of regional development through strategic value capture strategies. Certainly, 
factories capture a great amount of profit from the chain in Pará, but they are unable 
to control the market, or to invest in their expansion. They are squeezed by the 
informality of the Ribeirinho/Marreteiro economy and the formal business 
environment that they straddle. They rely on Marreteiros, and compete with the local 
batedores, who, despite their small individual size, tilt the balance of power in their 
favor because of their strong organization as a class. 
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Power distribution seems to be diffuse, without one clear dominating actor. Societal 
and territorial embeddedness appears to play a larger role in defining actor’s leeway 
within the chain than the intra-chain dynamics between them. In this way, the types 
of upgrading that could drive regional development, moving local factories into more 
high-technological and profitable positions in the value chain, remain out of reach. 
With an unfavorable business environment and poor logistics, and little coordination 
between actors, factories are relegated to very basic processing functions. 
Since demand for the berries constantly outstrips supply, and the supply chain is 
complex, there is little any individual actor can do to alter the status quo. If anyone 
has significant control to make modifications, it is the Marreteiros. But the pull of 
demand from both factories and Batedores also means that there is a daily struggle 
to obtain produce, keeping all actors somewhat in check. With mobile phones, and 
several trading options available, it is difficult for one single actor, or class of actors, 
to exert much dominance over the others. This has resulted in price increases and 
competition increase, benefiting Ribeirinhos. It appears that there are several trading 
options, except for those who are geographically isolated and rely on a single trading 
route, such as is the case with the more isolated communities in Marajó. 
 
There remains much room for improvement, for the açaí chain to fulfil its local 
development potential, particularly generating the urban jobs that would meet the 
State's current needs, with people moving in large quantities to the cities. There has 
been little targeted government support to improve conditions locally, or any real 
coordination between actors to improve conditions. Great improvements can still be 
made with better boats, better storage and improved financing lines. Without 
adequate policies, many see the risk that the açaí boom will suffer the same fate as 
the rubber boom, which quickly went bust after monoculture farming was instigated. 
Yet no effective steps are being taken to prevent that. Local factories are weak and 
underfunded, and are unable to take up the role of ‘lead firm’ that the literature 
recognizes can pull demand by promoting market access and regulating supply 
chains. Sectoral chambers are inept, and factories do not seem to recognize that 
they are also a product of the Ribeirinho economy, and should align themselves with 
them to solidify and defend their business model. Once big businesses sweep in to 
create their monocultures, they will most likely do their own processing as well, 
driving these factories out of business. 
 
To stop this from happening, actors in Pará must realize the importance of 
developing operational circumstances of the chain to preserve the industry. With 
monocultures becoming the norm in modern agricultural practices, processing will 
likely verticalized. Large producers (such as Santarem, or CAMTA, will set up their 
own processing plants, and add value by selling pulp directly, cutting costs and 
gaining efficiency. Factories in Belém will see their transaction costs become too 
high to compete. Once again, the creation of a real, functioning multi-stakeholder 
forum where all actors can recognize and work from their interdependence is urgent. 
This is a difficult task, which requires actors to overcome deeply ingrained cultural 
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preconceptions. The recognition of the need for common strategies can lead this 
chamber of commerce to become an effective advocate for public investment and to 
attract private capital and entrepreneurs. A collegiate effort can also jumpstart the 
branding of açaí as a product typical of Pará’s Ribeirinho and indigenous culture, 
and the investment in place branding, particularly for international markets. Together 
they can also invest in seeking alternatives to overcome the spare capacity that 
weakens this entire portion of the chain, which only exists when the fruit is in season. 
 
The açaí berry is still not officially registered as a Brazilian agricultural native, 
exclusive crop, and thus cannot be registered internationally as such, to expand the 
niche market for the product. At this moment, anyone can lay claim to it. There has 
been no campaign to label or brand the product as native to Pará, and to extol its 
environmental and social benefits. There is little appetite to add value locally through 
product development or marketing. These actors have also not managed to generate 
build demand for other available Amazonian fruits, so as to resolve the issue of 
spare capacity that plagues the entire chain over half the year. It seems that 
embeddedness in a quick-money, isolated, commodity-based State, with little social 
cohesion, and no real value recognized for Ribeirinho livelihoods makes it impossible 
for actors to come together and work towards these goals. 
 
The national and international dimensions of the chain, it seems that the pull of 
demand plays a key factor in sustaining and shaping the chain, while improving 
product quality. Access to international markets has pushed some local actors to 
upgrade their product into organic formats, and has also forced them to work on their 
quality, improving their internal processes. These markets are highly desirable, since 
they pay in advance. Yet few factories have the technical capacity to handle these 
orders, which requires them to have certified product year-round, and to have a 
minimum level of management and commercial capacity (such as answering emails 
in a timely fashion and in English). Local factories also do very little to chase 
customers abroad, such as taking part in events, creating promotional materials. It is 
the international entrepreneurs who come in to choose suppliers, leaving local actors 
to play a very passive role in the development of these trade relations. 
 
There is little research that considers the State of Pará that offering detail about how 
these actors relate to their buyers and how these relations condition the chain. In the 
particular case of the açaí berry market, where the chain was formed through 
external driving forces. To establish a clearer picture of the situation, further 
investigation of the national market, in the Southeast of Brazil, and the international 
market, particularly the USA, is paramount. 
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Table 6.2. The Analytical matrix – Marreteiros, Batedores and 
Processors in Belém, Brazil  
 
 
 
 Territorial 
embeddedness 
Societal 
embeddedness 
Network 
embeddedness 
Relation to 
chain 
creation 
- Açaí as a local staple 
with a strong local market, 
spurred by urbanization 
and population growth, 
provided stable basis for 
chain to grow 
 
- Difficult logistics have 
required a sophisticated 
web of Marreteiros to crop 
up to move product 
- The local culture formed 
an industrial class that is 
very reactive, and only 
sells product to those 
who reach them, without 
any projection outside the 
local context 
- The existence of a web of 
marreteiros has allowed the 
chain to grow despite logistic 
difficulties 
 
- The strong Batedor local 
market enabled outside 
actors to find a sufficiently 
robust chain from which to 
begin processing 
Relation to 
chain 
configuration 
The chain requires 
tremendous effort on 
behalf of marreteiros to 
stay in place with the 
difficult logistics, and 
factories must stay close to 
perishable supply to 
remain viable 
 
There is little credit for 
actors, which stifles 
factories' ability to stock 
product yearlong and 
achieve better margins, 
making them again reliant 
on outside actors - 
marreteiros finance a lot of 
the chain's cash flow 
The seasonality of the açaí 
generates costly spare 
capacity 
- Several factories, 
with identical offerings, 
compete in a predatory 
way, without seeking to 
reach new markets, 
increase their product 
line, etc. 
 
- actors at different level 
of the chain are 
mistrustful of each other, 
and cannot come 
together to overcome 
common obstacles 
Marreteiros provide key 
services, ensuring cash flows, 
controlling quality, ensuring 
adequate volumes reach 
markets 
 
The abundance of trade 
pathways (including the 
thriving batedores) makes it 
easy for actors to find buyers, 
which stabilizes prices and 
prevents abuses 
Relation to 
upgrading 
-Poor business 
environment hampers 
innovation into new, high 
quality and high value 
added products 
 
- The absence of credit 
makes it difficult to invest 
 
- With a generic product in 
a heavily competitive 
market, factories compete 
mostly on price for a low-
quality product 
- Because of the local 
culture and how the chain 
was formed, factories are 
not able to upgrade by 
marketing more diverse 
products or more 
sophisticated açaí 
offerings 
- The poor capacity that 
factories have to cross scales 
and broker different realities 
ties the chain down 
 
- As they improve their 
brokerage ability and become 
savvier, the open market 
makes it easy for marreteiros 
to move up the chain, buy 
bigger boats, etc. 
 
- Because factory products 
are generic, and quality 
control/legal controls weak, 
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   Batedores easily compete 
with factories, and go in and 
out of business easily as well. 
 
- Lack of brokerage capacity 
in local urban class keeps 
factories at low-value 
processing role, and unable 
to explore new markets, or 
add new product lines 
Development 
outcomes 
- Local processing 
generates some local 
development, but mostly is 
a necessary step to ensure 
that Ribeirinho products 
can reach markets 
 
- Innovation at factory level 
is low, and with rising 
urbanization, creating 
more and better jobs in 
cities is important. 
- Disorganized chain 
relations, and the 
unwillingness to come 
together to improve 
conditions hampers the 
chain's ability to grow 
 
- The inability to value the 
‘Ribeirinho’ identity or to 
visualize how to harness 
exchange value through 
marketing and this keeps 
value capture low in the 
region 
 
- Under these conditions, 
the temptation for outside 
actors to sweep in and 
implement monocultures 
with verticalized 
processing facilities is 
high 
- The açaí chain offers 
opportunities for social 
mobility until the factory level 
for a range of actors 
 
- Factories are mostly stuck, 
because they lack the 
brokerage skills they need to 
reach markets directly and 
upgrade 
Policy 
lessons 
- To truly sustain the chain 
in a way that is valuable for 
Ribeirinho populations and 
local urban populations, it 
is important to manage the 
spare capacity in the 
industry, by finding 
alternatives for the chain to 
function when the açaí is 
not in season 
 
- Enabling credit for local 
producers to stock product 
year-round would greatly 
improve their finances 
 
- Developing new products 
is useless when there is no 
demand, and actors rely 
on outside buyers to 
purchase them 
- More efforts must be 
made for local actors to 
come together and find 
common solutions for 
price fluctuations, quality 
control, logistics, etc. 
 
- Factory owners must be 
made to realize that 
without the Ribeirinho 
economy, they will run 
out of business. 
Monoculture models have 
their own processing 
facilities 
 
- For real value capture to 
occur, the marketing of 
local products must use 
the local culture as a 
creator of value, which 
requires a different type 
of entrepreneurship, 
where the ability to broker 
and canalize culture is 
essential 
- Even when the logistics 
seem daunting, when there is 
sufficient, stable demand, 
local actors will organize to 
form strong chain bonds that 
can sustain trade 
 
- The existence of powerful 
middlemen, who can 
negotiate on equal footing 
with factories is important for 
contractual security and chain 
stability 
 
- A diffuse web of local actors 
constantly competing for 
product keeps the chain 
stable without the need for 
captive governance ties 
 
- It is no use fostering the 
development of new products 
when entrepreneurs lack the 
brokerage skills to explore 
new markets 
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Chapter 7. THE SOUTHEAST OF BRAZIL AND URBAN BIRTH OF 
‘AÇAÍ POP’ 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the last twenty years, Açaí has become a marketable commodity that is pervasive 
throughout Brazil. It is available in small snack bars, bakeries, juice shacks, as well 
as supermarkets and other larger retailers. The Brazilian national market for açaí, 
according to the best available estimates, absorbs 40% of all production from the 
State of Pará19 . The majority of its production goes to the Southeast region of Brazil, 
which comprises the States of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Paraná and São Paulo 
(Tavares and Homma, 2015) Understanding how the chain is shaped and formed in 
this region, and the extent that local conditions percolate back towards Pará is 
crucial for arriving at holistic policy recommendations that will give eco-social 
benefits as well as maintaining economic viability. 
 
The development of the consumption of açaí outside of local communities originates 
from a famous, martial arts fighting family, from Pará, who included it in their healthy 
diet plan. They blended a mix of açaí pulp and guaraná syrup. Since then this 
product has been sold in large containers to small retailers by many small local 
factories, with pulp sourced from Pará. Large brands have developed and this 
product is available in supermarkets where a very similar product is sold in small 
containers. It is in this this form that açaí is mostly processed and marketed in the 
region. This chapter will explore how these firms who have branded Açaí operate, 
and under what conditions. What kind of development outcomes does this specific 
chain configuration engender? What lessons can we learn? Few Non-Timber Forest 
Product (NTFP) value chains have been investigated beyond the local level. Despite 
this, there is much to learn by exploring how issues beyond the regional/extraction 
level influence Ribeirinho livelihoods, and the sustainable development of the 
Brazilian economy as a whole. 
 
In Brazil there has been a much-improved business environment and more 
prosperous consumer base. Despite this, innovation is markedly lower than in other 
places such as California in the United States. The Californian market is 
characterized by the use of a model of networked co-packers and specialized actors 
that work collaboratively. This chapter will illustrate that in contrast to this model, in 
Brazil the food industry, and the açaí food industry in particular, is highly verticalized. 
Local industrial actors have very little foreign (international) sales, whether of 
finished products or intermediate goods. The formation of this chain has been hugely 
positive for increasing demand and developing an entirely new industry, however 
																																																						
19	https://ciorganicos.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/A%C3%A7ai-Sebrae.pdf	
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there is much space for improvement, particularly through the integration of the 
region into global production, trade and marketing flows. 
 
This chapter explores how consumer myths influence the chain, and with what 
impacts. Consumers’ interest or knowledge of açaí’s Amazonian heritage and its 
eco-social benefit remain very low. The açaí’s nutritional benefits are unknown, even 
though there is a vague notion that it is a healthy snack. No specific information 
about its antioxidant content and value is available, or known by the general public in 
Brazil. Although the elite classes have slowly begun to take an interest in these 
issues, consumer activism is practically non-existent. Large retailers are now mostly 
foreign owned, use imported systems of control that have led them to extend a 
series of requirements onto their açaí product suppliers to ensure some level of 
transparency and accountability within and between the links of the chain at this 
level. 
 
7.2 Tracing value-chain formation: How did the açaí trade achieve its 
current status?  
 
The story of how açaí spread from Pará to the rest of Brazil is tied to the strong 
current of Japanese immigration to Pará at the turn of the 20th century. In the 1910s, 
a Scottish Brazilian diplomat made a stop in Belém on his way to a posting in the 
Caribbean. He met a local, beautiful woman and decided to stay. The Gracie family 
settled, and Gastão Gracie became an influential local businessman. At that time, a 
large number of Japanese people were escaping harsh conditions in Japan to settle 
in Pará. The Japanese immigrants were encouraged by offers of land and passports 
made by the Brazilian government. They were eager to settle and populate the 
region that was at this time relatively deserted. This is this same wave of immigration 
that has given rise to the Japanese community and cooperative at Tomé Açú, who 
have played a key role in the dissemination of açaí products. When jiu-jitsu master 
Esai Maeda (also know as ‘Count Coda’) arrived, in 1914, he became friends with 
Gastão Gracie, who helped him settle and make his way in Belém. To show his 
gratitude, Esai Maeda decided to teach Jiu-Jitsu, (an ancient Japanese martial art), 
to Carlos Gracie, who was Gastão Gracie’s eldest son (interview 52). 
 
Eventually, the tide would turn for the Gracie family, and they would return to Rio de 
Janeiro to seek to rebuild their livelihoods. With them, they brought the jiu-jitsu they 
had learned from Esai Maeda, and the açaí they would eat daily. Carlos Gracie’s 
youngest brother, Helio, was frail and unable to handle the physicality of the original 
jiu-jitsu method. He would later re-imagine it to create what is now called Brazilian 
jiu-jitsu, a more-strategic variation of the original method. Helio would go on to 
challenge some of the World’s greatest fighters to the ring, and his momentous 
success, along with his famous exploits on the beaches of Rio, would make his new 
fighting method a sensation (interview 52). His older brother, Carlos, remained by his 
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side and the Gracie clan, with all of their offspring, became a powerful cultural and 
social influence in Rio de Janeiro. They created a thriving business, with gyms 
strewn across the city, and many championships and events attached to their name. 
For Carlos, nutrition was a key aspect of the fighter’s regimen, and he was keen on 
divulging his Gracie diet, of which açaí was a cornerstone. Although some açaí was 
probably available before this time, it was when the Gracie clan started endorsing it 
that it became a success (interviews 52 and 55, 58). 
 
As we have learned before, the fruit is highly perishable, and does not travel well. To 
get around this logistical challenge, Carlos had a friend who worked for an airline 
company and arranged daily shipments from Belém. Instead of the fresh açaí we see 
in Pará, the new açaí was frozen. To make the açaí more ‘energetic’ and agreeable 
to southern palates, guaraná syrup was beaten together with the frozen pulp, to 
create the ‘açaí bowl’. Guaraná is high in caffeine, thus making it highly energizing, a 
perfect pre-training pick-me-up. The guaraná-based syrup also has the advantage of 
being very sweet, making the natural earthy, dense, slightly metallic flavor of açaí 
more appetizing to this new audience. The new ‘açaí bowl’ was thus highly nutritious, 
frozen and sweet, a very attractive snack for a warm, and health-oriented ambiance 
such as that found in Rio de Janeiro (interviews 52 and 55). This is still how the 
product is consumed today and the chain has remained, although greatly increased, 
unchanged in its configuration. The chain starts with the pure açaí which is sent to 
the south frozen and this where it is thawed, mixed with guaraná and refrozen for 
final consumption. 
  
Figure 7.1 A typical açaí bowl, with frozen pulp blended with guarana, topped with 
bananas and granola (author's photo). 
 
Due to the endorsement of the healthy beach crowd, with its athletes, fighters, and 
surfers the açaí bowls became popular throughout Rio de Janeiro (Figure 7.1). This 
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meant that specialized factories in Pará began to grow in order to meet demand. 
Initially it was the Batedores that simply froze some of their daily batch, but this rise 
in demand encouraged new, dedicated factories to go into business in Pará to 
supply the market in the South. Many of these factories were initially Batedores who 
upgraded production. At some point in the mid-90s, açaí consumption began to 
appear on Globo’s programming, in some of its youth oriented series. Globo is the 
fourth biggest TV group in the World, and a truly hegemonic media presence across 
Brazil. Once açaí began appearing on TV, interest peaked. Specialized açaí houses 
began opening up across Brazil, particularly in big cities such as São Paulo in the 
late 1990s (interviews 50, 55, 58). 
 
Seeing an opportunity in this growing trend, a group of entrepreneurs would set up 
new businesses looking to expand this new market. Companies such as Frooty, in 
Toca do Açaí, and existing fruit pulp businesses such as Bella Ischia and DeMarchi 
began investing in açaí-related ventures. Eventually, a number of small companies, 
producing their own ‘mix’, of açaí and guaraná syrup and distributing to small 
businesses also appeared. Traditional advertising (print media or TV) was almost 
non-existent, although the consumption of açaí continued to be associated with 
sports (particularly fighting and beach sports, and a health-conscious lifestyle 
through athletic endorsements and beachside promotions). Consumption grew 
essentially through word of mouth). At present, although especially dedicated açaí 
houses have mostly closed, this produce can still be found in most snack bars which 
are called ‘padarias’ (bakeries which double as restaurants and are very common in 
Brazil), as well as all supermarkets. Consumption has remained pretty much the 
same, in the form of açaí bowls, made of frozen açaí pulp mixed with guaraná syrup 
(often in a prefabricated mix), blended with fruits mostly bananas or strawberries), 
often also blended with powdered milk, sweetened condensed milk, and served with 
granola and fresh fruit (Figure 7.1; interviews 58, 56, 87,88,55). 
 
Açaí is still not something that is commonly prepared at home, rather a snack to be 
had in bars or juice shacks. Most of these businesses buy a pre-mixed açaí and 
guaraná mixture from small distributors. Slowly, new product innovations have begun 
to hit supermarket shelves in Brazil, including pre- packaged juices, dehydrated 
granules, and new forms of frozen products, such as a diet version, or sticks and 
sorbets. When visiting retail outlets, it is easy to see that the variety of products 
found in the US market, which includes everything from yogurts, to cosmetics and 
candies, is not yet present in Brazil. Organic açaí is virtually non-existent as well, 
although Sambazon seems to be investing in the local market. 
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7.3 Tracing the chain in its current configuration in the Southeast 
region of Brazil 
 
The chain in this region is highly verticalized, and product innovation is relatively low. 
Of all the investigated actors in this study, only one company works with a co-
packing company. All of the other interviewees have their own plants, distribution, 
marketing, and other logistical infrastructures.  As they grow, it can be observed that 
they seek to exert vertical control over the extraction process through buying or 
setting up their own pulp plant, or, (such as the Coca Cola Company and Frooty 
seem to be doing, going all the way back to the Ribeirinho communities), as well as 
creating monocultures. The relatively new arrival, Ecofresh, has preferred to retain 
contractual ties only with pulp suppliers, despite its rapid growth over the last few 
years (interviews 55, 91, 58, 68, 83). 
 
In its present configuration, the chain that reaches the Southeast of Brazil is, in some 
ways, simply an extension of the initial system created by Carlos Gracie. The pulp 
arrives frozen from Pará, where it is mixed with guaraná syrup by a multitude of 
companies, then redistributed to retail outlets, where it is mixed into ‘açaí bowls’ for 
immediate consumption. However, the presence of industrial products at retail 
outlets has grown and this in turn has changed the dynamic of production and 
extraction back towards Pará where increasingly professionalized actors seek to 
control their supply and ensure control within the chain (interviews 55, 58, 61). 
 
There seem to be a few exceptions to the domination of Pará in the supply of açaí to 
the South although other Amazonian States have recently entered the market. 
Several interviewees reported that they bought directly from a farm in the State of 
São Paulo. This farmer, in the region of Arujá, supplies local ‘mix’ factories with açaí 
pulp because he plants on rotation which gives him two crops a year. By ensuring 
constant supply without the need for storage, he has grown and is gaining market 
share. He follows prices from the North and their fluctuations, but gains advantages 
with the proximity and constancy of his supply. Though his share of the market is still 
small, it does forebode a future where monocultures could take over from current 
small-scale, near-extractivist production modes (interviews 55 and 58, 83,84). It is 
unclear how much cheaper monoculture production is than current patterns, and 
what impact a shift towards predominant monoculture production would have on 
price. The Coca Cola Company gets its supply from the State of Amazonas, where 
açaí is also abundant and there is less competition (interview 61). With the rise in 
popularity, an increasing amount of Amazonian states have entered the trade 
(particularly Amazonas). They take advantage of different growing seasons to enter 
the market, although several interviewees relate that the flavor of this açaí is less 
appealing. It is also unclear whether sourcing costs from other states are significantly 
lower.  
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A host of small local factories supply retailers with a mix product. They are often 
small, and operate with a varying amount of regulation. Some of these produce other 
frozen goods such as ice cream, while others only work with açaí. The vast majority 
of factories buy frozen pulp from factories in Pará. Many of these transactions are 
off-book, meaning are not officially recorded to avoid tax payments. Quality control is 
haphazard, and negotiations are essentially price-based. As we will discuss in more 
detail below, Brazilian consumers have little knowledge, and thus demands, 
regarding antioxidant content or health benefits in general, making quality a lesser 
concern along the national part of the chain (interviews 55 and 58, 83,84). 
 
The industrialization process in these factories consists of thawing the frozen pulp 
purchased from Pará, almost always of the ‘fino’ variety (9% pulp) and blending it 
with a guaraná syrup, water and other additives that improve stability and texture (or 
not), and refreezing it and repackaging it into 10 liter packages for distribution. The 
guaraná syrup is often purchased from other suppliers, though some produce their 
own syrup as well. This syrup consists of refined sugar and water, with added 
guaraná extract. Although the guaraná was originally from the Amazon, the State of 
Bahia is now its largest producer, where production has switched to a monoculture 
model. Production of the syrup itself usually takes place in the South, as is the case 
with the açaí mix. The process is pretty much the same for large corporations and 
small operations. The quality and hygiene can vary immensely, with smaller outfits 
and often these are pressed to compete on price, add a series of additives and 
foreign items to their mix, from artificial additives to other produce such as avocados 
to bulk up the very expensive, relatively, açaí pulp (interviews 55 and 58, 83,84). 
 
None of the interviewed companies showed much interest in buying the prepared 
mix ready from Pará. Most companies claimed that in addition to wishing to control 
the exact outcome of their product, the logistics of this concept do not make sense 
because these factories are very far removed from consumer markets. The water 
content in the final product is much higher than that of the pulp. The pulp must travel 
3000 km by refrigerated truck from Belém to São Paulo and it makes no sense to, as 
one interviewee put it, to ‘pay a lot of money to transport water’ (interview 56). 
Additionally, the other ingredients and packaging needed are not available in Pará, 
making such an endeavor only potentially viable at very large scale12  (interviews 
54, 56, 57, 80). The 9% pulp, which is already mostly water, is only 60% of the 
finished product, plus packaging, storage and logistics. Although many companies 
would find it advantageous to produce some of their mix in Pará to supply markets in 
the North and Northeast, they report that the lack of professionalism in the business 
environment in Pará keeps them from investing, though some have tried in the past. 
There are not many qualified staff as well as an unreliable business infrastructure 
which discourages these actors from bringing some of their operation to Pará. 
 
Factories rely on the network of independent distributors to spread the product out 
across the myriad retail outlets that carry açaí products in the region. Often these 
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distributors also carry the traditional accoutrements, which are the granola that is 
usually sprinkled on the bowl, in addition to the 9% frozen pulp that is made into 
juices at retail outlets. Many also carry ice creams and other frozen products. This 
portion of the trade works at a relatively small and diffuse scale that flows between 
small factories in Pará to small and larger factories in the Southeast, distributors and 
a few retailers across the region. 
 
There are no official numbers that can help us determine what proportion of the açaí 
trade flows through this channel (interview 14). However, considering the 
pervasiveness of açaí in small retailers and the general preference of consumers for 
this mode of consumption, it is easy to conclude that this certainly is the prevailing 
‘leg’ of the chain. Ecofresh (a company that has grown out of this model into a large 
brand that is present in all major chains), estimates that this small-scale market 
represents 60% of all açaí trade in Brazil (interview 83). There is a large franchise 
outlet, entitled Toca do Açaí, has over 45 premises across the Brazilian territory. 
Although this is a substantial chain, exclusive açaí places have become rare in Brazil 
(interview 55 and 56). Once the main place to find açaí, they have mostly shut down, 
with the exception of a few stores and this franchise, which serves a wide variety of 
snacks and sandwiches in addition to the açaí. 
 
Large companies are being introduced to the market. Frooty, which is certainly the 
largest açaí company in Brazil, has grown exponentially. This company was founded 
in 1999, and was a key vector in the diffusion of açaí culture in Brazil. It is reported to 
have taken in R$ 80 million in sales in 2015. 
The company operated until 2013 much like the smaller actors in the region that buy 
frozen pulp from a range of factories in Pará and reprocess and repackage it into 
individual servings and large bulk buckets in a factory in São Paulo. It sells directly to 
large retailers, but has also retained a presence at small retail outlets, which are still 
dispersed across the territory by small distributors (interview 55). As the company 
has grown, it has changed its modus operandi. By selling off part of its equity to an 
investment bank, it has acquired the capital to open up its own pulp factory in Pará, 
in an effort to verticalized its production system and gain control over its supply. At 
present, the company has a processing capacity of approximately 120 tones per day 
between its two plants. With the volatility of the açaí market, this was a natural move 
for a company present in 20,000 retail outlets in Brazil and it intends to expand to the 
international market. In fact, Frooty has made its intention public that it intends to 
further gain control of its operations upstream by investing in the creation of its own 
monoculture plantations in the North. The company sees this upstream control as 
crucial to the stability of its expansion plans, which include a multitude of product 
launches and a new push towards international expansion (interview 55). 
 
The Coca Cola Company, has recently entered the market with its own açaí product 
which is a tetra pack juice mixed with bananas. This is part of the specialty line of the 
Del Valle brand and has used a different approach to securing its supply. In 2013, it 
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entered the market in 2013 and decided on a novel approach to securing a chain. It 
sought out a new supply hub, away from the crowded-out Belém region (much as 
Sambazon did by setting up its factory in Amapá). The Coca Cola Company decided 
to travel much further inland, and set up its supply hub in the State of Amazonas. 
According to the interview with their program manager, this logistical idea attempted 
to source sustainably in a new region and to spread out the eco-social benefits of 
working with native açaí, as well as to locate extraction near to Manaus. Manaus is 
the place where Coca Cola already operates a large plant and this development with 
the açaí made logistics more attractive. There they set up a full-scale development 
project, trained communities and invested in a sustainable development project. 
They worked in conjunction with the Natura corporation to ensure sustainability of 
supply, the social benefits of the scheme, and increase productivity whilst minimizing 
losses (which they claim to have reduced by 15%). The Coca Cola Company has 
signed a protocol with the State of Amazonas and this has been approved by sixteen 
development organizations20, including GIZ  (interview 91).  
 
The big players, Coca Cola, Frooty, Ecofresh and DeMarchi all trade directly with 
large retailers. Following global trends, the food retail sector in Brazil has become 
increasingly concentrated over the last decade, and increasingly controlled by 
multinationals, such as the Casino group, Carrefour, and Walmart. There is still 
space for independent retailers and smaller groups, but these are for smaller outlets 
dedicated to lower income categories. Large groups negotiate directly with bigger 
players, such as Frooty and the Coca Cola Company, as well as smaller actors such 
as Frootiva. This level of concentration has engendered a symmetrical trend towards 
concentration in companies that supply large retail outlets (interviews 55, 68, 83). 
 
Interviewees report that it takes significant business acumen and reputation to enter 
into business with one of these large chains. Minimum orders are large, and the 
stakes are overall quite high. There is no space for smaller firms to grow slowly 
within these structures. All of the large actors interviewed have had corporate 
backers to support their growth into national retail outlets (interviews 55, 61, 59, 68). 
 
As far as exports are concerned, all large companies interviewed did have an 
increasing appetite for international markets. Through their equity investors, they 
were made to modernize their international department and seek to attract 
international clients. However, this still represents a very small tranche of their 
business, on average something less than 10%, at best. Their aim is to export the 
‘mix’ product, for preparing açaí bowls, rather than any of the other products 
available, for example, in the US market. It seems, and this understanding is 
confirmed by what actors in California made clear, that only those actors who are 
willing to permanently trade in the US will have a chance of gaining access to that 
																																																						
20	https://www.cocacolabrasil.com.br/imprensa/release/coca-cola-lanca-bebida-de-açaí-com-banana-que-traz-projeto- 
inovador-de-transformacao-social	
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market. This entails, according to one interviewee, setting up a physical presence, 
with stockage, as well as a local corporate structure, as well as a sales department 
and the assumption of insurance to cover contractual default risks (interviews 68). 
 
7.4 Embeddedness 
 
The transition from Pará to the Southeast region is a stark contrast from the type of 
word-of-mouth bond that maintains relations in Pará. The Southeast has a 
‘corporate’ way of doing things and this is a significant transition in how the network 
holds together (‘network embeddedness’). Several interviewees claimed that their 
transactions between factories in Pará and smaller outlets in the Southeast are often 
done ‘off-book’ to avoid taxation and ‘bureaucratic complications’, though no 
individual actor did admit to such practices. These transactions are thus essentially 
trust-based, but relations are volatile, as it is rather easy to switch suppliers 
(interviews 50, 85, 86,87).  
 
Larger companies keep these links much tighter, either through verticalisation or 
strict contracts. All of these companies stressed in their interviews that they need to 
have tight control over supply to ensure that their operations run smoothly. They 
claim that buying from factories openly results in too much of a variation in quality 
and prices, and in turn jeopardizes the stability of their product and their margins. 
Frooty initially relied on contracts with suppliers, but as it has grown and received 
capital injections, in order to set up its own factory in Pará. This has also been the 
choice made early on by Sambazon. This verticalization of the chain guarantees the 
maximum level of control over supply (interviews 55, 58, 59, 63, 70). 
 
Ecofresh relies on a set number of pulp suppliers to provide it with the product year-
round. It has chosen this more flexible arrangement to increase its supply base 
without making a large capital investment. Written contracts ensure volumes and 
pricing throughout the year, shielding the company from the very large price 
fluctuations that are characteristic of the açaí trade. It is then up to the pulp factory in 
Pará to absorb the impact of these fluctuations, as well as to store the product year-
round. It is not surprising that the Vaccaro monoculture visited in the Santarém 
region has become a prime supplier for this company. The Coca Cola Company has 
chosen to retain a third-party factory as its supplier and tightly control its interactions 
with that factory and the Ribeirinhos that provide it with açaí. Through a mix of 
corporate controls and social investments, such as strengthening local governance 
and building schools, it hopes to improve livelihoods and control the production 
process. At present, Coca Cola employs a full-time employee at the community level 
to manage affairs on a daily basis (interviews 55, 58, 59, 63, 70). 
 
What is clear from this variety of arrangements is that in Brazil’s corporate 
environment, regular supplier-buyer relations are not sufficiently secure or stable to 
satisfy larger clients, who have tight rules to follow and large clients to cater for. The 
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Brazilian judiciary system is tremendously slow and unpredictable. It is nearly 
impossible to rectify this through the courts when a transaction goes awry, and even 
more unlikely that these remedies will arrive in time to avoid major losses. Therefore, 
either transactions happen very loosely, with payment upon receipt, or become more 
tightly attached through contracts or even verticalization. What determines this 
change in types of bond is the growth of the açaí ‘mix’-producing companies, as their 
own commitments to their clients become more fixed, and the stakes for non- 
compliance grow. Still, deterrents against non-compliance have more to do with loss 
of business and reputation than any actual legal remedy (interviews 58, 55). As 
companies grow, this bond becomes too loose and uncertain. Creating more 
controlled verticalized corporate structures becomes a trend. and they turn towards 
verticalization. This finding is very much in line with the Coase-derived theory 
(Coase, 1937; see Section 2.3 herein) of value-chain analysis, whereby 
concentration and verticalization occur when transaction costs outweigh and become 
higher than those entailed by increasing managerial control over other parts of the 
chain. 
 
With the link between processors and retailers, there seems to be a division between 
the type and solidity of bond as well as large and small actors. Small-scale retailers 
have no problem switching suppliers, and will do so often (interviews 81, 83, 84). 
They make purchases from small-scale distributors, who carry a varied line of 
products, and who switch products. Due to having so much of the product mixed with 
other ingredients, in addition to the pervasive flavor of guaraná, customers, and 
therefore retailers, are not really aware of what brand they are purchasing, or able to 
compare between them. It would also seem that the market operates at the same 
level of relative informality as the rest of the ‘small-scale’ strand of the chain. These 
distributors are constantly visiting and keeping contact with their geographically 
defined customer base, and the strength of these ties lies in that proximity (interview 
83, 86,85). 
 
Large-scale retailers who sell smaller packages of ‘mix’ directly to consumers are 
very demanding of their suppliers, and set up tough conditions in their contracts. It is 
not surprising that only larger companies, with sufficient available capacity and 
capital, are able to enter into such agreements. Not only are there minimum orders 
and precise delivery schedules to be upheld, there are also chain of custody and 
auditing requirements that would exclude any actor that might have an ‘informal’ 
aspect to his business. Additionally, penalties for non-compliance are stringent. The 
companies that supply these retailers are those who tend to seek to verticalize their 
operation to control their supply chain. Therefore, chain embeddedness seems to 
become more formal and less relationship-based as we move away up the chain 
from its inception. 
 
The entrance of larger actors has also increased the level of verticalization up the 
chain, with companies in the South either tying down suppliers with tight contracts or 
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setting up their own operations in the North. This shows a clear concentration of 
power in the hands of these large actors, but also reflects the demands of the large 
retailers to whom they cater. The chain of custody demands, the quality, volume and 
price requirements push these actors to control production of their main ingredient. 
The mode of extraction, which is small-scale, entirely informal and dominantly used, 
poses a challenge. It is not surprising then that monocultures have become so 
attractive to the majority of these actors. 
 
Ensuring supply from a monoculture, whose mode of production mimics their 
industrial, corporate modus operandi is a very attractive proposition. In this context, 
the monoculture experiment visited in Santarém, and even the locally produced, 
monoculture açaí have no trouble getting clients. The monoculture form of 
production is the ultimate guarantee of control. On the other hand, companies with 
‘international identities’, such as Coca-Cola and Sambazon do place a premium on 
the ‘Ribeirinho’, ‘wild harvested’ identity of the açaí culture. Yet they still need to 
create their mode of control with the supply. They have chosen to create firmer 
bonds with Ribeirinho communities through social interventions, this improves their 
social responsibility profile as well as securing and stabilizing their supply. Both of 
these large companies have chosen to set up businesses away from the 
Abaetetuba/Belém hub, to escape competition. This strategy could be questionable 
for its ‘patronizing’ or ‘interfering’ bias. Despite this it still seems to point to a modus 
operandi that answers to the needs of control and predictability of corporate markets 
while including Ribeirinhos and small scale, extractivist, semi-extractivist production 
(interviews 70, 91). 
 
With respect to the territorial embeddedness of the chain, and the business 
environment prevailing in the Southeast of Brazil, we could perhaps describe the 
situation as a middle ground between Pará and the US. National issues that affect 
the environment in Pará, such as a slow legal system, difficult credit and complicated 
tax system, also affect São Paulo. However, the Southeast industry shows 
substantially higher levels of economic development, with better infrastructure, larger 
and more-prosperous market, and a much stronger web of ancillary businesses to 
provide logistics, packaging, and marketing support. 
 
The Southeast region of Brazil is made up of four states which have  55.1% of 
national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The State of São Paulo alone represents 
32.1% of national GDP. In contrast to this, the State of Pará represents 2.1% of 
national GDP. Although still within the same country, disparities are such that one 
might believe otherwise. While the North region spans 3870 km²  (only slightly 
smaller than the whole of the EU countries collectively) of mostly dense and 
unconnected rainforest, with a population of 15.8 million, and a GDP/capita of R$  
14.18, the Southeast region spans 924.51 km², with a population of 80.35 million and 
a GDP/capita of R$ 29.72  (nearly double that of the North). Historic differences in 
settlement and development help to explain this sharp contrast between regions. Rio 
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de Janeiro was Brazil’s capital for nearly five hundred years and has been always 
been its main trading and agricultural center, as well as, more recently, its industrial 
core (IBGE, 2012). 
 
In addition to a much richer population, the Southeast has benefited by a developed 
business environment. There is a better infrastructure than the rest of the country 
which includes good quality roads, more-qualified labor, and the connected presence 
of a wider variety of ancillary industries, customers and suppliers that in turn facilitate 
the development of new products and their marketing. Unsurprisingly, 46% of the 
country’s food processing industries are in this region  (Itamaraty, 2005). A study 
produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Centre for Public Leadership 
further highlights the disparities in business environments. By comparing each state 
in Brazil, it puts São Paulo first, whereas Pará is ranked at nineteenth  (CLP and 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). These disparities are often cited in interviews 
when businesses justify their investment choices  (interviews 55, 58, 80, 84). 
 
Another problem for the introduction of the açaí ‘mix’ made in Pará to the Southeast 
market is the geographical distance that separates these regions.  As one 
interviewee put it, bringing the mix ready from Pará would be ‘paying to transport 
water’  (interview 56). The final product is indeed much more voluminous and heavy 
than the pulp alone, and this weight would make it unnecessarily expensive to ship 
South, in refrigerated trucks, which are particularly expensive to run. The lack of an 
adequate transport infrastructure is a definitive hindrance to the North’s integration 
and ability to exploit the national market. However, Pará is physically closer to 
Brazilian States in the Northeast of the country, where larger companies also have a 
presence. It would make sense for the finished product to come from there directly to 
supply these markets. One interviewee, who initially began operations to send ‘mix’ 
from Pará directly to clients in the Northeast stopped after having repeated problems 
with quality control. He finds it more efficient to ship the raw material to his factory in 
São Paulo and redistribute from there. From this perspective, personnel issues make 
it impossible to have advanced operations in Pará (interviews 84, 55, 58,59). 
 
The small-scale açaí trade is different and it is important to highlight the cycle of 
economic growth that the country has seen until recently, with massive rise of 
excluded groups into consumer markets. Although there are no reliable figures 
available on the sale of açaí-based products in the region, interviewees seem 
convinced that the middle class (B) and lower middle class  (C) the largest 
consumers. With nearly 50 million people entering the C class in the last ten years, 
the growth of the consumer base alone has been sufficient to sustain expansion of 
business (Neri and Souza, 2012) This expansion coincides with the rapid growth of 
small açaí businesses, and Toca do Açaí, which has stores across the Southeast 
region. For example, it is certain that this new-rich, middle-class are the main local 
açaí consumers at the present time. However, the form of consumption of these 
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lower-middle classes is very different from that of the upper-classes, and has a 
marked impact on the quality of the product supplied (interviews 54, 55). 
 
Despite its decidedly more-welcoming business environment and the prosperity and 
size of its consumer market, the Southeast region is not immune from the plethora of 
difficulties that plague Brazil’s economic prospects. Brazil ranks at 116th in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business rating 21. Taxes are high, and tremendously complex. An 
interviewee explained, when asked if he honored his tax obligations, “I hope so, 
there’s so much change, no one is ever sure”  (interview 66). The amount of money, 
time, and energy spent trying to keep accounts in order could certainly be better 
spent pursuing the company’s core business. According to a recent report by the 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2015) 
report, ‘a benchmark manufacturing firm requires 2600 hours per year to comply with 
taxes, as opposed to 356 hours per year (nearly an hour a day) in the average Latin 
American country and 184 hours per year in the average OECD country’ (OECD 
2015). 
 
In Brazil, all companies have a difficult time dealing with its labor legislation, which is 
constantly skewed towards employees, irrespective of the merits of the case. One 
interviewee relates having had to make large pay-outs to two employees alleging 
poor working conditions for having entered the refrigerated portions of the plant, 
which, according to their posts, they would have been banned to do anyway. Similar 
cases are common, firing underperforming staff is expensive, creating a labor 
scenario that is not only insecure and expensive, but that does not reward efficiency 
and is instead negatively incentivized. Additionally, educational levels are 
consistently amongst the worst in the world, even in the prosperous State of São 
Paulo (interview 59). 
 
Interviewed actors also find the lack of legal support affects their ability to negotiate 
their employment rights with each other. Several interviewees, (when discussing the 
difference between the co-packer based model in California and the more-
concentrated production model that exists in Brazil) identified the lack of contractual 
security as the key hurdle towards this type of arrangement. One interviewee even 
went so far as to claim that this is how ‘Bony’, one of the pioneers in the business, 
lost his company. The formula and know-how were simply incorporated by his co-
packer, who prevented him from running the business. This lack of contractual 
security is undoubtedly a barrier for innovation in the Brazilian market. Without 
incentives towards specialization, efficiency is lost and costs are high. This model 
also discourages innovation. Each new product launch requires the company to 
invest in machinery and ‘know-how’, as well as engage specialized co-packers with 
the capacity to create these products and produce them with little risks and at a low 
cost (interviews 55, 59, 84). 
																																																						
21	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ	
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Overall, Brazil’s value chains are excessively verticalized, due to the high transaction 
costs involved in working across fragmented groups. This is an aspect of the chain to 
where the traditional ‘Gereffi approach’ (Gereffi, 1994) that applies Coase (1937) to 
analyze transaction costs seems particularly pertinent. Although no interviewees 
mentioned this factor specifically, the OECD (OECD, 2015) report highlights that the 
tax structure in Brazil further encourages excessive verticalization. 
 
Innovation is also low. The current tax system is heavily based on indirect taxes and 
a corporate tax that predominantly focuses on turnover companies and as a 
consequence punishes fragmentation. This would help to explain why there are 
practically no co-packers operating in the Brazilian food production networks  
(OECD, 2015). 
 
A large proportion of innovations published in scientific papers and technical 
advances in Brazil do not have sufficient impact. A survey of the Brazilian production 
regarding açaí reveals a host of innovations, in technical processes, but also in 
product development. The science exists for the production of everything from 
probiotic açaí products to candies  (interview 62). Yet none of these products seem 
to be launched. In fact, the level of innovation in the food industry in Brazil seems, 
upon comparing retail outlets, markedly lower than in the US. These empirical 
observations are confirmed by an OECD (2015) report called ‘Brazil 2015 - 
Overview’. This explains that although policies exist to encourage innovation as well 
as research and development  (as seen in the high quantity of science being 
published), the lack of competition in Brazil’s highly concentrated marketplace 
creates a disincentive for innovation  (OECD, 2015). 
 
The highly concentrated retail-end of the chain not only constricts innovation, but 
also it creates barriers for the ability of new actors to enter the market. Following the 
relative expansion of Brazil’s economy in the 1990s, the retail sector quickly saw a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions that concentrated the market into a handful of 
players who were internationally owned. This process of concentration mirrors what 
has happened in the last two decades of globalization where there are large retail 
chains consolidating to gain bargaining power and efficiency. Since 1995, when 
Brazil first opened itself to foreign (international) investment, international groups  
have incorporated themselves into the national markets.  Presently, five large groups 
make up 60% of the Brazil retail market . Four out of these five groups are foreign 
(internationally) owned22. This level of concentration was achieved through 
acquisitions of large local groups, but also of small chains. In the Southeast, these 
five groups now have tremendous power over the food processing industry.  
 
																																																						
22	http://www.labcom.fau.usp.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/1_cincci/016.pdf	
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The dominance of internationally owned companies has several consequences for 
the açaí chain (de Oliveira and dos Santos Delgado, 2015). Interviewees relate that 
substantial capital investments are required to be accepted by one of these large 
groups. While the market in the US is also relatively concentrated, though less so,  
(four large groups control 37% of the market15), the premium market does value 
small producers and local retailers. In Brazil, this market segment is non-existent, 
pushing anyone who wants to enter into retail outlets towards these large 
conglomerates. This means that without a substantial capital investment, none of the 
small industries that supply mix have a chance of upgrading (interviews 55, 61, 62). 
 
Another impact for the açaí chain could be positive because it means that many of 
these groups have a chain of custody requirements. Interviewees explain that 
Walmart pioneered this trend and demanded that their suppliers present full reports 
about how their products are made, all the way through to extraction of materials. 
Large retailers, (by a varying degree and with Walmart being by far the most 
thorough), now require assurances about the environmental and social impact of 
their product lines. One interviewee, who purchases from the large monoculture in 
Santarém, stated that they have been concerned by their environmental track record 
because recently they were accused by authorities for alleged deforestation. In a 
country with incipient consumer activism, this type of control could be key to 
sustaining açaí’s eco-social benefits (interview 59). 
 
Companies in the Southeast are relatively absent from export markets and the 
Brazillian economy due to their poor business environment. Brazil represents less 
than 1% of global trade, even though it has the World’s eighth largest economy - 
International trade also represents a meagre 17% of GDP (Viola, 2017). Although 
Brazil has, since the mid 1990s, opened itself to investment, its participation in 
commercial flows remains weak. It is an economy that relies on the size of its 
domestic market primarily for growth. With few exceptions, it has not succeeded with 
its integration into existing or arising global production networks, other than through 
the supply of low value added commodities. A key hurdle towards better integration 
of Brazil and the growth of its exports is the difficulty businesses face moving 
merchandise in and out of the countries.  
 
Customs regulations and legal duties within Brazil are costly, complicated, and long 
delays are the norm. Exportation is slow, expensive, and requires a list of permits. 
Importation is even more complicated. This means that to integrate globally, actors 
need to export goods, but also import ingredients and parts easily to manufacture 
products competitively. According to the World Bank, by bringing its border 
administration and transport and communications infrastructure halfway to the 
world’s best practices, Brazil could add US $ 84 billions of trade yearly (Canuto, 
2014; Martins, 2015). In this context, exporters lose competitiveness and agility. 
When Brazilian companies compete internationally, they are more likely to improve 
their position internally. This was certainly the case for Frootiva, a local company that 
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sells dried açaí cubes as snacks. Its parent company, BlueMacaw, has been active 
as an international trader of açaí for several years, and has had access to the wide 
variety of açaí-based goods. With financing from a local autocracy dedicated to small 
businesses and technological input from ITAL, the Food Technology Institute of the 
State of São Paulo, it was able to develop this new product. The launch was a 
success and sales have grown steadily  (interview 68). 
 
Companies in the Southeast have the capacity to produce quality products, however 
it appears that they are fighting a losing battle when it comes to adding value to 
export products. To enter the US market with their value- added ‘mix’ product, 
interviews with actors from the Southeast explained several problems. They stated 
that to set up operations in the US, they need to have stock there, and perhaps even 
move production there, to ensure they can uphold contracts with large retailers. This 
has been a requirement of US buyers to consider stocking their products. With 
customs clearing and logistics representing such a challenge, getting a frozen, highly 
perishable product on the shelves in the US is no small feat  (interview 55, 59). 
 
Brazil’s export agency, APEX, does not however have any specific programs aimed 
at supporting açaí specifically, or Amazonian fruits in general. Although they have 
promoted some institutional videos advertising the region's unique gastronomical 
potential, however, support is sparse, and not tied to a cohesive strategy throughout 
the chain. According to an interview with the technician responsible for the fruit 
export program, their focus is on raw fruits, and they have no specific actions aimed 
at promoting value-added products. Their main focus is ensuring Brazilian products 
have the same quality, and that companies are as rigorous and regular in their 
dealings with international buyers as their counterparts in Chile. This interview 
explained that Brazilian açaí exporters have very little institutional support, at all 
levels in the chain, to enter international markets  (interview 57). 
 
 
7.5 Consumers in the Southeast region of Brazil 
 
Consumers in this region eat açaí almost exclusively in its ‘mix’ form. This product is 
more common in Rio de Janeiro where it is mixed in front of customers, whereas in 
the rest of the region a ready-made blend is available that has been processed. The 
product marketed in the US is sold in a purer form and higher grade than the product 
available in the markets of the Southeast of Brazil  (pure pulp of the ‘grosso’ variety 
or powder compared to an industrialized mix with sugar and guaraná syrup made 
from ‘fino’ or ‘médio’ pulp). Several interviewees confirmed the existence of a class 
divide in the mode of consumption of açaí. According to this perspective, upper class 
consumers prefer their açaí in a purer form and a higher grade which is mixed ‘only’ 
with guaraná syrup and fruits; where as consumers in lower class tend to blend their 
açaí with powdered milk, sweetened condensed milk and other rich and sweet 
additives  (in addition to the guaraná syrup), making the original açaí flavor 
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practically unrecognizable, and the initial, relatively healthy snack, a calorific ‘bomb’  
(interviews 55, 54, 83). Consumers eat their açaí at small local retailers, stocked by 
distributors who themselves buy from small local factories. 
 
The health benefits of açaí remain very hard to substantiate. Several interviewees 
highlighted this understanding. The focus group reported that while açaí is 
associated with the sports culture, consumers are generally unaware of what the 
actual health benefits might be.  All participants in the focus group were quick to 
point to açaí’s healthy reputation and its ‘energy-giving’ properties, nobody could 
actually name any of its health benefits or properties. This can be illustrated when a 
high-ranking executive from a large açaí firm was not aware of what an anthocyanin 
is, and of açaí’s high content of it  (interview 55). For the Coca Cola Company, 
based on their research, the introduction of their new açaí-based juice required an 
entire reintroduction of the fruit and its benefits to Brazilian audiences. They focused 
on introducing the concept of the ‘superfood’, around which the entire 
marketing/identity of the fruit is based in the US market. In the focus group, this 
knowledge was understood (interview 91). 
 
An aspect of the ‘açaí bowl’ that does occur often is its ‘energy-giving’ and calorific 
content. This product is always mixed with the guaraná syrup, and therefore the 
sugar content has been associated with açaí. Frooty’s extensive consumer research 
also confirms that people are generally unaware of açaí’s properties and health 
benefits (interviews 55, 67). That explains why the açaí that goes to foreign markets 
is a higher quality than consumed in Brazil. With so many additives and ingredients, 
the açaí’s flavor and nutritional profile lose importance. 
 
It has been confirmed in interviews with academics developing new açaí-based 
products at ITAL, a prominent food technology research institute in the State of São 
Paulo, that consumers are in fact wary of açaí’s earthy flavor. A researcher 
developing gummy candies with açaí could not find subjects to taste test her 
invention outside gyms and health-centered circles. The general public was put off 
by the açaí flavor and not willing to try. The Toca do Açaí interview also discovered 
this and according to them, increasing the concentration of the açaí used in their 
product  (the açaí that is sold here is the lowest grade, fino, at 9% concentration) 
would not be well received by customers. Though açaí does have a distinct flavor, 
this is a curious discovery. Perhaps Brazilians have an inordinately sweet and 
unadventurous palate or could is the grade of product in the South so low that 
consumers have been put off by its flavor? It might be that consumers are 
accustomed to açaí in bowl form, and are resistant to change. These are issues that 
have been discovered throughout this study  (focus group). There is a general 
resistance towards pure açaí, or açaí in other forms than in bowls and this illustrates 
the lack of diversity in açaí products in Brazilian retail outlets. While in the US açaí 
was present in everything from candies, energy drinks, smoothies, to chocolates, to 
yoghurts and cereal bars, in Brazil açaí is mostly found in the frozen aisle of the 
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supermarket in São Paulo. Certainly, the odd granola bar, snack, and now juice is 
also available, but the volume and popularity is significantly lower in its country of 
origin. 
 
Açaí’s Amazonian heritage and eco-social profile also do not seem to generate much 
interest on the part of consumers. Although some companies’ marketing strategy 
involves referring to nature, or the Amazon  (Toca do Açaí goes for an indigenous 
aesthetic, while Ecofresh has a nature theme), that is not necessarily the case. 
Frooty’s internal research, evidence provided by all interviewees, as well as the 
focus group shows that, though consumers are aware that açaí comes from the 
Amazon, they have little knowledge of its origins and cultural history  (interview 66). 
Amazonian culture is very much unknown throughout the whole of Brazil. Other 
Amazonian products are unknown, and the cuisine is only now slowly starting to 
appear nationally. In many respects, açaí is more of a Carioca beach food than an 
Amazonian food  (focus group). 
 
Amazonian culture is starting to register as a marketing factor in Southeast Brazil. 
Celebrity chef Alex Atala, number 30 on the World’s 50 Best Restaurants list23 , is 
known for creating dishes with Amazonian ingredients. A few restaurants in São 
Paulo have appeared which serve Amazonian dishes. Markets are beginning to 
stock Amazonian products, such as the jambú herb and tucupi, a manioc stock. 
Though this is still a niche trend, it is being actively supported in Belém. It could be 
possible to bring new visibility to the region’s culture, its produce and open up 
markets for Amazonian commodities that are harvested and produced by Ribeirinhos 
and small-scale producers. Apart from the already more familiar cupuaçú, all 
interviewed actors find these ingredients too niche to warrant investment in new 
product lines (interviews 55, 58, 59). 
 
Organic açaí has begun to appear in retail outlets because Sambazon has recently 
entered the market, however, this still accounts for a minority of sales. Overall, 
organic sales in Brazil are very low compared to the US. Brazil’s lower education 
threshold, and less open and competitive marketplace might help explain why levels 
of consumer activism, and general information demands around products remains so 
low compared to the US market. While ecosocial impacts have begun to interest 
consumers, they are still not influencing purchasing decisions (interviews 55, 67). 
Other certifications, such as Fairtrade, are non-existent in Brazil. There are very few 
products in existence that use their environmental benefits to convince consumers  
(such as Rainforest Crunch in the US, for example). However, interviewees relate a 
growing interest in eco-socially responsible products  (as does recent consumer 
research) (interviews 55, 67, focus group).  
 
																																																						
23	https://www.theworlds50best.com/list/1-50-winners#t21-30	
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In the last two years, new offerings of processed organic products have appeared on 
the market, and small organic farmers’ markets have become increasingly popular. 
Undoubtedly, this is still an elite, niche market, much as it was initially, and to a great 
extent still is in the US. Sales in the US are now large enough that the organic 
market itself is stratified into mainstream and premium. Though research has 
discovered that conversion into ‘intention to buy’ of this newfound consumer 
awareness remains low it is possible that the organic market as a whole does has 
consistent growth throughout the whole of Brazil. This growth is estimated to be 30 
to 40% per year, the overall açaí organic market size is only R$ 2.5 billion, or 0.4% 
of the overall market  (compared to 4% in the US), of which very little are processed 
goods  (Welle, 2015). At present there are no other types of certification, such as 
Fairtrade, or Rainforest Alliance, that serve to inform and differentiate these products 
for consumers in Brazil. It is possible that companies such as Coca Cola company, 
following a first phase of the marketing the focuses with the ‘superfruit’ narrative, 
could then use the ecosocial narrative as a next step in their strategy. Meanwhile, for 
those companies that cater to mainstream markets, this is not yet a realistic 
proposition. 
 
For the açaí value chain, this means that upgrading into higher grade, purer, or 
healthier açaí products, or marketing based on Ribeirinho identities is likely to remain 
very niche. This would require a great deal of information, and a dramatic change in 
the portrayal of the açaí products, from beachy/sporty to Amazonian. However, there 
has been growth with high value-added niches and there is increasing room for 
these types of product to reach markets, as we see with the arrival of Sambazon. 
Local companies do not have the risk- propensity to innovate with new product lines, 
particularly Amazonian ones – especially because their marketing is not tied to that 
identity. Frooty is now labelling itself a ‘superfruit’ company, expanding its product 
range, but further away still from its Amazonian origins. This has a dangerous impact 
on the Ribeirinho component of the chain, whose identity is being ‘fetishized’ away 
from the product. 
 
7.6 Value Capture 
 
 
Domestically, it is possible for a small company to grow from a small business selling 
açaí mix to small retailers, to a mid-size company supplying large retailers. This can 
be illustrated by Frooty, a pioneer in the market, which grew organically and is 
currently by far the bigger player in the market. It has relied on a sizeable investment 
from a financing institution to grow to its current capacity. It is now offering a much 
wider variety of products, from low-sugar to high-protein mixes, as well as adding 
new flavors to its range. 
Ecofresh has found a space in large retail outlets in a very short amount of time. 
Again, this did not happen organically, but rather through a large capital investment 
made by an investment fund  (much as we saw happen with Sambazon in California 
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as well). Other small businesses did not show any perspective of moving into retail. It 
is important to note that there are no large corporations trading frozen açaí products 
in the local market, which certainly is an important factor in the lack of space for 
smaller actors. 
 
There are significant barriers involved in moving from a small-scale business that 
caters to small retailers through distributors, to dealing directly with the big retailers 
that dominate markets throughout Brazil. Barriers include: high entry requirements; 
the need for distribution centres across the territory; minimum volumes and stringent 
quality requirements. Actors explain that even getting through the door to present 
products to these larger businesses is challenging. In the hinterlands of large cities, 
there is a lower concentration and the potential for access to retailers could be 
higher. With credit sparse, high levels of verticalization in retail and the absence of 
co-packers, barriers to entry are high. 
 
Other companies are also adding new products. For example, DeMarchi is following 
suit with its own sugar-free offering. Ecofresh has produced popsicle sticks as well 
as ice cream-like packaging. Variety is nonetheless still low, and companies do not 
express any interest in entering new segments, outside of the ‘mix’/frozen isle 
department. Perhaps consumers’ traditional form of consumption and lack of 
appetite for novelty, as well as the low levels of competition hinder innovations on 
this front. Because co-packers are rare in Brazil, adding another type of product 
would have very high capital costs, in setting up a completely new processing line. 
With such fixed consumer habits around the way açaí is eaten, it would be a major 
gamble. Ecofresh currently markets a ‘cupuaçú cream’ which it says is quite 
successful. Toca do Açaí also serves cupuaçú cream. 
 
 
Other Amazonian fruits or flavors are not in the ambit of most companies because 
they are not known to the Brazilian public. Not only this, but no single actor, including 
large players such as Coca Cola, would be willing to take on the marketing challenge 
of introducing an entirely new flavor to the public. Overall, none of the interviewees 
showed an interest in exploring new flavors. Reasons for this could be that 
investments in marketing would be too high and risky, or, because supply chains are 
not sufficiently mature, so this did not seem like a strategy worth adapting to these 
companies. Perhaps, the costs involved in setting up new product lines, and the 
concentration in retail that discourage innovation pose a true barrier to this type of 
upgrading strategy. Certainly the lack of interest in Brazilian society for Amazonian 
culture and ingredients is a strong disincentive. 
 
It seems that also in the Southeast companies have not managed to secure 
intermediary roles within the chain, such as having co-packers for international 
brands. Despite the non-existence of competent companies, such as Liotécnica, 
(who have the capability to produce powders and extracts), most of these products 
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are still made mostly abroad. Undoubtedly the ‘Brazil Cost’ plays a crucial role in 
impeding this kind of integration into globalized networks, leading foreign actors to 
prefer purchasing and transporting frozen pulp than acquiring products with added 
value. 
 
The existence of so many local firms that produce ‘mix’ products, and the reluctance 
of all interviewees to purchase anything but frozen pulp from the factories in Pará 
confirms the difficult situation of those factories discussed in the previous chapter. 
There is not only a problem with geographical isolation, but also, their inability to 
produce with the desired quality, hampers their ability to move up in the chain and 
add value to their product. They are squeezed by demanding buyers in the South, 
and difficult conditions such as irregular supply and prices in the North. Another 
potential problem is that there are tax issues that could potentially play a part in 
hampering Pará’s factories upgrading. Furthermore, all local actors report that they 
do not stock their pulp locally, but rather require that factories in Pará supply them all 
year. For the cash-strapped companies in Pará, this is a significant barrier, which 
likely keeps smaller actors from benefiting from entering into business with these 
larger-scale buyers. 
 
Although a two of the larger-scale actors in Brazil explained in an interview that they 
are beginning to look to exploit international markets, this activity has been incipient 
so far. Internationally, Brazil’s share in the açaí trade relies on shipping frozen pulp 
to companies abroad for transformation. This inability to upgrade by adding value 
mirrors the general prospects of the Brazilian economy, selling commodities with 
little value added and unable or unwilling to climb up. Companies are only now 
beginning to look at international markets, and sales are still a very small percentage 
of overall turnover. This might begin to change quickly now that two of the largest 
players, Ecofresh and Frooty, have professionalized their international department 
and decided to invest in export markets. Still, there seems to be little movement and 
lower rungs of the chain, producing intermediate goods, to seek integration into 
global networks. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
 
The Southeast of Brazil is where açaí's identity was made into the product that is 
known across the World today, both in processing and consumer myth, as 
summarized in Table 7.1 below. In this way, the passage of the product is not only 
important because of the volume of trade it absorbs, but also this is the region that 
was the catalyst for the process of consumer myth reconfiguration that made it 
appealing to Western audiences. This could have been done outside of a specific 
corporate strategy, not accompanied by a matching entrepreneurial drive and due to 
the region not being integrated into the global chain.   
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Due to the local market absorbing 40% of all açaí production, its relation to actors in 
Pará plays a formative role in the configuration of the chain. Problems exist for 
upgrading opportunities for actors in Pará these are the looseness of intra-chain 
relations; small companies dominating trade; and the setting in which actors are 
embedded fixes positions. Actors in Pará, who cannot move up the chain, are unable 
to offer new products, and have very little space to improve the efficiency of what is a 
rudimentary industrial process. 
 
Amongst the key reason why factories in Pará do not break into the açaí ‘mix’ market 
is that logistics do not make this a cost-effective option. The production of the mix is 
closely tied to packaging and branding, and in Brazil's unsure business 
environments, small actors prefer to concentrate their traditional practices. 
 
Whilst local companies grow, improve their processes and develop variations of the 
same product for supermarkets, they are slow to explore new product lines or broach 
the international market. This part of the chain, set in a more palatable business 
environment (territorial embeddedness) plays a key role in driving development in 
Pará, thousands of kilometers away. 
 
Changes in value capture here can have a great impact on Ribeirinho livelihoods, 
and should be considered as key levers of development interventions. The majority 
of the trade remains largely at the hands of small businesses. 
 
Businesses in the Southeast have begun to grow and cater to a small group of very 
large retailers with international forces, they have found it necessary to better 
manage their own supply chain. The value-chain theory explains that when 
transaction costs become an issue, companies verticalize. 
This has led several actors to either set up their own operations in Pará or create 
tight contractual bonds with their suppliers. Although these contracts ensure a fixed 
clientele for factories and allow them some level of predictability, they also constrict 
their ability to set prices. When volatility of raw material increases, factories in Pará 
that have tight contractual sales arrangements become particularly vulnerable. 
Additionally, the perception that these companies are not sufficiently professional, 
added to the logistical hurdles involved, seriously constricts their opportunity to 
upgrade into the mix market. Overall, with an insecure business environment as that 
of Brazil, verticalization works to mitigate transaction costs, very much in line with the 
traditional VCA reasoning and Coase’s (1937) teachings. Though verticalization 
does serve to improve coordination, and generates development by enabling the 
chain to grow and solidify, it also works to constrict mobility and discourage 
innovation. 
 
Because of this greater need for control in trading conditions and increased volumes, 
large local actors are welcoming the entrance of monoculture actors to the base of 
supply chain. As consumers have little knowledge or attachment to traditional modes 
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of production, there is no down side to this new mechanism. International groups that 
are present in the supply chain, either in the form of retail actors, such as Walmart, 
or as industrial players, such as Coca Cola, have imported corporate cultures that do 
place a greater value on the sustainability of products’ chain of custody. 
 
The Southeast is the cultural region, with its media groups and national influence, in 
addition to its industrial and consumer center. This is where the taste for açaí was 
popularized, and its identity reshaped into something palatable for Western 
audiences. This new identity was crucial to its popularization, but it also stifles 
opportunities for actors in Pará. The local market consumes açaí in a different form 
and is uninterested in higher grade or quality açaí, and not preoccupied with the 
social and environmental impacts of their consumer habits. The product’s 
Amazonian origin seems to not play a significant role in the product’s acceptance. In 
general, an Amazonian imprint is not popular, nor is there much appreciation for 
Amazonian culture. Considering that the highly verticalized production mode in the 
region inhibits innovation, it is very costly to try new things and launch new products, 
and launching new flavors is very risky. 
 
There is a consumer base that could be willing to pay a premium for organic and 
environmentally sourced products. This is nevertheless a very small market, with an 
uncertain future. As in the US with the organic market, we see a class division in 
consumption habits, with the consolidation of a premium market willing to pay for the 
exclusivity of wild harvested, truly sustainably and, most importantly, artisanal 
products. There is also a nascent interest in the region’s gastronomy, fueled by a 
couple of celebrity chefs, might open space for new products to find favor in the 
region. In this context, the potential for growth in other açaí products or products 
containing Amazonian commodities seem to be wholly underexploited. This 
reinforces the notion that perhaps the creation of monocultures might not altogether 
annihilate traditional production modes, as long as these are adequately aimed at 
niche markets, with proper certification and a compelling narrative. Fostering 
linkages between producers in the North and companies with marketing power and 
good incentives, launching products aimed at luxury niches, could form a virtuous 
trade pathway for açaí and other Ribeirinho products. Whether these niches would 
be sufficient to sustain Ribeirinho livelihoods remains to be seen. 
 
Though there are opportunities for new niche products, and there might be demand 
for a wider array of Amazonian goods, innovation remains very low. New variations 
of the same mix products are now beginning to hit supermarket shelves, but these 
are still very similar to the original. The fast declination of new flavors across a 
plethora of products, as seen in California, is far from a reality here. With a highly 
verticalized retail environment, small enterprises have a difficult time breaking into 
the market. Even the larger companies are reluctant to innovate in an uncertain 
business environment, where coordination across companies is difficult to achieve 
and new product lines must be paid for entirely by the company. In the absence of 
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co-packers to allow companies to venture into new product lines without these 
upfront costs, innovation is likely to remain low. In an insecure business environment  
(territorial embeddedness), risk taking and innovation are low. 
 
Finally, this part of the chain, despite some growing effort from the larger actors, 
remains somewhat disconnected from the international market. Though the açaí 
identity we see abroad is crafted here, local companies play no part in international 
trade. Although local companies function in an improved business environment and 
have sufficient access to technology to develop new products, the high levels of 
verticalization in the local industry and the hurdles that exporters face to integrate to 
international production networks seem to discourage inclusion. Only these large 
actors who market finished goods and have sufficient capital to set up an operation 
in a foreign market, seem to be able to make the leap. Moreover, historical isolation 
of the Brazilian economy makes entrepreneurs unlikely to explore foreign markets, 
even in neighboring countries. 
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Table 7.1 Analytical Matrix for the Southeast 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Territorial 
embeddedness 
Societal 
embeddedness 
Network 
embeddedness 
Consumers 
Relation to 
chain 
creation 
A much more 
prosperous 
consumer market, 
and more mature 
industrial complex 
has allowed the 
chain to grow in 
ways not possible in 
Pará, with more 
sophisticated 
products and 
marketing. 
 
- to deal with 
seasonality, 
companies here 
have begun to 
source from other 
regions 
Local entrepreneurs, in 
a more mature setting, 
were quick to 
reproduce the Gracie 
success and launch 
their own products - 
local entrepreneurs are 
more aggressive than 
in Pará. 
While the dominant, small-
scale trade is largely 
informal still, and 
negotiations are on a 
‘spot’ basis, as the 
companies grow, relations 
become more rigid 
 
- a highly concentrated 
retail led lead actors to 
enter direct retail and 
specific distribution, before 
seeking out mainstream 
retail distribution 
The formation of 
a new 
identity/myth for 
consumers in 
this region was 
the main driver 
of chain 
formation 
beyond Pará 
Relation to 
chain 
configuration 
- companies here 
prefer to mix their 
own product, rather 
than allow 
companies in the 
North, who have 
developed their 
capacity, but are not 
trusted by actors 
here to deliver 
 
- the still relatively 
poor business 
environment  (when 
compared 
internationally), and 
lack of integration 
into global chains 
keeps this leg of the 
chain isolated from 
the global chain 
- The Gracie açaí mix 
remains unaltered, and 
the risk-aversion and 
lack of interest in 
innovating keeps the 
chain as it is, larger, 
but mostly unchanged 
for decades 
 
- small businesses are 
accustomed to dealing 
with informality, explore 
the market without any 
support and often times 
still informally 
 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility is not an 
important issue in 
national business 
circles, which means 
that local businesses 
are not as preoccupied 
as international 
corporations with social 
impacts of chain 
- small businesses 
continue to take risks and 
trade often informally with 
small cheap suppliers in 
Pará, but must have formal 
documents in order to 
supply local retail, keeping 
the chain's diffuse 
configuration in place 
 
- larger companies 
concentrate all their 
activities in-house, instead 
of relying on a web of 
suppliers 
 
- larger companies focus 
their transactions on few 
supplier, with whom they 
have more official and 
constant bonds, and tend 
to seek more 
captive/verticalized 
relations to ensure supply 
- Until today, 
açaí is 
consumed in the 
same form, 
mostly at small 
retail outlets 
 
- Lack of 
consumer 
concern of health 
and quality allow 
producers to 
source based on 
price and ignore 
quality 
 
- Consumers 
consider açaí a 
snack to be had 
outside the 
house, and most 
sales continue to 
be done in small 
retailers rather 
than directly in 
supermarkets 
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Relation to 
upgrading 
- jumping from a 
small processor to a 
larger one, by going 
into direct retail, 
requires significant 
capital input, which 
must be done by 
equity investments, 
since credit is sparse 
 
- the highly 
verticalized business 
model stifles 
innovation 
- businesses do not 
feel that they can 
manipulate consumer 
myths and form 
demand for new 
products – they see 
themselves more as 
producers than brands 
 
- Businesses have only 
now decided to take 
the risk and begin to 
seek to export 
- concentration at the retail 
level constricts market 
entry for new actors who 
want to go from small 
distributors to selling to 
consumers through 
retailers 
 
- for companies to grow 
and enter larger retail 
spaces, changing bonds 
with açaí suppliers in Pará 
from loose to contractual is 
essential 
- lack of 
consumer 
interest in 
Amazonian 
origins precludes 
the launching of 
other offerings 
with other 
ingredients 
 
- businesses are 
discouraged 
from launching 
different product 
lines containing 
açaí because of 
a perceived lack 
of consumer 
interest 
Development 
outcomes 
- the region's better 
business 
environment has 
allowed the chain to 
solidify there, greatly 
increasing  (nearly 
doubling) demand for 
açaí, with great 
positive impact for 
Ribeirinhos 
 
- the chain also 
sustains many 
businesses in the 
region, having 
become a staple 
there as well 
- although local 
businesses were savvy 
enough to explore the 
new, popular açaí 
identity, they are 
unable to capture even 
more value by 
diversifying their 
product lines 
significantly through 
consumer myth 
building 
- local businesses and 
their ability to dominate the 
informality/unreliability of 
the açaí supply in Pará 
while distributing to a host 
of local retailers keep the 
chain flowing and generate 
significant development in 
Pará and in the Southeast 
 
- concentration at the retail 
level hampers innovation, 
with smaller players 
blocked from upgrading 
without prohibitive 
investments 
- the formation of 
a consumer myth 
enabled the 
chain to take 
form and 
generate 
substantial 
development, 
both here and in 
Pará. 
 
 
- the lack of 
myths related to 
aspirational 
Amazonian 
identities in this 
consumer 
market precludes 
exchange value 
formation for 
Ribeirinhos 
Policy 
lessons 
- positive 
development 
outcomes can be 
reached at one place 
through industrial 
development far 
away, where 
conditions are better 
 
 
- lack of contractual 
security makes 
businesses 
concentrate too 
many functions, 
-  entrepreneurs who 
have the ability to form 
and propagate 
consumer myths, and 
not only process 
goods, are crucial to 
chain development 
 
- investing in 
consumer myth 
building through 
cultural products is a 
powerful way to foster 
value capture and 
regional development 
 
- the presence of 
- eventually, for the market 
to grow, businesses 
require more contractual 
security in their supply 
chain – companies stuck 
between the formal and 
informal need special 
support if smallholder 
NTFPS are to remain 
active players 
 
- too much concentration 
at the retail level can drive 
concentration across the 
chain, and prevent actors 
- the 
reconfiguring of 
consumer myths 
can be a 
valuable way to 
form markets for 
NTFPs 
 
- however, 
substantial 
exchange value 
formation 
requires the 
original cultural 
universe to have 
significance for 
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 which stifles 
innovation/risk taking 
 
- the integration of 
the Brazilian 
economy into global 
markets could 
improve the 
Southeast's ability to 
capture value from 
the chain 
international players in 
the region is an 
important driver of CSR 
measures that seek to 
safeguard positive 
social outcomes of 
chain- 
internationalization 
drives behavior change 
in the business 
community and should 
be encouraged 
from upgrading or entering 
the chain at all 
consumers 
 
- niche 
consumer 
markets for 
sophisticated 
Amazonian 
products could 
help Ribeirinhos 
retain a place in 
the chain against 
the trend 
towards 
monocultures 
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Chapter 8. THE UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA - CO-PACKING, 
‘BEACH BUMS’ AND ‘YUMMY-MUMMIES’ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This present chapter follows the structure of previous chapters, first recounting the 
açaí value chain formation, and then tracing its contours. It explores its 
embeddedness in the local context within California, before exploring consumer 
perspectives, to establish how these factors have contributed to the formation of the 
chain and how it is sustained in its current configuration. We also seek to draw out 
development outcomes, and to extract policy lessons that can be valuable for chain 
development endeavors. 
 
The US is the largest international market for açaí berries  (Menezes et al., 2011). It 
has sales of approximately 120 million US$ per year  (Kingsley, 2015). In California’s 
coastal towns, açaí is present in juice bars, specialized ‘bowl’ shops, and a host of 
industrialized products at a variety of retail outlets. Also situated within California is 
the leading açaí firm in the country, Sambazon. The business environment here is 
vastly different from that in either Pará, or the Southeast of Brazil. The configuration 
of the chain varies a great deal, there is a diffuse mode of production and diverse 
product types are available. 
 
It is import to explore how the agility of the local industrial complex, the prosperous 
consumer landscape, financial and institutional support for start-ups have made the 
introduction of açaí relatively easy. The US is renowned for its entrepreneurial 
culture, and starting up a new business is a much easier and socially desirable 
endeavor than in the previously discussed locations (Chapter 7). A number of 
support institutions tailor solutions for start-ups. Additionally, the food processing 
landscape is made up of a web of interconnected and highly specialized companies. 
Each of these is devoted to one aspect of the production and marketing process, that 
operates in an orchestrated fashion to bring products to market. This structure 
reduces risks, the need for large start-up capital, and allows individual actors to go 
into market counting on the established goodwill and ‘know-how’ of existing players. 
California in particular, has a hub of food companies, an agricultural powerhouse, 
and is very receptive to start-ups. This business environment encourages innovation, 
and maximizes value capture locally. 
 
The positioning and marketing of açaí are possibly important for understanding the 
quick and pervasive uptake in this US state. The superfood accolade, along with the 
strong association with sports, beach, and healthy lifestyle, all integral to the 
California way of life, has been important for its success. This chapter provides 
results from intelligence gathered from retail outlets, a focus group, and secondary 
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data about consumer trends. It demonstrates how the positioning strategy adopted 
by leaders in the market, particularly Sambazon, have been crucial to açaí’s 
acceptance. Consumer activism and behavior have also had important 
consequences for the sustained inclusion of Ribeirinhos in the chain. 
 
Eight interviews were conducted with leading firms in the sector, from actors who 
occupied a variety of roles. The data from these interviews have been 
complemented by extensive research to produce corroborative secondary data. In a 
competitive business environment, and with limited time, accessing key players was 
certainly a challenge. However, with each company having diverse experiences, and 
the existence of ample secondary data, it was possible to construct a solid picture of 
the chain at this level. It was, however, impossible to obtain detailed information 
about costs and margins, as interviewees remained very guarded about their 
business secrets. This challenge is in contrast to the frankness encountered at the 
base of the chain with the Ribeirinho interviewees. 
  
 
8.2 Tracing chain formation: how did açaí get to California? 
 
Although açaí had already meekly found its way into the American market, it was 
around fifteen years ago, at the hands of brothers Ryan and Jeremy Black that it 
made a more-marked entrance. These two young surfers went to Rio in 1999 to 
celebrate New Year’s Eve and encountered the thriving açaí culture. They 
discovered the myriad juice and bowl shacks dotted across the city selling açaí to 
replenish surfers and athletes. After some hesitation, they travelled back to Rio, 
tracked down the source of the product in the Amazon, and found a sufficiently 
professional supplier to export a container to the US  (the source was the Japanese 
cooperative at Tomé Açú that has been mentioned in previous chapters), packed in 
the small plastic bags they had seen in Rio, with the Sambazon brand. While sorting 
out their supply, they also discovered the product’s important conservation and 
social benefits. 
 
When the first container arrived, the brothers went door to door, to small juice shop 
owners across California, to sell their merchandise. They targeted the athletic, surf 
and beach markets, much as they had seen in Rio. Importantly, they highlighted the 
product’s conservation upside. Initially, they set up stands at festivals and sporting 
events, where they encouraged people to taste the product. Growth of their business 
was slow at first, but eventually they secured a celebrity status for the product. This 
was precipitated by featuring at the Sundance film festival, and later by being 
featured on the highly influential television, talk-show ‘Oprah’, under the guise of a 
‘superfruit’. From the very beginning, their business was marketing, and not 
production. In Brazil açaí became a fixture by accident and it took a long period of 
time to establish, whereas in California the consumer myth of this fruit was formed 
intentionally, over only a few years. The difference can be explained by the 
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entrepreneurial attitude of the brothers and central relevance of the product 
(Colapinto, 2011 and interview 70). 
 
 Açaí, (which had until then been a niche product), began to go mainstream and gain 
national attention. It was at this point that a number of supplement companies, many 
of them operating online, saw an opportunity, and began to market açaí as a miracle 
cure for everything from cancer to obesity. In 2005, Monavie appeared on the 
market. It created an ‘elixir’, with supposed miraculous health benefits, and created a 
direct marketing structure to sell it, in the molds of companies such as Herbalife, or 
Amtrak. In an instant, açaí was the new super-cure for all of America’s health woes. 
It was claimed to be the one substance to combat all the ‘evils’ of sedentary 
lifestyles, pesticide exposure, smoking, and all other health problems associated with 
modern existence such as obesity (which is surprising considering açaí’s high fat 
content). 
 
The backlash was quick to arrive, of course. The government quickly controlled the 
internet scams, many of which were not only guilty of making hugely exaggerated 
claims about the product, but also of committing credit card fraud. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) strongly refuted the exaggerated health claims. As a 
consequence açaí’s reputation was seriously damaged. People became mistrustful 
of açaí’s health claims, and continued to associate it with the online scams. 
Eventually the superfruit trend lost some of its traction, with people no longer being 
as enticed by miraculous, international ingredients, and sales took a dip  (interviews 
75, 70). 
 
The controversy came and went quickly and this has been due to the constant 
marketing effort of companies which have continued to invest in the product. In 
particular the market leader, Sambazon, has managed to survive this wave of bad 
press and remain relevant in US markets16. In the meantime, the social and 
environmental benefits of açaí have played a major role in business-to-business 
marketing, particularly in securing shelf-space at eco- conscious retailers such as 
Whole Foods' outlets.  Açaí’s back-story that has linked it to environmental 
sustainability could have enabled Sambazon secure a US$ 3.5 million-dollar loan for 
building a processing facility in Macapá in 2005. According to the founders of 
Sambazon, relationships with buyers and their local presence in the Amazon has 
allowed them to establish Fairtrade practices and retain some form of control over 
the actual sustainability of their supply chain. This aspect of the business 
environment has been crucial to ensure a role Ribeirinhos in the chain. However, the 
sustainability backstory remains obscured for consumers by açaí’s beach superfood 
identity  (interviews 75, 76, 81, 70 and focus group 69). 
 
Açaí’s presence in the US market appears to have been consolidated during the past 
ten years. Local Whole Foods retailers’ aisles reveal a variety of products that 
contain açaí, from the traditional frozen pulps and smoothies, to cosmetics, cookies, 
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candies, and the still ubiquitous food supplements. The variety of açaí products is 
significantly larger than is found in Brazil. One wholefood store had as many as 28 
different types of products containing açaí; whereas in São Paulo I discovered at 
best three or four products. Juice bars often have an açaí smoothie on the menu (if 
not a bowl). Consumers are familiar with the product, and are accustomed to seeing 
it on the shelves.  (Menezes et al., 2011) Smoothie bowls containing açaí  (the 
original ‘açaí bowl’ invented in Rio de Janeiro), are a popular health food image on 
local Instagram accounts. The Sambazon company is expanding quickly due to new 
capital injections, and is set to up-scale into a significant national player. They aim at 
the ‘mainstream organic market’ that is dominated by large retail outfits such as 
Costco, as well as making a presence in the retail scene through specialized bowl 
shops. Other brands in the natural-health sector continue to include açaí in their lists 
of flavors and products and in my opinion this is due to the highly specialized and 
diverse food production structure at their disposal. 
 
In the cosmopolitan East Coast (at least in California), small niche firms continue to 
sell their own pulps and sorbets as well as this, independent juice shops and bowl 
shops consistently market açaí as one of their most important menu items. Breakfast 
bowls have become a major trend, which may increase açaí within them, or may 
drop it altogether (interviews 76, 77, 70). 
  
 
 
8.3 Tracing the chain in California and the United States 
 
The chain branches out into a variety of different configurations, in a way that is 
characteristic of the food business environment in the State of California. Companies 
often choose to relegate production to third parties, keeping only branding and sales 
as core activities. A host of ancillary actors, from venture capitalists, distributors and 
logistics experts work in tandem to form a network of constantly shifting, and well- 
orchestrated trade activity. 
 
Actors interviewed at this level described several ways that they source açaí pulp to 
transform and market it. They can verticalize their operations entirely, by establishing 
a business outlet in Pará, and then having their own factory (as Sambazon did). 
They can purchase from factories in Pará. They can also buy from traders in the US, 
either in frozen pulp or extracts and powders. The choices made depends upon the 
size of the operation, and the importance of the açaí to the company. Nonetheless, 
nearly all companies who market some kind of processed açaí products rely on third 
parties to produce them (interviews 75, 70, 77,78). 
 
Sambazon is the leading company within the US market. It has opted for building its 
own factory in Brazil. This meant that it completely verticalizes its operations in order 
to be strategic and de-risk their growth strategy in the US. Though initially they 
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sourced their product through procuring the produce from factories in Pará, (such as 
the CAMTA Japanese cooperative), eventually they opted for setting up their own 
factory in Amapá, near the Marajó Island, to produce their own frozen pulp. This was 
a move intended to ensure the quality and sustainability of their product, as well as 
seeking to open up a new production zone, away from the already saturated 
Abaetetuba region. Not only has this move required significant investment, it has 
also demanded attention from partners and managers. These are people who must 
watch how the facility is run, and the entire chain of custody is their responsibility. 
This strategy has enabled Sambazon to operate in the bulk market, selling to other 
companies in the US, in direct competition with factories in Pará and local traders, as 
well as having their own retail-oriented business. They are responsible for supplying 
a variety of juice shops and companies, both large and small, from the offbeat 
Backyard Bowls to the mainstream Jamba Juice  (interviews 76, 79, 70). As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, when companies grow, the need to control the growth 
of supply and this leads to verticalization at the base of the chain. 
  
With the exception of Sambazon, all other actors in the US appear to be either 
directly or indirectly supplied from third-party factories in Pará (or by Sambazon). 
Many companies within the pulp market often have a Brazilian connection (either a 
Brazilian partner or family member), and come to Pará to find a supplier to package 
pulp with their own brand name (interviews 75, 77). They import a large quantity, 
store it, and then market it to local retailers and juice shops. It seems that their ties to 
Brazil, and ability to speak the language, are key factors in their ability to source 
product. They concentrate on the type of branding, marketing and sales activities 
that factories in Pará have shown no interest in pursuing. 
 
US-based traders also buy the açaí pulp, stock it in large plastic containers, 
unmarked or unbranded, and then sell it in smaller quantities to their clients. Along 
with this service, traders often also develop and produce intermediate and final açaí-
based products (or ingredients) for their clients, such as powders and extracts. They 
play a key role in securing supply to that market, while maintaining direct, ongoing 
contact with the factories in Pará. It is their role to scout for quality and price. This 
study has already illustrated that not many factories in Pará fulfil the mandatory legal 
and quality requirements to export, and these traders take advantage of 
opportunities. They also stock up on the product, and finance its production (for 
example, by freezing pulp) so that the market may access the product throughout the 
year and therefore this mitigates one of the key hurdles faced by the factories in 
Pará. As one such trader put it himself, should the factories have enough rolling 
capital to produce and store on their own to sell throughout the year, much of his 
business would be redundant (interview 75). 
 
One factory in Pará, Bela Iaçá, has managed to make the leap to directly contact the 
market in the United States, and is offering its pulp directly to companies. It has 
become the largest factory in Pará, and has worked hard towards 
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professionalization. It is now stretching into the US market, offering high grade  
(14%) pulp, in a market where the gold standard until recently was 12%. This is a 
first for a Brazilian company, and may come to change the configuration of the rest 
of the chain at this level. We see again how keen entrepreneurialism can form and 
reform chain configuration, irrespective of contextual constraints. This company is 
aggressively pursuing Sambazon customers, who seem wary of the latter company’s 
foray into the retail market. Several other companies trade frozen açaí pulp directly 
to juice shops and retail outlets. These companies operate much like Sambazon did 
in its inception, and how most Brazilian companies still do (interviews 8, 76). 
 
The majority of companies that operate within the United States, including 
Sambazon, which has its own açaí pulp extraction operation in Pará, rely on third 
parties to manufacture their final products, whilst they focus on marketing and sales. 
The business environment in California resembles a diffuse web of interconnected 
companies; each of these is highly specialized with their core activity. Companies do 
not necessarily source, produce, package, brand and market and sell their products, 
but rather often distribute these activities amongst a host of partners that they 
coordinate. Many companies do not have açaí as their core product, but rather have 
added an açaí-flavored product to their existing product lines. 
 
Most producing companies have co-packers who operate in target segments; they 
produce a type of product, with several different flavors, for third-parties. They do not 
source these ingredients individually from producers. Instead, they purchase already 
pre-processed açaí into extracts, and add it to their product lines, which are often 
also produced by third parties.There is a wide variety of specialized ‘flavor’ 
companies in the US, making it easy to tap into a trend by adding a new flavor, 
without much effort spent on sourcing up the chain. 
 
Co-packer companies make most products containing açaí in the US market. Frozen 
pulp is produced in Pará by local factories, and specialized co-packer companies in 
the US make all of the other products, from cookies to smoothies. Sambazon, for 
example, reached out to a co-packer company called Aseptic Solutions in order to 
produce their line of smoothies, and package them in plastic containers in 2006 
when it began selling smoothies in retail outlets  (Reynolds, 2006). This allowed 
companies to quickly move into a new segment, without having to obtain the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) approval or work out the problems 
associated with the development of a specific format and investing in the machinery, 
space or the staff required to set up a production line. In this way, a host of other, 
supporting industries exist in the US market to keep the açaí chain, and the overall 
food chains, afloat. They form a complex, inter-twined network and work with 
surprisingly accurate and smooth coordination. This makes it very easy for a new 
product to hit the shelves to respond to a trend, but also very easy to stop a product 
when it is no longer successful. 
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The vast majority of small to medium companies in the US rely on brokers to reach 
retailers. Considering the myriad of small companies in the market, and the wide 
variety of products available in shops, managing every relation individually is not a 
practical arrangement. These brokers use their expertise to set up a portfolio of 
companies to represent, and manage sales between them and larger retailers, set 
up promotions, and provide important feedback between actors. Interviewees 
relayed that most large retailers will demand that smaller companies hire a broker to 
set up working relations, and these brokers are not only a sales force, but also they 
act as gatekeepers to the industry because they select only those products they find 
most likely to succeed in a retail environment. This enables small companies to 
reach large retailers, who are keen to include them, as the retail environment is 
much more competitive and diversified than in Brazil.  
 
There are a host of large, market dominating players, such as Whole Foods, Costco, 
and Walmart. Yet there are also a series of smaller, local chains such as Bristol 
Farms or Lassens that also carry açaí products. Although Whole Foods is the 
pioneer in bringing açaí products to market, and welcoming the Sambazon brand, at 
present the biggest player is Costco. With its large retail centres, pervasive presence 
and competitive pricing, larger mainstream retails are able to move a total amount of 
merchandise that smaller, though more elite and specialized businesses, such as 
Whole Foods, cannot reach. Recent research released by BMO Capital Markets 
states that while Whole Foods’ sales of organic in 2014 totaled US$ 3.4 billion and 
Costco sold around US$ 4.0 billion in organics. Although this is a small share of 
Costco’s yearly US$ 114 billion in sales, it represents a significant amount of the 
organic market. At present, 1 in 10 dollars spent on organics in the US is now spent 
at Costco24. This diversity allows new, small companies to constantly enter the retail 
sphere, without the massive barriers to entry that large, concentrated retailers pose 
in Brazil. 
 
It would seem, according to interviewees, that a split is occurring in the organic, 
specialty and superfood markets. While there has been a continuation of growth with 
organic and healthy food sales from mainstream consumers there is competition 
from cheaper and more accessible products which are being targeted to these 
audiences. On the other hand, small, niche and more-sophisticated or expensive 
products remain with the smaller retailers. This trend has meant that demand for 
organics is growing yearly at double digit rates, according to the USDA25. This 
means that a different outlook is needed for organic production and marketing which 
moves away from the niche and speciality markets, into the mainstream. In my 
																																																						
24	https://www.businessinsider.com/costco-becomes-top-seller-of-organic-food-2015-6	
25	https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-
agriculture/organic-market-overview.aspx	
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opinion, these trends will certainly have impact throughout the whole of the açaí 
chain.  
 
Finally, an important aspect of this retail market is its ability for açaí products to 
reach outside the Californian market, and to spread out across the country. Although 
açaí products are common in states such as New York, it is difficult to assess how 
homogeneously these trends are across the whole of the United States territory. 
Another key retail outlet for açaí products is the juice shop, and other shops that sell 
‘açaí bowls’. Açaí, in frozen or powder form, is routinely added to smoothies, which 
are immensely popular in the healthy, beach-based California food landscape. Many 
of these are small and independent, although big chains such as Jamba Juice also 
operate in the market. These actors buy frozen pulp in plastic bags, and powdered 
açaí, from companies such as Sambazon, and the other smaller pulp companies 
described above, or directly from traders. This is how açaí took off, and where a 
significant amount of sales still take place. The açaí arrived in the US through Rio de 
Janeiro, and it was thus introduced to the market as a frozen bowl, with fruits and 
granola, just as it is consumed in the Southeast of Brazil.  
 
To cement açaí’s place as a special food, Sambazon itself is presently opening its 
own chain of bowl shops in prime, trend-setting locations such as Newport Beach. 
Backyard Bowls, a longstanding retailer specializing in açaí bowls, has also recently 
opened a new outlet in the upmarket Beverly Hills, and is seeking to expand. The 
bowl niche is especially interesting for açaí, as it represents a unique form of 
consumption, where açaí is the key ingredient, whereas in smoothies and juices it is 
easily. 
 
Finally, the Californian consumer, with affluence and openness to health trends is a 
key anchor of the chain at this level. It is in California that many companies choose 
to launch new products, and the State has a reputation for being an innovative 
foodscape, where people are avid to try new things. In this respect, the Californian 
consumer is a key player in the chain. Buyer power is a strong driver in this market, 
and has spurred the rise of superfruits as consumers become increasingly health 
conscious. Açaí consumers vary from moms purchasing at grocery stores for their 
whole families, to single income households, to young, up and coming, trendy 
consumers who purchase bowls and smoothies at juice bars. 
 
 
8.4 Embeddedness in the Californian chain in the United States 
 
This part of the chain is embedded in a markedly different way than within the other 
locations in this study. This will explain the unparalleled diversity of products that 
contain açaí, and the existence of an underlying (web or network) of actors that 
makes this possible. It allows us to understand a continued role for Ribeirinho 
inclusion from the base of chain upwards despite monoculture pressures and this is 
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due to the ‘sustainability-sensitive’ business environment and consumer mindset in 
the United States. Overall, the business environment is characterized by a robust, 
agile food business sector with several areas that work well across companies. 
These operate in a thriving and diverse processing landscape that is anchored in an 
entrepreneurial culture which is at the core of American identity, and even more so, 
within California’s frontier spirit  (the societal embeddedness that conditions actors' 
dispositions). There are a variety of features in the local business environment that 
explains this tremendous agility of the food processing industry in the US, and the 
ease with which a web of specialized, but independent businesses integrate so 
efficiently. This efficiency includes a mature and diverse business environment; an 
ingrained entrepreneurial culture; an easy to navigate regulatory environment with 
high enforceability; access to financing; and a productive and yet flexible labor pool. 
 
In California food production and processing represents a key economic ‘engine’ for 
the State. There is a cornucopia of labels that have historically marketed Californian 
produce to its contemporary cuisine. California is the US’s largest food producer and 
processor. Almost half of the US’s fruit and vegetables are grown in the State, 
reaping in US$ 45 billion in yearly revenue  (USDA, 2015). California has the largest 
amount of the country’s food processing plants with around 11% of the total for all of 
the United States, these are mainly located in the Los Angeles and Bay Area. Total 
value added for food processing in California stands at US$ 245 billion, 10% of the 
national total  (US Census Bureau, 2015). This is a fertile place for food businesses 
to thrive, and take advantage of the web of actors and supporting industries that are 
coordinated for bringing to market a prodigious variety of food products  (territorial 
embeddedness). 
 
Within California food businesses cluster together to form a territorially-bound web of 
interdependent units, which lead the açaí chain to pulverize into this web of actors, 
much to the contrary of the verticalized businesses seen in the Southeast of Brazil. 
Although there are several big players, and many verticalized structures persist, it is 
very common for several companies to work together on different bits of activity into 
production. Concerning the açaí chain, ingredient wholesalers, community kitchens 
and co-packers, brokers and retailers all collaborate with food brands to send their 
products to market. In this context, it becomes a lot easier to get a new offering to 
market, or to pull it when it fails, without having to set up a whole new value chain for 
each new product. In 2016 alone, 21,435 new food products were launched in the 
US market17. This facet of the local territory explains why açaí products were so 
easily introduced and quickly spread out into such a wide range of products; from 
cookies to candies to cosmetics. 
 
In the case of the açaí chain, most actors work with co-packing companies that have 
been working within their own specialized markets for years, and can develop new 
products easily. A company that specializes in making juices, for example, will add 
an açaí line relatively easily, and with a relatively low cost. Hiring a specialized co-
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packer thus makes it much easier to enter the juice market than having to set up 
your own plant, with your own machinery, permits, staff, from scratch. Start-up costs 
are much lower, and so is the need for specific technical expertise in manufacturing. 
Once a novel ingredient piques consumer interest, it is relatively easy to decline it 
across an ample variety of finished products. A specialized manufacturer can make 
cookies, another makes juices, and another candy with these companies, the name 
on the packet represents the business that hires out the co-packing company, 
ensures supply of raw materials when needed, works out distribution, but above all, 
works on marketing and branding (Brody and Lord 2007; Fuller, 2011). 
 
The ease with which ingredients, and the technical support are available in the 
market not only makes new products and brands easier to launch, it also allows 
existing companies to add new flavors and variations. It is estimated that each year 
20000 new products, hit the shelves in the USA and many will disappear within the 
year26. A tremendous level of innovation and investment is required because 
companies rely on new launches to increase sales in the short term and to reinforce 
their brands through marketing strategies in the long term. Chain actors work with 
agility to develop and bring to market a constant stream of new products, which are 
quickly absorbed into retail spaces, which are constantly shifting to make room for 
new additions. This helps to explain the wide array of açaí products present at retail 
outlets, up to twenty at a Whole Foods site visit, including juices, smoothies, but also 
candies, snacks, vodka, yogurt, cosmetics and a host of supplements and vitamins. 
Leading companies such as Sambazon and Zola both use co-packers to 
manufacture their products.  
 
Starting and operating a new food business in the US is relatively straightforward. It 
takes on average only six days to open a business in the United States  (compared 
to 82 days in Brazil which is the 11th slowest in the World Bank ranking cited below. 
The context of the United States means that new food businesses, and ideas, are 
constantly arising in the food landscape, from caterers, to food trucks and stands, to 
processors and brands aimed at retail outlets  (World Bank, 2015). 
 
An important element that makes up the current food processing landscape in the 
United States is the high level of contractual security, which ensures that companies 
can create a web of interrelation and subcontracting which allows them to coordinate 
and distribute activities efficiently, without having to rely on vertical integration. 
Although, according to the World Bank ranking, the US ranks 41st in the OECD 
(2015), countries with respect to contract enforceability, there is still sufficient legal 
security that contracts will, in a year’s time, eventually be enforced. 
 
																																																						
26	https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/processing-marketing/new-
products/	
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All interviewees, whether from large or small businesses, connected to the açaí 
chain had access to credit to start up, and grow their businesses. In this respect, the 
US is ranked second in the World according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2015). 
One interviewee recalls getting a small business loan to start-up his business with no 
collateral, while others were able to find investors at a very early stage. There are a 
host of venture capitalist outlets in the US market that are willing to take risks with 
investing in small businesses that have good ideas. The high level of protection for 
minority investors is instrumental for this type of activity to take hold, and this has 
been highlighted by the World Bank in its ‘Doing Business’ report (World Bank, 
2015). In this study, the US ranks second overall in venture-backed capital as a 
percentage of GDP. To illustrate this, it is due to venture capital injections Sambazon 
has grown so steadily, and is now poised to become a national player. Sambazon 
was also able to tap into specific funding and support aimed at natural and eco-
social endeavors. 
 
Early on Sambazon received US$ 225 000 from the EcoEnterprises Fund, a unique 
capital venture partnership formed by the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Fund and The Nature Conservancy27 . This was crucial to 
allow them to establish themselves in the US market. They managed to secure a 
series of other investments, such as venture capital from Verlinvest S.A., and more 
recently have entered into a partnership with Rustic Canyons and Fontis Partners. 
These investments mean that the company has managed to build a plan not only to 
vertically integrate, by building their own processing plant in Amapá, but also to 
infiltrate the US market in its entirety, going from a local, niche company to a national 
player, across all 50 US states. 
 
As credit is readily available, there exists a host of suppliers that can stock açaí and 
supply it to industries in a variety of formats and quantities. One such company, 
which was represented at interview, purchases large amounts of frozen açaí pulp 
from factories in Pará each year during harvest season, and then stores it and 
resells it on the local market throughout the year. They also formulate products, 
provide technical assistance, and able to produce in scale for their clients. Unlike 
Belém’s factories, US companies are able to provide this type of service because 
they function in a very different business environment. As a large distributor in the 
US put it in his interview, if companies in Pará had enough rolling capital to produce 
and stock their own product year-round, he would be out of business. This unequal 
distribution of credit across the chain thus creates a business opportunity for traders 
to stock and distribute açaí pulp in the US, while contributing to the fragility of Pará's 
factories. 
 
The US also has an open economy, and it is relatively easy for merchandise to be 
imported and exported. Not only are trade regulations relatively easy to navigate, the 
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logistic infrastructure  (transport and warehousing) infrastructure is modern and 
relatively inexpensive. This allows companies to easily bring in the açaí, but also to 
trade in all the other necessary components that go into their products. It also makes 
the import of capital goods inexpensive, which helps to maintain its industrial park at 
the cutting edge of technological development. In theory, Brazilian finished goods 
could enter this market relatively easily. It might be strange not to see any of the 
finished products of the Brazilian Southeast on US shelves. Yet precisely because 
the Brazilian economy is so closed, and innovation is low, Brazilian products lack the 
sophistication, both in formulation and branding, that their American counterparts 
exhibit. This keeps the Southeast part of the chain, where more value capture 
happens than in factories in Pará, isolated from the international chains, and unable 
to take part in that largest share of value capture. 
 
It appears that the factors involved with making the US such an entrepreneurial 
country are greater than each individual contextual factor such as its culture  
(societal embeddedness). Despite not ranking in the top ten of most business 
environment rankings, it is consistently ranked first when it comes to entrepreneurial 
culture. It comes first, for example, in the Global Entrepreneurship & Development 
Index (GEDI)28, developed by Imperial College Business School in association with 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Pécs and 
George Mason University (Acs et al. 2015). A recent brief published by the 
Economist highlights: “between 1996 and 2004 it created an average of 550,000 
small businesses every month” (The Economist, 2009). 
 
America instils in its entrepreneurs the notion that failure is not something to be 
ashamed of, but rather a badge of honor, on the path to success. In fact, the ease 
with which one can go into bankruptcy, and emerge, is considered one of the many 
objective factors that sustain the American entrepreneurial culture. During the time 
spent in California, contacts made within the fieldwork, but also casually, confirmed 
this entrepreneurial spirit. Local fairs and farmers markers, students, housewives, 
seemed fearless about starting out new endeavors, exposing themselves to risk to 
set up shop and follow through on their own ideas, from the landlady starting out a 
mermaid tail/pool party business, to the senior citizen pedaling his famous marinara 
at Whole Foods. 
 
 
This cultural backbone to the US’ unique entrepreneurial climate has been 
recognized in the existing literature on entrepreneurialism, most notably in Lee and 
Peterson’s paper (2001, 412): 
 
“Today, entrepreneurship continues to be the dominant driver of wealth creation and 
employment. The U.S. culture engenders an ideology that supports and encourages 
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individuals to behave with a strong EO. It is a culture that advocates such concepts 
as following few rules and experimentation as opposed to maintaining the status 
quo”.   
 
 
In this more effervescent environment, açaí was quick to leave its niche status and 
spread to supermarkets. Sambazon's founders, imbued with that culture, felt they 
had the ability to form a new myth in the consumer landscape, which is something 
that Brazilian entrepreneurs feel insecure with. When superfruits first became a 
trend, in 2007/2008, new product launches in the segment immediately grew by 
67%18. Actors felt emboldened to quickly go into business, and tap into a 
functioning, well-coordinated web of food-related industries and support services, 
without working too hard at creating specific network embeddedness. At the same 
time, products can easily lose favor, because they become a fad, drop off the market 
and entirely forgotten. Around 70% of new product launches in the US fail within a 
year.19 The industry maintains this almost frenetic innovation cycle rolling to 
increase marginal sales and maintain brand positioning, and is quick to move on to 
the next new enterprise. 
 
While superfruits were a massive trend in 2008, they have somewhat been 
substituted by new fashions, such as gluten-free or low-carb foods. Already in 2011, 
product launches containing superfruits açaí, pomegranate or goji dipped by 60% in 
comparison to the previous year (Naturalproductinsider, 2013). Interviewees that the 
quick entry of açaí into the market, and overly enthusiastic claims about its health 
benefits, particularly in supplement (many of which touted it as weight loss miracle 
cure), led it to quickly lose favor with consumers, once the FDA and other authorities 
discredited bogus claims.  
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Figure 8.2 Açaí powder amongst other ‘superfoods’ in the Pasadena Whole Foods, 
high prices and sophisticated branding (author's photo). 
 
In the USA, concentration in the retail sector is also an important factor that shapes 
value-chain configuration. The largest 20 traders control 63.8% of all trade, with four 
big players having tremendous sway over the industry, much as in Brazil. These 
traders squeeze their suppliers and force consolidation up-chain, creating barriers to 
market entry for smaller businesses. Still, small-scale producers can still turn to 
specialty stores, such as Whole Foods stores, to attempt to enter the market place, 
where novelty, specialist brands are highly valued. Additionally, the existence of a 
web of actors behind products makes it easier to meet market requirements20. 
 
The instability in fads, quick turnover rate in industrial processes, and the 
stranglehold of large retailers compared to food-service opportunities explains why 
so many actors are now turning their attention back to açaí ‘bowls’. The ‘bowl’ is a 
unique form of consuming açaí, its original ‘carioca’ format, and this specificity 
shields it from the vagaries of ingredient trends in retail. Although these bowls are 
mainly sold in specific bowl and juice shops, the value they return to the açaí product 
chain in other formats is a valuable marketing tool29. Sambazon itself has entered 
the bowl retail market, opening its own specialized shop pilot in Newport, California. 
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It is bedecked with Brazilian themes, such as Amazonian foliage, a Carioca 
boardwalk pattern, and other signature accoutrements. It seems that a mere health 
claim does not solidify açaí’s place in the market, but that it must be packaged within 
a culturally specific identity in order to outlast the variabilities of the food fad cycles in 
the US market. Again, the health ‘myth’ formed in the Southeast, and the form of 
consumption that is popular there, are key elements of its success in the US, though 
none of its firms partake in that value capture. 
 
 
8.5 Consumers 
 
The presence of an affluent, health-conscious and adventurous consumer base in 
California's coastal areas has enabled the development of the açaí market in the US. 
California is remarkably prosperous. If it were a country, it would have the eighth 
highest GDP in the world  (on a par with Brazil’s entire economy). This prosperity 
allows for products such as açaí, which are inherently expensive and niche, to find a 
market more easily than they would in more budget-conscious milieus. In Los 
Angeles’ upper echelon juice bars, for example, a cold-pressed green juice served in 
a modern glass bottle, in a modern shop, by a modern, tattooed hipster can cost as 
much as US$ 12. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this is where the organic and natural food trends really became 
established markets. Organic farming in California reaches back to the 1940s, when 
Russell Wolter converted his property in the Carmel Valley, Monterey County, 
California into an organic farm. Its trajectory has been masterfully exploited by Julie 
Guthman (2003, p. 1175) in ‘Neoliberalism and the Making of Food Politics in 
California’, where she posits: 
 
“The organic food movement has been the major social movement contesting food 
and agriculture in the post-war period, and California has been an important center 
for this movement, imparting it with particular sensibilities”.   
 
In this context, açaí’s Amazonian appeal, and all organic and Fairtrade certification it 
may have acquired, play an important role in ensuring its success. Undoubtedly, the 
product’s sustainability is a key factor for its acceptance. The fact that it is a fruit 
product aimed at health-conscious consumers and has ‘natural’ appeal is also 
crucial. This was confirmed by the focus group debate conducted in the present 
study, members of which group are sure to check for certification seals on labels, 
and was relayed by all other interviewees. 
 
California is also having a beach culture, and is the birthplace of much of the youth 
culture that has spread across the globe in recent decades. This is where surfing 
and skateboarding became commonplace pursuits. Owing to the climate, the lifestyle 
is typically outdoor-based, and sports and health oriented. As historians have amply 
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commented, after the war, the sunny, youth-abundant state of California helped 
shape what we now know as ‘youth culture’, and its ‘fun in the sun’ atmosphere 
(Deverell and Igler, 2013). The existence of an entertainment industry, based in Los 
Angeles, helped propagate the myth of endless summers, surfing, and youthfulness, 
propagated through films, and TV shows, such as ‘Gidget’, the sprightly surfer girl 
that brought surfing culture to the masses in America (Deverell and Igler, 2013). 
 
This attitude is reminiscent of the lifestyle that dominates Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
where açaí berry consumption originally took hold as a healthy ‘superfood’ trend 
(Figure 8.1). This is perhaps the single most important factor that has facilitated the 
advent of açaí consumption so easily from Brazil to the US. The cultural ‘wormhole’ 
between these places was the fundamental driving force behind the formation of the 
value chain. The sharing of trends between them was easily accomplished, and not 
much translating was required. It is no coincidence that the lead firm for açaí berry in 
the US, Sambazon, was founded by a surfer, who first tasted the product with his 
surfing friends in Rio’s juice bars, and brought the product to athletes and to juice 
bars in California. 
 
In the interview with Sambazon’s founder in the present study, and in other 
interviews the company has given to the press, they stress that the key to their 
penetration of the US market was precisely their focus on health-conscious and 
beach lifestyles. They actively pursued surf championships and outdoor events as 
sampling opportunities to increase its customer base, and viewed traditional juice 
bars, aimed at this sector of the public, as their priority targets. They also focused 
much of their marketing efforts on building a close connection between açaí and 
sports, by endorsing athletes and championships, and reinforcing this association in 
their communication material. Other interviewees were also quick to point out the 
association between açaí and sports, and identify it as the key driver in its 
acceptance in the local market. This is exactly how the superfood consumer myth 
was formed, if accidentally in Brazil, butone which they purposefully reinvented in the 
US. 
 
In fact, most brands that have açaí berries at their core in the US use take the same 
approach, associating açaí with beach culture, health food, and notably, MMA 
fighting. Many of these fighters have jiu-jistu origins, and the açaí’s cultural story is 
tightly intertwined with the Gracie family, the founders of Brazilian jiu-jitsu, and their 
legacy. Although the ‘soccer mom’ type of consumer that made up the focus group 
was not particularly interested in MMA, the healthy, sporty associations of açaí 
berries were identified as its key distinguishing factor in California, as is its 
consumption in bowl form, and its superfood status. 
 
Consumers in the focus group, mothers of young children, were also particularly 
interested in products that would allow them to ‘sneak’ healthy foods into their 
children’s diets. In that sense, all the myriad preparations that the diverse food 
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processing apparatus are able to deliver play a key role in consumer acceptance, by 
presenting ingredients containing açaí in formats that can be easily incorporated by 
consumers in their daily lives, without necessitating changes in their routines. 
Parents now seem more interested in healthy foods in easily consumed formats, 
from smaller, niche and organic brands, than overly convenient and processed 
foods, marketed with child-friendly cartoon characters. 
 
Surprisingly, the Amazonian origin of the product, and any of its eco-social 
characteristics, were conspicuously absent from the focus group discussion, before 
they were probed. In fact, a wider discussion on the sustainability of the product with 
consumers in the focus group yielded mixed results. Though they did think 
sustainability and ethics were a key marketing draw, and thought that the Amazonian 
identity was interesting, they were mostly unaware of the fact that so many people 
lived there, and that their livelihoods were intertwined with conservation. They were 
also uneasy with the exploitation, however benign, of any forest assets. As one 
participant put it: “I don’t know, the Amazon, it’s just better to leave it alone”. Overall 
participants felt that the issue was too complex to worry about when making day-to-
day consumer choices in retail outlets. They responded very positively to simple, 
identifiable traits, such as organic certification or Fairtrade labels. They were also 
responsive to simple conservation claims, such as an appeal to save a specific 
endangered species, such as has been successfully employed by a chocolate brand 
now common in US stores 30 We see here how pervasive those myths of untouched 
nature and the absence of interest in the cultural peculiarities of its people are, and 
how directly they affect the marketing of their products. 
 
Mentioning the Amazon, and the connection between livelihoods and conservation, 
seems to worry consumers who are simply not ready or willing to address in the 
moments they have to make a purchase decision at the store. Also, the group seem 
to be more willing to help animals in the ‘wild’ jungle, which they feel belong there, 
rather than people, which they do not really know how to compute in their vision of a 
‘virgin’ rainforest. Therefore, the product’s complex social and environmental 
credentials play little part in its acceptance, and will continue to do so unless a very 
simple, straightforward message about its importance to Ribeirinho communities and 
local conservation is crafted. The message is lost in the consumer fetishism, and 
certification remains a crucial communication strategy, despite its apparent 
irrelevance to the Ribeirinhos in Pará. When probed in interviews, companies also 
claimed they made sure to make eco-social benefits known, but that this was seen 
as a more important marketing asset in business to business relations than in 
business to consumer. What does help consumers make choices are certifications, 
such as organic, Fairtrade, or Rainforest Alliance. Though these hold little to no 
meaning at the base of the Value chain, they do matter to these Westernized 
consumers. We see here Agrawal's (2005) fetish clearly at work, creating 
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incongruous upgrading strategies with little effective meaning for Ribeirinhos to 
satisfy culturally disconnected consumer markets. 
 
The consumer landscape is also quickly changing, and companies are struggling to 
keep up. A new consumer audience is currently becoming dominant in the US 
market, and impinging on the food processing industry. ‘Millennials’, born 
somewhere around the turn of the millennium  (some, such as the Pew Research 
Centre, put the start date at 1981), have a very different outlook compared with 
previous generations  (see Fry, 2015). At present, they outnumber ‘baby boomers’ in 
the work force, and companies are scrambling to market products that meet their 
needs and stringent criteria. This new generation is wise to the tricks of marketing 
lure. They are not easily swayed by powerful marketing messages from big 
corporations. They are much more concerned with the environment and 
sustainability than previous generations, and warier of institutions. Large food-
processing conglomerates lost US$ 18 billion in market share since 2009, according 
to  a special report by Fortune magazine31. Shoppers, and Millennials, in particular 
are now mistrustful of processed foods, artificial ingredients, preservatives, and 
GMOs. 
 
Meanwhile, sales of organic and natural companies, particularly smaller, niche ones, 
are growing exponentially. Health benefit has practically tied with value for money as 
the principal driver in food purchases: 71% of interviewees in the 2014 Food and 
Health Survey, conducted by the The International Food Information Council (IFIC), 
quoted by Marketine named health as the primary driver in food choices  (Marketline, 
2014). The Organic Trade Association reports that sales of organics have tripled in 
the last decade. Large food-producing/processing companies are either adapting 
their product lines  (removing sugar, artificial ingredients, and so on), or introducing 
the natural food company segment in a significant way. 
 
Social media now hosts many on-going threads of conversation about what to eat 
and what to avoid, and the food giants, can no longer control the messaging through 
their enormous marketing budgets  (Schultz, 2015). The same shift away from mass 
produced, ‘fast’ or ‘junk’ food is also visible in the retail environment, where big 
groups such as McDonalds are having year-on-year diminishing returns, while 
companies promoting healthier alternatives, such as Chipotle, which has recently 
eliminated all GMOs from its brand, are gaining ground quickly  (Rushton, 2015). 
 
For the açaí market, this can represent a substantial opportunity. Labelled as a 
superfood, and mostly organic and natural, it has space to grow in this new context, 
at the hands of the niche brands that now dominate its marketing (despite Sambazon 
being a big player within the açaí business, it is still a small in the overall foodscape). 
Other small outfits, such as independent bowl shops, also have a significant 
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opportunity in this scenario. If they succeed in marketing their products as all natural, 
healthy, but also culturally adventurous and somewhat elegant, they will be hitting 
the Millennial ‘sweet spot’ with ease. This seems to be the strategy of Backyard 
Bowls, whose beautiful, nutrient packed bowls have gained cult following in the 
Millennial-packed university town of Santa Barbara. They are now expanding, and 
their new shop in the heart of Beverly Hills serves up the same high-quality, 
adventurous and healthy concept in a restrained and sophisticated setting. 
Meanwhile, Sambazon has secured sufficient venture capital to go national, and is 
opening its own bowl shops. 
 
These findings are reinforced by a study conducted in 2011, which heard consumers 
extensively on their tastes and preferences, their knowledge of açaí, and even 
included tastings. Researchers found that:  
 
“The results were encouraging and allowed one to discern distinctly that there is a 
possible market for açaí-based products in young or older, female, food neophilic 
and health-conscious consumers. Products such as sorbet and juices may be 
promising alternatives to the Californian market”.  (Menezes et al., 2011, p.208) 
 
Undoubtedly, profit margins are lower when ingredients are higher quality, made 
without fillers, emulsifiers, and flavorings, such as large food corporations (‘Big 
Food’) are keen to use to maximize returns. In the Fortune article (Kowitt, 2015), the 
CEO of the Hain Group, a leader in the natural sector, admits to profit margins 10 to 
15% lower than mainstream competitors. ‘Premium’ açaí businesses that were 
interviewed reported the same statistic. With quality at the core of their business 
model, taking a ‘hit’ on their bottom line was the price to pay to retain their unique 
brand identity. Once again, as organics go mainstream, there is a split between 
niche, high-quality organics, and mainstream organics aimed at mass retail outlets 
such as Costco and Walmart. We have yet to understand how this may dilute and 
devalue organics as a whole, or whether the market can split into niche and 
mainstream seamlessly (Kowitt, 2015). 
 
 
 
8.6 Value capture 
 
At the topmost stages of the açaí value chain, it is noticeable that consumers and 
retailers have great power to ‘make or break’ companies, and are thus dominant 
actors in the chain, both for its formation and to sustain its current configuration. It is 
also clear that traders and lead firms in the US market have considerable control 
over factories they trade with in Pará, since they not only monopolize sales, but also 
finance production. Despite their power, however, they are, according to their own 
reports, unable to set prices for the commodity, since the local and national markets 
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are so strong. This is an important research finding, confirming the ways in which 
diversified markets, and strong local markets in particular, shield producers from the 
instability and imbalance of power of trading only for foreign markets. 
 
Amongst companies, and different specialized actors  (such as between brands and 
co-packers, or amongst competing companies), the open and secure business 
environment makes vertical control wholly unnecessary, as companies can easily 
and seamlessly switch trading partners, or move into new markets laterally. This 
conditions upgrading opportunities, with companies in California standing at the top 
of the açaí value chain have relative liberty to innovate and upgrade, while their 
trading partners in Brazil remain stuck in low-level activities in the chain, due to lack 
of financing and marketing capacity. They are also more likely to spark new 
consumption trends, and engender new chain connections. However, one company 
from Brazil seems to have managed to break the ‘glass ceiling’, and enter directly 
into the frozen pulp market with higher quality pulp, representing a unique example 
of functional and channel upgrading. 
 
It is, unsurprisingly, with market leader Sambazon that we encounter the most 
variety in adoption of upgrading strategies. We see here a much more-captive 
governance model than that we encountered elsewhere in the chain, with Sambazon 
clearly playing the role of a lead firm. Perhaps their first step towards market 
consolidation was in fact what could be called ‘process upgrading’, increasing 
efficiency, by building their own factory in Brazil, to secure their supply, without 
having to rely on third-party factories. Not only were they able to secure supply, but 
they also managed to demonstrate to their corporate buyers that sourcing in the 
Amazon was not only viable, but also socially and environmentally sustainable, 
eliminating the risk of any possible backlash for its trading partners. 
 
Sambazon was then able to branch out from the frozen pulps with which they began 
to assail the American market’s juice bars to develop their own products for end 
consumers, such as smoothies and juice drinks  (product upgrading), which are now 
their driving products, present in a wide variety of retail outlets, from the upscale 
wholefood retailers to the popular, low end Costco  (this variation of retail channels 
itself an example of channel upgrading). It is through this move, from a pulp provider 
to a brand that retails to consumers across an ever-growing number of channels  
(and currently growing bigger still, with forays into Asian markets), that Sambazon 
continues to grow, thanks, in great part, to constant capital injections by venture 
funds. 
 
It is interesting to note that their only physical production facility is in Brazil, where 
they produce their pulp, while third parties produce their entire line in the US market. 
This choice of strategy denotes the perceived uncertainty in the Brazilian end, in the 
Amazon Basin, in contrast with the sophisticated, and secure business environment 
in the US. As they move into the retail market, for example, with their bowl shops, 
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they are becoming direct competitors with many of their clients, who have shown to 
be irked by the move, and may easily begin to switch over to new suppliers for their 
pulp. 
 
As we learned in interviews, since this is an NTFP product, coming from a location 
with a complicated supply stream, control over pulp supply is crucial to corporate 
strategies. In fact, US buyers finance factories in Pará  (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), to retain control over their supply. This allows them to develop their 
strategies for the US market with ease, and without fear of competition. Many of 
these firms operate directly in the B2B market, buying and importing, and then 
selling to local businesses in the US that wish to add açaí products to their lines 
without the problems associated with sourcing. Smaller firms also abound in the pulp 
market in the US. All of these also purchase from factories in the Amazon, who 
package the pulp with their brand, and then resell them to juice bars and retailers in 
the American market  (much as Sambazon began). Many of these are also 
branching out into sorbet lines, adding new products that are higher-value added 
than the commodified pulp, and that are directly consumable, rather than requiring 
preparation. This current business model reserves upgrading and value creation up 
for the American market, leaving only the very basic operation of pulp extraction for 
the factories in the Amazon. The move into a new market, the bowl bar, represents 
another attempt not only to capture value by bypassing retailers, but also to 
consolidate the unique identity and mode of consumption of açaí in the mind of 
American consumers. 
 
 
In spite of the unwelcoming business environment in Pará, one of the interviewees, 
who owns an açaí brand in the US, has chosen to develop a product, a sorbet, made 
entirely in the Amazon basin region. In fact, as we have seen, many of the factories 
in Pará now have upgraded into this production capacity, though buyers in the US 
seem more interested in buying pulp in bulk. This specific entrepreneur argues that 
his product is of much higher quality than that of his competitors, since the integrity 
of the açaí berries, and the antioxidant properties, are not jeopardized by thawing, 
reprocessing, and refreezing. He has managed to place his product with a few large 
retailers in the US, even with this risky production strategy. However, he claims that 
this process, performed in Brazil, is tremendously complicated, since the local 
industry, despite its ability to process the sorbet, does not have access to the variety 
of packaging options, and ingredients  (there is no organic sugar readily available in 
Pará, for example). Not only are these supporting industries and their ingredients not 
present, importing ingredients into Brazil from abroad is also particularly 
complicated, constricting the development of a local industry in Pará which could 
upgrade into higher value added positions in the chain  (confirming the situation 
described above about the factories in Pará). It is important to note that marketing 
and sales remain firmly at the hands of a US based company, even when production 
is relegated to Brazil. 
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Nonetheless, as Bella Iaçá continues to prosper, and seems to have harnessed 
sufficient capital and business power, this aspect of the value chain could be about 
to change. It has succeeded in breaking into the US market by offering a higher 
quality pulp than was present in the US market until its entry, and seems to have its 
sight set on breaking American firms’ monopoly over the import and distribution of 
pulp in the American market. This breakthrough also highlights the ways in which a 
different individual, entrepreneurial streak can allow a particular company to break 
through structural limitations and upgrade, conquering new markets and adding 
more value. Bella Iaçá’s efforts to professionalize its management, develop its 
marketing capacity and invest in product development appear to be paying off. 
Perhaps this recent success will embolden them to further add value by creating a 
consumer brand, or at least becoming a significant co-packer of açaí products in the 
US market. 
 
Furthermore, Sambazon’s move into retail does seem to leave some space for a 
new large player to infiltrate the pulp market. Such a company (Bella Iaçá in 
particular) could also offer their own higher value added products, such as the sorbet 
and juices, taking the place of local co-packers. To do so, they must be ready to truly 
invest in building a constant presence in the US market, with sales forces and 
marketing teams ready to challenge their competitors. Interviews with companies in 
California, entering the US market indicate it is essentially about carving out a brand 
identity, and maintaining a consistent, effective marketing presence, with end 
consumers, retailers and corporate buyers. In theory, companies in Pará could pool 
together to build such a presence, but as we have seen in Belém, they are unlikely to 
come together and collaborate. 
 
One form of upgrading not seen in the US market is the inclusion of other 
Amazonian commodities, with equally notable health benefits and eco-social 
credentials, in the trading rosters of existing actors. A small bushy riverside tree 
(Myrciaria dubia) Camu camu has a marketing potential as a vitamin C supplement, 
but at present is very niche, presented in a few cosmetics and vitamin pills. Açaí was 
relatively easily transplanted to the US market through its incubation in the 
Southeast of Brazil, where it gained a cultural identity. When asked about the 
introduction of new flavors, many actors seemed interested, and saw potential, 
though most found themselves to have their hands full carving out market space for 
açaí. It would seem that the introduction of a new product would thus be reliant on a 
significant marketing push, to create a cultural envelope for these products and 
generate market demand. Though this requires investments, the curious and 
adventurous nature of ever-growing Millennial audiences makes the US market 
fertile ground for this type of innovation. Providing a culturally interesting Amazonian 
experience  (rather than the ‘carioca’ experience of the açaí, for example) could, for 
example, prove a beneficial avenue for new product introduction in the US market, 
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consolidating a place for the local culture and cuisine in American culture, much as 
Korean, Peruvian, and other cultures have managed to do in recent times. 
 
 Finally, fieldwork also shed considerable light on the potential impact on the US 
market of the current trend towards upgrading to monocultures in Pará  (process 
upgrading). It seems that this inevitable split, between wild-harvested and 
monoculture açaí is matched by a trend in the US market, towards a split between 
high end, niche organic products, and more generic, accessible products aimed at 
mainstream audiences currently purchasing organic produce/products from large 
retailers. From this standpoint, it would seem that there does indeed exist space for 
both production models  (wild and monoculture) to coexist, rather than the worst-
case scenario feared by many in Pará, where monoculture would destroy the wild 
market, forever excluding Ribeirinhos. This would allow for açaí to continue gaining 
market share, resolving price pressures, while sustaining Ribeirinhos through 
delimiting a more high-end niche. However, this market segmentation must come 
from an active marketing effort, to truly create this high-quality differential for the wild 
product, accompanied by the necessary production process changes to ensure that 
the wild product's quality is maintained throughout the logistical challenges faced in 
getting it to processing plants. 
 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
The innovative, loosely governed cluster that makes up the food business landscape 
in the USA, and particularly California, was quick to develop açaí berries markets 
and multiply them into a wide range of products and enterprises, leading to fast and 
widespread value-chain development. New products and uses appear constantly in 
the market, and turnover of them is fast and easy to achieve thanks to a web of 
specialized actors – co-packers in particular. Actors are able to easily upgrade and 
innovate in the US because of their business environment, in a very different 
scenario from that encountered in Brazil. This explains why the diversity of açaí 
products in the US is so much bigger than it is in Brazil. It also helps to explain why 
interviewees here were much more willing to experiment with new ingredients and 
explore new products than those we saw in Brazil. Food brands here are exactly 
that, brands, with most of their physical production derisked into third party 
operations. Instead, their challenge is to stay in the mind of consumers through 
marketing and branding, and through constant innovation. 
 
To break into this market with new ingredients, businesses have to focus on brand 
building; something not highly valued in the Brazilian business environment. Yet 
opportunities are manifold, particularly as Millennial audiences take to new, exotic 
ingredients with health benefits that have a strong eco-social backstory. The carioca 
identity, and the consumption of açaí in bowl form, have found favor, and created a 
cultural bridge for its adoption and continued consumption. Although the product 
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originates in the Southeast of Brazil on its way to California, it is through the creation 
of that series of stages in the chain, and the reconfiguration of its identity that it 
became a desirable commodity in the USA. However, because Brazilian companies 
are overly verticalized, and do not have the branding and marketing capacity of their 
American counterparts, they are unable to integrate into the international market.  
 
Consumers are powerful actors at this level of the chain, with substantial power to 
reshape trade relations. California, in particular, has a consumer base eager to try 
new natural products, as long as they are marketed in a sophisticated way. 
Consumer groups, known as ‘consumer activists’ actively investigate the 
sustainability of their purchases, and can ‘make-or-break’ a company based on their 
findings. They are also highly informed on the nutritional benefits of what they eat, 
they read labels avidly and do their research – particularly in the health oriented, 
affluent region of coastal California. With an avid market for ‘superfoods’, local açaí 
businesses there can be set up relatively easily, and know to focus on marketing, 
branding and sales, rather than production, in order to add value. 
 
The eco-social aspects of the chain, particularly its Amazonian identity, and its 
conservation benefits, are scarcely present in Californian marketing, although they 
do play a key role in business-to-business marketing and relationship building. 
Retailers in particular are extremely wary of their reputational risk, and require strict 
chain of custody controls to stock a product on their shelves. Organic labelling is 
here an important strategy to attract consumers in the current consumer climate and 
‘healthy’ market segment towards which açaí is oriented. As the organic market 
seems itself to split into two separate markets, one mainstream, and lower cost, and 
one niche, and quality focused, a possibility opens itself up to accommodate the split 
in production practices that is occurring in Pará, and pushes even monoculture 
producers towards more-sustainable agricultural practices. This could enable the 
stabilization of prices, which hamper growth, while retaining a dedicated space for 
the small-scale production that is so crucial to the development of Ribeirinho 
livelihoods. Furthermore, consumer activism is rife and Amazonian conservation 
could be an important selling factor, if adequately articulated. 
 
To achieve this, however, a concerted and targeted marketing effort would be 
required, which does not seem feasible for Brazilian actors. The Brazilian 
government, or producer associations, have played no role in bringing açaí into US 
markets, or supporting its expansion, or in finding markets for any other Amazonian 
commodities. It was through the vision and insistence of local entrepreneurs that the 
chain spread to the US and it is perhaps through another such endeavor that 
markets will open for other Ribeirinho produce. To enter this market, high quality and 
originality are key. There is nonetheless potential space for new, foreign actors to 
enter the market, either as end-customer brands or co-packers. The local economy 
is relatively open and fiercely competitive, and Bella Iaçá from Pará has begun to 
make the effort to break into the market. This move requires a change in business 
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culture, and a solid investment in sales and marketing on behalf of Brazilian 
companies who wish to explore the opportunity. 
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Table 8.1 Analytical Matrix for California 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Territorial 
embeddedness 
Societal 
embeddedness 
Network 
embeddedness 
Consumers 
Relation to 
chain 
creation 
An innovative, 
decentralized food 
industry facilitated 
the introduction of 
açaí and its 
declination into a 
wide variety of 
products 
 
With food brands 
focused more on 
marketing than 
production, it was 
much easier to form 
a new consumer 
myth relatively fast 
 
The propitious 
business 
environment and 
credit availability 
makes it easier for 
companies to invest, 
allowing the chain to 
grow quickly and for 
local actors to stock 
açaí 
As entrepreneurialism 
is a core component of 
national identity, and 
businessmen are keen 
marketers and 
innovators, local actors 
were quick to create 
new businesses and 
form a compelling 
place for the product in 
local market isles, but, 
most crucially, in the 
public's imagination 
The food sector is spread 
into clusters of highly 
specialized and 
interconnected companies, 
that generate low 
transaction-costs, spread 
risk and encourage 
innovation, enabling the 
quick adoption of new 
foods trends such as açaí 
 
Creating the bonds to form 
the chain required the 
local lead entrepreneurs  
(Sambazon) to travel 
extensively to Pará to find 
a reliable supplier, which 
they found in the solid 
Tomé Açu cooperative, 
and then to quickly 
verticalize 
 
A less concentrated retail 
landscape made it easier 
for smaller companies to 
break into the market 
Coastal 
California is the 
home of healthy 
and organic food 
trends, and is 
very receptive to 
the superfood 
‘myth’ of açaí  
Relation to 
chain 
configuration 
Açaí is present in a 
surprisingly large 
amount of products, 
and traded by 
several large and 
small companies 
 
Local distributors can 
stock açaí pulp in a 
way that factories in 
Pará are unable to 
do 
 
The sophisticated 
business landscape 
After a fast turnover of 
business models, with 
companies appearing 
then leaving the 
market, the chain has 
now consolidated and 
açaí is a staple, though 
new businesses are 
now crowding into the 
‘bowl’ iteration of 
consumption 
Sourcing açaí in the less-
professional and secure 
environment of Pará is 
mainly done by specialized 
companies, to a great 
extent by Sambazon, 
which has verticalized, or 
through dedicated 
distributors who can take 
the time to visit the region 
and manage those 
relations 
 
 
The local chain is spread 
Consumers are 
used to buying 
açaí in a variety 
of products, and 
are amenable to 
new ones 
 
Consumer 
preference for 
high antioxidant 
and organic açaí 
percolates 
through to Pará, 
where firms are 
encouraged to 
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 makes it hard for 
companies from the 
Southeast to enter 
the market without 
improving their 
offerings, keeping 
them mostly locked 
out of this leg of the 
chain 
 out and diffuse, mirroring 
the general configuration 
of the local food industry 
certify organic 
and to preserve 
and measure 
antioxidant 
content 
Relation to 
upgrading 
The concern with 
quality and 
sustainability 
standards drives 
actors in Pará to 
upgrade to better 
practices and 
certification, and 
raise the bar for the 
whole chain 
 
The competitive 
and open business 
environment leaves 
space open for 
Southeast actors 
who can compete 
locally 
Local businessmen are 
constantly launching 
new products, and 
experimenting with new 
marketing strategies 
Few seek to change their 
position in the chain and 
adopt new functions, 
because local coordination 
works well throughout 
Even though 
local myths also 
exclude 
Ribeirinhos, the 
local desire for 
healthy and 
sustainable 
products 
sustains the 
chain at a more 
desirable social 
and ecological 
level 
 
Meanwhile, local 
firms, small and 
large, are constantly 
innovating and 
creating new 
products to compete 
   
Development 
outcomes 
The receptive 
business 
environment has 
allowed açaí to 
quickly find a market 
and pull production 
 
Chain of custody 
requirement ensure 
positive social 
processes at the 
base of the chain 
The entrepreneurial 
culture encourages risk 
taking and new product 
development, and the 
mind set of lead 
entrepreneurs 
facilitated the 
adaptation of the 
consumer myth and its 
propagation 
A substantial amount of 
value is captured by the 
region, distributed across 
its web of companies, who 
can constantly turn over 
new products and create 
new value 
Even though 
local myths also 
exclude 
Ribeirinhos, the 
local desire for 
healthy and 
sustainable 
products 
sustains the 
chain at a more 
desirable social 
and ecological 
level 
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 The high level, 
constant turnout of 
the local food 
industry keeps less 
sophisticated 
offerings from the 
Southeast from 
being attractive 
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Chapter 9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the field visits, carried out in an area spanning thousands of kilometers, and 
involving a wide diversity of interviews, from the surfer turned ‘food bowl entrepreneur’ 
in Beverly Hills, to the armed Marreteiro on his boat in the rivers and canals of the 
Marajó in Amazonian Brazil, the goal was to find connections weaving together the 
stories of actors and places into a useful, innovative contribution to the field of 
development of Non-Timber Forest Product (NTFP) trade. Access throughout the 
fieldwork was often difficult, and each new research site posed a gamut of practical 
challenges and analytical opportunities to navigate. Yet eventually each link in the value 
chain, or field site, revealed new, unpredicted information and perspectives about the 
açaí berry use and trade, about the research process itself and its theoretical 
foundations. Ultimately, a clear picture emerged of how this chain came into existence 
and how it has held its shape, under what defining circumstances, and with what 
development outcomes. With these insights, it is possible to propose policy 
recommendations that serve not only those involved with this chain directly, but those 
seeking to undertake NTFP project implementation, as well as value chain-based 
development interventions more broadly. 
 
The research was geographically and theoretically broad-based, and was conducted by 
a single researcher. It therefore lacks some of the depth and quantitative evidence that 
a value-chain study could reach. For example, it is not possible to confirm that 
monoculture of açaí berry trees is more cost-effective collection by Ribeirinhos in a 
semi-managed wild situation, and therefore cannot truly gauge what risk this model 
poses, and at what pace, to smallholders. By spreading out across research sites, it 
was also difficult to assess, with much certainty, how inclusion can affect dynamics 
within communities. Much time was spent trying to gain access to business people at 
the research sites, and many of them were unwilling to share confidential or strategic 
information on costing and prices, for example. Many simply refused to be interviewed 
at all. This made the conduction of a truly comprehensive input-output analysis 
impossible, though the choice made for a Global Production Network (GPN) approach 
made this type of analysis less crucial. Gathering deeper information in research sites 
would require a larger team, with greater institutional support facilitating access and 
guaranteeing funding. Nonetheless, the key actors in the chain, which represent not 
only the largest trading volume, but also that were central to its establishment, the lead 
firms, were all interviewed at length. The breadth of findings help reduce these 
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limitations, and the complementarity of much secondary data gathered throughout the 
research effort often made up for shortcomings. 
The adoption of a ‘whole chain’ approach brought a trove of new perspectives to the 
existing literature on NTFP chains, in particular regarding the agency of entrepreneurs 
within contextual constraints, the limiting or enabling role of business environments in 
shaping chain configuration, and determining the success of development interventions. 
The notion of a vertical axis of ‘chain pull’ compared to a horizontal axis of contextual 
pull allowed for considerable clarity of analysis of the chain and its development 
outcomes and potential. An exploration of the consumer myths and branding concepts 
involved in the chain at different research sites was also crucial in helping to understand 
how the chain took shape, why demand was formed, and how this shapes the chain.  
 
 
9.2 Açaí value chain formation 
 
After extensive fieldwork analysis, it can be concluded that the key factors that help 
form the value chain are: 
 
• the existence of a strong local market from which the chain could scale up; 
• the formation of an easily absorbed ‘food consumer myth’ surrounding the açaí 
berry that translated well into urban consumer markets; 
• the presence of keen entrepreneurs with scale-crossing brokerage abilities at 
each link in the chain, both to articulate chain relations and territorial peculiarities (from 
extremely complex logistics, to unwelcoming business environments and retail market 
concentration) to organize production, but also to bridge cultures, reshape myths and 
create demand; and 
• the existence of a strong industrial base in which to process products in the 
Southeast of Brazil, as well as a large and prosperous middle class. 
 
At the base of the chain, the existence of a strong local market provided a basis from 
which this growth could occur. Açaí was already a daily staple in the Amazonian regions 
of Brazil, and a local trade network already existed in the area to get the produce to 
urban Batedores on a daily basis. This trade web, though it would be reshaped by rapid 
expansion in demand, already existed in an embryonic form beforehand. Without this 
base, the Gracie's would have had difficulty in bringing in their first coolers full of frozen 
pulp. These were easily acquired on the local market, and daily processed by the 
Batedores. This cohesive local web, with strong, short recurring bonds, provides unique 
solidity. The existing web merely grew in size.  
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It can be argued that the existence, and significant growth in the local market resulting 
from urbanization and population growth provided a trading alternative to the 
factory/export market, strengthening the market position of communities and 
Marreteiros, and improving their trading conditions within the growing factory system. 
Had there been no alternative trade pathway, factories would dictate prices and 
suppress the chances of communities of capturing value. In fact, interviewees relayed 
that because local markets are so vibrant, and the açaí such a necessary staple, that 
prices are often higher than what factories can afford to pay, because Batedores and 
their customers will still buy despite wild fluctuations in produce value. 
 
The arrival of mobile communication technology, which allows communities to follow 
trading prices constantly, has also played a key role in preventing abuses. This finding 
is very much in line with the current NTFP literature, having been confirmed through a 
large number of case studies and reviews (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). Local markets 
allow communities trading alternatives and enable an organic development of value 
chains, a more-gradual evolution that tends to better accommodate community needs. 
This understanding is also commonly reflected in Global Production Network (GPN) 
studies. When people have trading alternatives, they have more power and are less 
likely to suffer abusive trading practices. But a layer of causality, based on network 
theory, provides a key insight when designing interventions, as detailed below. 
 
A further pivotal factor in the development of the açaí value chain was the formation of a 
new identity for the berries, and a new form of consumption, which were very attractive 
to consumers outside the State of Pará. The introduction of the ‘açaí bowl’, instigated by 
the Gracie family, recreated the product as a healthy, trendy food closely tied to the 
aspirational beach culture of Rio de Janeiro, with its MMA fighters, sports enthusiasts 
and athletes. The frozen bowl, sweetened with guaraná syrup and served with fruits and 
granola was also highly palatable and appropriate for a sporty, beach-going audience. 
This is a typical example of how products adopt new and relevant identities in consumer 
markets, and how food myths can be translated from place to place, forming cultural 
‘wormholes’ (short-cut conduits) that make possible the inclusion of a new product in a 
distant consumer landscape. This pull of demand is central to chain development and 
determines its potential configuration. A productionist approach, which reduces 
consumers to mere final receptacles of a value chain, is unlikely to spur policy initiatives 
that open markets in meaningful, novel ways. This type of insight had until now been 
absent from scholarship in NTFPs, but is further discussed below. 
 
The relatively young age of the açaí chain also allows us to identify another important 
driver of chain formation: entrepreneurship. Though contextual factors, such as the 
existence of a local chain, and the serendipity of the formation of the market myth were 
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important ingredients, without the agency of entrepreneurs who envisioned a business 
in the improbable, and logistically awkward universe of açaí harvesting and processing, 
there would be no chain as we now know it. This confirms the findings of Te Velde in his 
value chain analysis conducted in Latin America (te Velde et al. 2006). The Gracie's 
were the determinant actors in bringing the açaí product out of Pará, as described 
above. But then a group of entrepreneurs in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo picked up 
where they left off, setting up juice bars and introducing the product to new consumers, 
while traveling themselves to Pará to find suppliers. In Pará, there were pioneers such 
as Ben Hurl, who set up a factory on an island near the center of Belém, bringing in a 
colossal old boat engine by pulley to serve as a generator. In the US, the Black brothers 
of the company Sambazon opened a market, after seeing the product being sold on the 
beaches of Rio. Because the chain is so recently established (and developing), the 
ways in which individual agency can reshape structures and reconfigure social and 
economic relations can be relatively easily mapped out. Through the individual agency 
of these key actors, and certainly many more, an entirely new chain configuration took 
hold, forever altering the social structures of the region. 
 
Slow and steady growth of the açaí chain was driven by these entrepreneurs and 
spurred the creation of new factories. It stimulated communities to manage their açaí 
palms, and increased the harvest area manifold, generating the kind of value capture 
and regional development that is so desired by the development community. Unlike te 
Velde et al.'s (2006) article, the centrality of specific entrepreneurs is more predicated 
on their brokerage ability than the captivity of their relationship with their suppliers. In 
the present research it became clear that those entrepreneurs who managed to cross 
scales to enable trade  (as illustrated in the network diagram (Figure 4.1) were crucial to 
chain formation. Those actors who are connected to a significant portion of the chain on 
one end, and serve as connectors to another scale, are the binding agents of the chain 
across scales. Without, specifically, Frooty, or Sambazon, or the larger-scale operating 
Marreteiros in Pará, the chain would not have widened as it has and would not be 
cohesive.  
 
The reception of the açaí business chain in the Southeast of Brazil was also 
instrumental to its development. The more-sophisticated business environment, within 
the same country and legal framework, enabled processing and industrialization to 
progress with relative ease, compensating for the general shortcomings of the industrial 
environment in Pará. It is here that the product went from an ingredient to a product, 
and it was relatively seamlessly adopted, once demand appeared. This is a valuable 
lesson. Often we seek to forcefully upgrade regions into value-added roles by 
subsidizing industrialization. When this capacity exists elsewhere, one must question 
whether this is truly the best strategy and consider what direct benefits can be achieved, 
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and for whom. It is common to see policy makers or development agencies investing 
money into processing plants that are unlikely to be efficient, and end up leaving 
communities without a truly viable market pathway. Luckily, the açaí chain sprang up 
outside of typical, determined, food product development practices. Of course, many 
ingredients also are adopted directly by foreign markets. But difference here is that açaí, 
thanks to the consumer myth of "sports and beach", and the business environment 
graduated from ingredient to product. This product identity is strong, and of such 
relevance, that it is the form in which foreign businesses are choosing to market açaí in 
the future. 
 
 
9.3 How network thinking and embeddedness allow us to understand 
value-chain configuration, value-capture possibilities and development 
outcomes 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward, and one of the most-valuable research outcomes 
achieved in the present study is the mapping of actors involved in the entirety of the 
chain and the roles that they play within each context. The key actors in the chain were 
identified and interviewed. Through this process it was established what roles each 
actor plays, and how they influence chain formation and configuration. When the 
context against network relations is examined, we can better grasp in how the chain 
remains intact, and where actors have capability to capture more value. For example in 
the diagram of the chain presented in Chapter 4, the crucial role of scale-crossing 
brokers becomes clearly evident.  
 
This analysis also allows to better define what upgrading strategies would be useful for 
communities. It allows us to determine that the following key factors keep the chain in its 
current configurations, enabling or constricting movement of actors and value capture 
throughout the açaí chain: 
 
• The territorial constraints of the interior of Pará require a web of interconnected 
middlemen to provide the necessary ‘network thickness’ upon which the entirety of the 
chain rests, attempts to reduce their number are unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile other 
actors seek to address these constraints by eliminating all these actors from the chain 
entirely, by the introduction of a monoculture model; 
• The poor business environment (territorial embeddedness) and the peculiar 
cultural universe that Pará's factories inhabit  (societal) tie them to low value added, 
fungible processing activities, where they are passive and unable to move into more 
advantageous positions where they could potentially capture more value for themselves 
and the region  (such as diversifying into other local products); 
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• The strong market and industrial complex in the Southeast of Brazil keep 
processing and marketing there, but a mix of societal embeddedness and contractual 
insecurity generate an entrepreneurial culture that is not innovative, and remains 
isolated from foreign markets, creating a break in the chain; 
• The demanding and quality driven Californian market, and its innovative 
entrepreneurial culture create an environment for constant new product introduction and 
maximum value formation. 
 
Based on these findings, we see why cutting out middlemen and moving communities 
into trading roles has proven unsuccessful. This has been the case in Marajó, where a 
boat was purchased for the local community, and a contract was arranged for them to 
supply a local factory. Had the chain been mapped, and the roles of actors been 
defined, it would have become clear that Marreteiros provide very important services to 
communities, mediating their relationship with factories, who are very prone to 
defaulting on payments. The concept of scale-crossing brokerage is particularly 
valuable here, as the ways in which Marreteiros connect disparate cultural universes 
indicates  (the strength of the chain is only as strong as the weakest link). The factory 
representatives that were interviewed found dealing with cooperatives quite difficult, and 
when they did, it was mostly to squeeze them into supplying their product for less than 
what they would pay middlemen. This is not a new finding, and several studies have, as 
described in the literature review, came to the same conclusion. In the present study, a 
more-detailed understanding of these actors’ roles in the chain, and perhaps more 
clarity on when they are in fact essential, and how their role can be improved is evinced. 
This is not to say that when communities are isolated and do not have the power to 
change trading partners they are not often abused by Marreteiros. The ‘captive’ nature 
of the governance structure works to their detriment, much as is commonly observed in 
other value-chain studies. The situation in Marajó, where the most-isolated communities 
received very little income from their product, and are often reduced to bartering under 
unfair conditions to acquire basic goods needed to sustain households. There does 
exist an official minimum-price policy, but it is difficult to enforce in these isolated 
locations. Geographic embeddedness is a force play constricting chain configuration 
and limiting value capture strategies. 
 
The Ribeirinhos interviewed did not appear keen on upgrading into other roles within the 
açaí chain. The majority their communities lacked the cultural capital to engage with 
corporate buyers and manage new enterprises. This traditional business knowledge is 
recognized in the NTFP literature as a difficult barrier to overcome for communities to 
shift positions in the chain, and can be construed as a factor of societal embeddedness 
that conditions chain configuration (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007). Outside help 
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would need to be invoked to take over these management functions and this is often 
how development interventions are undertaken by NGOs.  
 
Communities to be integrated into the market their isolation that must be combated. 
Transport in the Amazon is precarious and in view of these logistical challenges, it is 
important that processing plants be better spread out across the territory in a way that 
still enables them to ship their product at competitive prices. This could increase 
demand for açaí away from the most densely populated regions. It would thus seem 
entirely more appropriate for funding to be channeled to actors who are willing to 
establish themselves away from the Abaetetuba/Belém hub, as Sambazon has chosen 
to do, and who might trade, for example, fiscal incentives for supporting sustainable 
extraction prices. Yet they too must have access to improved logistics to reach markets. 
 
Regarding specifically the potential conversion to monoculture, although the trend is 
worrying, it is in many ways already an unavoidable reality. A vast monoculture 
plantation, far away from the Tapajós, a sizable farm even further away in the State of 
São Paulo itself already exist. Insofar as Brazilian consumers are not interested in the 
sustainability of the chain, or the cultural origins of this product, the conversion to 
monoculture, with the open support of the government of Pará, is being progressed 
through its Pró-Açaí program. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean the total 
exclusion of Ribeirinhos from the chain, and could represent a positive step forward, if 
adequately planned. There may be trading opportunities for both modes of production. 
 
If Ribeirinhos could somehow retain a market share, while mainstream prices are kept 
reasonable by the constancy of supply made possible by monocultures, this move could 
allow the chain to grow and stabilize, while retaining many of its positive development 
traits. Although this is not the case in Brazil, for example, actors in the US suggested in 
the conducted interviews that sustainability can be an important way to access markets, 
both for consumers and in business-to-business (B2B) scenarios. This type of insight is 
only possible when considering the entirety of the chain, and try to match contextual 
issues across geographical scales. 
 
The sheer size and diversity of this whole chain configuration, and the many local 
contexts it crisscrosses, also reveals a complexity that has largely been glossed over in 
other NTFP studies, and which could produce a variety of different analytical constructs 
and research pathways. There exists to date no representation of NTFP value chains in 
the literature that are this detailed, and that span as many locations. This allows us to 
examine and question the roles of actors in a new way. For example, when we expand 
research to factories and buyers in the Southeast of Brazil in sequence after factories in 
Belém, different findings are found compared to previous studies. In fact, factories in 
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Belém have a relatively weak position in the açaí chain, since their product is 
fungible/generic, and the local business environment seriously hampers their upgrading 
opportunities. They are also the link at which the chain switches from entirely informal to 
formal, and must be brokered between very different, and often conflicting realities. 
 
These factories are the gatekeepers to the Ribeirinho economy. The fresh fruit is highly 
perishable, and needs to be processed and frozen to be storable and tradable to more-
remote locations. Additionally, they are the point of the chain at which it transitions from 
entirely informal to formal. This creates an inherent challenge, and the factories’ 
brokerage between these realities is crucial. Corporate buyers are not necessarily 
equipped, or willing, to deal with the complexities of the local açaí economy. 
Additionally, factories in Belém and the Abaetetuba region are crucial to adding and 
retaining value within Pará. There is therefore market fragility. The factories are unable 
to upgrade, and are financially insecure. While more-traditional, local-only approaches 
would see them as establishments that dominate the chain, they actually require more 
support to keep the chain moving and sustain the Ribeirinho economy. At present, 
many actors feel that substituting this entire portion of the chain with a monoculture 
model, where farmers would replace Ribeirinhos, crops would be grown and marketed 
in a predictable pattern with set contract prices, without Marreteiros, with simple 
logistics and easy processing that would generate great efficiency, removing that 
portion of the chain. 
 
A strategic investment in those factories might be a better way of sustaining Ribeirinho 
livelihoods than attempting to upgrade communities into roles that they are ill-fitted to, 
and reluctant to assume. If there is a wish to sustain the existing model, and retain the 
Ribeirinhos’ involvement, then the current factories, which make this part of the chain 
viable from a ‘business’ perspective require support. In their words, and based on 
interviews with other actors, their key challenge is securing financing to increase 
production during the harvest season, to be recouped from sales throughout the year. 
They also have a difficult time paying for the refrigerated storage facilities required. Only 
very few, larger-scale actors can afford to work in this way, leaving many actors, who 
could potentially supply foreign and national markets, locked out. As one large açaí 
trader in the US put it, if local factories had the capacity to self-finance and stock, he 
would be out of business. 
 
This is a clear example of how the conceptualization of a network embedded in a 
context provide a higher level of nuance than that allowed by the focus on intra-chain 
dynamics, which is employed in value-chain studies. It also proves that value-chain 
studies that only look at part of a chain can come up with quite skewed results. So many 
of the issues that condition the relations between actors across geographical scales are 
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formed from the local context, instead of the mere intra-chain dynamics. For example, 
objectively thinking, one could easily envisage the upgrading of factories through the 
supply of the more-sophisticated product mixed with other ingredients, instead of plain 
pulp, at least to more proximal markets such as the Northeast and Centre of Brazil. The 
pricing would be attractive, and there is enough space in the governance pattern of the 
chain for these companies to upgrade. Yet the business environment in which they are 
enmeshed, and the societal embeddedness that conditions their behavior keeps them 
from succeeding in such a move, though many of them have begun developing the 
product. They simply cannot compete with the much more-advanced business 
environment found in the Southeast of the country. 
 
Companies in the Southeast operate in proximity to large consumer markets, in a much 
more propitious business environment, and in this way, play a crucial role in ensuring 
that açaí-based products reach markets. The region concentrates nearly 50% of all food 
industries in the Country, bringing in ingredients from across the territory to process and 
retail, and generating substantial local development in the process, thanks to its 
proximity to markets, but also the better pool of labor and auxiliary industries that it has 
amassed. Still, the reigning business model lacks agility and flexibility. In most cases, 
the highly verticalized business environment and near inexistence of co-packers 
hamper innovation. Companies in Brazil must take up the risk of product development 
and launching entirely on their own. The justice system is slow and insecure, and 
companies are wary of outsourcing. It is then no wonder that innovation is hampered, 
and little attention is paid to marketing. 
 
A potential intervention that would bring great benefits to the whole chain within the 
State of Pará and spur regional development would be the inclusion of another product 
to be harvested and processed during the time of the year when açaí is not in season. 
First, this would be a solution that stems directly from the ways in which Ribeirinho 
livelihoods are structured, spread out across a basket of activities throughout the year, 
and one that those interviewed found most desirable. Respecting livelihood patterns is a 
recognized key feature of successful NTFP interventions  (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 
2007). This would give Ribeirinhos another source of income on which to count on for 
the remainder of the year, which is what they most seem to desire, according to our 
sampling. As we have seen, they have a hard time managing their cash flow, and often 
have not retained sufficient savings from when the açaí is in season to sustain 
themselves the rest of the year. At the moment, their only source of cash income these 
communities have, apart from payments from federal programs such as Bolsa Família 
and Bolsa Verde. 
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When the açaí is not in season, they revert to a practically subsistence-based livelihood 
model, surviving off fish, chicken, and whatever they can grow. Yet their own livelihood 
model, which is multiple, seems to hold the key to the best possible development 
strategy. At the same time, in urban centres in Pará, factories either shut down or 
‘hibernate’  (only stocking and selling product, but not really processing) for half the 
year. Marreteiros continue to work across the region, going to where they can still find 
some product to supply the local markets, where prices skyrocket. Therefore, for most 
of the year, a great deal of idle capacity exists which could be put to use. For over half 
the year these factories are essentially idle, but still paying for staff, financing, taxes, 
and equipment that remains unused. The entire network of logistics between them is 
also already in place, meaning it would be relatively easy to add another product to the 
mix. There are many products that could fit the bill amongst the myriad of foodstuffs and 
potential cosmetic ingredients that are native to the region. A visit to the traditional Ver o 
Peso market in central Belém reveals an incredible range of fruits, herbs, roots, and 
seeds which are unknown and unexploited beyond the region. Perhaps one of them 
might be the next açaí. The exploration of market potential for other Amazonian 
products, and for Amazonian culture as a whole requires much further investigation and 
exploration. However, with the wide budgets available to such entities as APEX to 
develop markets for Brazilian products, and the strategic role that these commodities 
could play to conserve and revalue the Amazonian region, this investment could prove 
of strategic importance. 
 
Through GPN analysis, we learn that none of the companies interviewed in Pará or in 
the Southeast of Brazil showed palpable interest in taking a risk investing in a new 
product. In fact, the introduction of a new flavor seemed to them completely out of their 
remit. We must remember that none of the current actors in Belém or in the Southeast 
were involved in actively creating a story for the açaí or initiating a market. This was 
something that happened organically, almost accidentally. These actors merely 
responded to existing and growing demand, and spent some, though not very much, 
money perpetuating the consumer myth through the sponsoring of sports events. The 
creation of value and identity was done spontaneously by cultural and not commercial 
actors. Throughout the interviews, it became clear that marketing was not really at the 
core of their activities. 
 
The companies in Pará, which operate as business-to-business entities, do not feel 
confident trying to cater to consumer markets, of which they have little knowledge. They 
are accustomed only to dealing essentially with companies in the Southeast, and a few, 
with foreign buyers. They have never traded products with retailers, and have no access 
to the final consumer of their goods. They also seem to lack the financial capacity and 
human capital needed for such a change of position in the chain. Though several of 
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them have developed açaí ‘mix ‘products that are similar to those retailed in Southeast 
Brazil, they have found little demand for these products. For them, exploiting new 
ingredients, while retaining their position in the chain as intermediaries between 
extraction and final processing, would be the most advantageous way to increase value 
capture. Unfortunately, those most likely to benefit from such a strategy do not have the 
power or will to open a new market. This strategy would have to include their clients, 
who do have access to marketing structures and can influence consumer behavior. 
 
In contrast, companies in the US are marketing machines, in constant dialogue with 
keen and canny consumer groups. Many of them do not even produce any of their 
products. In fact that was the case for a significant proportion of the companies that 
carry açaí products. Because of the high level of contractual security, networks of 
intertwined companies divide amongst themselves the different tasks of production, 
gaining efficiency and fostering innovation. Production is outsourced to co-packers, 
distributors negotiate with retailers, another company is hired to command branding, 
logistics are often also handled by a third party, and so forth. These companies work 
together seamlessly because they know that if any of these other actors default, or 
make inappropriate use of proprietary information, they can quickly and easily seek 
legal remedy. This situation fosters innovation, as companies have the space to 
dedicate themselves more fully to creating and marketing new products, which can 
come to market through this web, spreading out the load of making production and 
distribution work. In this way, the foreign market is a guarantor of quality and 
sustainability in the chain, despite representing a mere 10% of overall international açaí 
trade. 
 
Companies in the US seemed much keener on experimenting, though they would not 
easily venture into value chain development in an entirely new country. They have little 
incentive to come to Brazil, develop new chain links to explore Amazonian ingredients. 
So many new products and ingredients come to them; there is little point seeking new 
opportunities afresh. Açaí arrived because a pair of surfers discovered the product for 
sale on the beaches of Rio and made it their mission to launch it in the US. They found 
a cultural proximity to the product that allowed them to envision its success in the US 
market. The açaí we see in the US is at least as ‘carioca’ as it is Amazonian. It was in 
this context that it made sense to these entrepreneurs, once an accessible consumer 
myth had already been set up. They went on to explore the supply in Pará, and set up 
their own production pathway, but the product itself was easily exploitable. 
 
Still, they accomplished almost singlehandedly what no company in Brazil did. They 
created a market and carved a niche for their product and its entity in the American 
cultural landscape. Still, they were only able to achieve this because the product was 
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easy to source, and the product was already in a form that was palatable to their 
consumers. All this was achieved in Brazil, though mostly by accident. Yet Camu Camu, 
for example, another Amazonian fruit that is very high in Vitamin C, is currently gaining 
interest in the supplement market, while remaining mostly unknown in Brazil. It is 
unlikely to become as popular as açaí has become without the culturally attractive ‘bowl’ 
format that is associated with açaí, but it has found its way into the market nonetheless. 
The societal embeddedness lens shows us that American entrepreneurs are always 
looking for the next new thing. Interviewees in the US seemed interested in exploring 
new flavors and ingredients, if they could find their way into the market. US consumers 
are markedly more curious and receptive of exotic new ingredients, and much more 
likely to opt for sustainable purchases. In this way, although the business communities 
in the Southeast of Brazil and Pará are more proximate to the communities, and under 
one some federal government, the involvement of foreign actors in the chain has 
definite advantages. The Californian consumer is more curious and accustomed to new 
products than that in Brazil. The local foodscape is constantly welcoming new 
influences, which are quickly embraced. The agility of the industrial complex also 
enables new flavors and trends to quickly become incorporated into new products and 
find their way into grocery stores. Not to mention that local companies are keen 
marketers, and have a knack for inserting new offerings into the local cultural mix. 
Perhaps it is through the American cultural machine that the next Amazonian 
commodity will first find a palatable identity and a place in the market. 
 
Another example of how the whole-chain and embeddedness approach can allow us to 
better understand dynamics between actors is the different impacts that trade to US and 
to the Southeast Brazil has for Ribeirinhos. While international buyers are particularly 
concerned with quality, as well as their chain of custody and eco-social track record, 
buyers in the Southeast worry essentially about price. Companies in Brazil are highly 
verticalized, and not prone to innovation. 
 
The protection of Ribeirinho extraction of açaí could also lie at the hands of the 
American market. If the Ribeirinho production could be adequately marketed as ‘wild 
harvested’  (in the fashion of the luxury foraging done by the likes of restaurants like 
Noma and other European sophisticates) into these premium niches, they could retain 
their activities while allowing the rest of the chain to grow into other modes of 
production. This finding corroborates a recent study, which examines the possible 
commonalities between luxury markets and sustainable development  (Achabou and 
Dekhili, 2012). Whether these are indeed necessary remains to be seen, but the fact 
that they are becoming a reality, regardless of opinion, requires policy-makers 
dedicated to preserving Ribeirinho livelihoods to find workable, practical options for 
these populations. There is no way of banning monocultures, after all. The case of 
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natural rubber, which is now often preferred in some niches compared to manufactured 
rubber, and has an ‘eco’ appeal, shows that proper marketing can preserve spaces for 
extractivism even in the face of mass production and monocultures. An extensive 
review of NTFP cases in Bolivia and Mexico also confirms that niche marketing can be 
a good strategy to combat substitution (Marshall et al. 2006). 
 
On certification, it is important to point out that the notion of organic açaí is entirely 
meaningless within the current Ribeirinho production mode, as the trees are not 
planted, do not receive any type of fertilization or pesticide. 
Nonetheless, a significant amount of açaí that is aimed at foreign markets is certified 
organic. All interviewees were clear that there was no premium for communities for 
supplying organic açaí. Therefore, as a form of upgrading and adding value, it is entirely 
meaningless for the açaí-harvesting communities. 
At best, certified communities have precedence when factories need to supply organic 
açaí, but considering how heated the market has become, this is of little use to them. 
Certification is nonetheless and important condition for accessing foreign markets, and 
thus valuable to factories who export, and the Ribeirinho chains they support. In order 
for this certification to have more positive effects, particularly as far as communities are 
concerned, a new type of certificate, which is particular to the NTFP scenario and 
ensures price premiums percolate throughout the chain, would have to be put in place. 
Other forms of marketing which highlight the value of Ribeirinho labor and culture such 
as the creation of an aspirational ‘wild harvested’ seal, must be examined. The NTFP is 
after all, as other researchers have put it, a cultural product as much as a commodity 
(Cocks et al., 2011). What we see here is that certification may be useful, but is not the 
core of the value-forming proposition that can effectively improve development 
outcomes. The formation of consumer myths, in curious markets, should be the central 
purpose of the intervention. 
                
 
9.4  Consumer markets and consumer power 
 
The business ‘pull’ of demand, or the power of consumers, can be crucial to determining 
the shape of the chain, and also to enable new strategies for value capture. These 
perspectives, gathered throughout the fieldwork, enable us to fill out the analysis, 
although the combination of these perspectives is not entirely theoretically resolved. 
 
The açaí berry did not find favor in markets because it is Fairtrade, organic, or 
associated with any charitable initiative – the usual upgrading or marketing strategies 
that are usually attempted by development programs. It has found favor because it is 
trendy, healthy, a ‘superfruit’, and associated with an aspirational culture. Even its 
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Amazonian origin is practically insignificant to its success. This growing demand, which 
has skyrocketed in the last fifteen years, has spawned several new branches of the 
chain, stimulating the creation of factories in Pará, and in the Southeast of Brazil, as 
well as processing units in the US and other countries, along with myriad new 
companies dedicated to commercializing açaí-based products. It has also entirely 
reshaped the local reality of the Tocantins estuary, doubling the size of the market for 
the berries, including a much greater number of communities, hiking up prices and 
creating a new stream of income for the region. The immaterial, subjective whims of 
contemporary consumer culture may be difficult to grasp, but their reach is very much 
tangible. The lessons here apply to GPN scholarship as well, which tends to overlook 
formation of value in consumer markets and their power to shape chain relations  
(Mceachern and Schroeder, 2004; Coe et al. 2008, Coe and Hess, 2013). The 
importance of aspiration compared to charity in food myth formation is crucial. Simply 
put, açaí is a success because it is associated with an aspirational culture, and not 
because it is a charitable purchase. Undoubtedly, this does not come without its only set 
of limitations. Within a ‘fetish’ that grossly excludes a produce’s origin, there is little 
room for adding further value at the base of the value-chain. As indicated at the 
beginning of this thesis, forest settings lack cultural characteristics of urban populations. 
In this context, formation of exchange value that is aspirational and which based on 
forest people identities is difficult, although not impossible. Cultures are malleable, and 
Millennials are particularly pliable and receptive. 
 
The consumer landscape, is also crucial to the configuration of the chain the Southeast 
of Brazil, the perception of açaí is of a vaguely healthy, filling snack. Consumers are not 
only entirely unaware of its origins, but they are oblivious to its health benefits. The 
product they consume, the açaí mix, is laden with sugar from guaraná syrup, which also 
masks its flavor. It is more of a dessert, which suits Brazilians’ sweet palates. The 
health associations prevail thanks only to the origins of its arrival, and the continued 
sports sponsorships. The local organic market is incipient, and people are unlikely to 
read labels and investigate the origins of the products they buy. Furthermore, 
Amazonian products are mostly unknown, and the vast forest holds little fascination 
from a cultural standpoint. In this way, organic certification, or seals of origin are very 
unlikely to have much impact on demand in Brazil (although they are important in the 
US). Successful marketing strategies highlight the flavor of the açaí, and its 
convenience as a snack. In this context, Ribeirinhos, and the Ribeirinho economy, are 
simply not part of the marketing picture. This makes it exceedingly convenient for 
companies to switch to monocultures as their suppliers, as is already beginning to 
happen. 
 
 
 
Page 205 of 249 
 
This identity of açaí, as a foodstuff for the sports-oriented beach lifestyle, was perhaps 
the most fundamental factor that enabled the transposition of the value-chain to 
California. It allowed the product to translate seamlessly from one beach culture (in Rio) 
to another. As discussed in the literature review, this is a ‘fetish’ that entirely obscured 
the nature of the product, yet it was crucial to the development of the chain, with direct 
positive impacts for communities. Yet the Californian consumer has its own peculiar 
view of açaí. There, it is a superfruit and by association imposes high-quality standards 
for the açaí berry supply. Purity is valued, and premiums are higher for higher quality 
produce. Organic açaí is especially valuable. As discussed previously, this could prove 
valuable to the Ribeirinho economy. 
 
This is not to say that this obscuring fetish is entirely unproblematic. As Ribeirinhos are 
not regarded as part of the story, or the basic origin of the product, they are considered 
to be easily replaced. No real premium can be placed on the laborious extractivist origin 
of the product. Frooty had several unsuccessful attempts at raising interest for the origin 
of the product. Yet their approach was documentary style, using imagery that showed a 
kind of idealized o sanitized version of production and nature we are used to seeing. 
 
  
9.5 Policy recommendations – consumer myth making and alliance 
building 
 
By employing notions of ‘embeddedness’, production networks, and consumer 
myths/branding, actors in the private and public sector can conjoin to formulate new 
development strategies that contemplate the needs of forest communities, recognize 
their central role to conservation and generate substantial regional development, but are 
based on solid market research, and must work across geographic scales, and integrate 
different realms of policy, from tax policy to cultural policy, to ensure that new trade 
relations, and better trade relations, are put into place, to truly harness the sustainable 
development potential of the Amazon.  
 
Based on the findings of the current research, two important streams along which 
policymakers can channel initiatives to improve the development potential of NTFPs are 
recognized: 
 
- taking a whole-chain approach, tracing the vertical axis of the chain;  
 
- evaluating embeddedness and its relation to value capture will enable strategic 
interventions to be successfully devised that consider how actions at several scales, 
and not just community level, can shape development outcomes. 
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- policy makers must shift from a productionist vision of economic development, towards 
one that embraces all the subjective nuances of exchange value formation. In today's 
increasingly immaterial economy, it is through consumer myths   that the persisting 
structural inequalities of trade relations can be truly eliminated. 
 
 
A whole-chain, strategic, and collaborative intervention that contemplates the vertical 
relations in the chain, but also the specificities and capacities of local contexts as 
described above, could prove at least as valuable as tinkering with local community 
dynamics. Adequate marketing could safeguard some of the ‘extractivist’ strain of the 
chain from the onslaught of monoculture. It would simply require actors to come 
together, such as trade bodies and export agencies such as APEX, as well as those 
strategically invested in the development of these communities, such as the 
Environmental Ministry and Development Ministry of Brazil, pooling their resources and 
collectively devising a strategic marketing plan, including branding, but also setting up 
trade and processing pathways to enable these products to get to market, be it national 
or international. Public support could also prove crucial to provide financing, fiscal 
incentives and institutional support. At present there exists a large amount of finance for 
conservation initiatives in the Amazon through the State’s public development bank, the 
BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social). Several current 
initiatives concern development of NTFP chains. Although they appear to carry out a 
worthy job of organizing local forces, they do not look beyond local conditions to create 
and sustain entire value chains. It is of particular importance for actors in the State of 
Pará to come together, to find solutions for the instabilities of supply, the spare capacity 
(‘slack’) in the chain, and the lack of credit that has an impact on factories particularly 
strongly. 
 
Taking a whole-chain approach would require actors to join up, communicate and find 
common ground. Unfortunately, this looks unlikely. Presently, there is no trade body or 
sectoral chamber that aims to bring together açaí chain actors in a meaningful way. 
Although several attempts have been made in the State of Pará to create such a 
commerce chamber, they have in the past not succeeded in becoming an active 
channel for the communication and common strategizing of its actors. There is a major 
cultural barrier between actors: the mostly illiterate, isolated Ribeirinhos, the working 
class Marreteiros and Batedores, and the upper class in the factories. It is not surprising 
that at present, the Pro-Açaí program32 being promoted by the government as the big 
step forward in the development of the chain that entirely excludes these actors, in favor 
																																																						
32	http://www.brasil.gov.br/editoria/educacao-e-ciencia/2016/01/para-ganha-programa-para-
ampliar-producao-de-açaí	
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of the implementation of a monoculture production model. Keeping them in the chain is 
crucial to retaining the açaí's pro-sustainable development potential intact. Shifting to a 
monoculture model would simply exclude the thousands of families who have the açaí 
palm as their key source of income, and drive them to return to logging and other 
unsustainable activities. It would also hamper the world's access to the Amazon basin 
and its myriad possibilities. 
 
To create a strong alliance would also require the inclusion of academic research 
centers with the power to develop new products, such as the very competent, but 
mostly isolated, ITAL in São Paulo. Product development has been recognized in the 
literature as crucial to establishing successful trading of NTFPs (Belcher and 
Schreckenberg, 2007). Very little of the research of these food technology institutes 
became new products continuing açaí, and a better joining-up of corporate and 
academic actors in Brazil would be enormously useful to the whole agri-food sector in 
general. It would spur innovation and enable more value to be retained, allowing Brazil 
to reposition itself from a producer and exporter of low-value added commodities to a 
major supplier of foodstuffs to global markets. The Brazilian economy remains 
remarkably isolated from global production networks and exports very little value added 
goods. This is a structural, nation-wide issue that requires serious changes in local 
factors, such as labor laws, logistics, and taxation. Still, there is room for change within 
the existing context to improve the position of the açaí chain. Several actors are starting 
to consider export markets, setting up subsidiaries and stock in the US, for example, to 
enter the US market with added-value products. Greater access to modern technology 
would increase opportunities to access new markets. 
 
Technology development and implementation, though a common component of value-
chain studies, seldom figures in the NTFP literature as a key driver of sustainable 
development. Yet in the case of açaí, it plays an important role. The cultural biases that 
center on the direction of technology development are clearly visible in the açaí case. 
Embrapa in Brazil (www.emprapa.br), the public agricultural technology institute, was 
not set up to look for agricultural technologies that would improve the lot of Ribeirinho 
communities and promote sustainable development. Rather, it developed a technology 
that would allow extractivism to be ruled out, in favor of a monoculture model. 
Sustainable-development impacts were not considered in project design. The research 
is publicly funded, but its impact on the region is not a prerequisite. Technologies that 
support Ribeirinhos, such as solutions for storage, and solar-powered, faster boats, can 
make significant changes to the chain and facilitate their participation. Discussions of 
agricultural and commercial models that integrate multiplicity of species is also 
fundamental to environmental stability. 
 
 
 
Page 208 of 249 
 
Meanwhile, students from around the World come to visit the Japanese cooperative at 
CAMTA in Brazil, whose multiple, rotating agroforestry model was, ironically enough, 
inspired from Ribeirinhos’ livelihood system of working on a suite of activities. CAMTA 
at the moment is the only company capable of supplying processed frozen pulps of a 
variety of Amazonian fruits, because it has taken inspiration from the region’s diversity, 
and counts it as the key to its success. The technology to successfully manage a 
multiple system at a large scale already exists, and is already successful. 
 Another key challenge faced by the chain, the logistics, is also easy to resolve, 
according to Professor Cordeiro, one of the açaí chain’s most prominent scholars. 
There are solar-powered boats which could better refrigerate the fruit, and cut down 
significantly the cost of transport, enabling much larger-scale extraction geographically, 
and greatly increasing supply without shifting to monoculture production. Yet current 
efforts do not reflect these needs and realities, because many actors are excluded, 
deemed unfit to be part of a ‘professionalized’ future for the chain. 
 
The specificities of supply, such as availability, quality, volumes, and seasonality must 
be matched to the realities of value chain formation. It is important to understand what 
actors could be relied on to form a new value chain, from local middlemen, to industries 
and retailers, and how they could be engaged. Though understandably this might prove 
too complex a task or discussion to have within the scope of a ‘Plano de Manejo’ 
(http://www.icmbio.gov.br/portal/planosmanejo) or similar policy interventions, it is hard 
to fathom how a plan might ever seem realistic without at least contemplating these 
issues and identifying partners that could take up the marketing mantle. It is thus 
imperative that this dimension of extractivism as an economic activity be contemplated 
in these documents, for them to effectively represent a pathway towards thriving 
sustainable forest livelihoods for local communities. This is a crucial lesson we can take 
from this research process. Employing the analytical tools of value-chain research, 
mapping actors and their roles, but also understanding the specificities of each involved 
business environment, and the attitudes of consumers, along the entirety of the chain, is 
instrumental in designing projects that succeed at successfully connecting communities 
to market. This is not to say that local initiatives, particularly those aimed at organizing 
production and ensuring the fairness of trade relations and redressing local inequalities, 
are not equally important, but that they are moot without the actual presence of a 
thriving chain to drive demand. The inequities across scales can be much larger than 
those we see locally. Despite the obvious difficulties and costs of looking at the whole 
picture, there is much to be gained from broadening the analytical lens to better target 
policies and program design. 
 
Therefore, a new mind-set must emerge for envisaging the future development of the 
region, something that is not ‘fines and fences’ conservation, nor the monoculture 
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model. This requires a mentality shift, a cultural re-thinking, to enable a policy 
redirection. A recent review published in Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America (Nobre et al., 2016) calls for the establishment 
of a new paradigm, accompanied by a new policy framework that enables the public-
private partnerships that would allow market-friendly innovations and research while 
sustaining and valuing local communities, their activities and knowledges. A new way of 
developing and sustaining pro-conservation and development value chains must take 
the place of current exploitative activities that allow little value capture and retention, 
one that could truly propel the region economically and socially without the magnitude of 
negative environmental impacts currently experienced. A new wave of technology-
intensive, environmentally and socially conscious companies would emerge, to create a 
new economic dynamic for the region that would retain more value, while preserving 
biodiversity. In this scenario, NTFP projects that truly include all actors, specifically 
communities, but also make the best possible use of globalization and value chain 
knowledge, as well as base themselves on an adequate grasp of value formation in 
consumer masks, could in fact catapult regional development. 
 
At present, however, local and federal authorities seem intent on doing things ‘the old 
way’. The ‘Ecoparque’, an industrial zone destined for this type of enterprise in Belém, 
is practically a ghost-town, only occupied by the natural cosmetics giant Natura. No real 
fiscal incentives or policies have been set in place to encourage such new corporate 
entities from establishing themselves there. Federal ministries do not work together to 
strategize solutions for income generation in forests. Though NTFPs matter to the 
Environment Ministry in Brazil, other crucial entities and ministries are not involved, 
because trade volumes are low. Still, as pressure grows on developing countries to halt 
deforestation, and achieve sustainable development goals, there is potential for new 
policy solutions to come to fruition under financing structures such as the Amazon Fund. 
33 
Investing in the Amazon does not need to mean investing in the Amazon, 
geographically, only. Value chains and value formation are diffuse. Many billions have 
been poured into local projects, building cooperatives and buying machines for 
processing, but without obvious, traceable, positive impact. The impact a fascinating 
feature film depicting the life of today’s Amazonians could have significant impact on 
World demand for the region’s products. There is a need to move from the mechanistic 
notion of investment and development, and engage with how value formation occurs in 
today’s immaterial economy. Certainly all pieces need to be in place, a newfound 
demand must be met by organized supply, but these things need to be contemplated 
together, in a much bolder strategy. 
																																																						
33	http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/pt/home/	
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To implement these solutions, entrepreneurs must be involved, and allowed to 
spearhead new trading options. It is their brokerage and business agility that truly 
heralds change. The fear that they will somehow oppress weaker actors in the chain 
cannot be allowed to be an obstacle to the implementation of novel, targeted policy 
solutions. In several cases, even the often-maligned multinational corporations have 
been found to play a dynamic role in organizing local forces to participate productively in 
value chains (Chelekis and Mudambi, 2010). In the açaí chain, the Coca Cola Company 
has fronted the creation of a remarkable project to include communities and improve 
livelihoods to trade açaí as sustainably as possible. They also have no intention of 
trading with monoculture sources. As te Velde et al., (2006) concluded in their 
comprehensive study, the often-captive governance of many NTFP value chains does 
not necessarily mean that entrepreneurs will abuse communities. On the contrary, these 
risk-takers not only are crucial scale-crossing brokers that enable market links to form, 
they are also in many ways the organizers of these new trade configurations. If we take 
the example of Sambazon, for example, they took a tremendous risk, setting up an 
entirely new business in the US, for an unknown product, creating demand, but also set 
up a factory in a State where there had previously been no açaí business, created a 
new hub of trade, built a factory, included new communities, and set up their own chain 
of custody controls  (although with mixed results) to ensure the sustainability of their 
product. The individual drive of entrepreneurs is thus a key ingredient in stimulating the 
arrival of new products on the market, and these actors must be nurtured and supported 
for sustainable forest enterprises that are truly market-savvy, as well as sustainable, 
take hold and catapult the development of the Brazilian Amazon into a sustainable, 
vibrant and prosperous business hub. Start-up acceleration must be a public priority, 
and the support of institutions, such as the government financing agencies, the export 
agencies, as well as the sectoral chambers and research facilities, must be available to 
them for new ideas to come to fruition. 
 
This market-based vision must be integrated in the policy instruments that shape the 
governance of the Amazon. In Brazil, for example, designated extractivist reserves must 
receive a ‘Plano de Manejo’, or management plan, to achieve the legal status of RESEX 
(an ‘extractive reserve’ for Ribeirinhos). These long, comprehensive documents contain 
a description of the social, geographical and economic profile of each territory, including 
the NTFP extraction profile, challenges and opportunities. However, all information 
regarding extractivism is based on local issues, and while topics such as logistics and 
markets may be mentioned, they are seldom explored. These documents, though 
informative, do not really help communities move forward in generating sustainable, 
year-round income from their activities, because they do not discuss market integration, 
and demand, in depth. Unless local markets are sufficiently abundant or trade pathways 
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and demand are large enough, for products that are well known, there is no plan. There 
is some indication of what activities can be established, or already are, but to 
understand how these come together to sustain communities, through what market ties 
is difficult. Once again, the localizing myopia is significant. Yet these products need to 
find their way into consumer markets as finished products somehow, and for that to 
happen consumers must desire them, and trade pathways must be established to get 
them there in the form of a product. 
 
Actors in Brazil must also understand that this is not only technological and commercial 
proposition, but very much a cultural one. Like their American counterparts, they must 
become dealers of identities and subjectivities. For a new product to be successfully 
introduced, a marketing campaign would have to be launched, in addition to the value-
chain orchestration and product development implicit in such an endeavor. There exists 
an entire industry dedicated to creating room for new products in markets, through 
research, branding strategies, packaging design and targeted advertising and 
promotions. Though this happened mostly by accident with açaí, corporations launch 
new products employing these strategies by the thousands each year. 
 
In addition to a whole-chain approach, policy makers must learn to move from a 
productionist vision of development, to a more contemporary vision which considers 
exchange value. In order for other Amazonian commodities to find successful market 
pathways, it is important that the açaí’s myth be expanded to include its origins as an 
Amazonian cultural heritage product. This does not mean producing videos on 
Ribeirinho communities in documentary style. Such as can be found, for example, on 
YouTube, many of which were produced by the companies that market açaí, such as 
Frooty. Consumers have very little interest in these stories, and do not really connect 
them to their purchase decisions. The ample research conducted by the leading açaí 
brand in Brazil confirms this understanding. Actual documentary style information holds 
little meaning or interest to consumers, and certainly does not influence their purchasing 
decisions much. This vision of the Amazon as an uninhabited, homogenous forest is not 
helpful here. For the World, the Amazon must be an absence of human culture, and the 
imagery produced continues to reinforce this idea.  
 
Yet there is a contemporary, vibrant, rich culture, with music, architecture, art, fashion 
trends, and cuisine that is relatively undiscovered. There is a nascent interest in the 
Amazon’s culinary culture, thanks in great part to the exposure achieved by top chefs 
such as Alex Atala, a Brazilian chef who runs the restaurant D.O.M. in São Paulo, who 
makes a point of working with Amazonian ingredients in his Michelin starred restaurant. 
Chef Thiago Castanho from Belém is also increasingly well known, and his book is a 
best seller (Castanho, 2013). The State of Pará has begun to work on a gastronomical 
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project to market its food culture. Policy pathways such as this will generate interest in 
consumers, by portraying the people of Pará and their food as valuable cultural 
products, and not charity cases.  
 
The fieldwork, the discussions, the visits to supermarkets and feedback from companies 
confirm that an aspirational myth is the key to securing a valuable place in markets for 
NTFP products. It is also in this way that new ingredients may find a compelling niche 
consumer market that is valuable, allowing the entire chain to operate year-round, and 
forming another source of income for all those involved. A myth that involves the origin 
of the product is important to the preservation of its traditional harvesting culture, but to 
find real acceptance, it must be one that is culturally proximate, and desirable, and not 
merely guilt-inducing. People are fascinated by ‘foodie’ programs and exotic cuisines, 
and these markets are tremendously profitable. There must be a space for Amazonian 
produce to fulfill this desire, if properly marketed. This is especially true of the US 
market, which could in many ways be more of an entryway than the Brazilian market 
itself. 
 
9.6 Theoretical considerations for Value Chain Scholarship 
 
For some time, GPN scholars have been calling for a program of study that integrates 
ideas of political economy and cultural economy into the actor-centric vision of chains 
within the wider value-chain literature, described in the present research. However, the 
GPN body of literature represents both context and intra-chain findings somewhat in 
parallel to each other, in a fashion that is descriptive and rich, but which can lack 
analytical precision. The further resolution of actor against structure debates is a crucial 
way forward for the development of GPN literature. Although the literature often 
references theories such as actor network theory, or structuration, as potential 
instruments to resolve these lacunae in reviews and programmatic papers, 
methodologies are not yet in place that can meaningfully integrate them into empirical 
research. 
 
In the present research, Hess' s work to identify and analyze embeddedness was 
adopted as context in its tripartite conceptualization as a guiding principle in this 
research, for questionnaire design and analysis (Hess 2004). Conditions that influence 
the chain over time were investigated, including chain formation, establishment into a 
set configuration, and how these conditions then reshape local social relations to create 
certain development outcomes. The approach was successful in that it enabled the 
formulation of valuable practical policy recommendations for development praxis, as 
described above. These processes overlap and combine themselves to form outcomes 
over time, but do not, however, lead to a convincing model that dictates these 
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interactions. The actual interplay amongst actors and social structure to form the chain, 
and reform those structures over time is clearly observable, but difficult to capture 
analytically. 
 
In a relatively new chain, such as the açaí chain, as Hudson (2004) points out, spacio-
temporality is a defining feature of networks, and so we can see how actors have, or 
have not, negotiated structures, and reconfigured them throughout the process of chain 
formation, and what strategies of value capture can and cannot be expected to 
succeed. For example, against a crushing territorial imperative, such as the geographic 
dispersion of açaí extraction throughout the Tocantins estuary, a web of perfectly 
coordinated traders emerged to give shape to the network and enable trade, reshaping 
structural isolation into commercial proximity. In another context, the lack of innovation 
of the business environment in Brazil constricts its entrepreneurs' ability to participate in 
the international portion of the chain. Though we are left with this empirical knowledge, 
it is not clearly articulated with the theoretical tools of GPNs. 
 
When is ‘embeddedness’ a condition to be negotiated by actors, and when is it an 
insurmountable structural barrier? How does this relation operate over time? These are 
not new questions. What emerges from the research is the need to clarify the meaning 
of ‘embeddedness’ as a tool to discuss structure and agency in GPN research. Mole 
and Mole (2010), for example, put forward an in-depth discussion on entrepreneurship 
as a negotiation between an actor and social structures, in a critique of the adoption of 
Gidden's (1984) structuration theory in favor of a critical realism perspective. This 
approach enables a critical analysis of how agency and structure interact over time  
(Mole and Mole, 2010). Such a detailed breakdown of how actors work individually and 
collectively to negotiate their environment, form chains and reshape structures would 
allow us to more precisely gauge what conditions and policies are crucial to the 
formation of certain chains, and with what outcomes. As these authors propose, we 
might first clarify what we mean by ‘structure’. What Hess's (2004, 2008) approach does 
is conflate fundamentally distinct viewpoints into a single concept made up of three 
aspects. It is proposed here that these should analyzed entirely separately. Territorial 
embeddedness is inherently tied to a certain place, a context that lies entirely outside of 
agents, against which they must position themselves. Meanwhile, societal 
embeddedness represents constraints that have been internalized by actors and which 
bind their behavior.  
 
Finally, network embeddedness is really not an issue of context, but relates to the 
characteristics of the chain, to the types of bonds that actors form, within and outside 
the chain based on their own characteristics as actors in interplay within and across 
territories. This is an important distinction to make. Much of the issues surrounding 
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territorial embeddedness have either material manifestations  (such as geographical 
isolation) or result from calcified institutional relations that relate to a place  (such as the 
business environment), or the relation between places  (Brazil's economic isolation). 
They are not entirely rigid, as some propose, but they are inherently different from the 
immaterial subjectivities that make up societal embeddedness, or the agile processual 
nature of network embeddedness. 
 
For example, in a propitious business environment  (contractual security, easy to open 
and close businesses) such as California, businesses organize themselves in diffuse 
networks, which encourages entrepreneurs in the food industry thatw are prone to risk-
taking to introduce new flavors and products. Meanwhile those same risk-prone 
businessmen will organize their own verticalized production unit for açaí in Pará, where 
the business environment is challenging and unsure, to secure their supply. There, 
despite having their own factory, they still rely on a web of coordinated middlemen to 
source açaí, who are apt at negotiating the physical and market uncertainties of the 
region. The territory is a condition that entrepreneurs adapt to, within and across scales, 
to form trade networks, based on their own positionality. Territory does not truly block 
entrepreneurship from taking place and networks from forming, it merely forces 
entrepreneurs, particularly those in key brokerage roles, to adapt, forming different 
chain configurations across scales. In theory, a Brazilian businessman could make use 
of the co-packer complex in California to enter that market with products, for example. 
The limitations of his own business environment do not preclude moving across the 
network. It is this internal mindset, formed from cultural attachments, that prevents 
action. What territories do constrain is a region's own ability to attract entrepreneurial 
activity and capture value. Perhaps this aspect of chains, and scale-by-scale analysis, 
has been overly developed because value-chain research is so often employed to assist 
in building policies to allow regions to increase regional development   The table below 
aims to reshuffle some key data from this research to build causal relations, rather than 
juxtapositions, between agency  (as constricted by societal embeddedness), region  
(territorial embeddedness) and chain  (network), and how they may or may not, 
iteratively, reconfigure existing social structures over time.  
 
It is the positionalities and subjectivities of actors will in fact enable them to work around 
territorial structures by forming network configurations. In turn, these new networks may 
or may not solidify into new institutional arrangements in and between territories. In the 
case study conducted in the present research, it is seen that the work of scale-crossing 
brokers in reconciling different territorial arrangements to make new chain connections 
is crucial to chain formation and for structures to be reconfigured. At the same time, 
efficient but closed circuits of bonds are crucial to chain solidification and 
institutionalization of relations. This is clear in the chain diagram in Chapter 4. When 
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scale-crossing brokers work to connect two or more poles of tight bonds, rather than 
simply make isolated connections, thick networks are built that can reform social 
structures over time. For example, Sambazon connects the Marreteiro networks of Pará 
with the co-packer networks of California, build a solid new chain, and many new 
configurations can form. It is the Black's brother unique agency, however imbued with 
America's entrepreneurial culture, which enabled these new solidified relations to take 
shape. In contrast, CAMTA, which works in isolation in Pará, does not reconfigure its 
surroundings in any meaningful way. These findings point to another form of studying 
value chains, based on how socially embedded actors  (now strictly within Granovetter's 
(1973) conception) negotiate territories and form bonds over time, and how these bonds 
reshape territories. The center of analysis here would be the agency within networks, 
and might draw more on network theory and other theoretical constructs and 
methodologies, than the more linear methodologies (‘follow the thing’) which still 
dominates GPN empirical research. 
 
Pickung up from Levy's critique, the present work also found several instances where 
highly subjective discourses skewed interpretation of the chain  (Levy, 2008). For 
example, actors across several stages of the chain find Ribeirinho participation 
inadequate, and, whether or not they are trying to save them or eliminate them, they 
decided to change them. For unreflexive development agencies, their labor is not 
valued per se, and must be corrected to merit more value capture. For proponents of 
monoculture conservation, they are unsuitable to participation and must be eradicated. 
The theoretical discussion around the cultural turn in value-chain studies is well 
illustrated by this situation  (Amin and Thrift, 2008). Ribeirinhos are the largest 
producers of açaí, and there remains a tremendous amount of unexploited potential for 
açaí production to grow under the current model, requiring only the improvement of 
logistics and the better distribution of trading centres. 
 
Marreteiros have been identified in this research as being extremely savvy 
businessmen, providing a variety of key services within the chain, amongst which 
logistics, insurance, quality control, regulating prices and ensuring the stability of supply 
to factories. Yet these actors are not respected as businessmen, out in the field, and are 
out of place in government meetings and other urban business settings. They are 
viewed as uncouth, ignorant, and a nuisance to the improvement of the chain, and tend 
to be excluded from discussions. To stake a right to a decent livelihood, they must at 
the very least be upgraded, capacitated, and ultimately, acculturated. Their present 
livelihood model, and cultural context, is of lower quality, and must be made to mirror 
those of other ‘more official’ actors. Certainly, many of them are unused to the settings 
is which workshops and discussions take place, but they are no less valuable to the 
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chain than any other actors. In fact, they are the gatekeepers to the Amazon's many 
undiscovered secrets and untapped cultural value. 
 
It is the lens of outside actors' own prejudice that is at work here, and that precludes 
new, valuable chain formations from taking place. The research here should not be 
viewed as encouraging new cultural ‘wormholes’ to form new myths that value 
Ribeirinho products and reflect the cultural wealth and diversity of their livelihoods, but 
to exclude them from the chain. Meanwhile the CAMTA cooperative has succeeded in 
great part by copying their lifestyle, with its complex agroforestry system, and managed 
to become a direct exporter of a variety of exotic fruits. It is their different viewpoint 
which enables them to see and negotiate the same territory in an entirely different way. 
 
These are not merely abstract, theoretical questions. Much care must be employed 
when policies are set in motion to ‘upgrade’ actors and to reconfigure chain formation. 
Top-down unreflexive intervention by biased actors can be unhelpful and disruptive. An 
overly depoliticized approach can easily lead to strategies for inclusion and 
empowerment that are in fact forms of oppression. Particularly when dealing with the 
rural poor, it is unwise to lose track of the socially constructed foundation of many 
inequalities. The idea that the poor would not be poor if they followed the linear 
progression towards prosperity that Western powers propose has already been 
demolished by development scholar such as Escobar (2011). It is not the mere building 
of warehouses and processing plants that will reshape the value of their labor. Without a 
heightened level of self-awareness, development agencies and policy makers can end 
up doing more harm than good. 
 
In this context, the present discussion around myth formation and the subjectivities of 
value, makes important contributions to the refinement of GPN theory. It is through myth 
making that most value is changed in our contemporary economy. This, in global value 
chains, remains tightly in the hands of developed countries: the design and branding, 
the advertising. Meanwhile, the periphery continues to supply raw goods, and even 
processed goods, but none of the myths. In this way, the colonial system of trade 
somehow persists, with the periphery locked out of cultural creation  (much as World 
Systems Theorists argue). Developed countries have long understood that it is through 
their cultural significance that they conquer markets and space. How much money does 
France pour into its cultural industries, its obtuse films and impossible couture, to make 
sure the whole world will buy all the perfume, wine and cheese that they can produce, 
with tremendous added value? They are aware that soft power is the way to retain 
control over the global geopolitical space. Meanwhile Brazil sells unbranded containers 
of commodities. This historic inability of the Brazilian economy, to move from an 
exploitation economy that sells commodities at price into the value creating power that 
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its tremendous culture certainly entitles it to be, is the bane of the açaí berry trade, as 
much as it is of its many other commodity chains. 
 
When development actors seek to redress these inequalities, they do not respond by 
strengthening the soft power of developing countries. Rather, they seek to expose 
corporations with raw images of poverty, to ‘break the fetish’. In this way, they 
instrumentalize poverty in the developing world to continue the debate based on their 
ideology and principles. They are trying to change their own societies, but are not 
necessarily helping others. The lower orders remain silent. If value is formed 
subjectively through myths, the developing world must be encouraged to form and 
propagate its own myths of aspiration. It must find ways to showcase the sophistication 
of its culture, its cuisine, its fashion, its film-making. 
 
The research community, and the developers and implementers of projects aimed at 
forest products must begin to look at new horizons when discussing the formation of 
markets for their products. There are many avenues available, and engaging with the 
communities of practice that dominate these immaterial activities is crucial. Though the 
semiotic sorcery is intangible, the impacts are very real. Practitioners must trust that 
investing in adequate branding and marketing is not superfluous, but crucial to project 
success. 
 
These findings provide a foundation to guide policy-making within the açaí chain itself, 
but can also come to inform the design and implementation of projects aimed at 
creating income for forest-dwelling populations through the establishment or 
development of trade relations, and trade-based development interventions in general. 
They also make a strong case for the application of holistic, full chain approaches to the 
study of such interventions. For NTFP interventions to truly become a vector of 
conservation and development, a new approach is urgently needed, one which looks at 
the interplay of agency and context throughout its entirety, and which incorporates the 
subjective formation of value as an instrument of development, rather than only as an 
ideological construct. 
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Table 9.1 -  Final analytical matrix 
Societal 
embeddedness 
– ACTORS 
Territorial 
embeddedness 
–TERRITORIES 
Network 
embeddedness 
– NETWORKS 
 
Impact on 
Territories 
Marreteiros have 
Ribeirinho origins, 
ability to work 
informally but also to 
negotiate with larger 
urban entities 
Several isolated 
communities, with 
large distances 
between them in the 
interior of Pará, 
Brazil 
Marreteiros collaborate 
to organize a web of 
actors that work in 
coordination to supply 
urban buyers 
Geographical 
isolation is undone: 
communities are 
no longer isolated 
Pará businessmen, 
unaccustomed to 
adding value and 
reaching markets, 
unappreciative of 
Ribeirinho 
economy 
Lack of support 
industries and credit, 
historical isolation from 
more developed areas 
of the State of Pará 
Form isolated, low 
value added industrial 
units who are passive 
in the chain  (in both 
directions) 
Despite their 
passivity, their 
presence in the 
chain builds a 
conduit for 
Ribeirinho products 
to the world, further 
eliminating their 
isolation – yet the 
region remains a 
place of low value, 
exploitative 
commodity 
production 
São Paulo 
businessmen ‘more 
professional’ and 
savvy, but not prone 
to marketing or myth 
creation 
Improved business 
environment in São 
Paulo, close to 
consumer markets, 
and with better support 
industries, but low 
contractual security 
makes tasking risks 
expensive 
Actively pursue supply 
or raw materials only 
through factories in 
Belém , form 
verticalized production 
units in the South and 
their own brands, but 
use a network of 
distributors to access 
retailers 
A conduit of trade 
from the North to 
the South, before 
nonexistent, is now 
in place, which 
could form the 
base for further 
trade – but 
because of actor 
mindsets remains 
limited 
São Paulo 
businessmen ‘more 
professional’ and 
savvy but not prone 
to marketing or myth 
creation 
Highly innovative 
business environment 
in California, with a 
high turnover of new 
products and heavy 
marketing 
São Paulo businesses 
disconnected from the 
chain in California 
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Californian 
businessmen, 
encouraged culturally 
to take risks, and 
culturally accustomed 
to myth formation 
Improved business 
environment in São 
Paulo, close to 
consumer markets, 
and with better support 
industries, but low 
contractual security 
makes tasking risks 
expensive 
Copy product myth in 
Brazil, but source their 
own product directly in 
Pará and take 
production to the US, 
leaving Southeast 
Brazil locked out of 
the international chain 
Structural isolation 
of Brazilian 
economy remains 
in place, despite 
the transposition of 
valuable product 
myth 
Californian 
businessmen, 
encouraged culturally 
to take risks, and 
culturally accustomed 
to myth formation 
Advanced, 
decentralized food 
industry in California, 
with production set out 
across co-packers, 
encourages company to 
focus on marketing and 
innovation 
California businessmen 
embed the açaí chain 
into the existing web of 
food production in the 
region, and focus on 
branding and marketing 
 
Direct trading 
bonds with Pará, 
with the potential to 
increase trade 
based on 
sustainability, local 
cultural identity and 
quality 
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